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Abstract 
 
 
I aim to understand whether apriority entails necessity, aposteriority entails 
contingency and conceivability entails possibility; that is, the relationship 
between, and the nature of, rationality and modality. The thesis is split into two 
parts: one on apriority and modality (chs. 2-4), and another on conceivability, 
apriority/aposteriority and modality (chs. 5 to 7). 
In Chapter 1, I discuss ‘two-dimensional modal semantics’, arguing that it is 
ill-equipped to provide a substantive account of rationality and modality, 
before setting out the basis of such an understanding. 
I begin the first part of the thesis (in Chapter 2) by outlining a preliminary 
account of the a priori: it is, strictly, not defeasible by empirical evidence; it 
involves a kind of necessity (‘rational necessity’); and it is (at least in its prima 
facie variant) fallible. 
In Chapter 3 I discuss the contingent a priori, arguing that genuine apriority 
entails necessity, before placing apriority qua ‘rational necessity’ (and ‘rational 
modality’ more widely) with respect to other kinds of modality (in Chapter 4). I 
conclude Part I of the thesis, by arguing that the a priori is not coextensive with, 
but is grounded in, metaphysical necessity. 
Part II of the thesis begins with a discussion of the necessary a posteriori 
(Chapter 5), where I argue that there are no genuine cases, thus aposteriority 
entails contingency and conceivability entails possibility. 
I then deal with Frege’s and Kripke’s puzzles (Chapter 6), which I claim (as 
with the necessary a posteriori) pose no genuine problem for conceivability-
possibility reasoning. 
Finally (in Chapter 7), I offer a deeper account of rational modality together 
with a tentative account of metaphysical modality (and essence). I then 
conclude that genuine apriority qua rational necessity entails metaphysical 
necessity; similarly, strictly, aposteriority (rational contingency) entails 
metaphysical contingency and, (in)conceivability (rational (im)possibility) 
entails metaphysical (im)possibility.  
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Chapter 1 
 
 
 
From Metaphysics to Semantics: 
Two-Dimensionalism, Rationality and Modality 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Philosophy, at least as traditionally conceived, is a deeply modal and broadly a 
priori discipline. Philosophers are interested in necessary and possible 1 
conclusions, and whether, for example, a priori or conceivability-based 
reasoning justifies these; whether apriority entails necessity and 
‘conceivability’ entails possibility.2 The empirical sciences (again, as trad-
itionally understood) are, as the ‘empirical’ suggests, largely a posteriori. 
Scientists are interested in contingent truths about the natural world and are 
generally less interested in whether, for example, aposteriority entails 
contingency. Broadly stated then, a simple, traditional demarcation of 
philosophy and science would have the latter exemplified by a posteriori 
investigation of contingent truths (or probabilities), with the former consisting 
of putatively a priori-necessary and conceivability-possibility forms of 
reasoning. 
After the seminal work of Kripke on the ‘contingent a priori’ and ‘necessary 
                                                         
1 I intend metaphysical modality here—but this is a topic of dispute throughout. I begin to 
clarify this issue towards the end of this section and throughout the remainder of the thesis. 
2 There is a lot of shorthand here, which I explain in more detail later. The scare quotes indicate 
the contentiousness of ‘conceivability’. I offer working understandings of modality shortly, and 
of apriority and conceivability in §3 below. 
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a posteriori’3 there appeared to be much to challenge such an understanding of 
philosophy, science, rationality and modality. Specifically, the contingent a 
priori (if genuine) invalidates any entailment from apriority to necessity. 
Similarly, the necessary a posteriori (if genuine) undermines (for example) 
philosophy’s position as the main provider of necessary or essentialist 
conclusions, since if a posteriori justification can result in necessary 
conclusions, empirical science (perhaps alone) can establish essentialist 
results; i.e. scientific essentialism. Moreover, the necessary a posteriori would 
also appear to further challenge the methodology of traditional philosophy, viz 
the conceivability-possibility form of reasoning; if p is necessary and a 
posteriori, ¬p is impossible but, apparently, ‘a priori possible’ or ‘conceivable’—
that is, ‘conceivability’ does not entail possibility. 
In short, whilst having significant ramifications for the status of both 
philosophy and science, apriority, conceivability (i.e. rationality) and modality 
are also independently interesting. In this thesis then, I want to understand the 
nature of the a priori and of conceivability; whether apriority entails necessity, 
aposteriority entails contingency and conceivability entails possibility—and so 
whether there are contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori propositions.4 
Most importantly perhaps, given that most of these are deeply modal issues, I 
want to understand the nature of modality itself. 
Now, modality is perhaps the deepest and most difficult of these topics—
and I only begin to offer a more complete account in the final chapter. I cover 
apriority and conceivability in a little more detail in §3 below but, given its 
importance, feel that some words must be spent on modality presently. 
Throughout the thesis, I assume the following general account of metaphysical 
modality. Beginning with the notion of necessity, p is ‘broadly logically’ or 
metaphysically necessary (p)5 iff p could not have been false—or, in the 
heuristic language of possible-worlds semantics, iff p is true in all possible 
worlds. So for example, 2 + 3 = 5, Hesperus is Phosphorus and Aristotle is a 
                                                         
3 Kripke 1971, 1972/1980. Cf. Putnam 1970, 1975. 
4 I realise the issue of propositions is vexed. I attempt to deal with this throughout the 
remainder of the thesis. 
5 The ‘broadly logical’ phrase is from Plantinga 1974, p. 2 and passim. I use the term 
‘metaphysical’ here so as to disambiguate this from other modalities, for example ‘strict’ or 
‘narrow’ logical (cf. Lowe 1998, ch. 1), and what I later call ‘rational’ modality—all of which I 
cover throughout the following. 
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person are (increasingly, potentially, controversial) examples of 
metaphysically necessary propositions.6, 7 
Possibility can then be defined in terms of necessity; p is possible (p) iff it 
is not necessarily the case that ¬p (¬¬p). So, it is possible that I went for 
coffee at 3pm, instead of continuing writing and (given its necessity) that 2 + 
3 = 5; it is not possible that ¬(2 + 3 = 5), and (perhaps controversially) that 
Hesperus is not Phosphorus and Aristotle is not a person. 
Similarly, contingency can be defined in terms of either of the previous two 
modalities; p is contingent iff p is possibly true and possibly false, or, 
equivalently, if p is not necessarily true and not necessarily false (p  ¬p or 
¬¬p  ¬p). So, a contingent proposition is one that is true, but not 
necessarily so; for example I did go for coffee at 3pm…, ‘Hesperus’ is co-
referential with ‘Phosphorus’ and Aristotle instantiates personhood. 
Now, there is one recent, broadly semantic framework, ‘two-dimensional 
modal semantics’ (2DS), whose adherents claim to explain many, if not all, of 
the foregoing issues. In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss the two-
dimensional account of rationality and modality; arguing that, in virtue of being 
a semantic framework, two-dimensionalism is ill-equipped to provide 
substantive answers to such metaphysical questions—since the general move 
from semantics to metaphysics is illegitimate (§2). I then set out the real issues 
and subject matter of the a priori, conceivability and modality (§3), before 
providing an outline of the remainder of the thesis (§4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
6 I use ‘’ and ‘’ to indicate complex propositions; i.e. to distinguish these from natural language 
sentences. 
7 The controversies concern issues such as the necessity of identity, identity statements 
involving names and the relationship between sentences, propositions and circumstances—all 
of which I discuss in what follows. 
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2 From Kripkean to two-dimensional semantics 
 
According to Kripke, statements or sentences8 such as 
 
(H) ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ 
 
and 
 
(S) ‘stick s is one metre long at t0’, 
 
are examples of the necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori, respectively. 
In very brief detail, (H) is (allegedly) necessarily true since the names 
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are rigid designators (designating the same object 
in all possible worlds where that object exists),9 identities between objects hold 
necessarily,10 so identity statements involving names are necessarily true. 
Moreover, Kripke claims that (H) is only knowable a posteriori since it is an 
empirical discovery that Hesperus and Phosphorus are identical; (H) is a 
necessary (or essentialist) a posteriori statement.11 
Similarly, (S) is (allegedly) contingently true but knowable a priori since 
although stick s might have been a different length at t0 (hence (S)’s 
contingency), someone baptismally introducing ‘stick s’, ‘fixes the reference’ 
rather than ‘gives the meaning’ of ‘one metre’. Accordingly, he knows (S) a 
priori despite its being contingent; (S) is an example of the contingent a priori.12 
Two-dimensionalism13 is a relatively recent, semantic framework offered 
                                                         
8 See his discussion of sentences and propositions in 1980, pp. 20-1. Much hangs on this 
distinction, as shall become clear in later chapters. 
9 Kripke 1980, p.p. 48-9 and passim. There are many issues with the notion of rigid designation 
(e.g. the existence of the designated object, weak and strong designation), some of which I take 
up in later chapters. (I take up the issue of possible worlds in ch. 7.) 
10 Op. cit., pp. 97-105 and passim. There are many reasons to doubt the Barcan necessity of 
identity (xy (x = y   x = y)) or, at least, its application in the current argument. Lowe 1982 
is a clear example of potential doubt about the latter; cf. Chandler 1975. 
11 Kripke 1980, pp. 29, 100-4, 107-9, 140-3. As shall become apparent, there are many reasons 
to doubt that (essentialist) object identities are purely empirical discoveries—and so the 
necessary a posteriori in general (see ch. 5, §§3-4, below, in particular). 
12 Op. cit., p. 54-7. As with the necessary a posteriori, there are many reasons to doubt the 
existence of contingent a priori propositions (as I argue in ch. 3 below), not least of all, the 
possibility of priori and de re knowledge of contingent objects. 
13 As presented by Kaplan 1978, Stalnaker 1978, Evans 1979, Davies and Humberstone 1980 
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largely to account for rationality, modality and, specifically, the necessary a 
posteriori and contingent a priori. As indicated above, my position on 2DS is 
that in being a semantic framework, it is ill-suited to the task of accounting for 
the (epistemology and) metaphysics of the a priori, conceivability and, 
especially, modality. In support of this, I argue that if 2DS is to account for 
rationality and modality in any way that preserves strong links between 
apriority/conceivability and necessity/possibility, it must defuse the 
contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori. In addition to this, Soames 
(2005) identifies and provides detailed, semantic criticisms of several species of 
2DS. 14  In short, I concur with Soames that ‘benign’ and ‘weak’ two-
dimensionalism are not in the business of offering a deflationary response to 
Kripke; only ‘strong’—or what I shall call ‘epistemic’—2DS15 can be viewed as 
seriously attempting to defuse the Kripkean semantic programme. All of this 
being the case, I focus on epistemic 2DS but (i) given the existence of diverging 
frameworks (and sets of terminology), it is occasionally necessary to generalise, 
and (ii) given that rationality and modality (as opposed to two-
dimensionalism) are my main focus, I wish largely to avoid exegesis. Thus, in 
attempting to present a version of 2DS that neutralises the necessary a 
posteriori and contingent a priori, the account I describe should not be 
attributed solely to any two-dimensionalist. 
A reasonably standard, two-dimensional interpretation of Kripkean 
semantics is as follows. Propositions are functions from possible worlds to 
truth-values; thus (H) is necessarily true in virtue of expressing a necessary 
‘horizontal’ proposition16—i.e. one that is true in all possible worlds.17 In 
addition to the standard, counterfactual view of propositional content however, 
                                                                                                                                                              
and, more recently, by Jackson 1994, 1998, 2004 and Chalmers (especially 1996, 2006a, 
2006b). 
14 See Chalmers 2006a and especially Manuscript, for some responses to Soames, as well as the 
‘Introduction’ of (and papers in) Garcia-Carpintero and Macia 2006, for critical discussion. 
15 As offered by Chalmers and Jackson primarily—see references in the previous note. 
16 See especially Stalnaker 1978 here (and with terminological amendments, Kaplan 1978). 
Stalnaker’s ‘horizontal’ (proposition) is broadly equivalent to Kaplan’s ‘content’, Jackson’s 
(1998, 2004) ‘C- (or counterfactual) proposition’ and Chalmers’s (1996, 2006a) ‘secondary’ 
proposition. Although the latter usually talks in terms of intensions and extensions, that his 
claims carry over to propositions is evident from Chalmers 1996, p. 63, where he equates the 
secondary proposition with Kaplan’s content. 
17 As hinted already, I am suspicious of the possible-worlds understanding of modality. That 
said, two-dimensionalism is deeply embedded in this framework; hence it would be impossible 
to provide a faithful outline without mention of possible worlds.  
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two-dimensionalists (as the name suggests) add a second dimension of possible 
worlds ‘considered as actual’,18 such that (H)’s aposteriority is explained in 
terms of its expressing a contingent ‘diagonal’ proposition19—i.e. true in some 
but not all ‘worlds considered as actual’.20 Similarly, (S)’s status as contingent a 
priori is explained in virtue of its expressing a contingent horizontal and a 
necessary diagonal proposition. 
Now there is some divergence on the nature of the diagonal or primary 
domain. Sticking with strong, epistemic 2DS presently, a ‘world considered as 
actual’ indicates an ‘epistemically’ (or centred)21 possible world. The point 
being, even if (H) is metaphysically (or secondarily, or, following Evans 1979, 
‘superficially’) necessary, the (primary or Evansian, ‘deep’) epistemic 
possibility that ¬(H) (given, for example, a centred possible world where 
‘Hesperus’ designates Mars) suggests that, despite (H)’s apparent necessity, 
¬(H) is entirely conceivable (qua epistemically possible) and so possible in 
some wider sense. Similarly, in virtue of expressing a necessary primary 
proposition, (S) is a priori; so despite being (secondarily, ‘superficially’) 
metaphysically contingent, it is (‘deeply’, epistemically) necessary. 
What all of this suggests is that strong, epistemic two-dimensional 
semantics requires something like the following analyses in order to account 
for the necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori: 
 
(1) The ‘diagonal’, ‘primary’ domain captures epistemic modality 
(understood in terms of centred, or counteractual possible worlds—
i.e. as not distinct from standard, metaphysically possible worlds); in 
                                                         
18 Most clearly evident in Jackson 1998 and Chalmers 1996, p. 60; both heavily influenced by 
Kaplan’s (1989) discussion of ‘contexts of utterance’ and ‘circumstances of evaluation’. I explain 
‘worlds considered as actual’ both the following notes and main paragraph. 
19 The ‘diagonal’ is from Stalnaker 1978 and is broadly equivalent to Kaplan’s (1989) 
‘character’, Jackson’s (1998, 2004) ‘A- (or counteractual) proposition’ and Chalmers’s (1996, 
2006a) ‘primary’ proposition.  
20 In short (but contentiously) two-dimensionalists posit two dimensions of propositional 
content, ranging over one set of possible worlds—but, importantly, worlds considered as 
counterfactual (i.e. Kripkean, ‘metaphysical’ modality) and as counteractual (i.e. ‘epistemic’ 
modality; conceivability, aposteriority and apriority). 
In addition to this, the idea that the counteractual domain is primary and the metaphysical 
is secondary, is very much related to Evans’s (1979; cf. Davies and Humberstone 1980) 
discussion of apriority as ‘deep’ necessity and (metaphysical) contingency as ‘superficial’. 
21 I.e. consisting of a world and agent and a time (for example). See Chalmers 1996, pp. 60-4 and 
2006a, pp. 81-3, for more detail. 
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particular, 
(1a) apriority is epistemic (primary) necessity; and 
(1b) conceivability is epistemic (primary) possibility. 
(2) The ‘horizontal’, ‘secondary’ domain captures metaphysical modality 
(again understood in terms of—counterfactual—possible worlds); 
so, 
(2a) metaphysical necessity is secondary necessity; and 
(2b) metaphysical contingency is secondary contingency. 
(3) There is one space of possible worlds; logical possibility consists in 
metaphysical and/or epistemic modalities.22 
Thus, 
(4) apriority entails necessity; 
(5) aposteriority entails contingency; and 
(6) conceivability entails possibility. 
Therefore,  
(7) there can be no necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori 
propositions. 
 
As suggested already, my short way with two-dimensionalism is that it tries 
to draw deep epistemic and metaphysical conclusions from a purely semantic 
framework; so I reject all of (1) to (7) above (at least in their two-dimensional 
guises). That said, before discussing epistemic 2DS in any more detail, let it be 
noted that there is strong disagreement within two-dimensionalism on 
whether the ‘diagonal’ is best understood in terms of epistemic modality—and 
so, whether there are such strong links between apriority/conceivability and 
necessity/possibility.23 Thus the relevant questions are; ‘can epistemic 2DS 
                                                         
22 The details of this point are very important, as shall become apparent below. 
23 Stalnaker’s ‘meta-semantic’ two-dimensionalism (1997, 2004) has it that meaning can vary in 
the diagonal dimension. His main example comes from mathematics. Consider an utterance of 
‘7 + 5 = 12’ (m), where the speaker is uncertain whether the intended meaning is the usual 
base-10 meaning or one that uses base-8 notation. Propositions such as m are usually 
considered paradigm expressions of necessary a priori truths. However, allowing the meta-
semantics to vary in the way described, m would have a necessary horizontal and contingent 
diagonal; i.e. apriority does not entail diagonal necessity and diagonal contingency does not 
entail aposteriority. 
Davies (2004) argues that names have their extensions essentially and are, consequently, 
‘deeply rigid’ designators. Assuming the (meta-) semantics so fixed, meaning cannot vary on the 
diagonal, so an apparently necessary a posteriori utterance such as ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ 
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show that we ought to view the diagonal as epistemic modality?’, and ‘should 
‘logical’ possibility be understood in terms of metaphysical and epistemic 
modalities?’ I now consider the ‘strongest’ version of epistemic 2DS, which, as 
noted above, must answer these questions in the affirmative, in order to 
provide the required account of rationality and modality. 
In ‘The foundations of two-dimensional semantics’, Chalmers argues that 
epistemic 2DS is the only account that vindicates the ‘core thesis’ of two-
dimensionalism: 
 
(Core) “For any sentence S, S is a priori iff S has a necessary [primary 
proposition].”24 
 
Accordingly, if (Core) “…is true, it restores a golden triangle of connections 
between meaning, reason and possibility…”, promising “…a view of modality on 
which there are deep links between the rational and modal domains 
(potentially grounding a link between conceivability and possibility)”.25 Thus 
Chalmers sets out epistemic two-dimensionalism as follows: 
 
(T4) “A sentence token S is metaphysically necessary iff the secondary 
intension [i.e. proposition26] of S is true at all [possible] worlds. 
(T5) A sentence token S is a priori (epistemically necessary) iff the 
primary intension is true at all scenarios [i.e. centred/epistemically 
possible worlds27]”.28 
 
Fairly clear consequences of these are as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                              
would be both horizontally and diagonally necessary; i.e. diagonal necessity does not entail 
apriority and aposteriority does not entail diagonal contingency. (I go into greater detail on all 
of this in Winstanley 2007.) 
24 Chalmers 2006a, p. 64. Chalmers uses the phrase “1-intension”; 1 more or less abbreviates 
primary; I explain the substitution of ‘propositions’ for ‘intensions’ (given  the two-dimensional 
interpretation of Kripkean semantics, where ‘proposition’ replaces ‘intension’) in n. 16 above. 
25 Ibid. and following. 
26 See n. 24 above. 
27 Chalmers (2006a, pp. 81-3) quite clearly equates ‘scenarios’ and ‘centred’/‘epistemically 
possible worlds’, arguing that just as possible worlds explain metaphysical modality, so are 
scenarios and epistemic modality related. 
28 Chalmers 2006b, pp. 585-6. The details of (T1) to (T3) broadly repeat points made in my 
exposition of general 2DS above. 
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(T6) “A sentence token S is necessary a posteriori iff the secondary 
intension of S is true at all worlds but the primary intension of S is 
[true at, at least one and] false at some scenario. 
(T7) A sentence token S is contingent a priori iff the primary intension of 
S is true at all scenarios but the secondary intension of S is [true at, 
at least one and] false at some world”.29 
 
All of this is a clear endorsement of theses (1) and (2) above. In order to derive 
(4) to (7) however, epistemic 2DS requires thesis (3); i.e. that there is only one 
space of possible worlds—‘logical’ modality consists in some combination of 
primary and secondary modalities. This point is quite vital; in order to show 
clear entailments between rationality and (real) modality (i.e. to have any real 
explanatory force), 2DS requires thesis (3). The point being, if there are 
separate spaces of metaphysical and epistemic possible worlds, then no amount 
of ‘conceivability’ (qua primary, epistemic possibility) will demonstrate (real, 
metaphysical) possibility (and mutatis mutandis ‘apriority’-necessity). This 
being the case however, my central concern is that if rationality and modality 
are so construed (viz as relating to a single space of possible worlds, considered 
as counterfactual and counteractual, respectively), ‘real’, metaphysical modality 
is reduced to the relevant, primary modality; namely the epistemic or 
conceptual. Thus, ‘real’ possibility would consist in conceivability qua epistemic 
or conceptual possibility; ‘real’ necessity would consist in apriority qua 
epistemic, conceptual or semantic necessity (analyticity). 
Now, as much as Chalmers is quite careful to distinguish his 2DS from the 
kind of position just described,30 other two-dimensionalists31 make precisely 
such an identification. For example, Jackson, following Lewis and Stalnaker, 
claims that propositions are sets of possible worlds,32 so if p is the necessary 
proposition, p must be a priori and analytic; there is no difference between 
                                                         
29 Op. cit., pp. 587-8. 
30 E.g. 2006b, pp. 595-6; but see 2002 for a strong defence of theses very close to (3) and 
following. For example, at 2002, pp. 194-5, Chalmers advocates ‘weak modal rationalism’, such 
that, primary conceivability entails primary possibility. He then goes on to suggest that if ‘pure 
modal rationalism’ (“[p]ositive conceivability  negative conceivability  possibility” (p. 194)) 
“is true, the epistemology of modality, at least when idealized, will be simple and beautiful” (p. 
195).  
31 Notably Stalnaker 1978 and especially Jackson 1998. 
32 Jackson 1998, p. 71; he cites approvingly Lewis 1986 (cf. 1968) and Stalnaker 1976. 
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analyticity, conceptual or logical necessity, on the one hand, and metaphysical 
necessity, on the other. 33  Accordingly, the necessary a posteriori (and 
presumably the contingent a priori) 
 
“…can be explained in terms of one unitary notion of a set of possible 
worlds. The phenomena do not call for a multiplication of senses of 
possibility and necessity, and in particular for a distinction among the 
possible worlds between the metaphysically possible ones and the 
epistemically possible ones.”34 
 
At this point, I could go into exegetical detail35 but, as I stress throughout, 
my main focus is rationality and modality per se and not the interpretation of 
2DS. This being the case, suffice to note the following key problems with this 
line of (attempted) explanation. As I hint throughout, the first problem with the 
claim that apriority/conceivability is epistemic (or conceptual) necessity/ 
possibility is that either this entails the relevant species of ‘real’ modality or it 
does not. If not, then 2DS looks explanatorily weak; conceivability-based and a 
priori reasoning flounder short of real possibility and necessity. If on the other 
hand it does, then the two-dimensional account of ‘real’ modality looks 
extremely close to conceptualism or, even, logical positivism. 
Second, when the above identification of propositions with sets of possible 
worlds is made (to avoid explanatory weakness), the problem of conceptualism 
comes into even sharper focus. If there are no necessary a posteriori (and 
contingent a priori) propositions in virtue of there being one necessary, a priori 
and so (allegedly) analytic proposition, two-dimensional modality is purely 
epistemic, conceptual or semantic; ‘metaphysical necessity’ is apriority qua 
epistemic, conceptual or semantic necessity, qua analyticity.36 
                                                         
33 Jackson 1998, pp. 68-70 (and following) is quite clear on this issue. He further clarifies at pp. 
84-6. 
34 Op. cit., p. 70. Strictly, Jackson doesn’t consider the contingent a priori but it is fairly clear that 
his interpretation of the necessary a posteriori carries over to the contingent a priori. Cf. pp. 74-
7. 
35 I do, with respect to Chalmers, in Winstanley 2007. 
36 The scare quotes suggest that real, metaphysical modality cannot be understood in terms of 
the conceptual or the epistemic. On the contrary, as I urge in later chapters, the conceptual (or 
better, the rational) should be understood in terms of the metaphysical.  
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Finally then, as I have been suggesting, the central problem (and the cause 
of the first two) is that an entirely semantic framework cannot generate the 
required substantive, metaphysical (and epistemic) conclusions. In being a 
semantic framework, the purported analyses are entirely semantic; ‘epistemic’ 
qua conceptual/semantic modality entails ‘metaphysical’ qua conceptual/ 
semantic modality. Attempting to understand propositional content in terms of 
‘secondary’, metaphysically possible worlds, results in the ‘single, necessary 
proposition’ analysis. Real, metaphysical modality however, does not consist in 
‘horizontal’ or ‘superficial’ modality; it is grounded in the natures or essences of 
all (metaphysical) things. Analysing the rational (apriority, aposteriority and 
conceivability) in terms of ‘epistemic propositions’, which then require sets of 
‘centred’, ‘epistemically possible worlds’, is perhaps even worse—in leading to 
an epistemic/conceptual account of modality itself. As I shall argue in what 
follows, real apriority, aposteriority and conceivability have little to do with 
mere, epistemic/conceptual or ‘diagonal’, ‘primary’ modality; they are 
grounded in ‘rational modality’, which, arguably, is itself further grounded in 
the metaphysical.37 Moreover, insisting that there is one set of worlds and 
suggesting that the epistemic is ‘primary’, ought to be viewed as the central 
semantic to metaphysical error of two-dimensionalism. A semantic analysis of 
conceivability as epistemic/conceptual possibility and apriority as epistemic/ 
conceptual necessity, leads to the ready conclusion that all necessity is 
epistemic, conceptual or semantic. But perhaps we should not be surprised by 
this, given the general idea; semantics in—semantics out.38,39 
In summary, rationality and modality are (epistemological and) 
metaphysical matters, and 2DS is a semantic framework. The key problem, as I 
have been hinting all along, is that two-dimensionalists are trying to draw 
epistemic and metaphysical conclusions from purely semantic premises. This 
pattern of reasoning is illegitimate. Recalling Salmon’s criticisms of Kripkean 
                                                         
37 I begin to explain this set of claims in the following (section and) chapters—although, as this 
is a central (and complex) set of claims, it is only fully explained later in the thesis; ‘rational 
modality’ is used to explain conceivability (‘rational possibility’ in Part II below) and apriority 
(‘rational necessity’—Part I). 
38 I very much echo Lowe (2007a, p. 31) here—and in the general theme that you cannot get 
substantive, metaphysical conclusions from semantic premises. 
39 Much of which is exemplified in Chalmers’s various discussions of two-dimensionalism, 
zombies, conceivability and possibility—as I argue in Winstanley 2007 (influenced to some 
extent by Yablo 1999). 
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essentialism,40 this is akin to pulling a metaphysical rabbit from a two-
dimensional hat, which has in turn materialised from semantic thin air. In order 
to draw such metaphysical conclusions we need to understand conceivability, 
apriority and real modality, not two-dimensional reconstructions thereof. 
 
 
3 The real issues 
 
So far, I have been discussing deeply modal issues—epistemic two-
dimensionalists (and their critics) assume that apriority, aposteriority and 
conceivability (in addition to metaphysical modality), should be given broadly 
modal explanations; epistemic necessity, possibility and contingency, 
respectively.41 Following two-dimensionalists to some extent, but disagreeing 
strongly on the details and methodology, I do view the rational (as opposed to 
the ‘epistemic’) as deeply embedded in the (real, metaphysical) modal; as I 
hope to explain, conceivability is something akin to a priori or ‘rational 
possibility’;42 apriority itself is ‘rational necessity’.43 This being the case, before 
introducing the remainder of the thesis, I ought to say a little more about 
(metaphysical) modality and apriority/conceivability understood in terms of 
‘rational modality’. 
As suggested already, the nature of (metaphysical) modality is a deep and 
vexed issue. I present the beginnings of a working understanding above but, 
given its centrality, I discuss modality throughout the thesis, only beginning to 
reach conclusions in Chapter 7. The history of philosophy is rife with 
discussions of (logical and other) necessity and possibility; Aristotle, Aquinas 
and Leibniz being key exemplars. More recent work (influenced by Leibniz) has 
focussed on ‘possible worlds’, modal logic and their semantics,44 but as 
                                                         
40 Salmon 1981. 
41 Although critical of 2DS, Soames (2005) assumes throughout that conceivability is epistemic 
possibility and apriority is epistemic necessity (see especially, pp. 82-3, 198 and 204-6). 
42 See chs. (3 and) 5-7 below, for more detail. 
43 As I argue (especially) in chs. 2-4 and 7. 
44 See Lewis 1968, 1986; Plantinga 1974; Adams 1974; Stalnaker 1976 for early possible-
worlds theories. See Loux’s (1979) classic collection for an overview of many of the central 
issues. Kripke himself was one of the main developers of modal logic, suggesting a possible-
worlds understanding throughout his 1980. See Chellas 1980 and Garson 2008 for an 
overview—and the latter for further references. 
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indicated already, I view possible worlds in particular as more heuristic than 
deeply ontological—and I suggest further in Chapter 7 that, since the main 
positive arguments are logico-semantic, the possible-worlds framework is 
another example of the (invalid) semantics to metaphysics form of reasoning. 
All of this being the case, any kind of literature review would be otiose at this 
point. 
Similarly with apriority (and aposteriority), the nature of the phenomenon 
is complex and vexed. Although Kant offers perhaps the classic discussion of the 
a priori as knowledge that is independent of experience, prior discussions of 
clearly related topics are too numerous to cite; e.g. from Plato’s Meno to Hume’s 
Treatise. Taking a lead from the positivist rejection of Kant’s ‘synthetic a priori’, 
more recent treatments have centred on analyticity, resulting in a broadly 
Quinean consensus that even if apriority is not an empty category, it is fully 
explicable in terms of logical or conceptual necessity.45,46 Again then, any kind 
of literature review would be somewhat redundant here;47 I provide a detailed 
discussion of the a priori in Chapters 2 to 4 below, with references throughout. 
Turning to conceivability, thought on this and clearly related issues, such as 
imagination and intuition, as well as thought experimentation, is as evident as 
discussions of apriority and modality.48 More recently there has been greater 
discussion of conceivability—especially as related to possibility.49 As before, a 
                                                         
45 Two-dimensionalists (and their critics) are no exception here. Jackson 1998, for example, 
couches his entire discussion in terms of epistemic/conceptual necessity qua analyticity (see 
especially, pp. 50-5 and 84-6). Similarly, Soames’s (2005, pp. 333-7) final examples of the 
contingent a priori are deeply semantic, involving as they do an ‘actually’ operator in 
conjunction with a broadly Kripkean semantics. 
46 See Quine 1951 (and Devitt 2005) for the emptiness claim. 
47 But I must cite BonJour’s 1998 as a generally excellent discussion; cf. several papers in 
Boghossian and Peacocke 2000. See Russell 2008 for many further references. 
48 E.g. (conceivability and especially imagination) from Descartes, Berkeley, Hume and Kant, 
through to Sartre and the phenomenologists. For more recent work on imagination, see (works 
cited in) Gendler and Hawthorne, 2002, pp. 7-9 (n. 17). On intuition, see especially Bealer 1987, 
1996a, 1996b, 1999, 2002; Yablo 1993; DePaul and Ramsey 1998. On thought experiments, see 
Horrowitz and Massey 1991; Sorensen 1992. Much of the work on thought-experimentation, in 
being broadly empirical, goes beyond the scope of this thesis—I am interested in ‘philosophical 
conceivability’ inasmuch as this is related to possibility. 
49 See in particular, Van Cleve 1983; Yablo 1993; Tidman 1994; Chalmers 2002; and Fiocco 
2007 (for an interesting discussion of conceivability and epistemic possibility—to which I am 
relatively sympathetic). See also the ‘Introduction’ of (and several papers in) Gendler and 
Hawthorne 2002, for an excellent overview of conceivability, possibility and several related 
issues—as well as references to many further, relevant works; cf. David Chalmers’s online 
bibliography of ‘zombies and conceivability arguments’ (http://consc.net/mindpapers/1.3b; cf. 
§§1.3c-g of the same). 
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detailed review this literature would be somewhat superfluous (given the 
discussion in ensuing chapters); that said, some consideration of Van Cleve’s 
and Yablo’s work50 would be apposite, in order to frame the remaining 
discussion. 
In brief detail, Van Cleve’s discussion (much like Yablo’s) begins with some 
taxonomic analysis of the meaning of ‘conceivable’.51 That said, he does identify 
a notion of “strong conceivability” as seeing that a proposition is possible, 
contrasting this with p’s being “weakly conceivable”, when “s does not see that 
p is impossible”.52 Although some distinction between strong and weak 
conceivability is useful (but, I claim, better explained in terms of prima and 
secunda facie conceivability53), in couching his analysis in terms of intellectual 
seeing, Van Cleve is in danger of (i) accusations of obscurantism (as are often 
levelled against ‘faculty of intuition’-based accounts of the a priori)54 from more 
empiricist critics and (ii) offering a deeply psychologistic account. For the latter 
reason in particular, I reject Van Cleve’s approach—as well as sections of 
Yablo’s analysis that make similar moves.55 
Turning briefly to the details of Yablo’s account, as I note above, whilst it is 
quite comprehensive, it is nonetheless deeply linguistic; many of the 
considerations Yablo offers consist in ‘common use’ analyses of 
‘conceivability’.56 After many pages of such enquiries, Yablo alights on the 
decidedly psychologistic: “…p is conceivable for me if (CON) I can imagine a 
world that I take to verify p”.57 Given my remarks on the possible-worlds 
analysis of modality and on epistemic possibility, which (despite Yablo’s 
                                                         
50 I set aside Tidman 1994, as there is no clear, positive account of conceivability (see pp. 307-8 
for the beginnings). I discuss Chalmers with respect to two-dimensionalism, above. 
51 Van Cleve, 1983, p. 36 and Yablo 1993, passim; cf. Tidman 1994, passim. Yablo provides an 
interesting discussion of Goldbach’s conjecture (pp. 8-9) and criticism of the ‘epistemic 
possibility’ approach (pp. 9-11, 22-5). 
52 1983, p. 37; cf. Chalmers’s discussion of positive and negative conceivability (2002, pp. 149-
56). 
53 See chs. 2 and 5-7 for discussion of this distinction with respect to apriority and 
conceivability respectively. My distinction is related to (but significantly different from) 
Chalmers’s discussion at 2002, pp. 147-9. 
54 See ch. 2, §3 for more discussion. 
55 E.g. Yablo 1993, pp. 29ff. Van Cleve does offer an excellent discussion of the Descartes-
Arnauld exchange on ‘distinct perception’ (pp. 38-41; cf. Yablo 1993, pp. 15-21). Geirrson 2005 
also offers an overly epistemic account of conceivability. 
56 Evident throughout the ‘negative discussion’ (Yablo, 1993, pp. 7-25) and especially in the 
‘positive discussion’ (pp. 26-30). 
57 Op. cit., p. 29. 
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remarks to the contrary)58 appears extremely close to ‘imagining a world’, it is 
fairly clear that I take this analysis to fail. As with the two-dimensional account 
criticised already, if conceivability is purely epistemic, it is difficult to see how 
this has any real bearing on metaphysical possibility; if p is impossible, I fail to 
see how my imagining a world such that ‘p’ has any real bearing as to p’s 
possibility. 
As should be clear from the foregoing, I take current, standard accounts of 
apriority, aposteriority and conceivability to be very much cashed out in terms 
of epistemic modality (e.g. conceivability is epistemic possibility, apriority is 
epistemic necessity and so on). In the remainder of this thesis, going beyond 
this a little, I shall argue that such explanations are ultimately best understood 
in terms either of the positivistic conceptualism just levelled against two-
dimensionalism, or of a more subjective notion along the lines of 
‘conceivability-for-me’ or ‘apriority-for-all-I-know’. In short, ‘conceivability’ is 
something like epistemic possibility qua ‘imaginability’ (viz of qualitatively, or 
epistemically identical situations) and apriority is epistemic necessity qua 
‘unimaginability of falsehood’; that is, deeply qualitative, subjective and, 
ultimately, (epistemic) possible worlds-based forms of reasoning. The point 
being, where something is deemed epistemically necessary/possible and so ‘a 
priori’/‘conceivable’, this is only in the weakest, subjective epistemic sense; 
apriority/conceivability ‘for-me’ or ‘for all I know’.  As I suggest above, whilst 
such versions of ‘apriority’ and ‘conceivability’ might be excellent guides to 
‘epistemic modality’, they are not good guides to any genuine or real kind of 
metaphysical modality. This being the case, I shall argue that apriority and 
conceivability should best be understood in terms of a more deeply 
‘metaphysical’, ‘modal’ modality, which sits between the logical, epistemic and 
the metaphysical; ‘rational modality’. I aim to explain conceivability in terms of 
‘rational possibility’ and apriority in terms of ‘rational necessity’ (as well as 
aposteriority in terms of ‘rational contingency’); in short, I shall argue that p is 
conceivable iff p is rationally possible, p is a priori iff p is rationally necessary 
and p is a posteriori iff p is rationally contingent. All of this being the case, 
before outlining the remainder of the thesis, I ought to say a few words about 
                                                         
58 1983, pp. 22-5. 
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rational modality in general (and rational possibility, contingency and necessity 
in particular). 
As I suggest above then, following two-dimensionalism somewhat, I do take 
the rational (i.e. apriority, aposteriority and conceivability) to be a somewhat 
mixed epistemic-modal category. That is, apriority, for example, is best 
understood in terms of some kind of deeper, wider necessity (and I focus on 
apriority/rational necessity here for ease of expression—my remarks 
extending to aposteriority/rational contingency and conceivability/rational 
possibility mutatis mutandis), which sits between the epistemic and the 
metaphysical. Going into slightly more detail, in Chapter 4 below (in particular), 
I offer a negative account of rational necessity, discussing kinds of necessity 
such as the epistemic, logical and metaphysical, suggesting that the rational 
cannot be coextensive with any of these. In particular, it cannot be fully 
epistemic as the latter is very subjective and, as the name suggests, epistemic; it 
is necessity-for-all-I-know (as I suggest above). Similarly it cannot be fully 
logical, as the logical requires the rational (and metaphysical) for its own 
explanation (as I outline in ch. 4, §3.2). Finally, it cannot simply be the 
metaphysical, given, for example, that there are many problematic cases of 
necessities that are not knowable a priori. Thus I conclude that rational 
necessity is a mixed, epistemic-metaphysical modality that must sit between 
the epistemic and metaphysical. Now this is all well and good, but I realise the 
need for a more positive account of rational necessity (and rational modality 
more widely).  
Going into more positive detail then, (again in Chapter 4) I begin to offer an 
account in terms of necessity in virtue of the natures of the relevant 
propositions, together with the rational assumptions of the relevant speakers 
or thinkers.  What I mean by this is as follows. Apriority qua rational necessity 
(and rational modality more widely) is what it is necessary (or possible or 
contingent for conceivability and aposteriority) to think, believe or know. In 
short what it is necessary (possible or contingent) to reason; p is a priori (or 
conceivable/a posteriori) iff p is rationally necessary (possible/contingent). 
Now clearly, and as intimated at the beginning of this paragraph, whilst this is a 
very ‘objective’ account of apriority, some degree of subjective variance must 
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also be built in. This being the case, whilst p might be more widely or genuinely 
a priori qua rationally necessary, I also discuss prima facie and secunda facie 
apriority in terms of what it is necessary to reason, given the epistemic position 
of a more or less idealised reasoner. So the first notion of apriority I describe 
above, qua genuine (or ideal) rational necessity, is, as I suggest, a deeply 
metaphysical, modal notion (somewhat idealised, as for what might be 
described as a perfect, ideal reasoner or similar), whereas the latter two 
qualifications (prima and secunda facie apriority) build in the required caveats 
for the account to be extended to less idealised examples of reasoning. 
To fill this out a little, what I mean by phrases such as ‘what it is 
necessary/possible/contingent to think or reason’ is as follows. Taking some 
examples I shall rely on throughout, if it is metaphysically necessary that ‘2 + 3 
= 5’, or that ‘Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus’, then strictly, the negations of 
such propositions are also metaphysically impossible and so, as I shall argue, 
strictly (i.e. genuinely, ideally) rationally impossible or inconceivable. That is, 
‘¬(2 + 3 = 5)’ or ‘Hesperus is not identical to Phosphorus’ (in the relevant sense) 
are metaphysically impossible and so rationally impossible or inconceivable; it 
is just not possible for a reasoner (genuinely) to rationally assert such 
propositions. The key point being, if two things are identical (or perhaps better, 
if one thing is self-identical) it is just not possible to imagine ‘their’ non-
identity, or better, its non-self-identity. Now as I say, this is somewhat (but not 
entirely) idealised. Of course, an idealised reasoner would (and could) not 
entertain such possibilities but a less ideal thinker might entertain related 
possibilities (perhaps what Kripke might call qualitatively identical epistemic 
counterparts) in the region of the alleged metaphysical impossibility (given, for 
example, a weak understanding of ‘2’ or ‘+’ or of, perhaps, the necessity of 
identity or the meaning of ‘Hesperus’) and this latter situation is captured by 
what I call prima facie conceivability qua rational possibility.  
In essence then, what I am saying is that for something to be genuinely 
described as a priori (or conceivable/a posteriori) it must be rationally 
necessary (or possible/contingent) and, ultimately, metaphysically so. If 
Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus (if they are one and the same, self-identical 
thing) imagining their non-identity is, as I shall argue, tantamount to asserting a 
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contradiction; asserting a logical, a priori, rational and metaphysical 
impossibility. This then is what I mean by the notion of ‘rational modality’ qua 
rational necessity, possibility and contingency; it is a broadly metaphysical 
modality in that there is an entailment relationship between a rationally 
necessary (possible or contingent) p and a metaphysically necessary (possible 
or contingent) p (even if the entailment in the other direction fails). That said, it 
is also a mixed, ‘epistemic-metaphysical’ modality as qualified for less idealised 
reasoners, for prima facie and secunda facie reasoning. 
Now, as should be clear, this kind of account has many interesting and 
potentially problematic implications, some of which I now highlight and deal 
with (at least for present purposes). First, as I stress throughout the above, my 
account of conceivability, apriority and aposteriority as rational possibility, 
necessity and contingency is admittedly, deeply metaphysical. Where p must be 
metaphysically necessary in order to be genuinely a priori justifiable, for 
example, this is akin to apriority as being a rational or metaphysical status 
judgement rather than as being some kind of ‘guide’, in the standard epistemic 
sense, to metaphysical necessity per se. Only in the weaker, prima and secunda 
facie variants can the rational be viewed as such an epistemic (i.e. as 
traditionally construed) guide to (metaphysical) necessity. 
Second then, and deeply related, is the very potential objection that such a 
construal of the rational cannot be any kind of relevant ‘guide’ to metaphysical 
modality. Against this, I make two points. First, rational modality is a ‘guide’ to 
the metaphysical in that, for example, and as I stress above, rational necessity 
entails metaphysical necessity; it is the best guide to metaphysical modality we 
might possess. Again however, as I stress above and shall argue below 
(especially Chapter 4), since there is no bi-conditional relationship here, 
although the rational entails the metaphysical modal, the two are not identical 
or co-extensive; hence the requirement to recognise rational modality as a 
separate kind of modality. 
My second subsidiary and final point, is that (as I already admit) the 
rational cannot genuinely be considered a ‘guide’ to the metaphysical in the 
standard, epistemic sense, since it is closer to being a fully metaphysical notion 
than a standardly epistemic one. This however is not the problem that critics 
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might think it is. The point being, standard conceivability, apriority and 
aposteriority as understood in terms of epistemic possibility, necessity and 
contingency, are themselves not at all very good guides to the metaphysical; if 
conceivability is to be understood qua conceivability-for-me, conceivability-for-
all-I-know, or in terms of sets of epistemically possible worlds, this can only be 
considered the weakest, most subjective guide to genuine, metaphysical 
possibility. In fact, as I shall argue, it is no good guide at all; conceivability qua 
epistemic possibility is only a guide to epistemic, conceptual or, perhaps (strict) 
logical possibility (as I argue in Chapter 4 in particular), and mutatis mutandis 
apriority qua epistemic necessity and metaphysical necessity. In short, 
epistemic modality is only a guide to epistemic, conceptual or (strict) logical 
modality; the rational needs to be partially metaphysical in order to entail or be 
any kind of genuine guide to the metaphysical. 
Finally then, before providing an outline of the thesis, I also note that I 
make much use of the phrase ‘is grounded in’ (and cognates) both in this 
introductory chapter and below. As with ‘rational modality’ some words of 
introduction are required. What I mean by such claims is as follows. If, as I 
suggest, apriority (for example) is best understood in terms of some kind of 
necessity, this implies that apriority entails (or at least implies) the relevant 
kind of necessity. Now, I claim, if apriority entails (some kind of) necessity, 
apriority ‘is’ (qua grounded in or, at the very least, qua involving) the relevant 
species of necessity; the latter is a necessary condition of apriority. This is the 
main thrust of such claims as that apriority/aposteriority/conceivability are 
grounded in necessity/contingency/possibility. Similarly (although I make less 
of this suggestion), where I claim that the rational is ultimately grounded in the 
metaphysical, what I should be taken to be saying is that apriority (and so on) 
entails, implies (or at the very least, strongly involves) metaphysical necessity 
(and so on). 
Now, I discuss involvement, grounding and the relevant modalities very 
much throughout the remainder of the thesis. The above remarks then, should 
only be viewed as introductory. This being the case, let me both conclude this 
chapter by offering an outline of the thesis. 
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4 Thesis outline 
 
In Chapter 2 (§§2 and 3) I consider the a priori as traditionally understood in 
terms of negative (e.g. independence from experience) and positive accounts 
(e.g. rational insight into necessary truth). Finding problems with both kinds of 
explanation, I nevertheless draw two lessons; (i) that an a priori proposition is 
one that is, strictly, not defeasible by empirical evidence, and relatedly, (ii) that 
some notion of necessity is involved in the claim that a proposition is a priori 
justifiable. I go into much more detail on (i) via a discussion of Euclidean 
geometry (§5) but before commencing the main discussion of apriority and 
modality, I also consider the a priori with respect to intersubjectivity (§4) and 
fallibility (§6). 
Turning to lesson (ii), if apriority somehow entails necessity and similarly 
for aposteriority and contingency, perhaps some form of coincidence thesis 
(CT) obtains. In Chapter 3 (§2) I use Goldbach’s conjecture (GC) and its 
‘contingent equivalent’ (CGC)59, to disambiguate (CT) into the following four, 
putative conditionals: 
 
(CT1) apriority entails necessity; 
(CT2) aposteriority entails contingency; 
(CT3) necessity entails apriority; 
(CT4) contingency entails aposteriority. 
 
I also claim that (GC) and (CGC) show that unqualified versions of (CT3) and 
(CT4) cannot hold, and that the rational and metaphysical domains cannot be 
coextensive; whilst all true propositions are either necessarily or contingently 
true, they are not all justifiable a priori or a posteriori. 
Of course, the main threat to any (attenuated) (CT) is the possibility of 
contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori propositions. This being the case, 
I spend some time on a detailed discussion of the contingent a priori (ch. 3, §3) 
and the necessary a posteriori (ch. 5). Beginning with (CT1) and the contingent 
                                                         
59 I do not state (CGC) as a separate conjecture as I am using the label generically, to indicate a 
putative, contingent thesis that is unknown or potentially unknowable. 
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a priori, I argue that genuine apriority does entail necessity; indeed a 
proposition can only be justifiable on an a priori basis if it is (or asserts) a 
necessary circumstance. Thus I argue that apparently ‘contingent a priori 
sentences’ express (at least) two propositions, but these are (generally) either 
‘widely’ contingent but justifiable on an a posteriori basis (if at all justifiable), or 
if justifiable a priori then ‘narrowly’, necessarily the case.60 
Finally concerning the a priori, and before taking up the issue of the 
necessary a posteriori, in Chapter 4 I place ‘rational necessity’ (and ‘rational 
modality’ more widely) with respect to other kinds of modality, arguing that it 
explains both negative and positive accounts—whilst avoiding allegations of 
obscurantism and mysteriousness that can be levelled against the latter (§2). I 
also claim that rational necessity is not the same as epistemic or logical 
necessities (§3), since epistemic necessity is entirely non-modal and subjective, 
whereas logical necessity is entirely formal and analytic, and, most importantly, 
requires apriority (or rational necessity) for its explanation. Rational necessity, 
on the other hand, is (at least) quasi-modal, intersubjective, non-trivial and it 
explains or grounds logical necessity. I conclude Part I of the thesis, by arguing 
that the a priori is not coextensive with, but is grounded in, metaphysical 
necessity (ch. 4, §4); if p is knowable on an a priori basis, there is a strong 
(metaphysical) sense in which p must be the case. 
Having discussed the a priori and modality, in Part II I set out to 
understand the relationships between rationality (conceivability, apriority) and 
modality, as well as to offer an account of modality itself. In Chapter 5 I discuss 
the necessary a posteriori as a potential counter-example to (CT2). In addition, 
as I suggest in §1 above, the necessary a posteriori, if genuine, would also 
appear to pose a serious problem to conceivability-possibility reasoning; since 
the negation of a necessary a posteriori p appears to be ‘conceivable’ but 
entirely impossible. With respect to the necessary a posteriori then, as with the 
contingent a priori, I argue that there are no genuine cases; apparently 
‘necessary a posteriori sentences’ in fact analyse out into (at least) two 
propositions, which assert either necessary circumstances justifiable on an a 
priori basis (if justifiable), or a posteriori justifiable but contingent 
                                                         
60 I explain ‘width’ and ‘narrowness’ both in the chapter under discussion and throughout chs. 
5-7. 
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circumstances. In this way, I claim that aposteriority does entail contingency, in 
that a proposition that is essentially justified on an a posteriori basis, must be a 
contingent proposition. Similarly, although there are apparent ‘necessary a 
posteriori’ sentences, (genuine) conceivability still entails possibility, since if p 
is impossible (Eminem is not Slim Shady, for example), strictly, this is also 
inconceivable or rationally impossible as well (the interim conclusion of ch. 5). 
During my discussion of the necessary a posteriori, I begin to suggest that a 
consideration of the semantics and pragmatics of belief ascription is required 
for a more complete understanding of conceivability and possibility. This being 
the case, I deal with Frege’s and Kripke’s puzzles, 61  conceivability and 
possibility in Chapter 6. With respect to the two puzzles, I argue that they rest 
on a confusion of ‘wide’ and ‘narrow’62 propositions asserted by a pair of 
original and apparently problematic sentences. For example, if a genuinely, 
rationally believes that ‘Paderewski is musical’, then a ought to conclude that ‘it 
is not the case that Paderewski is not musical’; a ought to realise that 
Paderewski’s being both musical and not musical is impossible. Importantly 
Kripke’s puzzle (and the related versions of Frege’s problem) trades on 
sentential ambiguities that mask such impossibilities; these are removed by a 
more complete, propositional, circumstantial and metaphysical understanding 
of the alleged problem cases. I conclude Chapters 5 and 6 by arguing that, 
strictly and as understood above, aposteriority entails contingency and 
conceivability entails possibility; there are extremely close ties between the 
rational and metaphysical, modal domains—even if the two are not 
coextensive. 
In the final chapter, having expressed a commitment to a heuristic account 
of ‘actuality’ and ‘possible worlds’ (throughout the thesis), I begin to outline an 
account of metaphysical modality itself (§2). It is basic but grounded in the 
natures or essences of all things; indeed it is a subspecies of essentialist 
necessity (as broadly suggested by Fine 1994). With this understanding in 
place, I further account for rational modality as metaphysical modality in virtue 
of human (or similar) rational capacities; what it is (rationally) necessary (for 
                                                         
61 See Kripke 1979 and Frege 1892 respectively. 
62 See n. 59 width and narrowness. 
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apriority) and possible (for conceivability) to think, respectively. After 
summarising my findings (§3), I then discuss potential objections and issues, 
such as accusations of two-dimensionalism and the possibility of modal error 
(§4)—the latter of which I explain largely in terms of the distinction between 
strict, philosophical conceivability (rational possibility) and weaker 
conceivability (more akin to epistemic possibility). 
  
 
 
 
PART I 
 
 
 
APRIORITY AND MODALITY 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
 
 
The A Priori: Preliminaries  
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The main concern of this thesis is the relationship between rationality and 
metaphysical modality; specifically whether apriority entails necessity, 
aposteriority entails contingency and whether conceivability entails possibility. 
In the previous chapter I begin to suggest an account of conceivability in terms 
of ‘a priori possibility’. Given all of this, we need to understand the a priori/a 
posteriori and the relationship between apriority/aposteriority and necessity/ 
contingency, since however these are related, presumably conceivability and 
possibility are similarly related. In this and the following chapters I intend to 
spell out those relations by offering, first, an account of the a priori/a posteriori 
and modality (mainly in the following two chapters but continued throughout), 
then an account of conceivability and modality (Chapters 5-7). 
With respect to the a priori, there is a lot to be unpacked before I can begin 
to offer any kind of detailed account. First, there are general issues such as the 
‘bearers’ and ‘makers’ of apriority; i.e. ‘what is p when p is a priori?’ and ‘what 
makes p a priori?’63 Second there is a cluster of problems concerning the 
                                                         
63 Clearly there is a lot of shorthand here. By ‘p is a priori’ I mean something like ‘p is justifiable 
a priori (for a subject s)’—with ‘justifiable’ deliberately wider than ‘justified’, given currently 
unknown but knowable a priori truths. Much of this (including the parenthesised ‘subject s’ 
remark) is explained in §4 below. 
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epistemic, alethic and modal status of a priori claims; what is the relevant 
status of p when p is a priori? Regarding this second set of problems, I address 
the epistemic, alethic and especially the modal issues of apriority throughout 
the following two chapters, and, to a slightly lesser extent, I examine some of 
the epistemic and alethic issues (such as justifiability, defeasibility and 
fallibility) in the latter half of this chapter. Concerning the first set and the a 
priori in general, this is the central topic of this chapter. 
Before dealing with some of the more complex issues however, let me say a 
few words concerning two of the original questions mentioned above; ‘what 
makes p a priori?’ and ‘what are the ‘bearers’ of apriority?’ As regards the first, I 
take this either to be a more or less epistemic matter (i.e. what exactly warrants 
or justifies p when p is justifiable a priori?) and as such beyond the scope of this 
thesis; or, rather, too closely related to the issue of the nature of apriority to be 
a distinct question; i.e. what is a priori justification? That being the case, I set 
aside the distinctly epistemic aspects of this question in what follows and focus 
on the nature of a priori justification as it relates to necessity and possibility 
claims. 
Regarding what might be called the ‘bearers’ of apriority, I take these to be 
propositions in the first instance but, since I take propositions to assert or 
express (or even, ultimately, to be) circumstances (that is arrangements of 
objects, attributes and so on), it is the latter that are the bearers of apriority. 
That said, since circumstances (and related notions) are vexed, since most 
other theorists in the area talk of a priori/a posteriori propositions and since 
apriority as so discussed is a broadly epistemic topic, I take the bearers of 
apriority to be the same as those of standard epistemic notions such as 
knowledge and belief, that is propositions (and/or the circumstances/objects/ 
                                                                                                                                                              
In addition, I clearly assume that there is such a thing as a priori justification; I largely 
ignore sceptical arguments to the contrary, citing a similar list of candidate items of a priori 
knowledge as does BonJour (1998, pp. 2-6 and 100-6) and following several of the anti-
sceptical arguments of the same (1998, chs. 2 and 3). For example, given that logic, 
mathematics, some central philosophical theses, together with some more general claims, such 
as ‘nothing can be red and green all over’, are a priori, and given that the very process of 
rational argument (qua system of rational inference) is itself largely a priori, it is evident that 
there is some important phenomenon in the region. This and the following chapter then, are 
very much an extended, tacit (and occasionally explicit) argument against the likes of Quine 
1951 and Devitt 2005. Even assuming Quine’s article is a successful attack on the analytic, it is 
not at all clear that the a priori can be explained in terms of that notion; so it is also not at all 
clear that the article successfully attacks apriority. 
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attributes and so on, which they express). This being the case, my ultimate 
concern with respect to the a priori is whether (and if so how and in what 
sense) a proposition’s apriority ensures its necessity (or vice versa). The point 
being, I am most concerned with the metaphysics of rationality and modality; 
whether and how a priori-necessity and conceivability-possibility claims are 
justifiable. Hence with respect to the a priori, I seek to understand the nature of 
apriority; what apriority is; but in particular, how it relates to necessity and 
conceivability claims; and especially whether an a priori (or conceivable) 
proposition is also a necessary (or possible) proposition (and/or 
circumstance). 
By way of a broad working understanding then, let us assume apriority to 
be knowledge or justification that is ‘independent of experience’; p is a priori 
(for a subject s) iff p is justifiable without experience (for s).64 This raises 
several immediate concerns; namely (i) the characterisation of the a priori in 
terms of ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ accounts, and relatedly, the relevance of 
‘independence’ and ‘experience’; (ii) the epistemic status of a priori 
justification, with respect to objectivity and subjectivity; (iii) the related issue 
of a priori knowability or justifiability—is what is a priori, justified or justifiable 
a priori?; (iv) the question of defeasibility and corrigibility—for example, is a 
priori justification defeasible, and if so, is it empirically, or only rationally, 
defeasible?; and (v) the epistemic, alethic and modal status of apriority itself 
(and specifically of p when p is a priori); for example, if p is a priori, then is p 
necessary and if so, in what sense? In this and the following chapters, I take up 
these concerns in turn. I deal with ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ accounts in §§2 and 
3 of this chapter; objectivity, subjectivity and justifiability in §4; and 
defeasibility, corrigibility and fallibility in §§5 and 6. In particular, a set of 
issues arises from the consideration of ‘experience-independence’ in §2; a 
priori justification seems fallible and defeasible, potentially empirically so. In 
§§5 and 6 I examine such claims, arguing that the a priori is only essentially, 
                                                         
64 As already suggested, there is a sense in which apriority is a ‘subjective’ notion, p being a 
priori-for-a-subject-s. Thus a better expression might be ‘s’s belief that p is a priori iff s’s belief 
that p is justified independently of experience’ (cf. Casullo 2003, pp 29-32). Presently, I use the 
more neutral, ‘objective’ phrasing for stylistic purposes. 
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rationally defeasible, whilst at the same time avoiding any commitment to 
infallibilism in regards to ‘prima facie’ apriority at least. 
These sections are where I set the scene for the discussion of the wider 
issues of alethicity and modality (i.e. issue (v) above), and for the advancement 
of my general thesis of the a priori, in the following two chapters. This being the 
case, that is, with this chapter being largely introductory and very much setting 
the scene for the following two chapters, I do not present any detailed 
conclusions until towards the end of Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
 
2 A negative account? 
 
If as I suggest above, the a priori should be characterised initially in terms of 
justification that is independent of experience, there is a sense in which this 
might be said to be a ‘negative’, or at least a ‘derivative’ account.65 It could be 
said to be negative based on the assumption that there is a class of a posteriori 
justifiable propositions, and the a priori is ‘not that’. Without an explanation of 
aposteriority then, we might then be left somewhat in the dark.66 Indeed, in §4 
below (and in the next chapter), I suggest that apriority and aposteriority are 
not so clearly interdefinable; mathematical ‘unknowns’ (and potentially 
‘unknowables’) such as Goldbach’s conjecture arguably being neither a 
posteriori nor a priori. There is then very good reason to suspect that such a 
fully negative account will not be forthcoming; even assuming the a posteriori 
can be easily demarcated, there are clear potential counter-examples to the 
claim that apriority is non-aposteriority. This being the case, perhaps a 
‘derivative’ account would be preferable? An account of apriority would be 
derivative, if we could provide separate, working analyses of the notions of 
                                                         
65 There is a sense in which I appear to agree with Casullo’s claim (2003, ch. 1) that 
‘epistemic’—that is, largely ‘negative’ and ‘positive’—accounts of a priori justification are 
initially the most promising; hence I begin by considering the Kantian, ‘negative’ conception. As 
will become clear however, my analysis cuts across Casullo’s in that I take ‘positive’ notions 
such as ‘rational intuition’ and ‘insight’ to be underpinned by a quasi-modal notion, ‘rational 
necessity’. This makes my account not ‘purely epistemic’ (i.e. ‘non-epistemic’) in Casullo’s 
terms. 
66 With the likes of BonJour (1998), Butchvarov (1970, pt.1, §9) and Pollock (1974, ch. 10), I 
view negative accounts as somewhat uninformative. 
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independence and experience; the a priori then being non-experiential 
justification (and Goldbach’s conjecture would be neither a posteriori nor a 
priori).67 Accordingly, sections 2.1 and 2.2 are an attempt to get to grips with 
independence and experience in turn. 
Now, it might be objected that a negative or derivative account of the 
subject matter somehow undermines the importance of the notion; so a 
positive account, along the lines of ‘rational insight’ or ‘rational intuition’68 is to 
be preferred. On the one hand such a position is attractive; if there is some 
notion in the region of rational insight (or even some faculty of rational 
intuition), which explains apriority, this would provide an appealing account of 
many areas of epistemology. On the other hand, first, one might contend that all 
analyses are ‘derivative’ to a certain extent; hence if a working understanding 
of independence from experience is available, so much the better for apriority. 
Second and more importantly though, many contemporary empiricists would 
find the notions of rational insight and especially a faculty of rational intuition, 
deeply objectionable.69 This being the case, in (this and) the following chapters, 
I discuss the notion of ‘rational necessity’ as providing the best account of 
apriority; suggesting that p is a priori iff p is rationally necessary. In the 
following two chapters in particular I argue that it is this latter notion that 
grounds independence from experience and ‘rational insight’, thus there is a 
clear sense in which ‘negative’, ‘derivative’ and ‘positive’ accounts of apriority 
are something of a side issue; rational necessity does the explanatory work. 
Having said this, in order to understand the notion of rational necessity, and the 
general relationship between apriority and modality, we must first get to grips 
with the topics of independence and experience. 
  
 
 
 
                                                         
67 ‘Non-experiential justification’ is extremely close to Casullo’s ‘positive’ (P2) “S’s belief that p 
is justified a priori iff s’s belief that p is justified by some non-experiential source” (2003, p. 31); 
making (P2), on my account, a negative, rather than a positive, analysis of apriority. 
68 As offered respectively by BonJour (1998, 2005) and Bealer (1987, 1996a, 1996b, 1999). 
69 I am thinking of a line of philosophers stretching from (at least) Quine 1951 to Devitt 2005. 
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2.1 Independence 
 
A standard position on apriority is that to know a priori that p requires 
understanding p, which in turn requires having had some experience relevant 
to p. That is, in order to understand a concept, one must possess that concept, 
and, at least some experience is required for concept-possession. 70  For 
example, consider the putative a priori claim red is a colour. To understand 
such a proposition, I need to possess the concepts ‘red’ and ‘colour’; and to 
possess such concepts, presumably I need to have experienced the colour red 
(or at least to have had some relevant experiences). This however, is where a 
distinction between (i) how we can come to know that p and (ii) how p is 
justified, needs to be made explicit; a distinction between what might be called 
‘occurrent (a priori) knowledge’ and a priori justification itself. The point being, 
it would be fairly straightforward to insist that occurrent knowledge cannot be 
fully independent of experience, based on the assumption that coming to know 
that p (here) involves at least minimal concept-possession and thereby 
experience, as above. This however, would miss the central point that a priori 
justification can be independent of experience even when the related 
(occurrent) knowledge claim appears to be experiential. This is because a priori 
justification concerns one’s reasons for believing a proposition, rather than the 
occurrent knowledge of that proposition and inasmuch as the latter is 
experiential and the former is not, so a priori justification is independent of 
experience. That is to say, if red is a colour is a priori, this is in virtue of 
rational reflection revealing ‘necessary’71 connections between the concepts, 
properties and/or objects involved, rather than in virtue of one’s simply having 
experienced redness to be a colour. This being the case, we can say that limited 
                                                         
70 Peacocke 2000 and Goldman 2007 are key, recent discussions of the issue of apriority and 
concept possession. 
71 This point is doubly contentious. First, I go into much more detail on the nature of the 
necessity involved in subsequent chapters. In this chapter the reader is invited to insert tacit 
scare quotes around all instances of the term ‘necessary’. Second, despite my espousal of 
fallibilism, any claim that a priori p entails p seems to suggest a strong infallibilism. My initial 
response to this potential objection is that prima facie ‘a priori’ justification can concern a false 
p, but if further rational (a priori) reflection reveals ¬p, then p can hardly be seen to be a priori 
in the first instance; hence fallible but corrigible a priori justification. I discuss this in much 
more detail in §§5 and 6 below. 
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experience is required for occurrent (a priori) knowledge, but that a priori 
justification is independent of experience in the relevant manner. 
Having avoided one possible pitfall in accounting for apriority in terms of 
experience-independent justification, there is however another potential issue 
concerning alleged defeasibility or revisability by experiential evidence. If a 
priori justification can be defeated by empirical evidence, then the alleged 
problem is that the a priori is not independent of experience in virtue of being 
so defeasible. Now, I argue that the claim that a priori justification is empirically 
defeasible has things slightly wrong, for the following two reasons. First, it is 
wrong to claim that the a priori is essentially, empirically defeasible; instead we 
should say that it is ultimately defeasible in the light of additional a priori 
reasoning—so it is the a priori rather than the experiential that is doing the 
relevant defeating work.72 Second, even where such empirical defeat appears to 
occur, this does not imply that apriority is not experience-independent. What I 
mean here is that where we have some putative a priori p and some a posteriori 
or experiential q (such that q is either equivalent to, or entails, ¬p), we should 
not conclude that p is defeated by an essentially, empirical q, but rather that, 
since we have ¬p, p was not genuinely a priori justified in the first place. That is, 
if p is (genuinely) a priori, p must (in the relevant—to be discussed—sense) be 
true; so if ¬p, p cannot be or have been (genuinely) a priori.73 In addition, even 
where an empirical q does so happen to defeat an allegedly (but not genuinely) 
a priori p, this does not show that apriority is not experience-independent; 
further analysis, I claim, shows instead that what we take to be a priori (p in this 
case) is essentially defeasible in the light of additional a priori reasoning. This is 
to say, where some such apparently empirical claim q does happen to defeat or 
revise some putatively a priori p, it is not entirely clear that q is essentially a 
posteriori. Instead, I suggest, if q is an a posteriori truth, then ◊q should also 
have been available a priori, and it is this possibility (◊q) that is what really 
                                                         
72 At least this first point is supported by Warenski 2009, pp. 412-3. That said, I do not share 
Warenski’s general ‘naturalism’.  
73 See n. 9 on fallibilism. I am indebted to discussions with Durham’s Eidos postgraduate group 
and Donnchadh O’Conaill in particular, as well as to Fraser MacBride and Tim Crane, for 
pointing out potential issues in this area. 
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defeats p, which, after all, in virtue of being a priori is necessary (in some 
sense); since if ◊q and q  ¬p, then ¬p; and so p cannot be a priori.74 
The foregoing is perhaps both complex and contentious, so let me explain 
further by way of an example. Imagine that a talented mathematician, Albert, is 
working through a long and complex proof of some theorem, p. Ignoring 
complexities concerning actual workings out, introspection and memory,75 the 
conclusion p is (prima facie) justified a priori and so (prima facie) necessary. It 
just so happens however, that Albert, being a meticulous mathematician, 
always checks his sums with a calculator and, on this particular occasion, 
realises that a certain calculation, essential to the proof of p, is not only wrong, 
but in fact implies ¬p (and so ¬p). Thus we have some further proposition q, 
such that q is allegedly justified a posteriori (Albert learns both q and the 
general reliability of his calculator by experience) and implies ¬p. So, the 
general form of this objection is as follows. Where we have some a priori p, it is 
possible that q is either a direct ‘empirical’ contradiction of p (i.e. equivalent to 
¬p), or an ‘empirical’ claim that implies ¬p; and since we have an a posteriori q 
qua ¬p (or since q  ¬p), we appear to have an a priori p that is defeated by 
an a posteriori q.  
As indicated above however, my response is that this (and mutatis 
mutandis for other examples) is not a case of genuine, essential, empirical 
defeat. This is because although the alleged empirical proposition q here 
happens to be known on empirical grounds, this need not be the case. That is, 
an entirely parallel example could have been given, whereby Albert realised, in 
working through the ‘proof’ of p (i.e. of p), not only that q, but also that q on a 
fully a priori basis (e.g. he reasoned to q without a calculator). So, this alleged 
case of empirical defeat is not essentially so; q (or ◊q) should have been 
available to Albert on a fully a priori basis. In addition, instead of q (or ◊q) 
defeating a p that is a priori, on the contrary, given that it is additional a priori 
reasoning that demonstrates ¬p, p turns out not to be a priori in the first place. 
This is because, where it is the case that q (or ◊q), and q  ¬p or q  ¬p, we 
                                                         
74 As I suggest several times, this depends on both the relationship between apriority and (the 
relevant) necessity, and fallible but corrigible a priori reasoning (approaching truth); both of 
which are discussed at length below. 
75 For which, see the following section. 
 33 
 
 
 
have ¬p (or ◊¬p) and, clearly then, ¬p; hence, as I say in the general case, ¬p, 
as opposed to p, would then be a priori. Assuming Albert is a sound reasoner 
and realises that his corrected mistake, q, is both fully justified and further 
justifies ¬p, then p itself cannot be justified a priori after all; it is ¬p that is so 
justified (and necessary). So, concerning the alleged problem for independence 
in terms of empirical defeasibility, that it appeared a priori that p, and yet that 
we discover a posteriori that q (and thereby ¬p), does not show that a priori p 
is empirically defeasible. On the contrary, it shows that p was not a priori in the 
first place. Moreover, this does not show that apriority in general is not 
independent of experience; it shows that what we take to be a priori (p in this 
case) is defeasible in the light of further a priori reasoning that q (or ◊q) and 
that q  ¬p or q  ¬p. 
I realise that the above example is contentious, complicated, and that a lot 
more could and should be said. In particular, there is a potential problem where 
the defeating proposition (q) is equivalent to, or rather is, ¬p. In such a case, 
given p’s initial, apparent apriority and assuming that apriority entails 
necessity (in some sense), ¬p would presumably not be available to the relevant 
subject a priori. That said, I very much discuss ‘subjective’ apriority in §4, and I 
provide a further example (Euclid’s fifth, or parallel postulate) in §5, where I 
also present a lot more argument and analysis of this and related points. All I 
want to suggest here is that in terms of independence, it is in no way clear that 
the a priori is essentially, empirically defeasible and therefore not experience-
independent. On the contrary I suggest, cases of apparent empirical defeat are 
cases that should be described as examples of potential a priori defeat; and, if 
an ‘a priori’ p is a priori defeasible, it is hard to see how p can be genuinely a 
priori justified in the first place. So, such cases show that revision of the given 
proposition is in the light of additional a priori reasoning, as opposed to 
empirical evidence. Thus, a priori justification, even in the light of such 
‘empirical’ revision, is still independent of experience—but, importantly (as I go 
on to explain), this is in virtue of the involvement of some form of necessity in a 
priori justification. 
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2.2 Experience 
 
Whether or not independence is useful in explaining apriority, there is also the 
related issue of experience; what is the relevant sense of experience that might 
begin to demarcate the a priori and a posteriori? As with apriority in general, 
there is not widespread agreement on the relevant salient features. In addition, 
a full account of the notion would take us well into the fields of epistemology, 
philosophy of mind and of perception. This being the case and my thesis being 
predominantly metaphysical, in what follows I present only a limited account of 
the potentially relevant features. 
Philosophers often begin by characterising the a posteriori in terms of pure 
sensory experience, noting that this would preclude such things as 
equilibrioception, proprioception and nociception, in addition to memory, 
introspection and (should such things exist) so-called parapsychological 
phenomena such as pre-cognition, clairvoyance and telepathy. The first three 
items in this list are, fairly plausibly, sufficiently close to standard cases of 
sensory, experiential knowledge to warrant an extension of the notion to 
include such cases. Experience then, if it is to be able to accurately demarcate 
the a posteriori, needs to be characterised sufficiently broadly so as to include 
items similar to these. Having said this, experience also needs to be 
characterised sufficiently narrowly so as not to include potentially a priori 
items that might appear to have some experiential basis; and this is where 
introspection in particular, and memory, to a lesser extent, appear to be 
problematic. For example, as already indicated, some philosophers claim that 
apriority involves ‘rational insight’ and they go on to explain this in terms of 
something akin to ‘rationally seeing’ the truth-value of the relevant 
proposition. 76  Now, whether or not this is plausibly coextensive with 
introspection, it would at least appear to be very closely related to that notion. 
For example, consider a simple passage of paradigmatic a priori reasoning to 
the conclusion that 
 
(m) 22 + 32 = 13. 
                                                         
76 For example, BonJour 1998, pp. 102-6. 
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To entertain such a proposition, there would appear to be at least a minimum 
level of introspective experience required. If this kind of thing is included in the 
account of experience intended to characterise the a posteriori, then such an 
account would appear to be too broad. Of course, the problem might become 
more apparent when we consider longer passages of a priori reasoning, which 
might involve detailed premises requiring an element of memory. The problem 
being that memory and especially introspection (or something in that region) 
seem to be required for many cases of a priori reasoning, yet both, and 
especially memory, might be more easily characterised as a posteriori. 
The issue of memory can perhaps be side-stepped by insisting that any 
extended piece of a priori reasoning is effectively equivalent to reasoning not 
involving memory; each particular step is justifiable a priori, so—whether or 
not a particular human being needs to remember each proposition—the 
extended piece of reasoning is also justifiable a priori. For now then, suffice to 
note that memory can perhaps be safely categorised as a largely a posteriori 
capacity and additionally as inessential for a priori justification; hence there is 
no genuine tension. This still leaves a problem with the notion of introspection. 
Of course, one might insist that introspecting, for example, I am in pain, I 
am warm and similar would be paradigmatic cases of a posteriori 
introspection, whereas introspecting m and the like would be a priori. It is quite 
clear however that such an insistence would require a separate notion of the a 
priori in order to demarcate a priori and a posteriori cases of introspection; 
strongly suggesting that a proposition’s apriority and its being introspected are 
largely independent. Perhaps in response to this kind of worry (together with 
the general problem of demarcating the a posteriori and a priori), some 
philosophers propose causal, perceptual-causal and contingency criteria to do 
just such work. McGinn for example claims that p is justified a posteriori for a 
subject s iff the relevant ground for s’s belief that p, causes s’s coming to believe 
p; p is then a priori iff the ground (e.g. mathematics, logic) is not so causally 
related.77 Similarly, BonJour suggests that p is a posteriori iff it is  
 
                                                         
77 McGinn 1999. 
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“perceptual in the broad sense of (a) being a causally conditioned response 
to particular, contingent features of the world and (b) yielding doxastic 
states that have as their content putative information concerning… 
particular, contingent features of the actual world…”78 
 
On such a causal account (and I focus on BonJour’s here), most of the initial 
list of potentially experiential items discussed above (in particular, 
introspection) turn out to be a posteriori. The a priori (and “mathematical 
intuition” for instance) is then demarcated in virtue of its concerning “eternal, 
abstract, and necessarily existent objects…” offering “…no information about 
the actual world”, given that “...its deliverances consist solely of (putatively) 
necessary truths”.79 So, with respect to the examples I discuss above, such a 
position seems to suggest that my perception of my being in pain or warm is 
introspective and therefore a posteriori; my ‘rationally seeing’ that 22 + 32 = 13 
is not essentially introspective and is thus a priori, in virtue of being non-causal 
knowledge, concerning necessary relations holding between abstracta. 
Now, there are at least three potential problems besetting such a non-
causal and especially a non-contingency account of a priori justification; these 
appear to increase in difficulty for the proponent of such a position. First, let it 
be noted that we are discussing a derivative account of the a priori, and 
especially independence from experience; if we need to appeal to positive 
aspects of the analysandum (such as rational seeing or insight), this would 
appear to obviate the need to discuss the derivative (or negative) aspects. 
Ultimately, I admit this problem, arguing in the following two chapters that a 
positive account of apriority as ‘rational necessity’ grounds the derivative 
understanding of experience-independent justification; so there is essentially 
no need to discuss the negative or derivative senses. As I indicate above 
however, I discuss independence and (especially) experience for completeness, 
and so as to pave the way for the later discussion of the positive account—§3 
below and the following two chapters. So, if there is a sufficiently strong, 
                                                         
78 BonJour 1998, p. 8. 
79 Ibid. 
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positive account of the a priori, a discussion of derivate (or negative) aspects is 
somewhat otiose; but this is not a great problem for my account. 
The second and slightly deeper problem is that if a priori justification 
concerns abstract objects and properties, then, allegedly, knowledge thereof 
cannot be causal; if, as is then alleged, knowledge in general is essentially 
causal, then such a non-causal criterion of a priori justification must fail. The 
deeper problem here of course, is that such a non-causal account of a priori 
justification appears to commit its proponents to something along the lines of 
an epistemological Platonism concerning the a priori.80 Given the foregoing 
considerations, BonJour’s response to this problem ought to consist in 
maintaining that a priori justification is non-causal, thus denying that all 
knowledge is causal and so biting the bullet with respect to (something like) 
Platonism. It is not all clear however that BonJour takes this line. Instead, he 
appears to argue that abstracta (such as properties) do not enter into causal 
chains, whereas the objects instantiating them do so. A priori justification then, 
qua concerning abstracta is non-causal, but qua concerning objects 
instantiating abstract properties is ‘quasi-causal’, in virtue of those properties 
“influencing minds”.81 Clearly, this response is potentially problematic in virtue 
of being somewhat hand-waving and, more importantly, as potentially 
contradicting the earlier claim that the a posteriori is causal and the a priori is 
non-causal. The point being, either a priori justification is causal (and there is a 
contradiction in BonJour’s position) or it is not (and perhaps the Platonism 
allegation appears to stand). Now, I am not suggesting that this objection is 
fatal for BonJour’s account; rather, I am suggesting that he should clearly take 
either fork of the above dilemma, as opposed to vacillating between the two. 
Taking the first for example, there are perhaps several potential ways in which 
a priori justification could be causal;82 were BonJour to adopt one of these, his 
                                                         
80 This is essentially a Benacerraf-style problem (in the philosophy of mathematics) as applied 
to the a priori more generally. See Benacerraf 1973. 
81 BonJour 1998, p. 160 (and pp. 159-61 for the general discussion). 
82 One of these might consist in an appeal to tropes; perhaps we have (a priori) causal 
knowledge of necessary relations in virtue of particular instantiations of those relations by 
tropes. Having said this, in accounting for apriority ultimately in terms of ‘rational necessity’, I 
would not make such an appeal. There is perhaps a sense in which the whole notion of a priori 
knowledge of abstracta is something of a side issue—presumably much a posteriori knowledge 
is also going to involve abstracta (the knowledge that this piece of paper is white for 
example). Presumably then, some account of the a posteriori knowledge of abstracta is also 
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account of the a priori would be stronger. Alternatively, of course (and this 
might be the preferable route), one could insist that there is a priori 
justification, that it is non-causal and thus not all knowledge is causal.83 Now, I 
realise my discussion of this point is very brief, but there are good reasons for 
this. My thesis concerns modality in general, and the relationship between the a 
priori and necessity (and conceivability and possibility) in particular; I am not 
interested in the details of critical exegesis. Whilst I do feel there is a potential 
contradiction in BonJour’s account, this is not interesting per se; what is 
interesting is what BonJour (and I) ought to say about the a priori. Hence my 
brief response to this problem is to accept the second option above (namely 
that a priori justification is non-causal) and so to reject the claim that all 
knowledge is causal. That said, I leave this discussion in its present scant state, 
since it is also related to ‘positive’ accounts of the a priori (which I discuss 
below) and, more importantly, the third problem, is potentially more serious. 
The third and most important problem then, is that such a non-causal, and 
especially a non-contingency account of a priori justification appears to rule out 
simpliciter the possibility of there being contingent a priori propositions.84 In 
response to this problem, I devote some space to a detailed discussion of the 
contingent a priori in the following chapter, where I argue that, strictly, there 
are no such propositions. Given that this is a more serious and complex issue 
however, I set aside a detailed discussion of the problem until the point 
indicated. 
Returning very briefly to the main, present topic of introspection then, 
what I want to suggest is that introspection is a largely experiential mode of 
justification; as with experience more widely, some propositions can be 
justified both introspectively and on an a priori basis. What I mean here is that 
whilst it is possible to grasp mathematical propositions such as 2 + 3 = 5 and 
m via introspection, their justification qua a priori propositions is independent 
of introspection (and experience) in virtue of those propositions being 
(relevantly) necessary. Again as before, there is a lot more to be said here, but 
                                                                                                                                                              
required (and tropes might offer a reasonable solution here). 
83 As Lowe begins to suggest at 2002, pp. 372-3; cf. Lowe 2006, p. 180. 
84 Similarly a causal, contingency account of the a posteriori would (strictly) rule out the 
necessary a posteriori, which I discuss in ch. 5 below. 
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this is taken up in the discussion of the contingent a priori, in the following 
chapter. 
All of this being the case, and making some reasonable assumptions 
regarding idealised apriority, causality and necessity, let us assume for present 
purposes that a course can be steered between the sufficiently broad and 
sufficiently narrow accounts of experience, so as to demarcate (prima facie) 
derivatively the a priori; if p is a priori, p is justified independently of 
experience. Introspection, in particular, is an apparent issue but assuming that 
there is some interplay between negative and positive accounts of the a priori, 
as outlined in the previous paragraphs (especially the points concerning the 
first problem above), it is an issue that is not insurmountable. 
 
 
3 A positive account? 
 
So far I have discussed purely negative or derivative characterisations of 
apriority, suggesting that there is sense in which the issue of derivative (or 
negative) versus positive accounts is somewhat otiose; derivative 
characterisations being essentially uninformative in virtue of relying on more 
positive aspects of the a priori. In what follows, I argue that although there are 
several viable, positive accounts, ultimately these also stand in need of further 
explanation; for example concerning the indubitability or ‘necessity’ of the 
relevant a priori proposition. Consequently, a positive account of apriority does 
not offer the deepest level of explanation; something more modal appears to be 
required. Therefore, this section is only the briefest of introductions to so-
called positive accounts; the real work of relating apriority and modality must 
wait until the following two chapters. 
Standard characterisations that begin to suggest a positive account include 
those of Descartes’s “clear and distinct perception” and the “great light in the 
intellect”;85 Kant’s “faculty of a priori knowledge”;86 together with recent 
                                                         
85 Descartes 1642, Third and Fourth Meditations respectively. 
86 Kant 1781, B3-4. Kant of course begins with perhaps the classic statement of the negative 
characterisation; “knowledge altogether independent of experience” (1781, B1). 
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accounts such as BonJour’s “pure thought” and “rational insight”;87 and Bealer’s 
“rational intuition”.88 The general suggestion seems to be that there is some 
capacity or ability akin to pure thought, intuition, intellectual grasping or 
seeing, and which is perhaps captured best (or maybe least contentiously) by 
BonJour’s notion of ‘rational insight’.89 This however is not the full story, since 
standard objections to such accounts include accusations of vagueness, 
obscurantism, mysteriousness and even mysticism, together with claims that 
the notion of rational insight is epistemically un-illuminating. Perhaps because 
of this, such accounts almost always appear to involve some additional 
explanation as to why a priori propositions are so available to rational insight. 
That is, an a priori proposition is not only one that is available via pure thought, 
or one that is grasped by rational insight, it is so justified in virtue of something 
additional; for example its clarity and distinctness (Descartes); its being 
‘unthinkably false’ (Butchvarov);90 or its being, or at least seeming to be, 
necessary (Kant, Butchvarov and BonJour).91 This being the case, perhaps we 
ought to see if there is an acceptable, positive account of the a priori that can 
avoid such accusations, and that can do without the need for such additional 
explanation. 
Following BonJour to a certain extent, perhaps there is not a lot that can be 
said, over and above suggestions that a positive conception of the a priori rests 
on notions such as pure thought, rational insight, direct or intuitive grasping or 
seeing; it is, perhaps, 
 
“…direct and unmediated, incapable of being reduced to or explained by 
any rational or cognitive process of a more basic sort—since any such 
explanation would presuppose apprehensions of this very same kind.”92 
                                                         
87 BonJour 1998, pp. 11-15 (pure thought), 16, 102, 106-10 and passim (rational insight). 
88 Bealer 1999, passim; cf. 1987, 1996a, 1996b. When discussing ‘conceivability’, Van Cleve 
(1983, pp. 36-7) makes similar remarks (to both BonJour and Bealer): “First, there is such a 
thing as just ‘seeing’—by a kind of intellectual vision—that a proposition is true…Seeing of this 
sort is what many philosophers call ‘intuition’ and what Descartes called ‘clear and distinct 
perception’”. 
89 Since this is perhaps less contentious (and open to empiricist criticisms of mysteriousness) 
than the notions of rational intuition and of a rational faculty. 
90 Butchvarov 1970, p. 72 and passim. 
91 Kant 1781, B3; Butchvarov 1970, §9 and passim; BonJour 1998, pp. 8, 11-16, 106-10; cf. 2005, 
p. 99. 
92 BonJour 1998, p. 16. 
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The problem here is that the main historical proponents of the a priori often 
assume (very arguably correctly) that a priori justification qua pure intellectual, 
rational insight is a fundamental requirement for rationality in general, and 
that it underlies our ability to argue and reason in particular. Perhaps because 
such a conception of the a priori is deemed to be so essential, the main 
proponents of the notion have had very little to say by way of a positive 
characterization. Having said this, perhaps apriority can be positively 
characterised by way of a couple of examples. The capacity for a priori 
reasoning (qua some kind of rational insight) is standardly thought to be a 
capacity of ‘intellectually seeing’ the ‘necessary’ truth of the proposition 
involved. For example, whether I reason to the conclusion 2 + 3 = 5 or the 
slightly more complicated 22 + 32 = 13, assuming that I am able to reason 
mathematically, once I understand the relevant propositions, I just ‘see’ them to 
be necessarily true. Another example, provided by BonJour (whose explanation 
I also follow to a certain extent), is as follows. What it is to reason a priori that 
nothing can be red and green all over at the same time, is first to understand 
the relevant concepts, properties and (where relevant) objects involved (e.g. 
redness, greenness, colour in general perhaps, and also the concepts of 
something’s being an extended surface—or similar—and of exclusion/ 
incompatibility); second it is seeing that the concepts, properties and objects 
are necessarily related in or by the relevant proposition; and third, a priori 
justification involves my being “able to see or grasp or apprehend in a 
seemingly direct and unmediated way that the claim in question cannot fail to 
be true”.93 So according to BonJour, it is this direct apprehension or grasping 
that best characterises a priori justification positively, and in terms of rational 
insight into or intellectual seeing that the relevant proposition is ‘necessarily’ 
true. 
Now, I would argue that some of the problems indicated above (at least of 
mysteriousness and mysticism) can hardly be seen to apply to such a simple 
and constrained notion of apriority. This account does not imply a mysterious 
or mystical faculty of a priori insight, nor even does it appeal to a potentially 
                                                         
93 Op. cit., p. 100-1. Again, I finesse the “cannot fail to be” (i.e. the nature of the necessity 
involved) in the relevant sections and chapters below. 
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confusing notion of rational intuition. Instead it is merely committed to the 
claim that a priori reasoning that p entails an intellectual grasping of the 
relevant concepts, properties and objects involved in p, together with a 
grasping that those concepts, properties and objects are somehow necessarily 
related. There are however, at least two potential problems still outstanding, 
first that of a potential re-surfacing of the epistemic (and perhaps 
metaphysical) Platonism alluded to above with respect to non-causal analyses 
of apriority; and second, the allegations of vagueness and obscurantism—we 
have claimed that apriority consists in something like rational insight, but what 
is this? Although both problems, I claim, concern ultimately the issue of 
modality (and are therefore properly subjects of the following chapters), I 
discuss them briefly here, in turn. 
First then, is the potential objection that this account appears to be 
committed to something like the epistemic (and now metaphysical) Platonism 
mentioned with respect to the causal/non-causal demarcation of a posteriori 
and a priori introspection, discussed in the previous section. That is, in virtue of 
invoking necessary relations between abstract concepts, properties and 
objects, the account is committed to a strange, or at least non-causal, account of 
knowledge and justification—perhaps in addition to a strong metaphysical 
realism concerning such entities. Against this objection, I would say first that 
strong, epistemic Platonism is not entirely, clearly applicable to the account 
until the relevant details are filled in; and second, if the details are so filled in, 
such that some metaphysical realism (not necessarily Platonism) about 
abstracta, concepts, properties and objects is required, then so much the better 
for this account; that is, some realistic metaphysics is to be preferred over 
alternatives. I realise however, that these remarks are contentious and stand in 
need of separate justification. For present purposes then, I note that the 
‘relevant details’, and justification thereof, must be left for further sections and 
chapters; apriority and modality in the following two chapters; 
Platonism/realism concerning propositions, properties (etc.) and its problems, 
very briefly in §6 of this chapter, and to some extent in Chapters 5 to 7. In brief 
then, I do not see these issues as deeply problematic, but a more complete 
defence of this claim must wait until the relevant sections. 
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The second issue is that of vagueness (and obscurantism); i.e. the charge 
that pure thought, rational insight and so on, qua explanans of apriority, are 
epistemically un-illuminating (and perhaps deliberately so). Unfortunately for 
some of the above-mentioned proponents of positive accounts, on this issue a 
strong response is less forthcoming. The point being, I am in some agreement 
with those who claim that an unqualified notion of a faculty of a priori or 
rational intuition is arguably vague, obscure or un-illuminating; hence 
something more along the lines of BonJour’s ‘rational insight’ is the best 
available, putative analysans. Having said this, inasmuch as the notion of 
rational insight is not mystical or even particularly mysterious, first, in the 
absence of a more complete explanation, it is still somewhat obscure. The 
desideratum is a full explanation of a priori justification in terms of its nature or 
essence; and, I claim, the notion of rational insight does not do this work. 
Second, I think it is fairly clear from the passages above that BonJour makes an 
essential further appeal to necessity; rational insight itself is tacitly admitted as 
not being the ultimate explanans. That is, the ‘more complete explanation’ 
renders rational insight itself as the explanandum; with necessity being the 
explanans. This being the case (and here I agree with BonJour—tacitly and 
explicitly), there is a need to discuss the notion of necessity in conjunction with 
that of apriority, in the hope of providing a more complete analysis. I turn to 
this issue in the following two chapters, but before we get there, there are 
several other preliminary concerns that must be discussed. These are 
‘objectivity’, ‘subjectivity’ and justifiability (the following section); 
defeasibility—empirical or otherwise (§5 below); and fallibility (§6). 
 
 
4 Justifiability, objectivity and subjectivity 
 
Until now I have largely been talking about a priori justification using phrases 
and terms such as ‘p is a priori’ and a proposition’s ‘apriority’, as if to suggest 
that this is a straightforward matter, whereby a proposition is ‘a priori’ or not 
simpliciter. I have hinted on several occasions that such talk is loose, suggesting 
that (i) by ‘a priori p’, an ‘a priori proposition’ and similar, what I mean is that p 
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is justified on an a priori basis; (ii) despite this, it might be better to talk about a 
priori justifiable, rather than justified, propositions; and now, more importantly, 
(iii) things are not so straightforwardly ‘objective’; it might be even better to 
talk about a priori justifiability-for-a-subject.94 In this section I outline why this 
is the case, focusing on (ii) and (iii), and explaining the implications for our 
account of apriority and its relation to modality. 
Let me begin by way of a well-known example, Goldbach’s conjecture (GC), 
that every even number greater than two is the sum of two primes. As already 
mentioned the truth of (GC) is currently (presumably) unknown and it is 
therefore not currently justified a priori. On the assumption however that (GC) 
is provable to non-omniscient creatures such as human beings, there is a strong 
sense in which it is justifiable a priori. Having said this, there is at least a 
possibility that (GC) is not so justifiable; it might be a true proposition that is 
unprovable in any consistent, formal system of arithmetic, or even more widely 
unprovable.95 Making the assumption either that (GC) is so unprovable, or that 
there is another such unprovable proposition, I now extend the label (GC) to 
cover both the original proposition and such in-principle, unprovable, 
mathematical propositions. 
This example then has several, very interesting implications for the a priori. 
First and as already indicated, on the assumption that (GC) is provable, it helps 
to disambiguate the notion of an a priori justifiable, rather than justified, 
proposition (i.e. point (ii) above). Second, it raises the question of ‘subjective 
apriority’ and, as I discuss below, demonstrates that what is a priori justifiable 
for one subject (e.g. an omniscient being), might not be more widely a priori 
justifiable for any other subject (i.e. point (iii) from above). Third however, on 
the assumption that it is unprovable, (GC) has implications for the negative 
account of apriority mentioned above (and relatedly for what I call the 
‘coincidence thesis’ (CT) in the following chapter; namely that 
“necessity…coincide[s] with apriority and contingency with aposteriority”96). 
The point being that since an unprovable (GC) is justifiable neither a posteriori 
                                                         
94 See n. 2 (and surrounding text); cf. the discussion of McGinn’s causal account in §2.2. 
95 See Gödel 1931. Clearly there are some large debates specific to the philosophy of 
mathematics that I wish to avoid here. 
96 BonJour 1998, p. 12. 
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nor a priori, it shows that the a priori cannot be defined simply in terms of non-
aposteriority.  
Now, I go into greater detail on (GC) and (CT) in the following chapter. This 
being the case, let us return to the second point above; ‘subjective apriority’ and 
human (or non-omniscient), as opposed to ‘omniscient a priori justification’, 
together with the further question as to how ‘subjective’ the former kind of 
justification is. In short, it might be felt that there is no fact of the matter; one 
can just make a decision, or stipulate that ‘a priori’ only applies to human (or 
more advanced, but still non-omniscient beings’) cognitive abilities. Against this 
however, the topic of the a priori (if anything is) is surely a paradigmatic issue 
amenable to a priori reflection; if our conclusions concerning the a priori are 
necessary in any sense, then it is least prima facie difficult to see how any such 
necessary conclusions could be generated by merely a posteriori or empirical 
means.97 Thus, any speculation as to whether ‘a priori’ does pertain to gods, 
humans or ‘Martians’, in virtue of being broadly psychological, sociological or 
linguistic (that is, broadly scientific or empirical—and regarding use as 
opposed to normative meaning), is going to generate probabilities and 
generalisations at worst and stipulations at best. This being the case, let me 
offer some more philosophical (that is broadly a priori) reasons for making any 
such decision. On the reasonable assumptions that (i) there are no entirely 
compelling arguments for the existence of an omniscient being, and therefore 
that (ii) it is at least extremely unlikely that finite, and spatio-temporally 
located beings such as humans are going to be such entities, it is broadly a 
priori that there are limitations in human knowledge and justification. Thus, I 
claim, human or at least finite beings’ cognitive capacities are what is and 
should be at issue here; the relevant, interesting and normative ability of a 
priori reasoning pertains to contingent, finite and non-omniscient creatures. 
This being the case, (GC) qua current unknown mathematical theorem is at 
least unjustified a priori (to humans) and possibly more widely; (GC) qua 
mathematical unknowable is unjustifiable a priori simpliciter. 
There is one final issue to discuss, which (as indicated above) follows from 
the previous point; is such non-omniscient a priori justification, in virtue of 
                                                         
97 Of course, this is a little contentious, pending the discussion of the necessary a posteriori in 
ch. 5. 
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pertaining to finite and contingent creatures, relativised to particular subjects? 
That is, how ‘subjective’ (or not) is a priori justification? A complete answer to 
this question depends on such issues as defeasibility, corrigibility, revisability 
and fallibility, which I cover in the following two sections, so a more detailed 
response must wait until after those discussions. That said, my initial response 
is as follows. Whilst I began by discussing a priori justification as independent 
of experience, there is a strong sense in which an account along the lines of ‘s’s 
belief that p is justified a priori iff s’s belief that p is independent of experience’ 
would be a better start than a more clearly ‘objective’ account. Having provided 
some further discussion of the objective/subjective divide, I now claim that an 
analysis in terms of ‘s’s belief that p’ is going to be the most realistic starting 
point, but not necessarily the final word; although there is a sense in which a 
priori justification is a somewhat subjective matter, there is perhaps a stronger 
sense in which it is a corrective, normative and more objective notion. As a very 
brief example, if s’s belief that parallel lines never intersect (p) is ‘a priori-for-
s’ there is a strong possibility that it might not be so justified for other, non-
omniscient thinkers. For example, if s were a very talented geometer, with an 
(apparent) proof of p, and if that proof were lost in antiquity, then it might be 
the case that p would not be a priori for any other thinker at all. If however, 
another thinker had a clear disproof of p, it would then be the case that p was a 
priori-for-s (or prima facie a priori) but not secunda facie or more widely, and 
certainly not genuinely a priori. What I am hinting at here is an account of the a 
priori whereby ‘prima facie apriority’ is a largely subjective affair, whereas 
‘secunda facie apriority’ (which approaches ‘genuine’ apriority) is less so. 
I realise however that the foregoing remarks are contentious and appeal to 
the example of Euclidean geometry. Thus without further ado, let us turn to 
that example, in order to understand in more depth objectivity, subjectivity, 
and more importantly, defeasibility, revisability and fallibilism.98 
 
 
 
                                                         
98 I return to the issue of objectivity, subjectivity and intersubjectivity in ch. 4. 
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5 Euclid and defeasibility 
 
Earlier in the chapter, I claim that a priori reasoning is not essentially defeasible 
by empirical evidence, given that it is potential, additional a priori reasoning 
that is what is really at force in correcting the original, prima facie a priori 
proposition. I now return to that argument via a detailed consideration of the 
case of Euclidean geometry (and the so-called ‘parallel postulate’) in order to 
achieve three aims.99 First, I hope to strengthen my claim that the a priori is 
only essentially defeasible on a priori grounds (this section). Second, I aim to 
advance a further but related argument concerning fallibilism, which is that 
given what I say about defeasibility, there is essentially only one general source 
of fallibility concerning a priori reasoning; mistaken thinking—which awaits 
further a priori reasoning by way of correction, somewhat akin to ‘reflective 
equilibrium’—as opposed to errors deriving from empirical sources (the next 
section). And third, I want to begin to assess the issue of the modal status of p 
when p is a priori; an issue that I conclude in the following two chapters.  
In order to understand what Euclidean geometry tells us about the a priori, 
let us begin with some of the relevant history of thought, before moving on to 
the geometric details of the case. Until the advent of alternative geometries in 
the nineteenth century, it was thought that Euclidean (or classical) geometry 
was an a priori, certain and therefore necessarily true body of mathematics; 
apriority entailed infallibility, which in turn meant certainty and therefore, 
necessity.100 In addition, assuming the alignment of apriority and necessity, it 
seemed clear that Euclidean geometry was simply the correct description of 
actual space; if it is a priori, certain and necessary, then it is surely true of actual 
                                                         
99 I am aware of BonJour’s discussion (1998, pp. 217-24). Whilst I am very sympathetic to 
several of BonJour’s claims concerning Euclid and the a priori, I am not entirely happy with his 
detailed treatment of the Euclidean case. I am also indebted to Torretti 2008 and Sklar 1974 in 
this section. 
100 I hint, of course, at the classical alignment of apriority and necessity here, and assume that 
both this and its application in the case of Euclidean geometry would be broadly accepted 
(assuming a liberal understanding of the relevant terms) by a diverse range of thinkers. Kant, in 
particular, highlighted Euclidean geometry as one of the paradigm exemplars of the synthetic a 
priori. There are, of course, several potential reasons to doubt this alignment, both post-non-
Euclidean geometries and potentially post-Kripke 1980. I consider the first set of doubts here 
and the Kripkean issues in following chapters. 
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space.101 If it were to turn out that there were other possible systems of 
geometry, Euclidean might not be necessarily true; that is, it might not be the 
single system describing all possible spaces. More to the point however, if it 
were to turn out that space is non-Euclidean, there would be something wrong 
with both the move from apriority to certainty and especially with the move 
from apriority to necessity. That Euclidean geometry describes actual space 
would not only be uncertain, it would be false, and so it would most certainly 
not be a body of necessary truths. 
Euclid’s Elements102 begins with a series of definitions (of points, lines, 
surfaces and so on), common notions (e.g. mathematical relations and functions 
such as equality and addition), and five ‘postulates’: 
 
“Let the following be postulated: 
 
(e1) To draw a straight line from any point to any point. 
(e2) To produce a finite straight line continuously in a straight line. 
(e3) To describe a circle with any centre and distance. 
(e4) That all right angles are equal to one another. 
(e5)  That, if a straight line falling on two straight lines make the interior 
angles on the same side less than two right angles, the two straight 
lines, if produced indefinitely, meet on that side on which are the 
angles less than the two right angles.”103 (See Fig. 1.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 
                                                         
101 As I explain in the main body below, I make the assumption that Euclidean geometry 
concerns actual space. 
102 For which I use Heath 1956. 
103 Op. cit., pp. 154-5, my numbering. 
l2 
l1 
a 
l3 
b 
Where a + b < 180, l2 
intersects l3 ‘on the 
same side as’ a and b. 
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Most commentators agree that postulates e1-e4 are relatively straightforward 
and so the propositions asserted by e1-e4 are clearly a priori, necessarily true 
and therefore (actually) true. There were however, historic doubts about 
Euclid’s fifth postulate, e5, which appeared to some to be neither self-evidently 
true, certain, nor derivable from the previous four postulates. Of course, if e5 is 
not a genuine postulate, then Euclidean geometry as a system is incomplete; 
propositions after 28 are not derivable from e1-e4 alone and cannot therefore be 
considered to be sound in the absence of a proof of e5. Kant of course, took 
Euclidean geometry to be an a priori and necessarily true body of 
mathematics—indeed he offered it as one of the paradigm exemplars of the 
synthetic a priori.104 With the arrival of Lobachevskian (or hyperbolic) and 
Riemannian (or elliptical) geometries105 shortly after The Critique however, it 
was clear that something might indeed be wrong with the claim that apriority 
entailed certainty and necessity. Most commentators took (and continue to 
take) the existence of rival systems of geometry to show that a priori reasoning 
is fallible, and on this point I am in partial agreement (subject to caveats to be 
outlined below). In addition however, when in the early twentieth century, 
Eddington’s experiments (corroborating Einstein’s theory of General Relativity) 
seemed to confirm the claim that actual space-time exhibits a Riemannian 
curvature,106 most commentators took (and continue to take) this to show that 
empirical evidence can and does defeat a priori reasoning, and in an essential 
and interesting manner. The conclusion being that Euclidean geometry (and in 
particular, the fifth postulate) is a priori but neither necessary nor, indeed, 
actually true; hence, empirical defeat of a priori reasoning by a posteriori 
evidence. 
In this section, I want to examine in more detail the specific claim that 
empirical evidence can defeat a priori propositions, before moving on to the 
related issue of fallibility in the following section. In order to do this, we will 
                                                         
104 Kant 1781, B15. 
105 Lobachevsky 1840; Riemann 1854. 
106 I refer of course to Einstein’s (1916) predictions concerning Mercury’s anomalous orbital 
precession and the later corroboration by Eddington (1919) regarding curved light observed 
during a solar eclipse. I say ‘seemed to confirm’, as this issue is slightly contentious. By 
‘Riemannian’ here I mean a ‘mixed’ geometry that can change from elliptical to hyperbolic, from 
point to point. In what follows, I use the term to refer specifically to the elliptical geometry 
introduced by Riemann, unless I make it clear that the hybrid sense is intended, where I write 
Riemannianmixed. 
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need to look at the details of Euclid’s fifth and the related ‘parallel’ postulates, 
together with the relevant alleged, empirical, and a priori, defeating claims. 
As before, let e5 be Euclid’s fifth postulate (illustrated by Fig. 1). At this 
point I could provide the two key counterpart postulates from Lobachevskian 
and Riemannian geometries respectively, but the latter of these is not so 
obviously in tension with e5 as it is with what I shall call p5 (the ‘parallel 
postulate’): 
 
(p5)  Exactly one line (l2) can be drawn through any point (p), not on a 
given line (l1), such that l2 is parallel to (i.e. does not intersect)107 l1. 
(See Fig. 2.) 
 
 
. 
    p 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 
 
 
The parallel postulate, p5, is not equivalent to e5, but it follows from the 
additional assumption that two straight lines meet only at one point, together 
with the conjunction of e5 and its converse.108 Now p5 is more informative for 
my purposes, as it is in direct contradiction with both its Lobachevskian and 
Riemannian counterparts; which I shall call l5 and r5, respectively: 
 
(l5) More than one line (l2-ln) can be drawn through any p, not on l1, such 
that l2-ln do not intersect l1. (See Fig. 3.) 
                                                         
107 This clarification is both supported by Euclid (Definition 23, in Heath 1956, p. 154) and 
necessary in order to draw out the contradictions with l5 and r5 below. 
108 I do not go into the details of this proof here, as it is one of the propositions of The Elements, 
and beyond the scope of this chapter. See Torretti 2008, §1 for details. 
l1 
l2 
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Fig. 3109 
 
 
(r5) Any line (l) drawn through any p (not on l1), will intersect l1. (See 
Fig. 4.) 
 
 
      . 
 
 
  
 
 
Fig. 4 
 
 
Just for clarity, let me make it clear that l5 is in direct contradiction with p5 and 
e5, whereas r5 only clearly contradicts p5. Looking back at e5 (and Fig. 1), this is 
because the Lobachevskian version of e5 would say something like, l2 to ln do 
not ‘meet on the same side as’ a and b; whereas the Riemannian version of e5 
would say that the lines ‘meet on the same side’, but that the relevant angles 
will be more than 180 (i.e. a denial of the antecedent of e5, as opposed to a 
clear contradiction). The Lobachevskian and Riemannian l5 and r5 however, are 
                                                         
109 Figs. 3 and 4 are stylized to illustrate the point. 
p 
l1 
l 
ln 
l2 
l1 
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clearly direct contradictions of p5—hence my focus on the latter in what 
follows.110 
As the foregoing is somewhat complex, let me recap what the alleged 
objection, and my response, is meant to be. I am trying to show that the a priori 
is not essentially empirically defeasible. Thus the relevant objection is not the 
general claim of a priori fallibilism that would follow from the argument that e5 
and p5 were a priori but not necessarily true propositions (of or about all 
possible spaces). Instead, the relevant objection is that Euclidean geometry and 
p5 in particular are empirically defeasible and, indeed, were so defeated by 
Eddington’s experiments corroborating General Relativity. Again because of the 
complexity of the issue at hand, let me recap the general form of the empirical 
defeasibility objection, and my response, from §2.1. There I claimed that if we 
have some a priori p and an alleged direct ‘empirical’ contradiction q, then 
instead of q defeating a priori p, q merely shows that p was not a priori in the 
first place. This is because, if we have a q that entails (or is equivalent to) ¬p, 
then (at least) ◊q would be available a priori;111 and it is this possibility (◊¬p) 
that is what really defeats p qua a priori proposition. The point being, if we 
appear to be able to have p a priori and yet we also have ◊¬p, then p cannot be 
truly said to be a priori (knowable or justifiable) after all.112 Now this is where 
the Euclid example is enlightening since, I claim, it is an even clearer case 
where the relevant, alleged, empirical q is not fully a posteriori. To see this, let p 
be p5 (as above) and now let q be the true empirical claim (if it is true) that 
(actual) space-time exhibits a Riemannianmixed curvature113 and note that the 
assumption that p5 was intended to describe actual space is essential for those 
who claim that it is potentially problematic in terms of being a priori and not 
necessarily true (since if p5 is necessarily true of some abstract, Euclidean 
space, then the original objection—that it is actually false and so not 
necessary—does not apply).  
                                                         
110 As BonJour (1998, p. 219, n. 4) points out, the situation is not even as simple as the one I 
describe. In elliptic or Riemannian geometry, some of the other definitions, common notions 
and/or postulates must be slightly altered—most notably straight lines are closed great circles 
on the surface of a sphere. I ignore such subtleties for present purposes. 
111 With the possible exception of ‘unknowables’ such as (for potential example) Goldbach’s 
conjecture, which is discussed in the following chapters. 
112 As I have said before, this very much turns on the nature of the relevant necessity—to be 
discussed at length in the following chapters. 
113 See n. 44 for the ‘mixed’ subscript. 
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Apparently then we have a priori p, q and q  ¬p, so ¬p and therefore 
(I claim) a disproof of p’s status as a priori. That is, we have an alleged case of 
empirical defeat of an a priori claim. Now, as before, I claim that this has things 
the wrong way round for the two following reasons. First, q here (and mutatis 
mutandis elsewhere), is not fully a posteriori; this is quite clear from the 
foregoing discussion of Riemannian geometry, which establishes (at least) the 
possibility of q on a fully a priori basis. Second therefore, as I argued in §2.1, the 
defeat of a priori p by q, does not show that the a priori is essentially 
empirically defeasible, it shows merely that p is revisable in the light of 
additional a priori reasoning. That is to say, p is revisable on a priori grounds 
and was therefore not genuinely a priori in the first place, despite appearing to 
be a priori to thinkers such as Euclid and his followers. In the following 
paragraphs, I intend to support these two claims and extend them beyond the 
Euclidean case, such that in general a priori p cannot be essentially defeated 
by an empirical q. 
My argument is that in the apparent case of empirical defeat of p5 by a q 
such as actual space-time exhibits a Riemannianmixed curvature, whilst we 
might happen to discover a posteriori that space-time is so curved, this 
possibility (i.e. ◊q) is also fully entertainable a priori. This much is 
demonstrated by the very existence of the entirely a priori rival systems of 
Lobachevsky and Riemann; l5 and r5 being fully a priori possible alternatives to 
p5. So, I claim, in the Euclid example (and mutatis mutandis for other examples), 
it could (and perhaps should) have been open to Euclid to imagine a flat space-
time and therefore, that a priori ◊p5 (as opposed to a priori p5); or an 
elliptical space-time and therefore ◊r5; or indeed, a hyperbolic space-time and 
therefore ◊l5. If these genuine possibilities were entertainable by Riemann and 
Lobachevsky, then had he done more a priori reasoning, the same possibilities 
would have been open to Euclid. That is, although short on empirical evidence, 
it could (and should) have been open to a thinker in Euclid’s position to 
entertain, fully a priori, that ◊p5, ◊r5 and ◊l5, and that all of these, as opposed to 
p5, r5 and l5 themselves, are a priori.114 This being the case, with hindsight, we 
                                                         
114 Pending, of course, more a priori reasoning about the nature of space and the kind of 
modality involved in apriority. I.e. could space be flat, hyperbolic or elliptical? And in what 
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can say that (pending further a priori reflection) it is ◊p5, ◊r5 and ◊l5 that are a 
priori, and therefore, arguably, that ◊p5  ◊r5  ◊l5 . In addition, given that 
we can only conclude that a priori ◊p5, as opposed to a priori p5, we should 
also conclude that further empirical work is required to see which of p5, r5 or l5 
applies to the actual world. This, I think, is both a fair result and the correct 
interpretation of the Euclidean case. 
Now the foregoing is perhaps not the standard response to the alleged 
problem of Euclidean geometry. This being the case, there are several potential 
counter-responses and clarifications. Not all of the options I shall present are 
direct objections to my response, in that some would also undermine 
assumptions that I share with the standard interpretation of the Euclidean case 
(such as e5/p5’s application to actual space being disproved by Eddington’s 
observations). I turn to these objections first, followed by a consideration of 
objections targeted specifically at my response. 
First then, there is the case of ‘absolute’ or ‘neutral’ geometry. This system 
was put forward by Janos Bolyai,115 and employs all standard definitions, 
common notions and postulates of standard, Euclidean geometry, with the 
notable exception of e5. Within absolute geometry it is then possible to prove 
the first 28 propositions of The Elements. The point here is that whilst we might 
be right to conclude that e5/p5 is false and therefore neither necessary nor, 
strictly, a priori, a limited system, excluding e5, would be both a priori and 
necessary. Now, in terms of the detailed modal issues, I return to these in the 
following chapters, so here, I want only to discuss the basic potential of this 
objection, which, as I see it, is limited. The problem being that whilst absolute 
geometry might be entirely a priori and ‘necessary’, qua formally or logically 
necessary, systems including e5, r5 and l5 are still open and rival metaphysical 
possibilities, demonstrating that absolute geometry cannot be the whole, 
(metaphysically) necessary truth. Moreover, as above, it would still be an 
empirical question as to which geometry most accurately describes actual 
space. So, whilst keeping the a priori elements of Euclidean geometry a priori, 
this response imputes the wrong kind of necessity (formal or logical) and so is 
                                                                                                                                                              
sense of could? 
115 See Torretti 2008, §1. 
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largely irrelevant to arguments that Euclidean geometry might be a priori but 
not actually true and so not (metaphysically) necessary.116 
Second, and very much related to the first, is the objection that instead of 
saying that Kant, for example, was just wrong about the a priori and alethic 
status of e5/p5, we should parse p5 into two separate claims along something 
like the following lines; p5-1, an a priori and (formally, logically) necessary 
claim about parallels and straight lines concerning an abstract Euclidean space, 
where lines are straight and so parallels never do intersect; and p5-2, an a 
posteriori and false claim that p5-1 also applies to actual space.117 Now, there 
are similar logical/metaphysical modal issues with this objection as with the 
former, so I shall not repeat those points. That said, the main problem with this 
objection is that it misrepresents the intellectual history in a way that 
undermines the point of the objection. Euclid’s e5/p5 were (and are) standardly 
taken to be a priori and putatively metaphysically necessary; e5/p5 appear to be 
neither necessary nor actually true; so at least regarding e5/p5, apriority and 
necessity appear to come apart. My response, that e5/p5 is neither a priori nor 
necessary, seems the clearest and simplest response to the case; moreover it is 
in no way troubled by this line of objection. This is because even if we do 
assume that Euclid was not offering a potential a priori account of actual space, 
and that Kant was wrong in his analysis of the situation, the objection that there 
are really two propositions in p5 is not actually a problem for my thesis. The 
point being, I am merely using the Euclidean case to support the claim that the 
a priori is immune to empirical defeat. The alleged bifurcation of e5/p5 into an 
unassailable a priori and necessary element and a defeated and false a 
posteriori element would not trouble this claim. 
Third however, there is a potential objection that e5/p5 might be true of 
actual space in a related way to that indicated above. As BonJour notes, either 
actual space might consist in a flat Minkowski space-time (and so Einstein did 
not discover a Riemannianmixed curvature, but rather that “the effects of 
gravitation are far more complicated and pervasive than Newtonian physicists 
                                                         
116 I realise it is difficult to separate out the specific geometric and modal issues throughout this 
brief consideration of objections. My strategy is to try to keep modal points to a minimum, but, 
where necessary, to hint at the conclusions I draw in following chapters. 
117 I have discussed this point with members of Durham’s Eidos postgraduate group—Michael 
Turp and Tuomas Tahko in particular. 
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had realised”),118 or space-time might also be flat and the apparent curvature of 
light rays around heavy objects in no way necessitates the identification of 
‘straight’ lines with such light rays.119 This latter point is extremely close to the 
main line hinted at in the previous objections. The point being that “our 
intuitive notion of straightness” might be such that it precludes curved light 
rays as being straight. As with the previous objection then, my response here is 
to agree that this is all well and possible, but that it misrepresents the 
Euclidean case and history of thought on the matter, and that it is not a problem 
for my initial response in an exactly parallel manner to the second objection. 
That is, I very much assume for the sake of argument, that Einstein and 
Eddington corroborate the application of a Riemannianmixed geometry to actual 
space-time, but then conclude that this is not a problem either (i) in terms of 
empirical defeasibility of a priori reasoning (since ◊r5 and ◊l5 are also available 
a priori); or (ii) as regards a priori reasoning leading to false conclusions (since, 
I claim, e5/p5 is not genuinely a priori in the first place). 
Having considered three potential problems that do not directly contradict 
my analysis of the Euclidean case, I now turn to two further objections that are 
apparently more problematic. 
Fourth then, is the general claim that a proposition’s truth-value and its 
justification (and a fortiori its a priori justification) are independent. In 
particular, so the point is alleged to go, e5/p5 might be justified a priori, even 
though false. This being the case, the problem is meant to be that a priori 
justification can be, and is, undermined or defeated by empirical evidence and 
in a way that suggests that a priori justification is thoroughly unreliable, and so 
does not guarantee (necessary) truth.120 My response to this objection is to 
rehearse my arguments from above, to the effect that e5/p5 in this situation 
would be neither true nor, strictly, justified a priori. The point being, whilst I 
endorse fallibilism, if further a priori reasoning shows that e5/p5 is false, then 
strictly e5/p5 should not be viewed as genuinely justified a priori in the first 
place. This being the case, as I claim above, it is not e5/p5 that is a priori in the 
                                                         
118 BonJour 1998, p. 221. 
119 Op. cit., pp. 223-4. 
120 As noted in §2.1, I am indebted to conversations with Donnchadh O’Conaill, Fraser MacBride 
and Tim Crane here (and throughout §6). 
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first place, but rather (something like) ◊e5/p5  ◊r5  ◊l5. This is to say, if the 
objection is that a priori justification can lead to false propositions, and in a 
systematically unreliable way, my response is that whilst, historically, this 
might appear to be the case, with additional a priori reasoning (either 
individual or collective) it is possible to correct the original ‘a priori’ intuitions 
to the effect that they were not genuinely a priori in the first place. As I hint 
above, the essence of this objection is to assent to the thesis of a priori 
fallibilism. As that topic occupies the following section and as I do tentatively 
endorse it there, I leave more detailed remarks until then. In very brief detail 
for now, what I would say is that a priori reasoning is fallible but corrigible—
whilst prima facie a priori reasoning is highly fallible, if a particular ‘a priori’ 
proposition is corrected with further a priori reasoning (as per e5/p5), then we 
must conclude that, whilst that proposition might have appeared a priori-for-
some-thinker-s, it is not, more widely or secunda facie a priori. 
Fifth and finally, I turn to the claim that whilst I might successfully have 
argued that the two cases used in this chapter (mathematical error and e5/p5) 
are ones where there is no genuine empirical defeat of a priori knowledge, I 
cannot generalise this to all cases of a priori knowledge. That is, I have not and 
cannot show that the a priori is immune to empirical defeat. Why might this be 
urged? Well, in the relevant sections, I put forward the general argument that 
where some alleged empirical defeater q is meant to show ¬p despite a priori 
p, given that this q is an item of a posteriori knowledge concerning contingent 
objects and properties, ◊q should thereby be a potential item of a priori 
knowledge; so it is not a posteriori q that defeats a priori p, but rather a 
priori ◊q, q  ¬p and similar arguments as above, to the effect that a false p 
cannot be necessarily true and therefore, ultimately, cannot be justified a priori. 
Now, the objection to this is as follows. Imagine some q such that q is a 
posteriori but unknown (and perhaps an ‘unknowable’ item of a posteriori 
knowledge), such that currently whilst we might take p to be a priori justified, 
true and thereby an item of a priori knowledge, there is, nonetheless, this 
unknown q such that were it to be discovered that q, then q  ¬p and so on, 
as before. 
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My response to this objection is as follows. If q is a potential item of a 
posteriori knowledge, then no matter how ‘unknowable’ this knowledge might 
be, if it is potential knowledge, then ◊q is a potential item of a priori 
knowledge.121 I would then run the arguments of the previous paragraph (and 
relevant sections) again. The only situation where this argument might be 
problematic is that whereby q is literally ‘unknowable’, but here, if q is literally 
unknowable, then p’s status as a priori is unlikely ever to be interestingly 
challenged anyway. Of course, this is a very difficult case to imagine, never 
mind to assess. What is being suggested here is something akin to a contingent 
but unknowable q, analogous to a necessary but unknowable proposition such 
as Goldbach’s conjecture. The obvious problem being, just what would be an 
example of such an a posteriori ‘unknowable’ proposition? Even if we could 
label such a proposition q (for the sake of argument), if q is a possible, 
contingent fact, then ◊q is surely a possible item of a priori knowledge, even if q 
is ‘unknowable’. This being the case, I would run the relevant arguments again, 
but with the added caveat that we were now dealing with a posteriori and a 
priori ‘unknowable’ propositions. 
 
 
6 Fallibility 
 
Given what I have said so far, it is possible to allege a suggestion of what might 
be called ‘good, old-fashioned infallibilism’ against my position; if the a priori is 
immune to empirical defeat and if additional a priori reasoning is 
systematically and successfully corrective, then it might appear that the 
deliverances of such ‘corrected’ a priori insight are certain; the a priori, in the 
‘genuine’ sense I seem to intend, is infallible. In this section, I intend to address 
this possibility and agree (albeit in a qualified manner) with those moderate 
rationalists122 who hold that (despite its power and indispensability for rational 
activity) a priori reasoning is fallible in some sense. Given what I say in 
                                                         
121 I realise that this paragraph is contentious and leaves a lot to be discussed. I discuss the 
issue of ‘knowability’ in more detail in §4, above, and with respect to Goldbach’s conjecture 
again (in still more detail) in the following chapter. 
122 Bealer (1999, 2002) and BonJour 1998 for example. 
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previous sections however, my stance on fallibilism is going to be somewhat 
different from the standard position. In short, the standard position is that 
there are two main sources of a priori defeasibility and therefore two main, 
general sources that demonstrate a priori fallibility; (i) cases of a priori 
justification that are defeated by empirical evidence; and (ii) cases of general 
errors in a priori reasoning (which, I suggest, can be corrected upon further a 
priori reasoning). Given what I say concerning empirical defeasibility, as 
regards a priori fallibility I more or less accept (ii) here, but deny the essentially 
empirical (i); if there is no genuine source of empirical defeat and correction of 
a priori justification (i.e. no source of defeat that is essentially independent of 
additional a priori reasoning), then the only genuine source of error is mistaken 
reasoning (and importantly then, correction is via further such a priori 
reasoning). If however (as I might appear to suggest in the relevant sections), a 
‘corrected’ a priori p is then taken to be a priori (i.e. ‘secunda facie’ a priori), 
then the objection would then go that this latter proposition is a priori and 
(necessarily) true qua infallible. In this brief section I need to clarify and defend 
my position that whilst such ‘secunda facie’ a priori reasoning might be more 
reliable than prima facie a priori insight, the former is, ultimately, fallible in the 
same sense, if not to the same degree as the latter. 
Now, the main and obvious problem with any position that seems to imply 
infallibility of a priori reasoning is the sheer amount of compelling examples of 
‘a priori’ propositions that subsequently turn out to be mistaken—or simply 
false.123 If for example, philosophy is a largely a priori discipline, one only need 
cite the history of wide disagreements on central matters of metaphysics, 
epistemology and ethics, to show that (assuming that at least some of the 
disputants are wrong), some allegedly a priori claims are in fact false. Further 
examples are also evident from mathematics and logic, where theorems taken 
to be self-evident are sometimes overturned, occasionally even centuries after 
their initial postulation or even ‘proof’. An obvious example from this domain is 
the very case of Euclidean geometry I have been discussing in detail above. A 
final set of examples comes from the standard errors in reasoning, calculation 
and proof that should be apparent to anyone who has ever attempted such 
                                                         
123 I am indebted to BonJour (1998, pp. 110-5) here, at least for some of the initial examples and 
problems. My response to those problems differs from BonJour’s. 
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processes. All of which being the case, despite denying genuine cases of 
essentially empirical defeasibility and corrigibility, I would like to avoid the 
conclusion that general a priori reasoning is infallible. 
My response to this problem is to admit a priori fallibility; we can and do 
have a priori disagreements in philosophy; we can and do make mistakes in 
reasoning, proof and even simple calculation, and on many occasions. So, does 
my suggestion that there is a distinction between prima facie and ‘secunda facie’ 
a priori reasoning (i.e. where an initial a priori p has been corrected by further a 
priori reasoning that ¬p) imply that whilst the former is fallible, the latter is 
infallible? Well, here I would reply that whilst the former is fallible, so too is the 
latter (if only to a lesser degree), for the two following reasons. First, it is 
fallible in the sense that ‘further a priori reasoning’ is an ongoing and 
essentially incomplete process.124 So for example, returning to the Euclidean 
case, where I claim that p5 is, on further a priori reasoning, not genuinely a 
priori in the first place, this is not to say that the modified conclusions—a 
priori ◊p5 or a priori (◊p5  ◊r5  ◊l5)—are genuinely a priori and thereby 
somehow necessary or certain; rather, it is to say that they are less prima facie 
a priori, and therefore less fallible, but still, essentially fallible. Hence my 
describing this as ‘secunda facie’ a priori justification, as opposed to ‘genuine’ 
apriority. 
Second, relatedly and perhaps more clearly, there is simply no obvious 
criterion that would demarcate in advance and in any useful way, cases of prima 
facie and genuine a priori justification.125 So, whilst I do claim that cases of 
apparent a priori justification, such as e5/p5, turn out not to be cases of genuine 
a priori justification given further a priori reflection, this in no way guarantees 
that the modified, ‘secunda facie’ a priori conclusions, ◊p5 or (◊p5  ◊r5  
◊l5), are genuine in the sense of being infallible, certain and certainly 
necessary. What this also seems to show, I think, is that we must make the 
distinction between prima and secunda facie a priori justification on an ongoing, 
case by case and, essentially, incomplete basis. Thus, there is a strong sense in 
which even very clearly and rigorously reasoned a priori propositions are, 
                                                         
124 Although something would have to be seriously amiss for propositions such as 2 + 2 = 4 to 
be a priori and false. Some a priori propositions clearly approach certainty? 
125 But see the previous footnote. 
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ultimately, ‘prima facie’, at least in the sense of being fallible in the same way (if 
not to the same degree) as clearly prima facie a priori propositions. 
In essence then, what I am saying is that a priori justification is generally 
fallible. Prima facie ‘a priori’ propositions such as p5 are very fallible and so only 
very fallibly do they ‘guarantee’ (necessary) truth. On further rational 
reflection, such propositions are corrigible; i.e. qua secunda facie a priori 
propositions. That said, even such secunda facie propositions are fallible—even 
if ‘collective apriority’ approaches (necessary) truth; a priori reasoning then, is 
a fallible guide to necessary truth; only if p is ‘genuinely’ a priori can p be said to 
be certainly (necessarily) true. In a sense then, my position is perhaps close to 
that of falsificationism with respect to empirical knowledge; x knows (a priori) 
that p does not guarantee that (necessarily) p but if further evidence (or a 
priori reasoning) shows that ¬p, then, quite clearly, the original (a priori) 
knowledge claim ought to be revised. That is, inasmuch as knowledge entails 
truth, apriority entails necessity; if p is a genuine item of (a priori) knowledge, 
then p must be (necessarily) true. 
In this chapter, I have suggested that the a priori is independent of 
experience, possibly in virtue of involving a constrained kind of necessity, 
underlying both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ accounts. Additionally, in virtue of 
being independent of experience, a priori justification is not essentially 
defeasible by empirical evidence; rather, it is revisable in the light of further, 
secunda facie a priori reasoning. Having tentatively admitted a priori fallibility, 
whilst endorsing such a strong link between apriority and necessity, I now note 
that what is really of interest in a priori claims (indeed, what I claim underpins 
the positive accounts discussed above), is the kind of modality involved therein; 
although a priori reasoning is fallible, genuine apriority entails necessity—but 
in what sense of ‘necessity’? I.e. what is the nature of the modality involved in 
such a priori reasoning? In particular, does a priori p entail that p is a 
metaphysically necessary truth? Clearly then, the time has come to consider the 
relationship between the a priori and modality in more detail. 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
 
 
Coincidence, Goldbach and the  
Contingent A Priori 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter suggests that the a priori is deeply tied to some (however 
constrained) form of necessity. Accordingly, in this and the next chapter, I begin 
the detailed discussion of this relationship. In §2 I introduce and discuss the 
‘coincidence thesis’ (CT)—that apriority and necessity are coextensive (and 
mutatis mutandis aposteriority and contingency)—using Goldbach’s conjecture 
(GC) both to disambiguate the thesis and to begin to suggest that (in its 
strongest variants at least) it is false. In particular, I suggest that (CT) is better 
represented as a set of four sub-theses, (CT1) to (CT4), and, since Goldbach’s 
conjecture only refutes one of these, (CT3), it is insufficient to demonstrate the 
falsity of (CT) in general. In §3 I discuss the contingent a priori, denying all of 
the Kripkean examples but giving greater consideration to a range of additional, 
putative ‘indexical’ cases, such as ‘I exist’. If any of these provide genuine 
examples of the contingent a priori, then (CT1) and (CT4)—in addition to 
(CT3)—would be refuted. That said, I conclude that such cases are not genuine 
and, indeed, that there is no substantive class of such propositions. Having said 
this, I also claim that a correct understanding of the contingent a priori requires 
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two significant contributions to our understanding of epistemology and 
metaphysics. First, it strongly suggests that there is a clear bifurcation between 
the metaphysical and epistemic domains. Second, in terms of metaphysics, I 
argue that the contingent a priori requires a clear understanding of the 
relationship between sentences, propositions and circumstances (or 
arrangements of objects and attributes126), as well as the related issue of de re 
and de dicto modality. That is, we need to understand what proposition a 
particular sentence asserts and (where possible) the natures of the relevant 
objects and attributes. 
 
 
2 The coincidence thesis and Goldbach’s conjecture 
 
As Kripke’s work in general suggests, although the a priori-a posteriori and 
necessary-contingent distinctions are closely related, this does not show that 
apriority and necessity, and aposteriority and contingency are coextensive. 
Indeed, as Kripke so often points out (pace much of the history of epistemology 
and metaphysics), it would be surprising if they were coextensive, since they 
are not of the same kind. The a priori-a posteriori distinction is, as standardly 
understood, an epistemic one concerning a proposition’s justification or 
knowability; the necessary-contingent distinction is a metaphysical one 
concerning either a proposition’s modal truth (de dicto modality) or concerning 
the relevant objects’ and attributes’ modal status (de re modality). 
BonJour makes similar claims to some of those I make in the previous 
chapter. Specifically he claims that a priori justification is independent of 
experience, by way of the latter’s being essentially perceptual in character and 
so being causally related to particular, contingent features of the world, thereby 
yielding contingent propositions; whereas apriority (as evinced by 
mathematical insight, for example), is “concerned with eternal, abstract and 
necessarily existent objects” and its “deliverances consist solely of (putatively) 
necessary truths”.127 Since I claim that a priori justification is independent of 
                                                         
126 I.e. properties and relations. 
127 BonJour 1998, p. 8; cf. pp. 11-2, 100-10 and p. 224, BonJour 2005, pp. 99-100. 
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experience in virtue of concerning ‘necessary’ propositions, it would appear 
that both BonJour and I might be committed to something that BonJour calls the 
‘coincidence thesis’ (CT),128 namely that 
 
(LB-CT1) “necessity…coincide[s] with apriority” and 
(LB-CT2)  “contingency [coincides] with aposteriority”.129 
 
In fact, in what follows I claim that BonJour’s presentation of (CT) is somewhat 
equivocal; some clarification is therefore required. It is at least fairly clear that 
(LB-CT1) and (LB-CT2) represent something like two biconditionals. Hence for 
purposes of disambiguation let us re-present (CT) as the following sub-theses: 
 
(CT1) apriority entails necessity;130 
(CT2) aposteriority entails contingency;  
(CT3) necessity entails apriority; and 
(CT4) contingency entails aposteriority. 
 
There is a significant problem confronting anyone who endorses (CT) qua 
the conjunction of all four sub-theses; its probable falsehood in the light of 
compelling, potential counter-examples, such as the contingent a priori, the 
necessary a posteriori and ‘unknowable’ but necessary (or contingent) 
propositions. If ‘genuine’ (or perhaps secunda facie) a priori justification is of 
(or aimed at) metaphysically necessary truths and if a posteriori justification 
only concerns contingent features of the actual world, this would certainly 
seem to imply (CT), at least qua both (CT1) and (CT2), but arguably it would 
appear to suggest (CT3) and (CT4) as well. The problem with this implication is 
as follows. As regards (CT3), some mathematical propositions are very 
plausibly necessarily true (or false) but not justified a priori, in virtue of being 
                                                         
128 BonJour 1998, p. 12. 
129 Ibid., my numbering. 
130 The (CT) theses should be understood as schematic and idealised. That is, I appear to ignore 
some of the qualifications the previous chapter, such as subjectivity and fallibilism. What I am 
getting at is that apriority should be understood as success-driven, truth-oriented and 
normative; as we happen to do a priori reasoning it is a fallible but corrigible process 
(approaching—necessary?—truth) but what we are aiming for is (necessary?) truth. Each 
thesis should then be understood (in the relevant idealised way) as shorthand for (mutatis 
mutandis) (CTn) If p is justifiable (e.g.) a priori then p must be (e.g.) necessarily true. 
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unknown or even unknowable—e.g. (GC), as introduced in the previous 
chapter. 
In the remainder of this section, I use (GC) (and a potential, generic 
‘contingent equivalent’, which I label (CGC) for ease of reference)131 for two 
main purposes. First, (GC) shows that (CT) must be disambiguated into the four 
sub-theses mentioned above. The point being, the a priori and a posteriori are 
not interdefinable and so do not exhaust the possibilities with respect to our 
epistemic access to propositions; some propositions are neither a priori nor a 
posteriori, so apriority cannot be the same as non-aposteriority (and vice versa). 
Metaphysical necessity and contingency, on the other hand, are so 
interdefinable and exhaustive, strongly suggesting that the rational and modal 
domains are not fully coextensive. So (CT) cannot be the biconditional 
suggested by BonJour’s two theses above; it is (at best) some combination of 
the four sub-theses. 
Second, I use (GC) and its ‘contingent equivalent’ (CGC)—i.e. a potentially 
unknowable, (generic) contingent proposition—to provide counter-examples 
to (CT3) and (CT4) simpliciter. In doing this, (GC) and (CGC) show that (CT) 
(qua conjunctive thesis) is untenable as stated; (CT) is, at best, either the 
conjunction or disjunction of (CT1) and (CT2), or it is some combination of 
suitably attenuated versions of all four theses. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I focus on (CT1) and the contingent a 
priori, eventually endorsing a suitably modified version of the thesis. I discuss 
(CT2) and the necessary a posteriori in ch. 5, where I endorse a similarly 
modified thesis, suggesting that it is also possible to hold very much attenuated 
versions of (CT3) and (CT4). Ultimately then, although I deny (CT) as it stands, I 
suggest that on suitably modified versions of the four sub-theses, some 
reasonably strong alignment of rationality and modality is tenable. In so 
discussing the modal issues of apriority, I also begin to suggest a final, positive 
account (towards the end of this chapter and throughout the following); 
apriority should be understood in terms of a more constrained ‘epistemic’ 
modality, which I call ‘rational necessity’. 
                                                         
131 I do not state (CGC) as a separate conjecture as I am using the label generically, to indicate a 
putative, contingent thesis that is unknown or unknowable in a manner isomorphic to that of 
(GC) qua necessary but unknowable thesis. 
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At this point, it would be wise to recall the working understanding of 
modality, outlined in Chapter 1, §1. Together with the foregoing paragraphs, 
such an account suggests that the domains of epistemic justification and 
metaphysical modality are distinct. As I claim above, Goldbach’s conjecture 
strongly supports this suggestion. This being the case, let us look at (GC) with 
respect to the a priori-a posteriori distinction. As with the coextensiveness of 
the a priori-a posteriori and necessary-contingent distinctions, there is a 
historical tendency to assume that the a priori and a posteriori are 
interdefinable; apriority is non-aposteriority and aposteriority is non-apriority. 
The problem with this alleged, two-way equivalence is that unknowable 
mathematical propositions present clear counter-examples. The point being, 
(GC) is currently an unproved (and potentially unprovable) mathematical 
theorem, in virtue of which it is a proposition whose truth-value is currently 
unknown (and is possibly unknowable simpliciter). Assuming (GC) to be an 
unprovable theorem, it is not justified, and not justifiable, either a priori or a 
posteriori. Thus (GC) appears strongly to suggest that the a priori and a 
posteriori do not exhaust the possibilities with respect to our epistemic access 
to propositions; some are a priori, some are a posteriori and some (for example, 
the unknowable mathematical propositions) are neither a priori nor a 
posteriori. Therefore, (GC) is a strong counter-example to the thesis that the a 
priori and a posteriori are interdefinable and especially to the claim that 
aposteriority is non-apriority. 
In demonstrating that the a priori and a posteriori are not exhaustive with 
respect to our epistemic access to propositions, (GC) thereby helps to show that 
BonJour’s, 
 
(LB-CT1) necessity coincides with apriority 
 
and 
 
(LB-CT2)  contingency coincides with aposteriority, 
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are not the complete story with respect to (CT). The problem with this 
statement of (CT) is that if ‘coincides with’ is read along the lines of a 
biconditional, and if contingency is the same property as non-necessity and 
aposteriority is the same as non-apriority, then the two would appear to be 
equivalent. That BonJour accepts the latter equivalence (aposteriority and non-
apriority) seems to be suggested by his discussion of Goldbach’s conjecture as a 
counter-example to the following, third thesis: 
 
(LB-CT3) “necessity entails apriority (or, equivalently, that aposteriority 
entails contingency)”.132 
 
Here, BonJour is appealing to contraposition, and so assuming that 
contingency is non-necessity—with which I agree—and that aposteriority is 
non-apriority, which is what I dispute. The problem with this alleged 
equivalence of aposteriority and non-apriority is, as already suggested, that 
unknowable necessary propositions—Goldbach’s conjecture being a prime, 
putative example—present clear counter-examples; they are neither a priori 
nor, clearly, a posteriori. Qua counter-example to the alleged equivalence of 
aposteriority and non-apriority then, (GC) shows that (LB-CT1) and (LB-CT2) 
are not, after all, equivalent, and that the two sections of (LB-CT3) do not 
constitute an example of contraposition. The point being, Goldbach’s conjecture 
is only a counter-example to (LB-CT1) and the non-parenthesised section of (LB-
CT3); not (LB-CT2) and the parenthesised section of (LB-CT3). All of which 
suggests (i) a confusion in BonJour’s presentation of (CT), which would be best 
remedied by (ii) a strict conditional, as opposed to a biconditional, reading and 
so (iii) the interpretation I present here, together with the additional clauses 
(CT3) and (CT4). 
As well as saying that (CT) is best parsed into four separate conditionals, I 
also claim that (GC) and its (generic) ‘contingent equivalent’ (CGC) provide 
clear counter-examples to two of those conditionals, (CT3) and (CT4) 
respectively. I have already discussed (GC) in some depth, so let me now focus 
on potential examples of (CGC) and its impact. Of course, an immediate, 
                                                         
132 BonJour 1998, p. 13, my italics. 
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potential objection to such a proposition would be to doubt its existence; that 
(CGC) seems possible however is, I think, undeniable. Perhaps the best way to 
demonstrate this is via some examples. One such example might consist in 
some statement of theoretical physics that is constitutionally or physically 
unknowable. For example, the initial conditions of the universe are X at t0 (p), 
where X is described by some complex mathematico-physical statement, 
unknowable in virtue of the fact that t0 is an unknowable ‘limit’; because, 
perhaps, of the properties of the speed of light and our ensuing inability to 
observe such starting conditions. Presumably such a proposition would be a 
contingent truth; thus it would be an apparent counter-example to (CT4) and 
(in tandem with (GC)) to (CT) qua strong, conjunctive thesis. Having said this, 
one potential objection here concerns the contingencies involved; one might 
object that our inability to observe conditions at t0 is a mere, nomic or physical 
contingency; given this contingency, there is nothing stopping us, in principle, 
from knowing p here. Perhaps then (CGC) is less clear than its necessary 
counterpart, (GC). Either way, I think it is fairly clear that there are certainly 
strong, potential counter-examples to (CT4); and that, given the existence of 
(GC), (CT) is untenable as the conjunction of the sub-theses (CT1) to (CT4). This 
being the case, I now consider (CT1) and the contingent a priori, since this, if 
genuine, would be a clear counter-example to (CT1) and (CT4), leaving (CT2) as 
the only potentially tenable sub-thesis. 
 
 
3 The contingent a priori133 
 
So far I have suggested that the contingent a priori is deeply related to the issue 
of the kind of modality involved in the a priori. I also claim that a correct 
understanding of the contingent a priori requires a clear understanding of what 
proposition(s) a putative contingent a priori sentence expresses and of what 
circumstances (i.e. objects and attributes) such propositions are about or 
involve. Third and finally, in claiming that a priori deliverances are somehow 
                                                         
133 See Kripke 1980, pp 14-5, 54-7, 75-9 and passim; and Plantinga 1974, pp. 7-9. For discussion 
see Fitch 2004, pp. 116-7. 
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‘necessary’, I am apparently more obviously committed to (CT1)—that 
apriority entails necessity—than I am to any of the other sub-theses.134 This 
being the case, we need to understand whether and how (CT1) might be true; 
we need to consider the contingent a priori qua putative counter-example to 
that thesis. In what follows, I begin with this final issue, but in discussing the 
contingent a priori qua putative counter-example, I also begin the discussion of 
the kind of modality involved in apriority and the relationship between 
sentences, propositions and circumstances—i.e. the first and second issues, 
above. 
I discuss Kripke’s putative ‘metre stick’ example (S) briefly in the 
introductory chapter (and with respect to two-dimensionalist analyses of 
apriority). Clearly a re-presentation of this material would be somewhat otiose, 
nevertheless the force of the objections to Kripke’s examples of the contingent 
a priori very much relies on understanding his distinction between ‘providing a 
synonymous meaning’ and ‘fixing a reference’. Accordingly, in the following I 
set aside the discussion of two-dimensionalism, provide a more detailed 
analysis of the synonymy/reference-fixing distinction and discuss further the 
problems besetting the standard metre stick example (in §3.1); I then go into 
much greater depth with respect to some potentially clearer, indexical 
examples of the contingent a priori (§§3.2 and 3.3); before discussing the 
relationship between apriority, introspection and causation135 (§3.4). 
BonJour also considers Kripke’s metre stick example:136 
 
(S) ‘stick s is one metre long at t0’. 
 
BonJour’s analysis is initially that (S) is putatively a priori, since the speaker 
uses the length of s at t0 to fix the reference of the metre, yet contingent, given 
that the length of s at t0 does not provide the meaning of the relevant property—
s could have been a different length at t0. He goes on to claim however that the 
                                                         
134 As before, I remind the reader of my position on fallibilism. That is, I would seem more 
unequivocally committed to (CT1), in that a priori reasoning appears to result in necessary 
propositions (at least on an ‘as yet undefeated’ basis). 
135 Cf. ch. 2, §2.2. 
136 BonJour 1998, pp. 12-3. BonJour’s example sentence is not quite the same as the one I use. I 
use the Kripkean ‘stick s is one meter long’ together with the temporal addendum (that Kripke 
goes on to suggest), so as to avoid problems of immediate changes in length. 
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example is not, ultimately, convincing, arguing briefly that there is a difference 
between how we fix the reference of a term and how the relevant reference-
fixing “general concept[s]” apply to the relevant objects.137 Thus, (S) analyses 
out into two separate propositions; one (a priori and necessary) relating a 
property and its reference-fixing, initial dubbing, and another (a posteriori and 
contingent) applying that property to s. Now, BonJour’s discussion of the case is 
a little brief (it only occupies one paragraph of the Defense), so in what follows I 
supplement this line of argument with further discussion of the 
synonymy/reference-fixing distinction and with additional considerations 
concerning the (im)possibility of a priori knowledge of de re contingencies. 
Taken together, all of this suggests that the Kripkean examples of the 
contingent a priori are mistaken—and that the category as a whole is empty. 
 
 
3.1 Problems with the metre stick 
 
In The Nature of Necessity, Alvin Plantinga doubts that the metre stick example 
is a genuine case of the contingent a priori, arguing that it would be entirely 
possible, for example, never to have seen stick s and not to know its actual 
length yet still to use “‘one meter’ [sic] as a rigid designator of the length, 
whatever it is, [of s at to]”.138 According to this kind of objection, the utterer of a 
sentence expressing the proposition stick s is one metre long at t0 (p) would 
then know a priori that the sentence expressed some true proposition p (having 
introduced the relevant reference-fixing term), but he would not know a priori 
the nature of the proposition he was expressing; i.e. that the metre stick (the 
object) had the property of being one metre long. According to this line of 
objection p is indeed contingent but it is not known a priori. What the utterer 
does know a priori in the metre stick example is that “if I use ‘one meter’ as a 
rigid designator of the length of s…then [p] expresses a truth in my language. 
                                                         
137 BonJour 1998, p. 13. 
138 Plantinga 1974, pp. 8-9, n. 1. Cf. Donnellan 1977. For further discussion see Casullo 1977, 
2003, pp. 205-9; Evans 1979; Kitcher 1980a, 1980b; Salmon 1987; Fitch 2004, pp. 118-21; and 
Hughes 2004, pp. 95-107. 
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This conditional, however, is necessary rather than contingent”.139 Together 
with Donnellan’s (1977) similar line of argument, this forms the basis of the 
remainder of my discussion of the Kripkean cases. My version of the objection 
is slightly more complex (in order to deal with some replies), but the basic 
point is that alleged contingent a priori sentences analyse out into (at least) two 
propositions; one ‘wide’ (arguably de re), contingent but a posteriori; and 
another ‘narrow’ (and less clearly de dicto140) a priori but necessary. In short, I 
claim that you cannot have ‘wide’ (de re) a priori knowledge of contingent 
arrangements of objects and attributes. 
By way of fleshing out such claims, imagine that I introduce the name ‘Bob’ 
to fix the reference of the uppermost pebble on Mount Everest at t0 (via 
satisfaction of the relevant description). The supporter of the contingent a 
priori would then claim that having so introduced the ‘descriptive name’, ‘Bob’, 
I know the contingent, 
 
(1) Bob is the uppermost pebble on Mount Everest at t0 
 
on an a priori basis; i.e. (1) expresses a contingent a priori proposition. Against 
this however, I think it is not at all clear what proposition (1) is (or expresses); 
indeed, it is not clear whether (1) expresses a single proposition and whether 
any such proposition is contingent and a priori. In order to see this, let us turn 
to the alleged apriority of (1) first. Considered in isolation, it is not at all clear 
that (1) is straightforwardly a priori, since, first, apriority is (at least prima 
facie) an epistemic notion involving a subject, believer or knower; so there is a 
strong sense in which something asserted by (1) must be a priori for the 
introducer of ‘Bob’ (i.e. me in this case). Second however, it is still not clear that 
(1) is a priori (to me), at least not considered in isolation from the foregoing 
phrase ‘having introduced the name ‘Bob’’; so, what we must consider as being 
the correct candidate, putative contingent a priori claim is not (1) but 
something more like: 
 
                                                         
139 Plantinga 1974, p. 9, n. 1. 
140 Since the de re/de dicto distinction is complicated, as I explain below. I explain the ‘wide’ and 
‘narrow’ terminology throughout the following. 
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(1.1) if x introduces the name ‘Bob’ via the description ‘the uppermost 
pebble (…)’, then Bob is the uppermost pebble on Everest at t0. 
 
So is (1.1) a contingent a priori (for-x) sentence or proposition? Well even 
here, it is not clear that there is a single candidate proposition. First, there is 
what might be called a ‘wide’ proposition (which removes some of the 
subjective elements I have just mentioned); and second there is a ‘narrow’ 
proposition, which retains those elements. First then, considered widely, if we 
strip out as much of the ‘subjective’, ‘epistemic’ requirements of (1.1) as is 
possible, I think it then asserts something like the following proposition: 
 
(1.2) if ‘Bob’ is introduced as ‘the uppermost pebble (…)’, then, if there is 
such an object, Bob (the object) is the uppermost pebble (…) (the 
attribute).141 
 
The problem with (1.2) however, is that it exposes a tacit move (in the original 
(1) proposition) from names and predicates to objects and attributes; that is, 
from semantics to metaphysics. The point being, in order to know the 
contingent, de re circumstance that Bob is the uppermost pebble, it is 
necessary to have the relevant kind of direct and unavoidable, de re, causal and 
so empirical (i.e. a posteriori) interaction with the relevant, contingent 
circumstance(s). Now I say ‘the relevant kind’ here in order to deal with 
liberalist/chauvinist allegations. For example, one might urge that I am 
suggesting that direct and fully causal (e.g. quintessential) interaction is 
required, thereby ruling out much testimonial knowledge and justification. In 
response to this, I would say that knowledge by testimony is fine but the kind of 
‘knowledge-by-stipulation’ that is occurring in the Bob case is not tantamount 
to testimony. I fail to see how I can genuinely know an alleged circumstance by 
semantic trickery. 
Against this, it might be urged that the phrase ‘if there is such an object’ (i.e. 
the conditional aspect of (1.2)), allows for just such a move; no genuine de re 
                                                         
141 I embolden to stress the distinction between names and objects, on the one hand, and 
predicates (or descriptions) and attributes, on the other. 
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knowledge is required by the consequent, since its truth is conditional on the 
(de dicto?) antecedent. In response to this, however, the consequent certainly 
seems to involve a substantive, de re claim, so either it is such or some serious 
explanation to the contrary is required.142 In addition, such an appeal to 
conditionality (and to the claim that (1.2) is effectively, fully de dicto) still does 
not secure the move from premises about names and predicates to conclusions 
about objects and attributes; the point being one cannot generate substantive, a 
priori knowledge (conditional or otherwise) ‘at the stroke of a pen’ so to speak. 
That is, simply insisting that ‘Bob’ is a name does not succeed in generating Bob 
(and mutatis mutandis for ‘the uppermost pebble’); so, insisting that ‘Bob’ is 
‘the uppermost pebble’ does not entail that Bob is the uppermost pebble, 
conditionally or otherwise. All of this being the case, I claim that the wide (or de 
re) (1.2) is indeed contingent but also that it is substantively object-involving 
and, more importantly, it is existential and contingent property-ascribing, and 
as such requires direct and unavoidable, de re and so ultimately, a posteriori 
knowledge. So, if (1.2) is knowable, it is contingent but knowable only on an a 
posteriori basis. 
As indicated above however, there is a further, narrow proposition that 
(1.1) might be taken to express: 
 
(1.3) if ‘Bob’ is introduced as ‘the uppermost pebble (…)’, then ‘Bob’ is 
‘the uppermost pebble (…)’. 
 
Now, whilst this proposition might be a priori, I urge that it is also fairly clearly 
necessarily true, in that it is a narrow (perhaps de dicto)143 claim, making a 
general and conditional necessity claim about concerning names and 
predicates. As before however, any move to try to shore up the contingency or 
apriority of the proposition will either involve an unavoidable causal 
connection with the relevant objects and attributes (Bob’s being the 
                                                         
142 Moreover, if (1.2) is viewed as ‘fully de dicto’ I would argue that it collapses into (1.3); i.e. it 
would then be a necessary a priori proposition. 
143 As per some of the foregoing notes and main text, I am less confident that this is a fully de 
dicto proposition, hence the couching, ‘perhaps’. The point being (1.3) might still involve 
objects and attributes, albeit tendentiously. 
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uppermost pebble), so requiring de re a posteriori knowledge, or it will further 
involve viewing the antecedent a general, necessary but a priori conditional. 
What I am suggesting here is that (à la Salmon 1981) the move from 
semantics to metaphysics has the order of explanation the wrong way round. 
Alleged contingent a priori sentences either assert contingent but a posteriori, 
wide (or de re) propositions, or they assert narrow (or mixed de dicto/de re), a 
priori but necessary propositions. The key point being, one cannot generate 
substantive metaphysical conclusions from (trivial) logico-semantic premises; 
one cannot demonstrate the existence of the contingent a priori from the 
insistence that there can be descriptively introduced names whose references 
are fixed by descriptive predicates. 
Now Robin Jeshion objects to arguments such as those above, arguing that 
it is possible to have ‘acquaintanceless de re belief’.144 The basic idea being that 
where the speaker introduces a ‘Fregean’ or descriptive name (arguably like my 
‘Bob’ above),145 it is possible to have substantive, de re and a priori knowledge 
whether or not the relevant object exists. That is, it is possible to have such de re 
knowledge of fictional,146 and non-existent,147 objects. In brief detail, my reply 
to this argument is as follows. Whilst it is possible to assert a de re proposition 
via an apparently contingent a priori sentence, if that proposition is contingent, 
I would urge that given the existential and contingent property-ascribing 
nature of such a proposition, knowledge thereof must involve the relevant kind 
of unavoidable causal interaction with the relevant objects and attributes; that 
is, it must be a posteriori. If on the other hand, the sentence expresses an a 
priori proposition, then (as I further argue below) the relevant circumstance 
must be necessary. Thus, the issue is not the possibility of de re, a priori 
knowledge (which I accept—for necessary propositions and circumstances), 
but the possibility of de re, a priori knowledge of contingent circumstances 
(which I reject). In short, the very point of the contingent a priori is to challenge 
the traditional alignment of apriority with necessity by suggesting genuine a 
priori knowledge of contingent circumstances. If it is necessary to assume the 
                                                         
144 As urged by Jeshion 2001 and 2002. 
145 And as we shall see below, like Evans’s ‘Julius’. 
146 Jeshion 2002, p. 57. 
147 Op. cit., p. 58. 
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possibility of de re, a priori knowledge of contingent circumstances, in order to 
generate the contingent a priori, this would be a short and circuitous piece of 
reasoning. 
As should be evident, much of the foregoing turns on a distinction similar 
to the one suggested by Plantinga’s objection to Kripke’s contingent a priori. As 
I rely on this in what follows, let me now say a little more. My distinction is 
slightly more complex than Plantinga’s; it is that of a sentence expressing a 
proposition that is about, or asserts, a circumstance (i.e. an arrangement of 
objects and attributes). The point being, where a subject x ‘knows a priori’ that 
a sentence expresses a proposition p, given that apriority is a broadly epistemic 
notion, I argue that it operates at the (circumstantial and) propositional level(s) 
first and only derivatively at the sentential. Similarly, in terms of modality, I 
argue that this operates at the circumstantial and propositional levels, and then 
only derivatively at the sentential. In addition, as I argue above, if p asserts a 
contingent circumstance, some unavoidably causal, and so a posteriori 
justification is required in order to know the relevant circumstance—and so the 
nature of the proposition. What I mean here, is that for an individual to know 
precisely which proposition he is expressing (via some natural language 
sentence), he must know the nature of the relevant circumstance; he must 
know what arrangement of objects and attributes the proposition asserts. Thus, 
whilst a given p might assert a contingent circumstance such as a (possibly non-
existent) stick’s being a certain length, or a (possibly non-existent) pebble’s 
being so high, in failing to grasp the relevant circumstance (and in failing to rule 
out the possibility of empty—or multiple—reference, for example), the subject 
fails to have de re, contingent a priori knowledge of p; he fails to assert a 
contingent a priori proposition. More to the point, as I have argued already (and 
shall reinforce, below) and going beyond Plantinga, where such a contingent 
proposition is expressed, the subject’s failure to have de re, a priori knowledge 
is due to the fact that genuine a priori knowledge and justification must concern 
necessary propositions and circumstances; there cannot be contingent a priori 
propositions.148 
                                                         
148 Yablo 2007 provides an additional putative example: ‘Hot things feel different from cold 
things’. As in the main body, I would argue that this effectively boils down to (at least) two 
propositions, one quite clearly existentially committing and so contingent but a posteriori, 
 76 
 
 
 
Despite so arguing against the main lines of the Kripkean contingent a 
priori, I note that there is perhaps a disanalogy between the metre stick and the 
‘Bob’ case I introduce above. 149  Kripke provides several other putative 
examples of the contingent a priori in Naming and Necessity, most of which are 
closer to the ‘Bob’ than the metre stick case. If the disanalogy is sufficiently 
strong, perhaps a defender of Kripke’s contingent a priori could use this to 
respond to the foregoing; if on the other hand the disanalogy is illusory (or if 
there is a deeper objection to Kripke’s examples, as I suggest), it would appear 
that all of Kripke’s putative examples of the contingent a priori fail. Some of 
Kripke’s other examples are, briefly, as follows (in each example, the name 
should be understood to be introduced by the reference-fixing description—
page references in this section are to Kripke 1980): 
 
(2) “Aristotle is the greatest man who studied with Plato” (p. 57); 
(3) ‘Jack the Ripper’ is “the man, whoever he is, who committed all these 
murders” (p. 79);150 
(4) Neptune is the planet causing certain disturbances in the orbit of 
Uranus (p. 79, n. 33). 
 
Kripke continues to provide several additional, putative cases of the 
contingent a priori, all of which appear to involve a rigidly designating name 
‘baptismally’ introduced via a non-rigid, reference-fixing description.151 The 
idea being that the reference-fixing description picks out a property that 
determines the referent of the name in virtue of the named object’s 
contingently having the relevant property; where a rigidly designates “the 
unique object that actually has property F”, then a speaker who “did introduce a 
designator in that way…would be in a position to say ‘I know [a priori] that Fa’, 
                                                                                                                                                              
xy (Hx  Cy  x feels different from y), and another a priori but necessary, x (Hx  ¬Cx) 
(where ‘C’ means ‘¬H’). The ‘feels different from’ relation is dropped in the latter proposition, 
since, ‘widely’ considered, this is what Yablo’s target sentence asserts. 
149 Geirsson 1991 also notes that there are two types of example, but his conclusion (that the 
metre stick case works) differs from mine (that it does not). I am not convinced that Geirsson’s 
example, the length stick s appears to have at t is one metre, is contingent and a priori, since 
the given proposition requires the introspective notion of an appearance; and, I claim, this kind 
of introspective claim is fully empirical. 
150 Cf. Evans’s (1979) ‘Julius’ example, which I discuss below. 
151 Kripke 1980, pp. 80-91. 
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but nevertheless ‘Fa’ would express a contingent truth” (p. 14); Fa would be a 
contingent a priori proposition. One problem with all of this however is that, as 
is so often the case in Naming and Necessity (perhaps due to its nature as a 
verbally delivered set of lectures), the presentation is a little loose. Thus, in 
order to see if there is a significant disanalogy between the metre stick and 
‘Bob’-type cases, this will have to be tightened up a little. So, charitably 
understood, what is Kripke saying here with respect to synonymy, reference-
fixing and the contingent a priori? 
On the Kripkean account, a here is a rigidly designating name that serves to 
denote a unique object in all world-states in which that object exists.152 In the 
discussion noted above (1980, p. 14) Kripke mentions the ‘property’ F and 
suggests that a baptiser b, introducing a via the property F knows Fa a priori. 
One problem with this is that Kripke does not make a clear distinction between 
the linguistic or logical F (the predicate) and its ontological relatum (the 
property—which I shall indicate via an emboldened F). So, to re-state the 
Kripkean position, where a designates the unique a, and where a is introduced 
baptismally via a reference-fixing, descriptive predicate F, this is achieved in 
virtue of F’s non-rigidly designating the property F and Fa being a contingent 
circumstance. In this way, b allegedly knows a priori Fa, but Fa asserts the 
contingent circumstance Fa. This, I think, is the essence of Kripke’s position; F 
fixes the reference of a in virtue of a’s being the object that is or has F; thus F is 
a reference-fixing description, not a synonymous meaning of a, and Fa is 
therefore (allegedly) a contingent a priori proposition. 
So, is the metre stick example analogous to the other cases—does it fit the 
reconstructed Kripkean pattern more or less than the ‘Bob’-type examples? 
Well, assuming the names in (2) to (4) are introduced baptismally (which is 
perhaps most likely with (3) and (4)), it is fairly clear that they fit the pattern in 
terms of reference-fixing. For example (with respect to (4)), let F be ‘the planet 
causing certain disturbances in the orbit of Uranus’ and let a be ‘Neptune’. It is 
at least plausible that Leverrier might have so introduced the name using such 
a description to refer to the relevant property F and, ultimately, the having of 
                                                         
152 Skating over difficulties of contingent existence addressed elsewhere. 
 78 
 
 
 
that property by a (i.e. Neptune153). As described however, the metre stick case 
is fairly clearly disanalogous. The problem being that a (or, to follow Kripke’s 
usage, s here) appears to be a rigid designator for the metre stick s, whereas the 
relevant F appears initially to be parsed best as something like ‘one metre long 
at t0’; and, instead of F being used to fix the reference of s, Kripke (as initially 
reconstructed) appears to insist throughout the relevant section (pp. 54-7) that 
F is being used to fix the reference of something else, which he refers to as “the 
‘meter’” (sic), “the length of s at t0” (p. 55) and “one meter”(p. 56). So, unlike the 
‘Bob’-type cases, the metre stick example does not appear to be one where a 
non-rigid predicate F is being used to introduce something that is clearly, 
concretely objectual. The point being, all that F seems to introduce in this case 
is the property F (i.e. being one metre long or being a certain length), which 
then picks out, at most, an abstract object the metre or a certain length, as 
opposed to the concrete object s. Is this disanalogy enough to give the 
supporter of Kripke a distinction between the oft-cited metre stick case and the 
other name/object-based examples? 
There are two possible interpretations here; neither attractive to the 
supporter of the Kripkean contingent a priori. First, one could be charitable to 
Kripke (in terms of textual consistency) and argue that the examples are 
parallel; i.e. the descriptive predicate F is used to fix the reference of s in virtue 
of non-rigidly designating the property F, which is uniquely and actually, but 
contingently, satisfied by s (the metre stick). The problem with this 
interpretation however is that given my remarks on ‘Bob’ and (2) to (4) above, 
there would appear to be (at least) two propositions expressed by the metre 
stick sentence, one contingent but only a posteriori, Fs, and another a priori, 
but necessary, If ‘s’ is introduced via the predicate ‘one metre long at t0’, then 
‘s’ is ‘one metre long at t0’.154 Quite clearly the second is necessary and a priori 
but with respect to the first, Fs, a little explanation is in order. In line with the 
‘Bob’ case, whilst it is reasonably clear that the relevant circumstance, Fs would 
be contingent, it is not at all clear that Fs could be justified a priori. The 
                                                         
153 I embolden ‘Neptune’ here for emphasis, realising that the English distinction between 
‘Neptune’ and Neptune might do the same work (cf. n. 18). This is, of course, very much related 
to Quine’s ‘use/mention’ distinction; Quine 1962, pp. 23-6. 
154 I realise that there are complications in this case. I discuss these with respect to the ‘Bob’ 
example above. 
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problem is that even where the baptiser b so fixes the reference of s via F, 
importantly and crucially, b would not know a priori that Fs asserts the 
circumstance Fs, since he would not know (at all) what Fs says about the 
world. That is, he would not grasp Fs, in virtue of the fact that in order to 
know that the very object s had the very property F contingently, b would 
require unavoidably causal, a posteriori and de re knowledge of F and s. So for 
example (and as above), having never climbed Everest, I have no idea what 
object the predicate ‘the uppermost pebble on Mount Everest’ picks out and 
similarly, b would not know who or what ‘Aristotle’, ‘Jack the Ripper’ or 
‘Neptune’ designate. So, I would not know what Bob is the uppermost pebble 
on Everest expresses and b would not know what Aristotle is the greatest 
man who studied with Plato or s is one metre long at t0 express. In short, no 
Kripkean baptiser would know a priori any of the putative examples of the 
contingent a priori, provided in Naming and Necessity. The relevant 
propositions all assert contingent circumstances, but the nature of those 
arrangements of objects and attributes would not be a priori knowable. 
The second interpretation is perhaps even less attractive to the Kripkean, 
in that (it suggests a textual inconsistency and) it further highlights why the 
foregoing objection applies; thus further ruling out any putative, Kripkean 
examples of the contingent a priori. This deeper problem is as follows. There is 
a disanalogy between the metre stick and ‘Bob’ cases, as long as we insist on 
two things, (i) that the metre stick case does consist in the (legitimate) 
introduction of an abstract object, the metre (or m, rigidly designated by m); 
and (ii) that the relevant reference fixing F is something akin to ‘the length of m 
at t0’. Unlike with the ‘Bob’ cases above, if we make this insistence, the 
proposition Fm would be known a priori by the relevant baptiser, b, in that b 
would know what Fm asserted; namely that Fm, or the metre (m) has the 
length of m at t0 (whatever that length is). In the Plantingean line of objection 
to the original version of the example, something like the latter, parenthesised 
clause is used to suggest a lack of knowledge of the circumstances, such that b 
does not know (a priori or not) what Fs actually asserts. In the revised 
example, it is perhaps more plausible that b knows what Fm asserts, since in 
including a reference to m itself in the descriptive F, it is highly arguable that 
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Fm is justifiable a priori, in that it asserts the arrangement of objects and 
attributes that is m’s having the length of m at t0. The problem with this 
response however, is also reasonably clear; the circumstance Fm is necessary, 
rather than contingent. This, I claim, is clear due to (a) the deeply self-
referential nature of the relevant, asserted proposition and, more importantly, 
(b) the fact that m is an abstract object, which, presumably, in virtue of being 
such (a length), has the property of being a certain length essentially. So, whilst 
the relevant English sentence and Fm would indeed be a priori, the 
circumstance asserted, Fm, would also be metaphysically necessary. The point 
being, unlike as with contingent circumstances, I would argue that it is possible 
to have non-causal, a priori de re knowledge of necessary circumstances 
involving abstracta. This being the case, I would conclude that the clear, 
name/object-involving, Kripkean cases of the contingent a priori fail and that 
even if a disanalogy can be worked into the metre stick example, this too fails 
due to its concerning an essential property of an abstractum; it is an a priori 
proposition asserting a metaphysically necessary circumstance. 
 
 
3.2 ‘I exist’: a better example? 
 
So far I have suggested that there are good reasons to doubt that Kripke’s main 
examples of the contingent a priori are genuine. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I discuss one more set of putative examples; those involving 
indexicals—specifically, I discuss putative cases such as ‘I exist’ 155  and, 
relatedly, those involving ‘actually’. I argue that such cases fail to provide 
genuine examples and, ultimately, that the class of contingent a priori 
propositions is empty. Clearly, a case by case dismissal of the contingent a 
priori would be of little philosophical value; my argument against this class of 
examples then, is designed to extend to other potential cases, demonstrating 
why the phenomenon is illusory. In short, although apriority (qua rational 
                                                         
155 Despite my discussion of Plantinga as a critic of Kripke, he also presents several similar 
examples (1974, p. 8; specifically discussing the ‘I exist’ case), reaching a tentative, positive 
conclusion that the contingent a priori is at least a possible phenomenon. Kaplan (1989, p. 538) 
discusses a similar example; ‘I am here now’. 
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necessity) is not simply coextensive with metaphysical necessity (because of 
the failure of (CT3) in the light of Goldbach’s conjecture), the former is 
‘grounded in’ the latter—it is necessity in virtue of rationality.156 That is, a 
proposition is knowable on an a priori basis, strictly, only if it asserts a 
metaphysically necessary circumstance; and if p is (knowable) and 
metaphysically contingent, it must be possible to doubt the negation of that 
proposition—hence the proposition must be a posteriori as well. This being the 
case, there can be no contingent a priori propositions; genuine apriority entails 
necessity. 
First then, let us see why 
 
(e) ‘I exist’ 
 
is not a genuine example of the contingent a priori. As with the ‘Bob’ and ‘metre 
stick’ cases, my claim is that the apparent contingent a priori status of the 
sentence turns on the nature of the proposition(s) or circumstance(s) it asserts. 
Let us look at the metaphysical, modal aspects first. In terms of contingency, e 
certainly appears to be a saying something contingent about the world. 
Assuming that the sentence (or thought) has not been uttered by a necessary 
being, it certainly seems to express a contingent proposition. The problem with 
e however is that if it is read as (expressing a tenseless proposition) asserting a 
metaphysically contingent circumstance, it is also fairly clearly a posteriori. The 
point being, the negation (I do not exist) is clearly (and rightly) conceivable, 
since I might not have existed, so e cannot be said to be a priori. In addition, 
without tying the proposition to the time of its utterance or grasping, its 
asserting a contingent circumstance means that more detailed, empirical 
information is required to ascertain when it is true and when it is false; its 
being tenseless, I need to know particular pieces of information at particular 
times in order to know whether or not it is true. So, simply read as the tenseless 
e, ‘I exist’ cannot be an example of the contingent a priori. 
There are however two further relevant, candidate, contingent a priori 
propositions that the English ‘I exist’ can be taken to express: 
                                                         
156 I explain this claim both below and in the following chapter. 
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(e`) I exist at the time of uttering ‘I exist’; 
(e``) I exist at t0.157 
 
Fairly clearly, the first is so deeply self-referential as to suffer the same 
objections as I raised against the Fm case in the previous section; logically e` 
could be parsed as the following conditional: 
 
(e*) Uaet0  x (Uxet0  x = a),158 
 
which, given the impossibility of a true antecedent and a false consequent is, 
presumably, conceptually and metaphysically necessary, as well as being a 
priori. This leaves e`` as the only relevant, potential, contingent a priori 
proposition. Thus, we need to understand whether e`` can steer a course 
between the contingent and a posteriori e, and the a priori but necessary e`.159 
In terms of contingency, initially, e`` appears to be much closer to e than to 
e`. That it is (at least) initially unclear how best to parse e`` would seem to 
suggest that it is not a mere conceptual necessity or trivial, logical truth; 
assuming that the ‘t0’ does not tie the truth of e`` to the time of utterance of the 
proposition (which is the essential point), that I exist at t0 can be seen 
possibly not to have obtained appears to suggest that it is not (or does not 
assert) a metaphysical necessity. In addition, and perhaps more to the point, my 
not being a contingent object certainly seems to suggest that e`` is contingent; 
surely I might not have existed at t0. If however the negation of e`` is 
metaphysically possible (and e`` is contingent), I would argue as before, that 
since it is rightly possible to doubt ¬e``, it cannot be an a priori proposition. 
                                                         
157 As before the temporal qualifier is added so as to suggest that the English ‘I exist’ expresses 
a proposition asserting the current (at the time of utterance) existence of the utterer. 
158 Not a lot is meant to hang on the precise details of this formalisation—it is merely intended 
to illustrate the rational and conceptual necessity of the implication; p and ¬q looks impossible 
here. I realise however that there are deep issues in the region, such as time, tense and 
indexicality. I return to the last of these below. 
159 Fitch (2004, p. 118-9), seems to avoid categorising propositions such as I exist at t0 as a 
priori, appearing to claim that Kripke’s account of the a priori implies that knowledge of 
contingent circumstances cannot be a priori (despite then going on to claim that there can be 
trivial examples involving indexicals)—Hughes (2004, p. 97), at least raises a similar question. I 
would not want to attribute this claim to Kripke (even though I agree that contingent, 
existential claims require a posteriori justification), since it would appear to rule out 
substantive examples of the contingent a priori tout court, which would be a peculiar thing for 
Kripke to do in a book one of whose central contentions is the existence of the same. 
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Having said this, there are (at least two) deeper questions, concerning 
indexicality and introspection, that follow from this suggestion. First, perhaps 
some essential indexicality might render e`` as a priori whilst retaining its 
contingency. Second, even if e`` is contingent, perhaps its availability to 
introspection renders it knowable on an a priori basis. I now discuss these two 
issues in turn; indexicality and contingency in §3.3; introspection and apriority 
in §3.4. In what follows, very much as before I claim that e`` is either so deeply 
self-referential that it is metaphysically necessary but a priori, or e`` is closer to 
the original e and so it is indeed contingent but a posteriori. In addition to 
arguing this, during the discussion of the latter issue I begin to suggest a further 
set of claims; that apriority essentially involves a kind of necessity, ‘rational 
necessity’, and that this further depends on, or is grounded in metaphysical 
necessity, such that there can be no contingent a priori propositions. 
 
 
3.3 Apriority, indexicality and Evansian, ‘superficial’ contingency 
 
In ‘Reference and Contingency’ Gareth Evans attempts to defuse the puzzle of 
the contingent a priori by arguing that whilst the alleged cases do involve a 
priori knowledge, the relevant propositions are only ‘superficially’ 
contingent.160 That is, there are many cases of the contingent a priori but they 
are fairly trivial; they are neither “interesting” nor “scary”.161 Evans’s initial 
example (which I discuss as (7) below) involves the ‘Fregean name’, ‘Julius’, but 
he also argues that the contingent a priori need not involve such names, since 
cases can be constructed using an indexical ‘actually’ operator—together with a 
broadly two-dimensional semantics. Perhaps the defender of the contingent a 
priori can use such an argument to support the claim that e`` is similarly a priori 
but contingent, even if only superficially so. 
In my discussion of Evans, I begin with the ‘Fregean name’ variants but 
suggest these are either akin to the Bob-style cases already discussed (and so 
not contingent and a priori) or they are effectively equivalent to Evans’s 
                                                         
160 Evans 1979; cf. Kaplan 1989. 
161 The “interesting” and “scary” are from Donnellan 1977, p. 23; cf. Fitch 2004, p. 120-1. 
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‘actually’-involving cases (again not contingent a priori) in that the latter only 
really involve ‘actually’ as a rhetorical device. I then go on to discuss the 
‘actually’ cases qua potential examples of the ‘superficially’ contingent a priori, 
concluding that these are entirely artificial and ultimately (since they do not 
involve contingent circumstances) insubstantive examples of ‘contingent a 
priori’ propositions. Thus Evans’s arguments cannot be used to support either 
the claim that e`` is an indexical example or the wider conclusion that there are 
genuine, contingent a priori propositions. 
Consider the following examples from Kripke, Donnellan and Evans: 
 
(3*) ‘Jack the Ripper’ is the man, whoever he is, who actually committed 
all these murders”;162 
(5) “Provided the murderer exists, let ‘Vladimir is the murderer’ express 
a contingent truth”;163 
(6) “Let us use ‘Julius’ to refer to whoever invented the zip”; and 
(7) “If anyone uniquely invented the zip, Julius invented the zip”.164 
 
In the discussion of the failure of the Kripkean examples (2) to (4) above, I hint 
that Donnellan’s (and so Evans’s) examples are very similar to Kripke’s original 
(3), thereby suggesting that all suffer a similar fate; either they express 
contingent but a posteriori propositions (in virtue of the contingent or 
existential-introducing claims requiring unavoidably causal, de re, and so a 
posteriori justification) or they express propositions knowable on an a priori 
basis but which assert necessary, general conditionals. This is perhaps a little 
unfair, since (5) and (7) might be a lot closer to (3*) than to the original (3); the 
point turning on the possibility of ‘Fregean names’ and, perhaps more 
importantly, on the indexicality of ‘actually’—if an utterer u stipulates that a is 
the actual F, Evans’s thought is that u thereby knows (a priori) that Fa, but Fa is 
also thereby ‘superficially’ contingent, even if ‘deeply’ necessary.165 For what it 
is worth, I think (3*) is ultimately more or less equivalent to (3) (and both are 
                                                         
162 Amended slightly from the Kripkean (3) above. 
163 Donnellan 1977, p. 20 (my numbering). 
164 Evans 1979, pp. 163 and 171 (my numbering). 
165 See also the discussion in Davies and Humberstone 1980. 
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similar to (5) and (7)), since the ‘actually’ is tacitly assumed in the original and, 
importantly, functions purely as a rhetorical device; it is not a genuine, modal 
predicate, in virtue of not designating a genuine, modal property.166 Thus I 
claim the Evansian examples are not genuine cases of the contingent a priori, 
since they either reduce to the former examples (of a posteriori, de re 
contingencies) or they consist of purely trivial, semantic examples of a priori 
knowledge based on an artificial ‘actually’ operator, which are thereby very 
‘superficially’ contingent; going beyond Evans, this is because no genuine 
circumstance has been asserted, given the illegitimacy of the ‘actually’ operator. 
Interestingly concerning (5) (and so by extension, (7)), Donnellan claims that a 
detective, stipulating ‘Vladimir’ as the name of the murderer, does not thereby 
come to “know [a priori or not] the existence of any state of affairs”.167 Hence 
my use of the Kripkean (3)/(3*); after ‘naming’ ‘Jack the Ripper’, I do not think 
Scotland Yard’s work was complete. 
Evans’s discussion of (7) in ‘Reference and Contingency’ very much turns 
on the distinction (discussed above and expressed again in my terms here) 
between knowing that a sentence expresses some proposition and knowing 
what circumstance that proposition asserts. His main point contra Donnellan is 
that the latter assumes that for an utterer u to understand what circumstance 
the relevant sentence asserts (via the relevant proposition—(7) in this case), u 
must have causal or a posteriori knowledge of the referent of the relevant name 
used therein. That is according to Evans, Donnellan rules out any possibility of 
knowledge of the meaning of (7) and the like, in the absence of a posteriori 
knowledge of (6) and the like. In short, according to Evans, Donnellan rules out 
the possibility of de re knowledge of contingent circumstances based purely on 
‘Fregean’ or descriptive names. Now, Evans makes three points in response to 
this kind of line, “one ad hominem, one substantive, and one promissory”.168 I 
now deal with only the second and third of these, since I view the first as a 
much weaker point. I deal with the second in slightly less detail, since it 
consists of an appeal to the kind of two-dimensionalism (and to the general 
                                                         
166 The point being, if ‘actually’ is a genuine predicate, this requires a substantive metaphysics 
of possible worlds. I argue against this below (‘actually’ as a genuine predicate) and (both 
issues) in more detail, in the final chapter. 
167 Donnellan 1977, p. 20 (my emphasis). 
168 Evans 1979, p. 172. 
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semantics to metaphysics form of argument) dismissed in Chapter 1 (and 
generally, throughout). I cover the third in more detail as this is where the issue 
of indexicality and the ‘actually’ operator is most relevant. 
Beginning with the second point, Evans spends some time arguing169 that 
the kind of line Donnellan offers relies on the claim that knowledge of (6) is 
insufficient for knowing precisely what (7) asserts; i.e. that substantive, 
knowledge of de re contingencies cannot be generated by mere linguistic 
stipulation. As I suggest above, since Evans’s argument is effectively an appeal 
to (a more or less) two-dimensional semantics (and is thus an attempt to derive 
epistemic and metaphysical conclusions from such semantics), and since I have 
already spent some time on the positive argument, on two-dimensionalism and 
especially on the move from semantics to (epistemology and) metaphysics, I 
only provide a brief discussion of all of this presently. 
In very brief detail, Evans’s argument is as follows. Sentences are 
associated with functions from possible worlds to truth values, which Evans 
calls propositions (being closer but by no means identical to what I call ‘wide’ 
propositions), but such functions are not the same as a sentence’s “content, or 
what it says”170 (which is closer to what I call a ‘narrow’ proposition above, qua 
thing most obviously, ‘narrowly’ believed when a sentence is uttered or 
thought). Accordingly, when two sentences with the same content are believed, 
“what is believed by one who understands…the one sentence…is the same as 
what is believed by one who understands…the other sentence”. 171 Now, 
assuming that ‘Julius’ in (7) has been introduced by an utterer u’s use of (6), 
Evans alleges that ‘Julius is F’ and ‘The inventor of the zip is F’ are “associated 
with different propositions…” but “are epistemically equivalent [for u]”;172 i.e. 
(7) is a priori (for u). 
Against all of this (but briefly, for reasons already indicated) and beginning 
with the metaphysics, contingency is surely, primarily a property of 
circumstances (that is arrangements of objects and/or attributes) and only 
derivatively of sentences. Moving to the semantics (with more metaphysics and 
                                                         
169 Op. cit., pp. 174-82. 
170 Op. cit., p. 176. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Op. cit., p. 178. 
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some epistemology), if I stipulate that ‘Flob’ is x (if it exists) and ‘glumph’ is the 
contingent property, F (ditto), then I certainly know a priori that ‘Flob is 
glumph’ asserts a contingent proposition if it does assert a proposition, given 
that the sentence involves Fregean names; however, I do not know the nature 
of this proposition nor even that I have asserted the genuine circumstance of 
Flob’s glumphing.173 Returning to the metaphysics (and drawing the correct 
epistemic and semantic conclusions), since x and F might very well not exist, I 
cannot be said to have de re a priori knowledge of the relevant, contingent 
proposition or ‘circumstance’, since to know such a circumstance, I would 
require unavoidably direct, causal and so a posteriori knowledge that x (exists 
and) Fs; so I have not asserted a contingent a priori proposition. Finally with 
respect to the second point and doing the meta-metaphysics, moving from 
(two-dimensional) semantics to (epistemology and) metaphysics is the wrong 
order of explanation; one cannot generate apriority and contingency from mere 
linguistic stipulation. In summary then, inasmuch as (7) involves a simple (i.e. 
independent of ‘actually’-based considerations), Fregean name, it is of precisely 
the same kind as the previous Kripkean, putative cases; not examples of the 
contingent a priori.174 
Turning to the third, ‘promissory’ point, Evans claims that even if such 
arguments against the Fregean name variants are successful, there are cases of 
the contingent a priori that do not involve such names; those involving an 
indexical, ‘actually’ operator. Drawing on his points concerning propositions 
and content, Evans claims that there can be wholly uninformative but 
contingent sentences: 
                                                         
173 The difference with genuine names would be based on the latter being causally or 
baptismally introduced with relevant causal-historical chains preserving reference and so, de re 
knowledge. Where a chain shifts or breaks, à la Evans 1973, reference would shift or break, 
preserving (or not) de re knowledge. Descriptive names, of course, are never so causal, never so 
preserving (or rather generating) of knowledge of contingencies. 
174 There is a potential objection here that such an account of Fregean names makes knowledge 
(involving names) very hard to come by. In the case of standard names I deny this claim, as per 
the previous note. That said, there are many examples of ordinary mistaken identity that are 
witness to a lack of knowledge in such cases. For example, in a scenario where the object 
allegedly designated by the name Gödel does not exist, someone uttering ‘Gödel proved the 
incompleteness of logic’ (g) might know that g expressed something like, !x (x = g  Px) (g`), 
but he would not know what (de re proposition or what circumstance) g` asserts. In this kind of 
scenario, I think we would well say that many claims about Gödel, which we previously took to 
be known to be true, were in fact false and not so known. 
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“A sentence with this character could express a priori knowledge without 
engendering paradox, since, in knowing it to be true, one thereby knows 
nothing about the world.”175 
 
Evans’s initial, formal, putative example is as follows: 
 
(8) x (Fx  A(Fx)), 
 
where A is an ‘actually’ operator; for example, “If anything is red it is actually 
red”.176 According to Evans, such sentences are clearly contingent since “there 
are worlds with respect to which it is not true, viz any world in which there are 
things which are not red in the actual world which are red”.177 In addition, 
sentences like (8) are allegedly knowable on an a priori basis and so are 
“perfectly innocent, if rather uninteresting, examples of the contingent a 
priori”.178 Going beyond Evans somewhat, with respect to e`` the allegation 
would be that this is a similarly indexical but clearly an interesting case of the 
contingent a priori—if I exist, then know a priori that I actually exist, even 
though my existence is contingent. In response to all of this I have three points 
to make, which, taken together, suggest that alleged examples of the contingent 
a priori based on A cannot provide the suggested rescue for e``’s similar status. 
My first point is that, as with previous, putative examples of the contingent 
a priori, in order to decide the issue, we need to understand precisely what are 
the relevant candidates for such a status. With Evans, clearly the status of (8) as 
contingent a priori crucially turns on the nature of A; if for example A is a 
mere rhetorical device (and does not appeal to possible-worlds semantics and 
the existence of the actual world as opposed to a realm of additional merely 
possible worlds), (8) is effectively the same (wide) proposition as 
 
(8`) x (Fx  Fx), 
 
                                                         
175 Ibid., my italics. The last clause is telling, as we shall see. 
176 Op. cit., p. 184. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Op. cit., p. 186. 
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i.e. an a priori but trivially, necessary proposition. If, on the other hand, (8) 
(itself) is to be considered as genuinely a priori, then (as before) although it 
might be a priori that (8) asserts some contingent A-involving proposition or 
circumstance (if it asserts any circumstance at all), for (8) itself to be genuinely 
contingent, the relevant circumstance (i.e. arrangement of objects and 
attributes) must ‘actually’ exist. That is to say, there must be some x that Fs and 
a set of possible worlds, such that A functions as a substantive indexical, so as 
to distinguish the actual world from such possible worlds. The point being, as 
much as it might be the case that A(Fx), in order for this to generate a distinct 
and substantive modal property, one would need to move from the semantics 
of A to the existence of the substantive circumstance, A(Fx). This, of course, 
would require something like the existence of real (in some sense) possible 
worlds and, in particular, the existence of the actual world as a property-
generating particular. On all of these points I am highly suspicious but, as I 
indicate, I take this up in the final chapter of the thesis. My point then (to be 
taken up later), is that this appeal is illegitimate; there are no such possible 
worlds (as distinct from the ‘actual’ world). So A is not a world-involving, 
genuine, modal predicate; it should be understood as a mere, rhetorical device, 
suggesting strong belief in the relevant proposition or circumstance on behalf 
of the utterer.179 
Turning to the second point, even if my first point is rejected, to conclude 
that there are genuine contingent a priori propositions on the basis of a logico-
semantic device is to argue from logic and semantics to epistemology and 
metaphysics; the wrong order of explanation. Perhaps one might argue that 
some epistemic conclusions (concerning a limited species of the a priori) are 
viable from such semantic premises; for example, given the semantics of (8) 
and (8`), the latter, at least, is trivially necessary and so a priori—and perhaps 
one could urge the same for (8) itself (as above). That said, to generate 
substantive (epistemic and) metaphysical conclusions from purely logico-
semantic premises is surely the wrong way of doing things. To drum up a 
                                                         
179 Similarly, Davies’s (2004, p. 103; cf. Kaplan, 1989, p. 539, n. 65) two-dimensional example of 
As  s is a trivial, insubstantive and, ultimately, entirely semantic case of the contingent a 
priori. 
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substantive, metaphysical contingency from an indexical A operator is an 
illegitimate manoeuvre. As indicated above, surely contingency (and necessity) 
apply to circumstances (arrangements of objects and attributes) in the first 
instance and only derivatively to sentences. So to generate ‘contingent a priori’ 
(and for that matter ‘necessary a posteriori’) propositions from A-involving 
sentences is just the wrong way of doing things. So (8) does not provide an 
example of interesting, substantive knowledge; to echo Evans’s own 
introduction of this class of cases, it does not say anything about the world—it 
does not assert a circumstance. This being the case, (8) cannot be viewed as a 
genuinely contingent a priori proposition, since the argument for applying this 
status is entirely grounded in logico-semantic premises. 
Of course, one might object here that (8), in being a universal 
generalisation, would generate interesting instances of the contingent a priori 
upon particular instantiation, à la 
 
(8``) Fa  A(Fa). 
 
Against this, I would suggest two considerations. First, very much as before, 
even whilst the proposition appears to be contingent and a priori, any 
substantive, contingent, existential claim such as Fa itself, either involves a 
‘Fregean name’ (with the same foregoing considerations concerning the lack of 
substantive de re, a priori knowledge of contingencies) or it requires 
unavoidably contingent and so empirical justification, since it asserts the 
contingent existence of a named object. Thus if any such conditional is 
contingent-existential committing, in relying on an a posteriori antecedent, it 
would be, as a whole, a posteriori. Second (and again as before), to generate 
contingent circumstances via a proposition involving an A operator is to 
semanticise substantive, metaphysical (and epistemic) conclusions; i.e. not to 
provide genuine and interesting cases of the contingent a priori. 
Finally with respect to Evans’s A-involving putative cases, I turn to my 
third point; that, given what I say about A, it cannot be made to rescue or 
support e``’s status as contingent and a priori. The putative case here would be 
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something akin to I actually exist at t0 (Ae); given that I know that I exist, I 
allegedly know a priori that I actually exist—but, of course, that I exist is 
contingent. Concerning Ae however, the central point is that either the 
‘actually’ functions as a genuine A operator (requiring a separate discussion of 
the actual and possible worlds) or it is a mere, rhetorical device, adding nothing 
to the original sentence, e`` qua e. In the first case, without the discussion of 
possible worlds (which I provide in the concluding chapter), Ae can only be 
viewed as a purely semantic, trivial and insubstantive ‘contingent a priori’ 
proposition, since the claim that if I know that I exist then that I know a priori 
that I ‘actually’ exist, depends crucially on the relevant possible-worlds 
semantics. In the latter case, since e`` qua e was judged either to be contingent 
but a posteriori or a priori but necessary (in the previous section), the same 
applies mutatis mutandis for Ae. In slightly more detail, if Ae is asserting a 
contingent circumstance such as Ei (my timeless existence), then given that it is 
conceivable that ¬Ei, Ae turns out to be the a posteriori proposition e; i.e. 
contingent but a posteriori. If on the other hand Ae is a priori, this is in virtue of 
the fact that the A is so constitutionally tied to the utterance of Ae that it 
expresses a proposition to the effect that If I am uttering e at t0 then I exist, i.e. 
it is the proposition e`, or, 
 
(e*) Uaet0  x (Uxet0  x = a), 
 
which is a priori but metaphysically necessary as well. The key point being, if I 
am uttering e at t0, then (of metaphysical necessity) I must exist at t0. Thus Ae 
(qua e`/e*) is an a priori proposition asserting a metaphysically necessary 
circumstance.180 
                                                         
180 I am indebted here to Tim Williamson (and others), who raised the question of indexicality 
in my paper at the SIFA graduate conference in Padova, September 2007. Williamson (1986) 
argues that “There is at least one believer” (p) is contingent and a priori on the basis of 
substitution into the a priori and “absolutely reliable method for forming true beliefs,…(M) 
Given a valid deduction from the premise that someone believes that p to the conclusion that p, 
believe that p” (pp. 114-5). According to Williamson, p does not rely on any indexicals 
whatsoever, since, allegedly, (M) simply requires a valid deduction from Bxp to p. The problem 
with this is that if p is so embedded in (M), we would seem to have ‘if x believes that p is valid 
then p’, which is surely a priori and necessary (as per my analysis of ‘I exist’ above). 
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3.4 Apriority, introspection and causation 
 
Having discussed e`` with respect to indexicality and A, I now turn to a 
potential argument that e`` is contingent but a priori on the basis that it is 
known via introspection. Plantinga considers ‘I exist’ to be an example of the 
contingent a priori, arguing briefly that “I know a priori that I believe that I 
exist; I also know a priori that if I believe that I exist, then indeed I do exist”.181 
The main problem with such a line however is usually taken to concern the 
nature of introspection.182 The point being, introspection is taken by those 
objecting to such an argument, to be an experiential or a posteriori mode of 
knowing; and e`` is allegedly, essentially justified via introspection, so it is 
allegedly a posteriori rather than a priori. Now, I discuss the notion of 
introspection in the previous chapter (§2.2), where I suggest that it is a largely 
experiential (but somewhat heterogeneous) capacity, appearing to cover 
experiential awareness of such things as one’s own bodily feelings, sensations 
or tastes and less clearly experiential (in fact, as I claim, a priori) insights into 
necessary propositions. Whereas the former are fairly clearly a posteriori 
instances of introspection—I am warm and I like biscuits for example being 
cases of sensational and memory-sensational introspection respectively—the 
latter are plausibly a priori; 
 
(m) 22 + 32 = 13, 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Alternatively, if someone needs to believe p`, I am a believer (in virtue of believing this belief) 
(or similar), in order to believe p, then the latter must be a priori and necessary in virtue of the 
deep self-referentiality of p`. If, on the other hand, someone needs to believe p``, I am a believer 
(tenseless) (or similar), then p would have to be contingent and a posteriori in virtue of the 
conceivability of ¬p``. Hawthorne (2002, pp. 250-1), expresses related doubts. 
Williamson (1986) also introduces the notion of ‘hyper-reliability’ as a sufficient condition 
of apriority, such that if “it is impossible [for subject s] to believe falsely that p” (p. 117), then s 
knows that p a priori. Against this, I urge that this is a confusion of something akin to epistemic 
necessity for apriority. If s knows I exist (e), there is a strong sense in which this is hyper-
reliable (or epistemically necessary?), but ¬e is surely conceivable, hence e cannot be a priori. 
Pryor (2006) expresses similar thoughts as to the hyper-reliability, but non-apriority, of ‘I exist’ 
and similar (see several of the following notes). 
181 Plantinga 1974, p. 8. 
182 Pryor (2006), for example, argues that (his version of) e`` is straightforwardly a posteriori, 
since it relies on occurrent experience. 
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for example, being rationally necessary (i.e. necessary in virtue of the nature of 
the proposition as understood by relevant thinkers or speakers) and so a priori. 
What I mean to say here is that if a proposition is essentially, and only, justified 
via introspection, that proposition is a posteriori, whereas propositions such as 
m, although knowable via introspection, are not essentially so; and in virtue of 
being rationally necessary, they are a priori. That is, although one can come to 
know (occurrently) m on the basis of a posteriori introspection, propositions 
such as m (qua mathematical propositions) are essentially justified a priori in 
virtue of being rationally necessary. 
Of course, m, in virtue of being a mathematical truth, is necessarily true as 
well as being a priori. So what about the contingent a priori? Well, here one 
might argue that e`` is just such a proposition; in virtue of ascribing the 
contingent property of existence to its utterer u, and in virtue of u’s uttering 
and thereby grasping e``, it is contingent but rationally necessary, or a priori. As 
stated towards the end of §3.2 however, the second line of objection to e``’s 
status as contingent and a priori is that introspection is not an example of a 
priori justification; e`` is contingent but not a priori. BonJour for example, makes 
this kind of objection, claiming that introspection is a posteriori since it consists 
in a causal-perceptual “awareness of temporally located contingent facts”.183 So 
whilst “I exist as a thinking thing” is “automatically justified for anyone who 
understands”184 it, since it is based on introspection qua unavoidably causal-
perceptual awareness of a contingent fact, it is justified a posteriori rather than 
a priori. As I suggest in the previous chapter, there are some problems with the 
causal-contingency criterion of a posteriori justification on which BonJour 
relies; not least of all that a non-contingent criterion of a priori justification 
would appear to rule out the contingent a priori by definition. This being the 
case, we need to understand whether e`` is essentially introspected, whether 
this requires causal-perceptual and therefore a posteriori justification (and 
potentially contingency), and how ‘automatic justification’ (which Williamson 
                                                         
183 BonJour 2005, p. 99. Cf. Pryor 2006 (especially pp. 333f.). Briefly, Pryor argues that I am 
uttering a sentence (u), whilst being ‘hyper-reliable’ (or true in virtue of being thought), is not 
thereby justified a priori. On both my and Pryor’s understanding of ‘utter’, u is very closely akin 
to e``. Pryor claims that u (and so e``) requires occurrent, introspective (i.e. a posteriori) 
justification, whereas the embedded claim that anyone thinking u (or e``) thereby thinks a true 
thought is a priori and necessary. 
184 BonJour 1998, p. 10. 
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and Pryor might describe as ‘hyper-reliability’) 185  is related to rational 
necessity. As before, I argue that a lot of these issues are settled by 
understanding just which proposition e`` is taken to be. The previous sections 
are to some extent a discussion of a version of e`` whereby it is equivalent to the 
indexical and necessary e`. In this section I begin by arguing that if e`` is taken to 
assert a contingent circumstance (my existence at some time—not indexically 
linked to the time of utterance of e``), then it is effectively equivalent to the 
original e discussed at the beginning of §3.2; that is, a contingent but a 
posteriori proposition. 
My argument for this claim is as follows. Ultimately, if rational necessity is 
to be an interesting, useful and genuine modality, then it must be ‘grounded in’ 
the metaphysical; it must be something akin to metaphysical necessity (or 
possibility) in virtue of rationality—what it is necessary (or possible) for 
rational agents to think.186 In particular, it must be (as I go on to argue in more 
detail both below and in the following chapter) distinct from ‘epistemic 
necessity’. This being the case, if a proposition (e or e`` for example) expresses a 
metaphysically contingent circumstance (my tenseless, or temporal but non-
indexicalised, existence), Ei, the very possibility of ¬Ei requires that ¬e or ¬e`` 
be rationally possible (or conceivable). Clearly then, if all of e, e``, ¬e and ¬e`` are 
rationally possible, then e and e`` must be rationally contingent; they must be a 
posteriori. So, if e`` is metaphysically contingent, I claim, (if it is at all knowable) 
then it is rationally contingent, or a posteriori, as well. Against the possibility of 
the contingent a priori then, this argument combined with that of the foregoing 
two sections amounts to the following. Proposition e`` is either effectively 
equivalent to e`, such that it is deeply self-referential and so a priori but 
metaphysically necessary; or, e`` is equivalent to the metaphysically contingent 
but a posteriori proposition expressed by the original e. In addition, given such 
an understanding of contingency and aposteriority, any deeply, substantively 
contingent circumstance is only going to be knowable (if knowable) on an a 
posteriori basis. Thus, all such (allegedly) non-indexical, putative examples of 
the contingent a priori will, I claim, turn out to be a posteriori. 
                                                         
185 See several previous notes. 
186 Possibly relativised to individual—or groups of—thinkers. I discuss this in the previous and 
the following chapters. 
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Having said this, there are deep and complex matters at issue here; 
introspection; experience, causation, and (rational and metaphysical) modality, 
to pick out the main topics. We need therefore to understand whether ‘I exist’, 
e`` qua e (and similar), are essentially justified introspectively and 
experientially; whether this makes such propositions causally justified (and 
vice versa); whether this rules out their apriority; and if this then comes apart 
from rational necessity. This being the case, by way of supplementing and 
clarifying the foregoing argument, I now focus on several test cases: e, m187 and 
the additional example; 
 
 (pain) I am in pain. 
 
The point of the pain example is that it is a fairly evident case of an 
introspective, causal and a posteriori proposition, which asserts a clearly 
contingent circumstance. I use it therefore to highlight similarities with e, and 
to show the relevant differences between epistemic and rational modalities. 
The point being, some philosophers would argue that e, in virtue of being 
‘automatically justified’, ‘hyper-reliable’ or, perhaps, ‘rationally necessary’, is in 
fact an a priori proposition; whereas pain is merely epistemically necessary. In 
what follows, I argue that automatic justification, hyper-reliability and 
epistemic necessity hang together, whereas rational necessity is a separate, 
more objective modality, grounded in the metaphysical. Moreover, importantly, 
pain and e fall in the former as opposed to the latter category; they are 
epistemically necessary but rationally (and metaphysically) contingent. 
Let me begin then, with reference to the following table (displayed 
overleaf): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
187 Where m is any true mathematical proposition. 
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Proposition Justification Modality 
Essentially 
introspective? 
Causal? A priori or a 
posteriori  
Rational Metaphysical 
m 
22 + 32 = 13 
No No A priori Necessary Necessary 
E 
I exist 
Issue 1 Issue 2 A posteriori? Contingent? Contingent 
pain 
I am in pain 
Yes Yes A posteriori Contingent Contingent 
 
Table 1. 
 
The table begins with proposition m, since this is perhaps the easiest to 
complete with respect to the five justificatory and modal-justificatory 
categories. Concerning e and pain, my initial thoughts are that (a) the two hang 
together—they are both rationally contingent, a posteriori and so causally 
justified; and (b) the claim that either proposition is rationally necessary rests 
on a confusion between the more subjective, epistemic necessity and rational 
necessity proper. Some of these claims are most clear with pain,188 hence the 
numbered issues with respect to e at this stage. By way of providing the 
detailed argument lacking so far, the following is my defence of (a) and (b) with 
respect to e. 
Moving from left to right along the row for e then, the first issue is that of 
introspection. Here the salient questions are; ‘is an introspectively justified 
proposition experientially justified?’ and ‘if so, is e introspectively and 
experientially justified?’ Beginning with the former question, in general (and as 
discussed in ch. 2, §2.2), clearly a priori justified propositions such as m are 
standardly not justified essentially by introspection; this can be a route to the 
occurrent knowledge that m, or a way of grasping m, but introspection alone 
does not justify m (and similar). Conversely, I would argue that if a proposition 
(pain for example) is clearly, essentially introspectively justified, then this is an 
experientially justified proposition. Turning briefly to the latter question then, 
                                                         
188 On this point, I am in agreement with John Hawthorne (2002, p. 248), when he claims that 
defining such propositions as I am in pain and I have a headache as a priori would be a 
“cheap shot” in terms of defending the contingent a priori. 
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is e introspectively, and therefore experientially justified? Here I would argue 
that e (qua assertion of my tenseless—or tensed but non-indexicalised—
existence) is much closer to pain than it is to m. This is because e, by asserting a 
metaphysically contingent circumstance, must be a proposition whose negation 
is conceivable (rationally possible), and both e and ¬e being rationally possible 
entails that e is rationally contingent, or a posteriori. Importantly, the claim that 
e (itself) is rationally necessary and so a priori, rests, I think, on one of three 
mistakes; either (i) the confusion of e for the deeply self-referential (and 
necessary) e`, (ii) the confusion of e (itself) with the inference from a’s thinking 
e to the necessity of e, or (iii) the confusion of epistemic for rational necessity. 
In slightly more detail on (ii), the confusion here is between the contingent 
and a posteriori e with the a priori but necessary conditional along the lines of 
‘if I am thinking, I exist’ or, more obviously (and trivially) ‘if I exist, I exist’. The 
point being, if we take the proposition, 
 
(e*) Uaet0  x (Uxet0  x = a), 
 
we have a rationally and metaphysically necessary conditional, with an 
antecedent, which, if considered in isolation must be contingent and a posteriori 
(assuming the ‘t0’ is not a strong indexical). Now, recalling Gassendi’s objection 
to the cogito, pain is instructive here, since if we were to replace the Uaet0 
antecedent in e* with Pa (for a is in pain or I am in pain), we would get the 
same result; a rationally and metaphysically necessary proposition: 
 
(p*) Pa  x (Px  x = a), 
 
with an antecedent, which, when considered on its own, must be contingent 
and a posteriori, qua essentially introspective and experiential. 
Going into slightly more detail on (iii), what I claim is the most likely 
mistake is that of confusing the epistemic necessity of e (and pain) for the 
rational necessity of the same. This mistake rests on the confusion of the 
impossibility of doubting that one is in pain or that one exists, when one 
experiences the thoughts asserting such circumstances, for the wider (but 
 98 
 
 
 
false) impossibility of ever being wrong about such matters. If I am aware that I 
am in pain (or that I exist) it is impossible for me to doubt the relevant 
circumstance (the thoughts are ‘automatically justified’ or ‘hyper-reliable’). 
That I might not have been in pain (or in existence) at this time is, however, 
rationally possible or conceivable; hence pain and e cannot be rationally 
necessary or a priori. 
Having said this, a complete defence of such claims requires a full 
discussion of the distinction between rational and epistemic necessities. I 
provide this in the following chapter, so the foregoing is merely a preface to 
that section. The general idea of the distinction I want to make is that epistemic 
necessity is fully subjective and non-modal; rational necessity is more objective 
(perhaps ‘intersubjective’) and more clearly modal. Now, I claim, e and pain are 
epistemically but not rationally necessary. The point being, if I know that I am 
in pain at t0, then this is, quite simply, epistemically necessary-for-me; it is 
impossible to doubt pain given that I know pain. In virtue of its extreme 
subjectivity however, the proposition is less widely necessary; it is entirely 
conceivable that ¬pain or ¬e. That is, e and pain are just not the same kind of 
proposition as m; they are not justifiable a priori. 
The second issue is that of experiential justification and causation. Similarly 
as before, the salient questions are, ‘Is all experiential justification causal (and 
vice versa)?’ and therefore ‘Is e causally or non-causally justified?’ I have 
already discussed BonJour’s and (more relevantly now) McGinn’s positing of a 
causal account of a posteriori justification—in the previous chapter (§2.2). 
There I suggest that a non-causal criterion of a priori justification is perhaps 
preferable to a fully causal account (or a rejection) of apriority. I would now 
add that this claim certainly seems supported by the two more easily 
categorisable propositions, m and pain; the former being clearly non-
experientially and non-causally, and the latter experientially and causally, 
justified. Setting aside the doubt that rationally necessary, a priori propositions 
such as m might somehow be causally justified then, I think it is a fairly safe 
assumption that aposteriority goes with causal and apriority with non-causal 
justification. Again, as before, and having already strongly suggested that e is 
rationally contingent and so a posteriori, I would also argue that e is much more 
 99 
 
 
 
closely analogous to pain than to m here. By way of supporting this intuition, I 
would argue that since e is contingent-existential committing, it must be 
rationally contingent, a posteriori and so causally mediated. 
Having said all of this, there is now a sense in which I appear to be 
endorsing BonJour’s and, perhaps to a greater extent, McGinn’s causal/non-
causal account of a posteriori/a priori justification. If this is the case, if 
causation demarcates the a posteriori and a priori, there is a worry that the 
notion of rational necessity becomes otiose; if causation does all the 
explanatory work, what is the need for this additional explanans? Well, in short, 
as much as I accept the basic tenor of such causal accounts, I would argue that it 
is rational necessity that is doing the deeper explanatory work; all a priori 
justification is non-causal but this is so in virtue of rational necessity; an a 
priori proposition is non-causally justified in virtue of being rationally 
necessary. 
 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
I began by discussing the coincidence thesis (CT), suggesting that certain 
mathematical unknowables, such as Goldbach’s conjecture (GC), show that 
apriority and aposteriority are not exhaustive with respect to epistemic 
justification (unlike metaphysical necessity/contingency, which are 
exhaustive), thereby disambiguating (CT) into the following four, putative sub-
theses: 
 
(CT1) apriority entails necessity; 
(CT2) aposteriority entails contingency; 
(CT3) necessity entails apriority; 
(CT4) contingency entails aposteriority. 
 
In addition to the non-exhaustiveness point, cases such as (GC) and its 
‘contingent equivalent’ (CGC), provide counter-examples to (CT3) and (CT4) 
respectively; showing that (i) apriority and metaphysical necessity are not 
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coextensive, and suggesting that (ii) the best conjunctive thesis a proponent of 
(CT) could hope for would consist in (CT1)  (CT2). 
This being the case, in §3 I discuss (CT1) and the contingent a priori,189 
where I dismiss the Kripkean examples, such as stick s is one metre long at t0, 
claiming that there is an unresolved tension between knowing a priori that a 
certain sentence expresses such a proposition and knowing the nature of this 
proposition. I go on to allege that the resolution consists in understanding that 
contingent a priori sentences generally express (at least) two propositions; one 
‘widely’ contingent but requiring a posteriori justification to generate 
substantive (de re) knowledge of contingent circumstances; and another 
‘narrowly’ knowable a priori but asserting a necessary and usually conditional 
(de dicto or de re) circumstance. The difference in justification being that a 
priori knowledge of (de re) contingent circumstances is impossible; a priori 
knowledge of necessity is possible and, indeed, standard. 
In §§3.2 to 3.4 I discuss other potential examples such as I exist (e, e`, and 
e``) and x (Fx  A(Fx)), arguing that such cases either express existentially 
committing and so metaphysically contingent propositions, which are therefore 
rationally contingent or a posteriori, or they are so deeply indexical-involving 
that they express a priori but metaphysically necessary propositions (or are 
extremely superficial examples of a priori sentences that assert contingent 
propositions or circumstances—if they assert any circumstances at all). The 
key corollary to all of this being that rational modality is grounded in the 
metaphysical; if p is genuinely justifiable on an a priori basis, p entails a 
metaphysically necessary circumstance. There can therefore, be no contingent 
a priori propositions. 
All of this said, the contingent a priori is no philosophical dead-end, since a 
genuine understanding begins to suggest several important theses (which I 
argue for and rely on throughout this and the following chapters); (i) that there 
is a three-way, sentence-proposition-circumstance relationship; (ii) that 
sentences are only derivatively a priori or a posteriori, since propositions are 
the bearers of rational modality (which is, in turn, dependent on the 
metaphysical); whereas (iii) circumstances (or arrangements of objects and 
                                                         
189 I discuss (CT2) and the necessary a posteriori in ch. 5. 
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attributes) and then propositions are what is metaphysically necessary and 
contingent in the first instance; sentences are only very derivatively so. 
As should be apparent then, I view the contingent a priori as very 
‘interesting’, in virtue of, at least, its contribution to understanding the 
distinction between apriority and necessity; it is perhaps not so ‘scary’, since, as 
I argue throughout, there are no genuine contingent a priori propositions. So, 
whilst I dispute the existence of substantive examples of the phenomenon, I do 
think that a correct understanding of the relevant modalities strongly supports 
(a) a clear bifurcation of rational and metaphysical necessity, and (b) the need 
for a clear distinction between sentences, propositions and circumstances. 
Indeed, the failure of Kripke’s examples, is very much due to the latter 
distinction; the baptiser knowing a priori that a sentence expresses a certain 
proposition, on the one hand, but failing to know what circumstance that 
proposition asserts, on the other—the circumstance itself (and so the 
proposition), however, being clearly, metaphysically contingent. 
Given the failure of the Kripkean and indexical-involving cases then, it 
would seem that there is some case to be made for accepting (CT1), at least in 
an attenuated form: 
 
(CT1*) if p is a genuinely a priori justifiable proposition, then p must be 
metaphysically necessary. 
 
Having said this, I stress my commitment to fallibilism throughout the previous 
chapter (especially §6). Consequently, there is a significant worry over the 
utility of a notion of ‘genuine’ apriority. If it took approximately two millennia 
for humanity at large to realise that Euclid’s fifth postulate, e5 (for example), 
was not, ultimately, justifiable a priori, there is a possible sense in which 
‘genuine’ a priori justification is something of a chimaera; we can know what is 
not genuinely a priori (e5 for example) but never, in advance, what is genuinely 
a priori—in this way, apriority has a parallel problem to that of induction in the 
philosophy of science—the jury will always be out. 
So perhaps the best we can do is prima facie apriority and  
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(CT1p) if p is a prima facie a priori justifiable proposition, then p is a very 
weak guide to metaphysical necessity. 
 
Well, as I insist in the previous chapter (and as I hint again here), although I am 
committed to fallibilism, it seems to be the case that if we can prove a priori 
that ¬p then p should not be viewed as more widely a priori in the first instance; 
whilst p might have been prima facie a priori-for-s, given a proof of ¬p, we ought 
to be able to revise p’s rational status. So, perhaps my final position on (CT1) is 
to hold the following attenuation: 
 
(CT1s) if p is a secunda facie a priori justifiable proposition, then p is a 
strong (but still fallible) guide to metaphysical necessity. 
 
All of this being the case, we need to understand whether (CT2) also holds; 
we need to discuss the necessary a posteriori, conceivability, and rational and 
metaphysical modality (to which I turn in Chapters 5 to 7). Before doing this 
however, I first need to set the scene for such a discussion. Thus, in the 
following chapter, I complete my discussion of apriority and modality via a 
further consideration of rational necessity, rational insight, and ‘epistemic’ and 
logical modalities. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
 
 
Rational, Epistemic, Logical 
and Metaphysical Modalities 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter can be viewed as a criticism of the details but an 
endorsement of the spirit of Kripke’s general epistemic-metaphysical 
distinction; whilst I dispute the existence of the contingent a priori, I endorse 
the claim that the rational, epistemic and metaphysical domains are distinct, at 
least qua non-coextensive. That said, I suggest that the a priori is, or involves, a 
kind of mixed ‘epistemic’ or ‘rational’ necessity. This being the case, the main 
aim of this chapter is now clear; we need to understand what kind of necessity 
is involved in a priori justification—and, more widely, what kind of modality is 
involved in general, rational claims. 
In what follows, I begin the main task of setting out the positive details of 
the relationship between apriority and modality; discussing ‘rational necessity’, 
rational insight, whether and how this entails metaphysical necessity (§2), the 
‘regress problem’ (§2.1), fallibility (again), certainty and objectivity (§2.2). In 
particular, I begin to draw out some of the implications and requirements of the 
previous chapter as regards apriority and metaphysical modality; apriority is 
not coextensive with metaphysical necessity and instead is better understood 
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in terms of a kind of ‘epistemic’, or rather, ‘rational’, necessity. In the following 
section (§3), I continue this discussion, covering the relationship between 
apriority and rational, epistemic and logical necessities. I argue that apriority 
cannot be a fully epistemic necessity and, following BonJour to a certain extent, 
I claim that apriority is not coextensive with either ‘strict’ logical necessity or 
‘narrow’ logical necessity. Finally (§4), I suggest that apriority should best be 
understood as coextensive with ‘rational necessity’ and that this is not 
coextensive with epistemic, logical or metaphysical necessities (even if it is, 
ultimately, grounded in the latter). I then outline the positive implications of 
this theory, in terms of its endorsing and explaining the rational/metaphysical-
modal distinction; disambiguating the coincidence thesis; disarming the 
contingent a priori; setting the scene for an understanding of the a posteriori as 
‘rational contingency’ and of conceivability as ‘rational possibility’ (as I go on to 
explain in Part II of the thesis). 
Before beginning these tasks however, noting that I make such claims as 
that apriority ‘involves’, ‘is grounded in’ or, even, ‘is coextensive with’, some 
species of modality, let me first say a little about this. In response to such a set 
of claims, a first thought might be that apriority is merely a qualification or 
mode of knowing, whose main force is to endow the objects of knowledge with 
some kind of truth or necessity (ignoring for the moment the details of 
defeasibility and fallibility). Thus, since such claims appear to imply that 
apriority is (or is at least grounded in, or involves) some separate kind of 
modality, they are suspect or illegitimate. The general line of thought being that 
we should avoid coextensivity or grounding claims and focus instead on the 
alethic or modal status of a given p when p is a priori. Now I am in broad 
agreement that apriority is not a distinct modal realm qua some ‘species of 
modality’ perhaps best analysed in terms of a separate domain of (e.g. 
‘epistemically’) possible worlds,190 and I broadly agree that it should be 
understood as being some kind or mode of knowing. As I insist in the early 
stages of Chapter 2 however, the kind of knowledge that we are considering 
with respect to the a priori is propositional, so in qualifying propositional 
knowledge, apriority qualifies propositions; it is in this sense that I mean that 
                                                         
190 But, as I say in ch. 7, I do not view metaphysical modality in terms of such a realm of possible 
worlds either. 
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the a priori is, or involves, or is grounded in, a species of modality. That is, if a 
priori p  p, then, in endowing p with some kind of necessity, apriority ‘is’ 
(qua grounded in or involving) some kind of ‘modifying’ modality, in that the 
modifying modality is a necessary condition of apriority. The point being, if 
apriority somehow entails some species of necessity, I think it is fair to say that 
apriority ‘is grounded in’ or at least ‘involves’ the relevant kind of necessity. 
Now, I discuss involvement, grounding, coextensivity and the relevant 
modalities in the remainder of this chapter, but since these topics are central to 
the thesis as a whole, a more complete outline can only be presented towards 
the end of Part II. This being the case, this chapter should be seen as an attempt 
to work through the beginnings of an understanding of apriority as somehow 
involving or being grounded in some kind of necessity. That is, I seek to answer 
the question of the kind of necessity involved in p when p is a priori; i.e. 
questions such as, ‘what kind of necessity ‘is’ apriority?’; ‘what kind of necessity 
is involved in a priori claims?’; ‘what grounds apriority?’; ‘what is the nature of 
apriority?’ 
 
 
2 Rational necessity, insight and metaphysical modality 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, BonJour is somewhat equivocal on the 
issue of (CT1). He appears to endorse Kripke’s general distinction between 
metaphysical and epistemic modalities, whilst denying Kripke’s main example 
of the contingent a priori and appearing to doubt the phenomenon in general, 
making repeated claims that a priori justification results in direct insight into 
the necessary truth of the relevant proposition or, even, circumstance: 
 
“Turning to the positive aspect of the concept of an a priori reason, the 
traditional view, which I believe to be essentially correct, is that in the most 
basic cases, such reasons result from direct or immediate insight into the 
truth, indeed the necessary truth of the relevant claim.” 
 
“…[a priori insights are] insights into the essential nature of things or 
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situations of the relevant kind, into the way that reality in the respect in 
question must be.”191 
 
And,  
 
“[f]rom an intuitive standpoint, such rational insight purports to be nothing 
less than a direct insight into the necessary character of reality…What, after 
all, could be a better reason for thinking that a particular proposition is 
true than that one sees clearly and after careful consideration that it 
reflects a necessary feature that reality could not fail to posses?”192 
 
Thus, despite endorsing the epistemic-metaphysical distinction, BonJour at 
least appears to tie apriority, in an immediate and essential manner, to 
necessity (and it is reasonably clear from what he says that this necessity is 
metaphysical). In a similar vein to much of this, if my arguments from the 
previous chapter are applied, if a priori insight consists in endowing the 
relevant claim with metaphysical necessity, then there would appear to be a 
case for the claim that apriority is grounded in (or at least involves) a 
‘modifying’, metaphysical modality. 
There are however several, potential problems (some already noted) with 
the idea that apriority consists in rational insight into metaphysically necessary 
features of reality simpliciter. These are; 
 
(P1) the possibility of contingent a priori propositions and the potential 
falsity of (CT1)—as already discussed; 
(P2) a potential obscurity involved in the very notion of grasping or 
seeing such de re necessary features; 
(P3) a regress problem that might be implied by the notion of necessarily 
true, propositional a priori knowledge. 
 
As I have already discussed issue (P1) at some length, rejecting the contingent a 
priori and expressing commitment to versions of (CT1), I now focus on (P2) and 
                                                         
191 Both from BonJour 2005, p. 99. 
192 BonJour 1998, p. 107; cf. the surrounding discussion, p. 8, pp. 11-2 and p. 224. 
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(P3), respectively, only returning to the general issue of apriority and necessity 
after responding to these problems. BonJour’s insistence on a strong link 
between apriority and metaphysical modality makes responding to (P2) very 
difficult; hence in the remainder of this section, I offer a solution faithful to his 
general approach but substituting ‘rational’ for metaphysical necessity. Issue 
(P3) is perhaps more problematic, so in §2.1 I offer a distinct solution, whilst at 
the same time, admitting the viability of BonJour’s response. The proposed 
solution is that apriority consists in rational necessity but that it ultimately 
involves a propositional grasping of metaphysical necessities. Now, as I suggest 
in the previous chapter, (P1) is even more awkward for someone committed to 
a strong relationship between apriority and metaphysical necessity. This being 
the case, in §2.2 I return to my response to the contingent a priori and to my 
general position on the a priori; the endorsement of rational defeasibility, 
fallibility and of (CT1), via the claim that apriority consists in rational necessity 
but is, ultimately, grounded in the metaphysical.  
Turning to issue (P2) then, if apriority consists in rational insight into the 
necessary features of reality, this potentially raises two additional questions; 
(a) ‘what is rational insight?’, and (b) ‘how could contingent beings have such 
insight into such necessary features?’ In terms of the ‘what is’, I claim (as in 
Chapter 2, §2.2) that BonJour’s account is initially, slightly obscure, in that it 
appears to equivocate between a non-causal and causal account of the a priori 
but, ultimately, seems committed to a kind of epistemic Platonism. In the same 
section, I discuss and respond favourably to the latter issue, arguing (to some 
extent with BonJour) that rational insight is not akin to some Platonic faculty of 
rational intuition. BonJour’s (and to some extent, my) initial, positive response 
to (a) (i.e. that rational insight is akin to intellectual seeing, which is 
independent of experience and so, ultimately, concerns necessary propositions) 
still appears obscure to some philosophers.193 The residual obscurity here is 
twofold and, ultimately, related to, or the same problem as (b). First, the 
account appears to endorse the claim that apriority strongly involves 
metaphysical necessity; at least in terms of endorsing (CT1). I respond to this 
problem throughout the remainder of this chapter via the sentence-
                                                         
193 Notably for example, Devitt 2005. 
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proposition-world relationship, together with the concomitant claim that 
apriority involves rational, rather than metaphysical necessity, at least in the 
first instance. Second and more problematic however, is the implicit question 
(b) itself; if apriority qua rational insight is an intellectual grasping of necessary 
features of reality, how is this possible for contingent beings? That is, how can 
such finite, contingent entities as human beings have direct and immediate 
access into necessary arrangements of objects and attributes? 
My solution to this problem is also an initial response to the entailment 
problem. Apriority, in general,194 is not rational insight into metaphysically 
necessary features of reality simpliciter, rather, it is coextensive with what I call 
‘rational necessity’ in the first instance—even if it is ultimately grounded in the 
metaphysical. Now, before providing any positive argument for this set of 
claims, let me first respond to a quick potential objection that such a view is 
both limiting with respect to our access to modal truths and potentially self-
refuting (given that I might appear to be claiming that a priori access to 
metaphysical modality is metaphysically impossible). Taking the second half of 
this objection first, let me state quite simply that I am not making an 
impossibility claim; what I am saying is that, in general, a priori access to 
metaphysical modality is not immediate; where that access is via an utterance 
of a sentence (or a thought), which expresses a proposition that says something 
about the world, the access is, quite clearly, mediate. In order to grasp the 
necessity obtaining in a relationship between certain objects and attributes, if 
that relationship is asserted by a proposition expressed by a sentence, then the 
grasping is, at least once, mediate. In response to the first half of this objection 
then, I do claim that we can have a priori access to metaphysical modality; only, 
this is mediated or limited by our grasp of propositions and the sentences that 
express them. That is, in order to know what (metaphysically necessary) 
circumstance is asserted by a proposition, it is necessary both to understand 
what proposition is being expressed by the relevant sentence, and the nature of 
that proposition, which, ultimately, is a matter of understanding relations 
between objects and attributes. 
I now illustrate the foregoing claims (i.e. that (i) a priori, rational insight 
                                                         
194 The reason for this qualification will become clear in the following section. 
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involves rational necessity in the first instance—even if it is ultimately 
grounded in the metaphysical—and (ii) a priori access to metaphysical 
modality is possible, but, in general, mediate) and provide more positive 
argument for the non-obscurity of apriority qua rational insight, by re-visiting 
an example I have already used; my version of Euclid’s fifth postulate, 
 
(p5) exactly one line (l2) can be drawn through any point (p), not on a 
given line (l1), such that l2 is parallel to (i.e. does not intersect) l1. 
 
With respect to the first two of the foregoing claims, if a priori access concerns 
propositions that are justifiable independently of experience (and so that are 
necessary in some sense), in virtue of apriority being a broadly epistemic 
notion, we ought strongly to expect the relevant necessity to be broadly 
epistemic as well. So how does p5 provide support for the claim that the 
relevant modality is rational (and ultimately metaphysical) rather than 
specifically epistemic? Well, the argument of Chapter 2 was that the various 
versions of Euclid’s fifth postulate were prima facie a priori but, in virtue of not 
being (metaphysically) necessarily true on further (a priori) reflection, not 
genuinely a priori. This being the case, there is a very weak, very prima facie 
sense in which p5 is a priori (that is, necessary in some sense) and yet not 
metaphysically necessary; this is that p5 appeared on occasion to a thinker to be 
a priori but, on further, clear, rational reflection, p5 turned out not to be a 
priori—p5 was prima facie a priori but not genuinely a priori. Now, what I think 
this shows is that given certain systemic background assumptions, p5 can be 
said to be epistemically necessary or logically necessary (i.e. given certain 
assumptions about the relevant geometry, p5 is a logically necessary truth 
concerning that geometry) but that it is not more widely, rationally (or 
metaphysically) necessary. That is, in order to understand apriority, we require 
a modality that is stronger than (the logical or) the epistemic, even if it is 
weaker than the metaphysical per se; and it is this modality that I am labelling 
‘rational’. 
In further support of both the first and second parenthesised claims, I now 
discuss the p5 example in slightly more detail. This example supports both the 
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claim that apriority consists in ‘rational’, rather than epistemic necessity, and 
that although we do have a priori access to metaphysical necessity, that access 
is mediate, as I now hope to explain. The p5 proposition is, however, slightly 
more complicated, in that whilst it provides initial support for, and clarification 
of (ii), since I claim throughout that is it not, ultimately, an a priori proposition, 
a further more clear-cut example would be helpful at this point. This being the 
case, let us briefly return to my discussion of Euclidean geometry from Chapter 
2. As I have discussed the details of such examples in that chapter, I only 
present the relevant, bare bones here. So, to recap, assuming that p5 is prima 
facie justifiable a priori, it is thereby (according to those who claim that 
apriority entails metaphysical necessity) prima facie (but ultimately of course, 
not) metaphysically necessary. The a priori possibility (or conceivability) 
however, of l5 and r5 respectively, and both l5 and r5 contradicting p5, 
demonstrates that p5 cannot be metaphysically necessarily true, and indeed, 
therefore, not strictly justifiable a priori. Thus, in the final sections of Chapter 2, 
I conclude that p5 is not genuinely or secunda facie a priori after all; it is only 
something like 
 
(p5*) ◊p5  ◊r5  ◊l5  
 
that is secunda facie a priori. Now however, a further question arises; is such a 
revised a priori proposition a metaphysical necessity? Well, as I state above, 
even ignoring the mediation of the sentential access to the proposition, in order 
to know that the proposition asserts a metaphysically necessary circumstance, 
it is necessary to know the nature of that circumstance; it is necessary to 
understand what relation is being asserted to hold between which objects and 
attributes. Turning back to the details of p5*, what do the constituent 
propositions ◊p5, ◊r5 and ◊l5 assert? In the simplest terms, each of these 
propositions concerns possibility, together with items such as lines and points 
(i.e. presumably abstract, necessarily existing objects), and relations between 
those objects, which, given the discussion of the geometry in the previous 
chapter, must be dependent upon the nature of the spaces assumed by the 
relevant geometries. Having said this however, putting the three propositions 
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together as p5* it is fairly clear that ◊p5, ◊r5 and ◊l5 are mutually compossible, 
and so p5* is true and knowably so, a priori—at least, secunda facie. In addition 
however, I think it is also clear that p5* is metaphysically necessarily true,195 and 
a priori knowably so, in virtue of the rational necessity of p5* and the mediate 
metaphysical necessity of the same; i.e. the metaphysical necessity that ◊p5, ◊r5 
and ◊l5 are compossible. So in slightly more detail, what is the mediated 
necessity here and how is it knowable or justifiable a priori? Well, what is 
mediated is that p5* is metaphysically necessarily true; i.e. that p5* asserts a 
necessary set of circumstances; a necessary arrangement of objects and 
attributes. Moreover, this is justifiable a priori in virtue of the a priori rational 
insight into the natures of the relations between (and the natures of) the 
objects and attributes mentioned in the constituent propositions. So, where we 
have a circumstance asserted (and mediated) by an a priori proposition, if we 
have a priori access to metaphysically necessary relations between the relevant 
(metaphysically necessary) objects and properties, then we have mediate, 
propositional a priori access to metaphysically necessary circumstances. 
In summary, what I am suggesting here is that there is a difference in (at 
least) strength, but also in kind, between the species of modality involved in 
propositions such as the original p5 and the modified p5*. The former, since it 
turned out not to be metaphysically necessary, cannot be said to be a priori (or 
rationally necessary); it is only ‘necessary’ in the weaker, epistemic sense, given 
certain background assumptions, beliefs and knowledge about the system of 
which it is an axiom. That is, p5 is ‘necessary-for-Euclid’; it is necessary given 
the assumption of Euclidean space. The latter however (p5*) is more widely, 
rationally necessary, since it is (at the very least, very arguably) metaphysically 
necessary. That is, upon further rational reflection, p5* is rationally necessary 
on a (very much) as yet undefeated basis, to a much wider set of thinkers that 
the original p5 proposition. 
All of this being the case, against those philosophers who claim that 
apriority is obscure, I suggest that, on the contrary, it is best understood as 
being rationally necessary insight into metaphysical necessity, which is 
mediated in virtue of being propositional in character. So, apriority is as 
                                                         
195 Noting of course defeasibility and fallibility constraints mentioned in previous chapters. 
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obscure as the notions required to explain it; propositions and rational 
necessity. Having said this, I realise the topic of rational necessity is not cleared 
up by the foregoing paragraphs. However, this is a central concern of the thesis 
as a whole (and this chapter in particular). This being the case, I very much 
hope to partially define the notion in the following sections (§§3.1, 3.2 and 4 in 
particular).  
 
 
2.1 The regress problem 
 
Throughout the above, I have skirted around an issue that lurks in the 
background; namely problem (P3) noted at the beginning of the previous 
section. This problem is discussed in an exchange between BonJour and 
Devitt,196 and it applies irrespective of whether a priori reasoning delivers 
metaphysically necessary propositions simpliciter (i.e. BonJour’s position) or 
whether it is better viewed as being closer to rational necessity, and as 
delivering metaphysical necessities on a mediate basis (i.e. my position). The 
alleged problem is that when a proposition is justified or knowable on an a 
priori basis, that the proposition is so justified then requires further a priori 
justification, so generating a vicious, infinite regress; i.e. is a priori p 
justifiable a priori, and if so, what about a priori (a priori p) and so on? 
Devitt’s response to this problem is that the a priori should be explained (away) 
in terms of “conceptual competence” and that this is a skill, or knowledge-how, 
rather than knowledge-that. 197  This then, vis-à-vis propositional a priori 
                                                         
196 BonJour 2005, p. 100-1; Devitt 2005, pp. 112-3. The problem is also one that George Bealer 
attempts to solve via the idea that a priori, rational intuitions form a kind of basic ‘evidence’ 
(Bealer 1996b, pp. 121-30; 1999, pp. 30-7; 2002, pp. 102-5; cf. 1987). As with BonJour’s work, 
whilst I am sympathetic to Bealer’s general position on the a priori, the notion of intuition that 
he appeals to is not one that would convince non-rationalists; and the idea that a priori 
intuitions themselves are a kind of evidence, would, I feel, be entirely unappealing to the 
contemporary empiricist. This being the case, I try to solve this problem in the spirit of Bealer 
and BonJour, but without the appeal to a more thoroughgoing rationalism that such a notion of 
rational intuition would require. Bealer’s later position (2007), that metaphysical necessity is a 
kind of analyticity, is not one I can endorse. 
197 Devitt 2005, p. 113. Devitt’s discussion is couched in terms of the attempt to analyse 
apriority as analyticity and so to eliminate it in favour of conceptual competence. Devitt agrees 
with BonJour on the failure of an analytic explanation, but for eliminative reasons; the title of 
his paper being, ‘There is no a priori’. Ultimately however the entire discussion is framed within 
a naturalistic Duhem-Quinian holism (op. cit., pp. 106-7). On all of these points, I am in strong 
 113 
 
 
 
justification, is a dissolution rather than a solution. Having spent some time 
discussing the a priori in a positive light, I would at least appear to be 
committed to its utility, explanatory force and, ultimately, existence; a solution 
would therefore be preferable to a dissolution. BonJour at least has a potential 
response to this problem; that at the most fundamental level, a priori insight is 
non-propositional, direct and immediate. That said, whilst there is much to 
admire in BonJour’s work on the a priori, his solution here is not altogether 
satisfactory, in that it appears to account for apriority in terms of a kind of 
brute intuition (despite the fact that BonJour often attempts to avoid such a 
position),198 which, in virtue of being akin to a kind of inner faculty of knowing, 
is something that an opponent of the a priori would find deeply objectionable. 
In this section then, I address the regress problem, once again via the example  
 
(p5*) ◊p5  ◊r5  ◊l5 
 
together with some examples provided by BonJour. I begin with a brief 
discussion of p5* so as to further introduce the issue and set up BonJour’s 
response. I focus on my account of the a priori-rational/metaphysical modality 
relationship, as, despite its being more complex than BonJour’s, I think it is 
closer to the truth and that it offers a slightly better response to the problem. In 
addition, despite hoping to tackle this problem in isolation, what I say here very 
much relates and contributes to my general theory of the a priori and modality, 
in that such examples of the a priori, when taken together with cases such as 
(GC) and (CGC) (from the previous two chapters), as well as showing that (i) 
apriority is not coextensive with metaphysical necessity (but is better 
understood to be coextensive with rational necessity, in the first instance), also 
show that (ii) a priori justification can provide epistemic access to metaphysical 
necessity, but that this access is generally mediate. It is (ii) that is most relevant 
here, in that if a priori justification of metaphysical modalities is mediate, qua 
propositional ‘all the way down’, then each propositional claim a priori p 
seems to stand in need of further justification a priori (a priori p) and so on. 
                                                                                                                                                              
agreement with BonJour, who argues that they fail to account for (or eliminate) the a priori in 
any way (as I go on to argue in §3 below). 
198 The solution is at BonJour 2005, p. 100-1; one of the attempted avoidances is at op. cit., p. 99. 
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Thus, the main questions of this section are, (iii) is a priori access to 
metaphysical modalities entirely propositional (i.e. mediate)?; if not (i.e. if there 
is immediate access, as BonJour claims), then (iv) what is this immediate, non-
propositional a priori access to the metaphysical?; and if it is mediate, then (v) 
is there a regress problem after all, or is this a prima facie problem that can be 
avoided? 
Turning to p5* then, let us see what this shows with respect to questions 
(iii) to (v). As I have been suggesting throughout, with any utterance of a 
sentence such as ‘p5, r5 and l5 are individually possible’, there is this three-way 
relationship between the sentence, the proposition expressed (p5* in this case) 
and the circumstance asserted; i.e. the relevant arrangement of objects and 
attributes (which I label p5* here for ease of reference). This being a three-way 
relationship, any access to p5* would appear to be twice mediate; one needs to 
know what proposition is expressed by the relevant sentence and what 
circumstance the proposition asserts. I suggest however, that apriority, in 
virtue of being a broadly epistemic notion, operates intrinsically at the 
propositional level and only derivatively at the sentential; thus for present 
purposes, we can perhaps set aside the latter and focus on propositional 
mediacy. There is then a two-way relationship and the remaining, concomitant, 
apparent one-level mediation of epistemic access to p5* via the proposition p5*. 
So, at least prima facie, if p5* is a priori, our access to the circumstance p5* 
would appear to be mediate qua propositional. Considering the example of 
modus ponens however, BonJour says the following: 
 
“…because of the role that such [a priori] insights are supposed to play in 
deductive inference, it is often and quite possibly always a mistake to 
construe them as propositional in form…[A]t least in the most fundamental 
sorts of cases (think here of modus ponens), the application of a 
propositional insight concerning the cogency of such an inference would 
require either a further inference of the very sort in question or one equally 
fundamental, thereby leading to a vicious regress. Instead, I suggest, the 
relevant logical insight must be construed as non-propositional in 
character, as a direct grasping of the way in which the conclusion is related 
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to the premises and validly flows from them.”199 
 
BonJour continues to argue that this non-propositional conception of a 
priori insight should be extended to many other cases, including examples such 
as 2 + 3 = 5 and no surface can be uniformly red and uniformly blue at the 
same time. Ignoring the latter, more complex example for now, the justification 
of which would appear to be very propositional in nature, and focusing on 
examples such as p5*, modus ponens and 2 + 3 = 5, the problem with this 
approach is that such examples just seem deeply propositional. Moreover, in 
offering an account of apriority in terms of direct, immediate, non-propositional 
rational insight, BonJour appears to be coming very close to espousing the kind 
of (faculty of) rational intuition that he (and critics of the a priori) find so 
problematic; i.e. if apriority ‘at the most fundamental level’ just boils down to 
some direct, non-propositional insight, if we just see or grasp such claims to be 
(necessarily) true, then critics of the a priori will have much to complain about. 
This being the case, let us return to the examples discussed, so as to see 
whether they might suggest a more satisfactory solution to the regress problem 
and questions (iii) to (v) above. 
In order to grasp p5*, it at least appears to be necessary to understand p5* 
and that this asserts the circumstance p5*; our a priori access to the relevant 
circumstance just seems propositional. Against this however, in this apparently 
straightforward case, perhaps it is possible to insist that (the truth of or the 
circumstance asserted by) p5* is just grasped, immediately and in a non-
propositional manner; i.e. that p5* does assert (or even, is) p5* in virtue of some 
direct grasping of p5* itself? Well, here, first let it be noted that (even without 
the parenthesised phrase ‘the truth of…’), ‘that…p5* is just grasped, 
immediately’ and ‘that p5* does assert p5*’ once again at least sound 
propositional; although, that I might just grasp or see p5*, of course, sounds 
much less so. So perhaps neither consideration is telling; we should not look to 
syntax to determine ontology. Now, as I suggest, this issue is really at the 
deepest level of metaphysics and ontology—we are trying to talk about 
propositions, objects and attributes, and about relationships that might hold 
                                                         
199 BonJour 2005, p. 100. 
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between them; but although it is possible to label propositions relatively 
unproblematically, in labelling relationships, objects and attributes and by 
attempting to discuss whether (it is the case that) such circumstances are 
grasped, we can skew the debate either way depending on the choice of 
terminology. This being the case, it is extremely difficult to come to any sensible 
and reasonable conclusion here. Nevertheless, let me at least attempt to do so. 
My proposed solution to the regress problem then, is as follows. First, 
apriority, in virtue of being an epistemic notion, is going to be largely 
propositional; if I am justified in believing something a priori, that something is 
a proposition (whatever that might be—and even if that, ultimately is a 
circumstance or arrangement of objects and attributes). Instead of attempting 
to draw the sting from the problem by proposing a bifurcation of apriority in 
terms of a general, mediate, propositional form that ‘bottoms out’ in a direct, 
immediate, non-propositional form (with respect to the most fundamental 
cases) then, in what follows, I aim to block the regress at the first level; i.e. to 
admit the potential regress but to argue that it is non-vicious. 
So, with an a priori proposition such as p5*, that this is justified a priori 
appears, prima facie at least, to suggest that the proposition a priori p5* also 
stands in need of such justification (and so on). Against this, I claim, once p5* is 
seen to be a priori qua rationally necessary, the proposition just is justified a 
priori, in virtue of being so rationally necessary (admitting the constraints of 
defeasibility and fallibility of course). That is, p5* for example, in virtue of being 
justifiable independently of experience just is rationally necessary, and vice 
versa; i.e. where a particular proposition p is a priori qua rationally necessary 
qua justifiable independently of experience, p just is so justified; hence there is 
no need to posit any regress whatsoever. Now, of course, if p is a priori, then we 
can generate an apparent regress by saying that a priori p also happens to be 
a priori (and so on) but, of course, if p is a priori, then so will be the proposition 
a priori p (and so on). Thus, in this respect, rational necessity operates in the 
same way as metaphysical; if p is (rationally) necessary, it is also (rationally) 
necessary that p is (rationally) necessary (and so on). I conclude therefore, that 
this regress is entirely explicable, mundane and neither vicious nor 
problematically infinite. 
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2.2 Apriority and rational necessity; certainty and objectivity 
 
As I indicate above, there is much to admire in BonJour’s work on the a priori. 
So what has gone wrong with the direct, non-propositional view? BonJour’s 
mistake, I think, is to confuse the ‘feeling’ of a priori insight, the 
‘phenomenology of apriority’ perhaps, with a priori justification itself. Indeed, I 
would agree that the occurrent feeling that accompanies an a priori rational 
insight into the truth of p5*, modus ponens or 2 + 3 = 5, for example, strongly 
suggests that such insight does consist in a direct and unmediated access to the 
truth or rational (and ultimately, metaphysical) necessity of the same. Against 
this however, I would argue that there is no need to explain the ‘what’ and the 
‘how’ of a priori justification in terms of the occurrent feeling of a priori insight; 
this would be to shift the subject matter unnecessarily and, as we have seen, 
problematically, in that such direct, non-propositional insight, even if it ‘solves’ 
the regress problem, remains somewhat obscure. Instead, we should focus on 
the real issue—a priori justification—and realise that this does not generate a 
vicious regress, in that where a regress is possible this is akin to the higher-
order necessity of p when it is metaphysically necessary. 
Having said this, there is a possibility that the direct, non-propositional, 
versus the mediate, propositional view of a priori access is something of a side 
issue. The point being, if some objection to the foregoing paragraphs can be 
made to show that a vicious regress remains, it is difficult to see just how 
BonJour’s account would manage to avoid the same problem. That is, if a priori 
p really does stand in need of additional justification such that a priori (a 
priori p) and so on, unless there is a positive account of what direct, non-
propositional access is, the same problem would appear to apply to the non-
propositional version; direct-a priori Fx200 would seem to stand in need of 
additional justification such that direct-a priori (direct-a priori Fx) (and so 
on). The objection here is that as much as the proponent of direct, non-
propositional access might insist that the first direct-a priori Fx does not 
stand in need of further (direct) justification, since the access just is a direct, 
                                                         
200 As before, Fx is meant to suggest an arrangement of objects and attributes; i.e. a 
circumstance. 
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non-propositional grasping or seeing, in the absence of a clear and 
unobjectionable account of what this amounts to, it certainly seems akin to 
claiming that our access to Fx just is directly a priori. Now, if we can have such 
direct access to Fx, then why not direct access to the circumstance asserted by 
the proposition direct-a priori Fx (and so on); thus the regress would apply to 
this version as much as it might to the propositional account. The point I am 
trying to make is that if the regress did apply (and I think it does not—certainly 
not in an objectionable way), it would apply to either account, each ultimately 
being a different description of the same circumstances. In favour of the 
propositional account, apriority is a broadly epistemic notion; knowledge and 
justification (in the relevant senses) are usually understood to concern 
propositions; the simple cases discussed all seem strongly propositional (and 
this would apply a fortiori for more complex cases); moreover, the 
propositional account, together with the concomitant notion of rational 
necessity, is significantly simpler and less obscure than the direct, non-
propositional view. This being the case, the propositional account is to be 
preferred over the non-propositional view. There is however, a sense in which 
my solution is very similar to the non-propositional account. The point is, 
BonJour’s account ‘bottoms out’ in a direct, non-propositional grasping of the 
relevant circumstance; similarly, mine rests on a near equivalence of apriority 
and rational necessity, the latter (like direct grasping) being what makes p a 
priori; what justifies the claim that p is a priori. As an interim summary, whilst I 
appear to favour strongly the propositional account, I do not intend to claim 
that direct, immediate access is impossible; rather, I claim that the 
propositional account is simpler, more consistent and coherent, better fits the 
examples, and is less objectionable than the non-propositional. That said, a 
priori access is, in general, mediate; if and where it is immediate, it is rational 
necessity that does the explanatory work; where a subject does grasp Fx a 
priori, either Fx itself, or the p that expresses it, must be rationally necessary, 
and vice versa; if Fx/p is rationally necessary, Fx/p is justified a priori. 
By way of summarising the previous two sections, I now offer some further 
clarificatory remarks on what I say above with respect to rational necessity 
explaining, or grounding, apriority. My claims of the foregoing paragraphs (that 
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the a priori qua justifiable independently of experience qua rationally 
necessary, does not stand in need of further justification; hence in virtue of 
being rationally necessary, an a priori proposition just is directly justified) 
might appear to more committed empiricists, and perhaps to strongly fallibilist 
rationalists, to smack somewhat of infallibility, certainty, indubitability and, of 
course, necessity. This being the case, a few words are in order to explain this 
appearance. First, concerning necessity, I explain the differences between 
metaphysical and rational necessity throughout the previous chapters—and I 
have more to say in what follows. So, whilst apriority consists in rational 
necessity, although rational necessity is distinct from the metaphysical, it is, I 
claim, grounded in the latter in that either it strongly involves or is ultimately 
explained by the metaphysical—as I say however, I have more to say about this 
below. 
Second, and with respect to the other notions, I also admit that the a priori 
is fallible (and defeasible—by further a priori reasoning) in previous chapters, 
so as regards being rationally necessary, what I mean to say here is that if p is 
prima facie (fallibly, defeasibly) a priori, p is fallibly and defeasibly rationally 
necessary (and vice versa). Similar remarks then apply to certainty and 
indubitability; if p is a priori, p is fallibly (and defeasibly) ‘certain’ or 
‘indubitable’ (i.e. very weak forms of ‘certainty’ and ‘indubitability’). Only 
where p is genuinely a priori, can it be said to be entirely infallible, indefeasible 
and certain or indubitable—but of course, the class of genuinely a priori 
propositions is going to be very small and difficult to establish for such limited 
creatures as human beings. Now, indubitability in particular has been a 
cornerstone of thoroughgoing rationalist accounts of the a priori; one 
interpretation of Descartes’s epistemology being that it begins by attempting to 
reconstruct human knowledge on the basis of that which it is impossible to 
doubt. Whilst I claim that a rationally necessary proposition is ‘indubitable’ (i.e. 
on an ongoing, prima facie basis), let it be noted that this is a very constrained 
form of indubitability; rational necessity is defeasible, corrigible and 
thoroughly fallible; so ‘more’ a priori claims are more indubitable and ‘less’ a 
priori claims less indubitable. To cash this out in terms of examples, considering 
some of the cases we have already discussed, e5/p5 is, as I make clear, 
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thoroughly prima facie a priori; hence it is highly dubitable (indeed, apparently, 
actually false); BonJour’s colour exclusion proposition no surface can be 
uniformly red and uniformly blue at the same time, is perhaps more secunda 
facie a priori, so more indubitable; and so on for p5* and, ultimately, the likes of 
2 + 3 = 5. These, I claim, are increasingly ‘indubitable’ in the relevant sense 
(but I suppose there is some sense in which we might just have mathematics ‘all 
wrong’).201 
One final topic to clear up, with respect to apriority as rational necessity, 
concerns the notions of ‘objectivity’ and ‘subjectivity’ (as discussed in Chapter 
2, §4). As with certainty and indubitability, some of my remarks above might 
appear to suggest that apriority is some kind of ‘objective’, modal phenomenon. 
As before, although I suggest that apriority is a kind of alethic, epistemic 
necessity, this is not intended to imply that it is some kind of fully ‘objective’ 
phenomenon, akin to metaphysical necessity. In addition, whilst I claim that 
apriority must be akin to an alethic version of epistemic necessity, I do not 
intend this to commit me to a fully ‘objective’ account; there remains an 
essential ‘subjectivity’ to a priori claims, and if apriority is best understood in 
terms of rational necessity, then there is a strong sense in which this notion 
must be essentially ‘subjective’ too. I discuss all of this, with respect to a 
working understanding of apriority as independence of experience, in Chapter 
2. There, I outline the position that apriority is an essentially ‘subjective’ (qua 
intersubjective) notion. This being the case, my conclusions of that section 
should now be applied to the amended account of apriority; apriority qua 
rational necessity is an essentially intersubjective phenomenon; where a 
particular proposition is rationally necessary, there is a strong sense in which 
this must be considered rationally necessary for a particular (set of) subject(s). 
The phenomenon is not thoroughly subjective however, the process of 
‘collective reflective equilibrium’ going some way towards making collectively, 
secunda facie a priori propositions ‘more’ objective (qua intersubjective). Just by 
way of an example, e5/p5 qua prima facie a priori proposition could be said to be 
                                                         
201 I hope not to endorse the Quinean thesis that ‘there are no unrevisable truths’ here, since, 
for fairly clear reasons, the statement itself must either be revisable or not (and so false on 
either count). That is, there must be some central class of unrevisable a priori propositions, but 
saying what these are, is, perhaps, a very difficult task Cf. Putnam 1978. 
 121 
 
 
 
‘a priori-for’ Euclid; the amended and corrected p5* being more collectively 
(intersubjectively) a priori, post Riemann and Lobachevsky’s additional a priori 
reflection on the original proposition. 
 
 
3 Rational, epistemic and logical modalities 
 
So far, despite endorsing some attenuated versions of (CT1), I have argued that 
apriority is not coextensive with metaphysical necessity; that is, I have denied 
the general coincidence thesis (CT), especially in the light of Goldbach’s 
conjecture and its ‘contingent equivalent’ (CGC). In claiming that apriority 
should be understood in terms of a constrained form of epistemic or ‘rational’ 
necessity, however, I have also argued that it is propositional, mediate and that 
there is no clear regress problem. The latter claims very much turn on the 
notion of rational necessity as a form of ‘epistemic’ necessity. This being the 
case, I now need to explain precisely what this amounts to. Given that apriority 
is ‘essentially intersubjective’, as I say above, does this mean that it just is 
standard epistemic necessity, or is it a more constrained, more modal kind of 
modality? And if it is the latter, is this just the same as some kind of logical 
necessity, or is there room between strict, narrow and broad logical (i.e. 
metaphysical) necessity so as to accommodate the rational? In this section I 
discuss such questions, beginning with the epistemic (§3.1), arguing that 
epistemic necessity is too epistemic (i.e. non-modal or ‘modal-for-all-I-know’) to 
account for apriority. I then discuss the more familiar logical necessities, 
arguing that none of these is sufficient to explain rational necessity (§3.2); 
concluding that the latter must therefore be a kind of modality ‘between’ the 
epistemic/logical and metaphysical. 
 
 
3.1 Rational and epistemic necessity 
 
The distinction between epistemic and more ‘modal’ senses of necessity (and 
especially the relevant relation between epistemic and rational necessity) is not 
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a topic that has been discussed at great length in the literature.202 Two-
dimensionalists (and Chalmers in particular) 203  make much use of the 
distinction between ‘metaphysical’, ‘horizontal’ or ‘secondary’ necessity on the 
one hand, and ‘epistemic’, ‘diagonal’ or ‘primary’ on the other, all of which I 
discuss in Chapter 1, concluding that such two-dimensional analyses are overly 
logico-semantic, given that the relevant analysandae are metaphysical and 
epistemic, and that neither field can be reduced to logic or semantics. Such 
analyses are, of course, very much related to Kripke’s discussion in Naming and 
Necessity. Kripke discusses ‘epistemic possibility’ throughout that work, but 
apart from scattered remarks, does not make much use of the distinction 
between epistemic and more the ‘modal’, rational modality I intend here.204 
Yablo (1993) discusses various senses of epistemic possibility with a view to 
understanding the notion of conceivability, but he only touches on the 
distinction I want to make. There is a sense then in which I am breaking new 
ground here.205 This being a difficult task, in what follows I begin with the 
(fairly standard) notion of epistemic necessity (and possibility—both of which 
have been discussed more thoroughly, at least in terms of epistemic logic)206 
and continue to argue that there is a clear distinction between the standard 
notion, which might be called ‘mere’ or ‘subjective’ epistemic necessity (i.e. 
what I occasionally label ‘necessity-for-all-I-know’) and the more relevant, 
more modal, rational necessity, on the other. 
Turning to the more standard, historical notion, epistemic necessity and 
possibility, as expressed by the modal qualifiers ‘necessarily’ or ‘must’, and 
‘possibly’, ‘might’ or ‘may’ respectively, are usually understood to convey what 
                                                         
202 ‘Epistemic possibility’ is discussed by DeRose 1991; Hacking 1967, 1975; and Teller 1972 
but, as I indicate, not in the way I discuss it here. 
203 See Chalmers 1996, 2002 and 2006a; cf. Jackson 1998, 2004. 
204 Hughes (2004, pp. 86-7) discusses Kripke’s use of ‘epistemic possibility’, highlighting a 
deviation from standard usage (i.e. subjective, non-modal) towards “a priori (Cartesian) 
certainty” (Kripke 1980, p. 143, n. 72). If Kripke is talking about ‘epistemic possibility’ qua ‘a 
priori possibility’, then his usage is much closer to the sense of rational modality I intend here. 
As ever though, pinning down Kripke’s actual position is somewhat difficult. Hughes’s 
discussion of Kripke’s use of ‘might have turned out’ and ‘might turn out’ is also interesting 
(2004, pp. 87-8). 
205 Fiocco (2007) offers some discussion of conceivability and epistemic possibility—but, again, 
not the kind of discussion I am suggesting. 
206 I am thinking of work on the logic of knowledge and belief dating as far back as Aristotle’s 
Prior and Posterior Analytics, but more recently including works such as Prior 1955, White 
1975 and Rescher 2005. 
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is entailed by and what is consistent with a subject’s knowledge, respectively. 
So for example, if I know that the cat is on the mat, it is epistemically necessary 
(for me) that there is something on the mat; it is epistemically possible (for me) 
that there is an additional item on the mat (e.g. a lightly chewed bird); and it is 
epistemically impossible (for me) that there is nothing on the mat (since the cat 
‘must’ be on the mat). Similarly, a subject s who knows that the cat is not on the 
mat but is elsewhere in the house, may utter the phrase, ‘It must be somewhere 
else in the house’; and if s does not know that it is in the house, he may say, ‘It 
might be in the house’ (perhaps both understood with the tacit ‘…for all I 
know’). 
Now, the examples here are illuminating. The first cat example shows that 
epistemic modality is, as the name suggests, a deeply epistemic (and subject-
relative) ‘modality’.207 The point being, if I know some p and that p entails q, 
then, according to the standard reading of epistemic necessity, both p and q are 
epistemically necessary (for me);208 and both ¬p and ¬q are epistemically 
impossible (for me). Both examples support the insertion of the ‘for me’ 
qualification, and make the conclusion that epistemic necessity is a very 
subject-relative ‘necessity’, ‘for all s knows’, more evident; i.e. they support the 
conclusion that where s knows some p (and that p entails q), it ‘must’ be the 
case (for s) that p (and mutatis mutandis for epistemic possibility). 
Now on the second point, epistemic necessity cannot be the same notion as 
apriority or rational necessity, since the latter, whilst being ‘subjective’ to a 
certain degree (what I am able to know a priori, depending largely on my 
epistemic situation), is much more ‘objective’, in virtue of being 
intersubjectively corrigible as per the e5/p5 example (of prima facie apriority) 
used extensively throughout this and previous chapters. Even more ‘objective’ 
examples of rational necessities are provided by the various mathematical 
examples already cited, such as 2 + 3 = 5; all of these are rationally necessary 
in a much wider sense than that suggested by the notion of epistemic ‘necessity’ 
as entailment under a certain body of knowledge or belief. 
                                                         
207 The scare quotes indicating a tension in something’s being both deeply epistemic yet fully 
modal. 
208 I ignore here a debate about the closure of knowledge under known entailment. For details 
and further reading see the ‘Introduction’ (and papers mentioned therein) to Sosa and Steup 
2005. 
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More to the point however, is the very epistemicity of epistemic ‘modality’ 
as opposed to the wider modality involved in the a priori domain. The point 
here being that a claim such as the cat is on the mat can hardly be seen as a 
plausible candidate, metaphysically necessary proposition and, this being the 
case, it is very difficult to see how it could be considered to be more widely 
rationally necessary (i.e. intellectually necessary irrespective of empirical 
concerns) or a priori. Standardly a priori propositions such as 2 + 3 = 5 not 
depending on such unavoidably empirical information as a particular object’s 
location in space, for example.209 It is this involvement of, or grounding in, 
metaphysical necessity that is what really distinguishes the rational from the 
epistemic; i.e. apriority qua rational necessity from mere, epistemic ‘necessity-
for-all-I-know’. 
Having thus established a subjective-‘modal’/intersubjective-modal 
distinction, which suggests a clear dichotomy between epistemic and rational 
necessity, I now need to tease out the implications for the related issue of 
alethicity. Metaphysical modality is one of the alethic modalities, in that where 
p is metaphysically necessary this is usually understood to be in virtue of 
something’s making it the case that p; propositions being necessary in virtue 
of the necessity of the relevant circumstances; circumstances being necessary 
in virtue of the natures of the relevant objects and attributes. This being the 
case, both examples, in highlighting the deep epistemico-subjectivity of 
epistemic necessity, show that the relevant p is not more widely necessary 
when s knows that p; if s knows that p (and that p entails q) the so-called 
epistemic ‘necessity’ here is entirely dependent on it being the case that s knows 
that p, and whilst s’s knowing that p might be objectively the case, the 
metaphysical necessity of p is not made true in virtue of that fact (since s knows 
that p, yet p is not metaphysically necessary). As with metaphysical necessity 
on the other hand, apriority and rational necessity are (or should be) broadly 
alethic notions, in that whilst prima facie a priori justification can generate 
falsehoods, such as e5, more ‘genuine’, secunda facie apriority or rational 
                                                         
209 Similarly, these examples show that epistemic possibility is not the same as a priori 
possibility—or, as I claim in the following chapter, conceivability; there being nothing on the 
mat being epistemically impossible (for the relevant s), but surely (more widely) conceivable. I 
leave the details of this claim for the next chapter however. Yablo (1993) makes similar points. 
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necessity should only generate necessary truths—albeit fallibly. The point 
being, as with the p5 example, I claim, if it turns out that p is false and so not 
metaphysically necessary, p cannot be said to be a priori knowable or rationally 
necessary. All of this being the case, I claim, epistemic necessity is distinct from 
rational necessity in virtue of being (i) deeply subjective and, more importantly, 
(ii) entirely non (alethically) modal. 
There are two main objections to the foregoing line of argument, which I 
now outline (together, since they are related) and respond to briefly, before 
moving on to the various logical necessities. First (developing a theme 
suggested in the previous paragraph), is the claim that since knowledge itself is 
objective and (fallibly) alethic, so too must be the relevant sense of ‘epistemic 
necessity’. The second objection is that epistemic necessity (at least as in the 
examples described) is alethic in the relevant sense and so the examples (as 
described) miss a salient point; namely that what is putatively ‘necessary’ is not 
the cat is on the mat or the cat is in the house, but some more qualified 
propositions (and circumstances) such as actually, the cat is on the mat (at t0), 
or (if what I know/believe to be the case is true), then (actually) the cat is in 
the house (at t0). Taken together, the two objections would be alleged to show 
that the considerations of the foregoing paragraphs, and especially the two 
examples, are significantly misguided; there is just no such sense of ‘subjective’ 
epistemic necessity; there is only the kind of epistemic (qua ‘objective’, 
rational) necessity I describe. 
Before responding to both objections, let it be noted that even if both were 
to go through, if there were only one, ‘objective’ sense of epistemic necessity 
after all, then I would be reasonably happy with this result; we would still have 
something in the region of the target analysans—intersubjective, epistemic/ 
rational necessity. That said, I think there is a distinction to be made and that 
this is helpful in terms of elucidating the notion of rational necessity and, 
therefore, apriority. Concerning the first of the objections then, I both hinted at 
this and responded briefly in the foregoing. Whilst on several (externalist and 
internalist) accounts of knowledge and justification, if s knows that p, there is 
something objective that makes this the case, this does not make the relevant 
sense of ‘epistemic necessity’ objective and thereby alethically modal. The point 
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is, whilst knowing that p may well be an objective issue, that p is thereby 
‘epistemically necessary’ does not render p necessary in any wider, substantive 
sense. Given that the cat’s being on the mat is a thoroughly contingent 
circumstance, s’s knowing this circumstance (however objective) does not 
thereby render the circumstance necessary in any objective sense; p here is 
neither rationally nor metaphysically necessary. 
This exchange however leads directly to the second objection; that it is not 
the obviously contingent circumstance described that is ‘necessary’, rather it is 
a more qualified circumstance, such as the ‘actuality’ of the cat’s being on the 
mat. In response to this second objection, let me first say (as I did at the start of 
the previous paragraph), that if, in virtue of the insertion of such an ‘actuality’ 
qualification, we have located a form of objective epistemic necessity, then so 
be it; we have something like rational necessity, something like apriority. That 
said however, and as very much as argued in the previous chapter, I do not 
think that in virtue of inserting an ‘actually’ operator, A, in front of phrases 
such as ‘the cat is on the mat’, we generate genuine, interesting necessities; 
such a move smacks of the two-dimensionalism I reject in Chapter 1 and, more 
importantly, is precisely analogous to the Evansian examples of ‘superficial’ 
contingent a priori propositions I reject in the previous chapter. The point 
being, just via some combination of the occurrent knowledge that p, and the (S5 
or other) semantics of  and A, we do not thereby generate the genuine 
metaphysical necessity Ap. This is because such a necessity (i) would be 
thoroughly de dicto in virtue of so relying on the semantics of  and A, and (ii) 
would be intrinsically bound up in the notion that metaphysical necessity 
should be best understood in terms of an actual world together with infinite, 
additional (real or ersatz) possible worlds. I view the relevant sections of the 
introductory and concluding chapters, as refuting implication (i), in virtue of 
there being no obvious entailment from de dicto to de re necessity; I take up the 
issue of the correct understanding of modality in the concluding chapter, where 
I argue that ‘actually’ or A are not genuine predicates of real, modal properties. 
It is fairly clear then that mere epistemic necessity is not the same as the 
more objective (or at least intersubjective) and modal, rational necessity I am 
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suggesting as the analysans of apriority. As opposed to being a purely epistemic 
modality, rational necessity is more closely akin to the metaphysical, in virtue 
of the deliverances of secunda facie a priori reasoning being (fallibly) true—and 
the relevant circumstances obtaining of metaphysical necessity. That said, our 
target modality cannot simply be taken to be metaphysical qua broad logical 
necessity (given some of the coextensivity issues I mention throughout), so 
perhaps it is akin to, or just the same as, one of the narrower logical necessities; 
strict (i.e. formal) or narrow (i.e. definitional or conceptual) logical necessity.210 
In the following section, I discuss this possibility. 
 
 
3.2 Rational and logical necessity 
 
Even the most obvious cases of apriority we have discussed so far (p5*, and 
various mathematical examples such as 2 + 3 = 5), are fairly clearly not purely 
formal, logical necessities; the latter class of propositions (i.e. mathematics in 
general), very arguably being not reducible to any formal, logical system, 
following the discovery of Russell’s paradox and Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorems.211 So, assuming that strict logical necessity cannot account for even 
the most basic a priori truths, I begin with narrow logical necessity. If a priori 
propositions are narrow logical necessities, they are at least logical necessities 
in some sense; and I take this sense to be analyticity. Concurring with BonJour 
to a large extent however, I shall argue that analyticity cannot account for 
apriority; ultimately in virtue of the fact that the necessity of the ‘lowest-level’, 
explanatory, analytic truths would itself stand in need of further justification. 
This justification, I claim, comes in two forms; first, we know that logical 
necessities are necessary in virtue of their rational necessity (i.e. their apriority 
epistemically explains their analyticity); second, logical necessities are 
necessary in virtue of the natures of the relevant objects or properties (i.e. 
                                                         
210 The phraseology of broad, strict and narrow logical necessity is borrowed from Plantinga 
1974, as modified by Lowe 1998. 
211 See Russell 1902 and Gödel 1931. I realise there is a lot more that could be said here. As will 
become apparent, I view the prospect of an analysis of apriority in terms of strict or narrow 
logical necessity as remote; hence I hope to avoid spending time on side-issues, no matter how 
large and vexed. 
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logical necessities consist in the expression of metaphysically necessary 
relations between logical formulae—and definitions or concepts). So, 
analyticity cannot explain apriority; rather, rational necessity explains (and 
metaphysical necessity grounds) analyticity. This being the case, I shall argue in 
what follows that apriority should best be understood in terms of rational 
necessity, a kind of quasi-epistemic but, importantly, modal necessity, distinct 
from all fully epistemic and logical (as well as metaphysical) necessities. 
Now, I realise that analyticity is a deep and vexed issue, its utility and 
definition being debated in recent philosophy, and its very existence strongly 
called into question by Quine.212 This thesis largely concerns apriority and 
metaphysical modality, so analyticity, qua some kind of conceptual, definitional 
or semantic necessity, is only of tangential interest. In addition, since I claim 
that analyticity cannot explain apriority, what follows is, to a certain extent, an 
exercise in working through such failings. So, I very much assume (pace Quine) 
a working understanding of analyticity as narrow logical necessity; my main 
focus here being the claim that analyticity, even so charitably understood, 
cannot account for the a priori. That said, before making this move, it is 
necessary to provide a very brief historical discussion of the Kantian and 
Fregean conceptions of analyticity, especially since the latter largely underlies 
the claim that analyticity is narrow logical necessity. As I suggest, the main 
issue here is not the similarities or differences between accounts of the analytic 
(Kantian or Fregean for example); the issue is whether there is some broadly 
workable account of analyticity that might explain or ground the a priori. 
Historically there are two main accounts of analyticity; the Kantian 
characterisation in terms of (covert) predicate containment,213 and the Fregean 
analysis of substitution of synonyms (or definitional equivalents) salva 
veritate.214 The latter of these (if it is clearly distinct from the Kantian 
account)215 is most closely linked to the notion of narrow logical necessity, so 
                                                         
212 Quine 1951. See Grice and Strawson 1956 for the rearguard defence. For more recent 
debate, see Peacocke 1992; Boghossian 1996, 1997; Katz 1998; Rey 1998, 2003; and Bealer 
1998. 
213 Kant 1781, A6-7/B10-1. 
214 Frege 1884. 
215 Here is the issue of similarity: if the ‘psychologistic’ elements are removed from the Kantian 
conception (as I discuss it below) and if ‘synonymy’ amounts to little more than ‘conceptual 
containment’, the two accounts at least begin to converge. 
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this will form the main focus of the following paragraphs. Very briefly however, 
the Kantian version is as follows. Using a traditional, broadly Aristotelian, 
subject-predicate form, a proposition or judgement A is B is analytic if the 
predicate B belongs to or is ‘(covertly) contained’ in the subject A; otherwise it 
is ampliative or synthetic. 216 For example, in the claim, ‘All bodies are 
extended’, the subject, ‘body’, supposedly includes the property expressed by 
the predicate ‘is extended’; being extended would appear to be part of the 
meaning of the term ‘body’. ‘All bodies are heavy’ however, is synthetic, in 
virtue of the fact that ‘body’ does not so include the property expressed by the 
predicate ‘is heavy’. Kant continued to explain the notion of ‘(covert) 
containment’ in terms of conscious, conceptual analysis of subject and 
predicate (A7/B12). The key point to appreciate is that since conceptual 
analysis of predicate inclusion is all that is required to understand analytic 
truths, if a proposition is analytic, it is a priori. This is an issue that Kant 
bestows upon the modern empiricist; if Kant is right that analyticity should be 
explained by way of apriority, then some explanation is needed by those 
wanting to account for the latter in terms of the former, if such an account is to 
avoid circularity (which is an issue I return to below). Finally, the ‘conceptual 
containment’ account is all that is required to generate synthetic a priori truths 
(such as those—allegedly—of mathematics, geometry and philosophy). Again, 
very briefly, Kant’s main example of the synthetic a priori, 7 + 5 = 12, is very 
plausibly a priori in virtue of being a truth of mathematics, and it is allegedly 
synthetic because ‘12’ is not contained in the concepts of ‘7’ and ‘5’.217 
Frege saw various problems with Kant’s notion of conceptual containment, 
notably in terms of the ‘psychologistic’ implications of consciously associated 
predicate inclusion. This being the case, Frege famously introduced his formal 
language of quantifiers, relations/functions, variables, arguments/constants 
and connectives. Using this language, together with the notion of substitution of 
synonymous terms (or definitional equivalents) salva veritate, Frege sought to 
                                                         
216 Op. cit., A6-7. 
217 I gloss over many issues here. For some that I do not cover, see BonJour’s excellent 
discussion (1998, pp. 21-6). BonJour’s dismissal of Kant as a genuine rationalist, although 
perhaps idiosyncratic, is especially compelling (pp. 23-5); Kant’s synthetic a priori solely 
concerning phenomena as opposed to noumena, suggesting that Kant is a forerunner of 
‘moderate empiricism’, as opposed to an ‘arch rationalist’. 
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provide an alternative account in terms of reduction of the problematic cases to 
clear (‘strict’ on my terminology) logical truths. For example, sticking with a 
more or less Kantian example, 
 
(1) All bachelors are unmarried, 
 
Kant would explain this in terms of the concept of ‘bachelor’ including that of 
(for instance) ‘being unmarried’. Frege however notes that if a speaker s fails to 
associate the predicate ‘is unmarried’ with the subject term ‘bachelor’, then 0 
will fail to be analytic (for s). Thus, Frege proposed to analyse (1) as 
 
(2) x (Bx  ¬Mx). 
 
Of course, it is not immediately clear how a simple substitution (of another 
function here) would render 0 analytic.218 In order to remedy this situation, 
Frege argued that if one substitutes a synonymous definition of the term B (i.e. 
‘bachelor’), such as ¬M (e.g. ‘an unmarried male (of marriageable age…)’), 0 
becomes the more obviously analytic logical truth, 
 
(3) x (¬Mx  ¬Mx). 
 
As I indicate above, the key point here is not the similarities or differences 
between Kant and Frege but rather that there are the beginnings of a workable 
account of analyticity in terms of logical truth and necessity. The issue is 
historically vexed (and, as noted, deeply problematic post-Quine), so I merely 
intend to introduce the analytic qua narrow logical necessity as a potential 
analysans of apriority. So, setting aside the more problematic Kantian notion of 
conscious conceptual containment, in favour of Frege’s more clearly formal 
account, the relevant question is; can analyticity, qua substitution of 
(definitionally synonymous) terms, salva veritate, account for the a priori?; that 
is, does apriority consist in some kind of narrow logical, conceptual 
                                                         
218 This kind of worry (and problems with the notions of definition and synonymy) is what 
begins to motivate Quine’s assault on analyticity. 
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(understood non-psychologistically) or definitional necessity? 
In response to these questions I now argue that analyticity cannot account 
for the a priori, in very brief virtue of (i) it being very likely that there are 
synthetic a priori propositions and, more importantly, following BonJour’s 
discussion of ‘moderate empiricism’—the position that analyticity accounts for 
apriority—somewhat,219 (ii) the order of explanation being the other way 
round—analyticity must be explained in terms of apriority. 
As I suggest, I do not consider (i) to be the most pressing objection to 
moderate empiricism, since the issue of the synthetic a priori is vexed, perhaps 
because there are many competing conceptions of analyticity. That said, I view 
a broadly Fregean conception of the analytic220 as, at least, workable. Thus the 
issue of the synthetic a priori is worth at least a brief consideration. 
Considering (BonJour’s), 
 
(4) No surface can be completely and uniformly red, and completely 
and uniformly blue at the same time,221 
 
if this is an example of the synthetic a priori, then the analytic and the a priori 
are not coextensive; analyticity cannot account for apriority.  
Assuming (4) to be a priori then, on both Kantian and Fregean conceptions 
of analyticity I think it is fairly clear that it is synthetic or, at the very least, not 
clearly analytic. On the Kantian conception of predicate containment, it is not at 
all clear that the predicate ‘is red’ includes the predicate ‘is not blue’. Thus, on a 
Kantian account, (4) has the beginnings, at least, of being synthetic. Similarly, 
on the Fregean account, it is very difficult to provide a synonym of ‘red’ such 
that it is definitionally equivalent to ‘not blue’. For example, parsing (4) as; 
 
(5) x ¬(Rx  Bx)t0  
(where x ranges over surfaces, R/B stand for ‘is completely and uniformly 
red/blue’), it is not at all clearly analytic. Similarly, substituting ¬R for B, on the 
                                                         
219 BonJour 1998, ch. 2. 
220 Supplemented perhaps with much work on the notion of sameness of meaning—either in 
terms of convention or of, for example, necessity in virtue of meaning. 
221 Amended from op. cit., p. 29. 
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assumption that B can be defined such that it is equivalent to ¬R (e.g. assuming 
that ‘red’ can be defined as, for example, ‘light having a wavelength in the 
region of 625-750nm’, ‘blue’ would then be an example of ‘not-red’), would be 
deeply problematic; such a definition of B qua ¬R would not include other 
colours such as yellow, thus it would very arguably be a poor ‘definitional 
equivalent’ of ‘blue’. 
That said, a clearer and more forceful objection (as suggested by the use of 
the phrase ‘can be defined’ in the previous paragraph) is that there is a clear 
modal force in operation in the very notion of definition and synonymy; we can, 
of course, define red to be such and such, so as to make the notion of analyticity 
viable, but it is just not clear what the definition, the meaning of red would be 
(‘definition’, by definition, being a somewhat conventional, linguistic matter).222 
This would suggest, at the very least, an element of gerrymandering in the 
notions of definition, sameness of meaning and therefore, the analytic—in the 
absence of earlier, modal presuppositions. This being the case, whilst I am 
nowhere near as suspicious of analyticity as is Quine, and whilst I take Frege’s 
account to be the most viable and, at least workable, the modal force at work in 
our ‘definition’ of terms suggests that the notion of analyticity itself is 
somewhat gerrymandered and artificial—in the absence of further modal 
considerations. Ultimately, if it is an interesting modality, it is very likely to be 
grounded in some further, wider modality—such as the rational or the 
metaphysical. That is, if there is to be a viable notion of analyticity it must, I 
claim, rest on more clearly modal grounds, such as apriority or, even, 
metaphysical necessity. The point being, if the ‘real’ definition223 (i.e. as 
opposed to the ‘linguistic’ definition) of ‘red’ is ‘light having such and such a 
wavelength’, then, presumably, nothing (i.e. no thing) can possess this property 
and not possess this property. As I suggest however, this claim has so many 
inbuilt ontological presuppositions that it can hardly be considered to be 
analytic. I claim that it would be metaphysically necessary, a priori and 
synthetic. Thus there are good grounds for holding that (4) is, after all, 
                                                         
222 That is, ‘linguistic definition’, as opposed to any kind of ‘real definition’ in terms of 
necessities or essences. The latter, of course, would not be a matter of convention; rather it 
would be a matter of metaphysical natures or essences. See Fine 1994 in support of such claims. 
223 As per the previous note, I hint in the direction of Fine 1994 here. 
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plausibly synthetic. Having said all of this, and whilst there might be more 
obvious examples of the synthetic a priori,224 perhaps given that the notion of 
analyticity is not entirely clear, although there might be a strong case for 
claiming that the synthetic a priori rules out the coextensiveness of the analytic 
and the a priori, I set this aside for present purposes. 
This being the case, let us now consider the second and more important 
issue mentioned above; the general failure of analyticity as providing an 
account of apriority. Although this point is more important than the previous, it 
is made explicit by BonJour (1998, ch. 2), hence I only present the bare details 
here. The basic theme is fairly straightforward; even assuming there is a central 
class of ‘obviously’ analytic truths (such as the strict logical necessities), the 
epistemic justification for such a class, would itself have to be a priori; thus 
analyticity cannot explain apriority. The point being, even on the most viable 
account of the analytic, the final explanation of analyticity is via definitional 
reduction to truths of logic, such as ¬(p  ¬p). Now, whilst it might be 
reasonably clear that such propositions are analytic, to provide an analysis of 
such analyticity in terms of the analytic would itself be an analytic and a highly 
trivial claim. In order to explain the analyticity (or logical necessity) of such 
truths, it is therefore necessary to appeal to the a priori (e.g. ¬(p  ¬p) just is 
rationally and so logically necessary), and perhaps further, to metaphysical 
necessity (e.g. such propositions are logically necessary in virtue of being 
reducible to logical formulae that hold of metaphysical necessity). Thus (strict 
and narrow) logical necessity cannot explain apriority and rational necessity.225 
All of this being the case, apriority cannot be explained by analyticity 
understood either in terms of narrow logical necessity or strict logical 
necessity. Given the existence of Russell’s paradox and Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorems, strict logical necessity cannot fully account for the most obvious 
                                                         
224 Such as the various mathematical examples discussed throughout, which are presumably 
a priori, and given Russell’s paradox and Gödel’s theorems, not analytic qua not reducible to 
formal logic. There is a lot more to be said here but, as before, analyticity (and the synthetic 
a priori) is not central to this thesis, so I leave the details for another time. 
225 I also note approvingly BonJour’s argument (1998, pp. 58-61) that the central thesis of 
moderate empiricism, that all a priori propositions are analytic, is itself deeply problematic. 
Qua central philosophical thesis (arguendo) it is presumably a priori—it is certainly difficult to 
claim that is it true and a posteriori, given (for example) the problem of induction. It cannot 
therefore be synthetic, on pain of contradiction; yet it is exceptionally hard to see how the claim 
could itself be analytic. 
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category of a priori truths (mathematics); given both the probable existence of 
synthetic a priori propositions and the artificiality of the very notion of 
analyticity, so-called narrow logical necessity cannot explain apriority either; 
and, most importantly, given that analyticity itself stands in need of a priori 
justification, it cannot explain apriority. 
 
 
4 Apriority as rational necessity 
 
By way of concluding this chapter I now summarise my position on the 
relationship between apriority and modality, and provide further clarification 
of the sentence-proposition-world relationship. 
In Chapter 3, I discuss the coincidence thesis (CT), that necessity coincides 
with apriority and contingency with aposteriority, using Goldbach’s conjecture 
(GC), to show that apriority and aposteriority are not exhaustive with respect 
to epistemic justification (unlike metaphysical necessity-contingency which is 
an exhaustive distinction); thus disambiguating (CT) into four sub-theses: 
 
(CT1) apriority entails necessity; 
(CT2) aposteriority entails contingency; 
(CT3) necessity entails apriority; 
(CT4) contingency entails aposteriority. 
 
Initially I suggest an apparent commitment—to (CT1) at least—but, ultimately, 
I deny any conjunction of all four (simple) theses, in the light of mathematical 
unknowables, such as (GC), and possible contingent equivalents (which I 
generically label (CGC)) refuting (CT3) and (CT4). I then discuss the contingent 
a priori, dismissing both the Kripkean examples, such as stick s is one metre 
long at t0 and indexical versions such as I exist at t0 and x (Fx  A(Fx)), 
arguing, ultimately, that there is no such class of propositions. This being the 
case, I express an attenuated commitment to the following versions of (CT1): 
(CT1*) if p is a genuinely a priori justifiable proposition, then p must 
assert a metaphysically necessary circumstance; 
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(CT1p) if p is a prima facie a priori justifiable proposition, then p is a 
fallible guide to metaphysical necessity; 
(CT1s) if p is a secunda facie a priori justifiable proposition, then p is a 
stronger (but still fallible) guide to metaphysical necessity. 
 
Despite my strict denial of the contingent a priori, understanding the failure 
of the various cases begins to suggest several theses I argue for and rely on 
throughout this (the previous and following) chapter(s); (i) that there is a 
three-way, sentence-proposition-world relationship; (ii) that propositions (and 
ultimately circumstances) are the bearers of apriority (and aposteriority), 
whereas sentences are only derivatively so; (iii) that apriority should best be 
understood as grounded in a kind of ‘epistemic’ necessity—rational necessity; 
and (iv) that circumstances or arrangements of objects and attributes, and then 
propositions, are what is metaphysically necessary and contingent in the first 
instance—sentences are only derivatively so. 
In the present chapter (§2), I elaborate on claim (iii) that apriority is 
grounded in rational necessity, suggesting that apriority qua rational necessity 
is not obscure and is generally propositional and mediate. Furthermore, I claim 
that there is no vicious regress problem; if rational necessity is propositional ‘all 
the way down’, then it behaves like the metaphysical (p  p etc.); if, on the 
other hand, it ‘bottoms out’ in a direct, immediate, intellectual grasping, any 
apparent avoidance of the same regress problem is illusory. Nevertheless, since 
the problem is not so great and since rational necessity is less obscure and 
objectionable than (some faculty of) rational intuition, the former (plus mediate 
propositional apriority) is to be preferred. 
In §3 I further elaborate on the claim that apriority is rational necessity, 
accounting for the latter by way of a negative discussion of standard, non-
alethic, epistemic necessity, and of strict and narrow logical necessities. 
Apriority cannot be coextensive with, or grounded in, epistemic necessity as the 
latter is essentially subjective and non-modal, whereas rational necessity is (at 
least) intersubjective and alethic—albeit fallibly and defeasibly so; it is at least 
modal. Similarly, rational necessity cannot be any kind of logical necessity, since 
(following BonJour to a large extent) this itself requires a priori justification 
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and so cannot account for apriority. All of this being the case, I conclude that 
apriority consists in, or is grounded in, a kind of necessity, which sits between 
the alethic, logical and metaphysical necessities; rational necessity. It is broader 
than (and epistemically explains) the logical; it is narrower and not coextensive 
with the metaphysical (given the failure of (CT3) and (CT4)); although as I 
suggest several times above (and expand upon in second part of the thesis), 
rational necessity (and modality in general) is perhaps explained, ultimately, by 
metaphysical necessity (and modality). 
Now, I begin to explain this latter point presently (albeit very briefly) and, 
in more detail, in the following chapters, where I also claim that conceivability 
is grounded in metaphysical possibility. In a similar way to that in which I 
explain logical necessity—in terms of necessity in virtue of the natures of the 
logical laws and formulae—above, one might explain rational necessity as 
necessity in virtue of the natures of the relevant (sentences, thoughts and, 
ultimately) propositions, perhaps together with the rational assumptions and 
abilities of the relevant speaker or thinker. Thus, where a proposition (p) is 
prima facie a priori, that is, a priori-for-a-subject, that subject explicitly (or 
tacitly) holds p to be necessary in the strongest sense; metaphysically 
necessary. In this way, prima facie apriority is a relatively weak, fallible guide to 
necessity. Similarly, where a proposition is more widely, secunda facie a priori 
(for a subject or group of subjects), p is a stronger, but still fallible, guide to 
metaphysical necessity. Ultimately, I claim, a proposition can only be genuinely 
a priori if it asserts a necessary arrangement of objects and attributes; genuine 
apriority is grounded in metaphysical necessity in virtue of the fact that the 
relevant p must (metaphysically) be the case (or rather asserts a circumstance 
that must obtain). There are, I suppose, two main strands of argument for this 
conclusion; the first as I hint above, being the claim that apriority consists in 
the rational grasping that the relevant circumstance must obtain (of 
metaphysical necessity); and the second being the extended argument against 
the possibility of the contingent a priori as presented in Chapter 3. As I suggest, 
the full details of the first argument (essentially that rational modality is 
grounded in metaphysical modality) go beyond what I have said so far, so I only 
begin to provide the groundwork for such claims here; I go into much more 
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detail in the following chapters, where I discuss rational contingency, 
aposteriority, rational possibility and conceivability. 
Having said all of this, there remains one final set of issues—related to the 
previous—for the remainder of this chapter (and the following). Given the 
interim conclusions (i) to (iv) (from several paragraphs above), and especially 
given the sentence-proposition-world distinction, can we have reliable a priori 
access to metaphysical necessity, and if so, how? In particular, given a priori p 
what is the metaphysical, modal status of p?226 To a certain extent I have 
already answered the first question; by understanding what proposition a 
sentence expresses and by grasping what circumstance that proposition 
asserts, we can have a priori, mediate access to the metaphysical. For example 
‘p5, r5 and l5 are individually possible’ is a (fairly strong candidate) ‘a priori’ 
sentence in virtue of its expressing the (secunda facie but arguably genuinely) 
rationally necessary, a priori proposition p5* and so asserting the 
metaphysically necessary circumstance p5*; my access to the necessity of the 
English ‘p5, r5 and l5 are individually possible’ then, is reliable inasmuch as I 
grasp the relevant proposition and circumstance. On occasion then, a priori 
reasoning is mediate, fallible and subject-relative but, as I suggest throughout, 
further, corrective a priori reasoning leads from the prima to the secunda facie, 
approaching the genuine. My access to p5* is fallible and mediate but, at least 
secunda facie, on further rational reflection, this is a good candidate, genuine, 
rationally necessary, a priori and so, arguably metaphysically necessary 
proposition and circumstance. 
Similarly ‘2 + 3 = 5’ is both a priori and metaphysically necessary, and my 
access to its necessity is (arguably extremely) reliable for exactly parallel 
reasons, mutatis mutandis. This said, the second (metaphysical modal status of 
p) question is now the most pressing and interesting. In order to answer this 
question I return, for one last time, to propositions p5* and e5/p5 (from previous 
chapters). 
In Chapter 2 I claim that e5/p5 is prima facie a priori but ultimately, given 
                                                         
226 Again, these are issues that span both this and following chapters; hence their position here. 
The point being, the relationship between apriority and metaphysical necessity is the main 
topic of this chapter; those between aposteriority (rational contingency), conceivability 
(rational possibility), and metaphysical contingency and possibility, being the main focus of the 
following. 
 138 
 
 
 
the existence of the Riemannian r5 and Lobachevskian l5, not metaphysically 
necessary and so not genuinely a priori. The metaphysical contingency of p5 is 
fairly easy to see, given the possibility of r5 and l5 and given that both contradict 
p5; p5 cannot be necessarily true. That p5 is not a priori is a little more complex 
but the reasoning is similar. As I claim in Chapter 2 (and above), it is not p5, or 
for that matter r5 and l5, that are a priori, rather it is p5, r5 and l5, and, given 
that all three are mutual contraries, none of p5, r5 or l5 (without the modal 
auxiliaries) can be genuinely a priori; if all three original propositions are 
justified a priori as being metaphysically possible and if all three are a priori 
contraries, none can be rationally necessary, i.e. a priori. So, perhaps prima facie 
apriority is all that we can have; that p5 is ‘a priori’ would then only deliver the 
metaphysical possibility, p5. Against this, there is what I have been calling 
‘secunda facie apriority’ and the possibility of ‘further rational reflection’ 
correcting prima facie a priori reasoning in a process akin to ‘reflective 
equilibrium’. However, with a proposition such as 
 
(p5*) p5  ◊r5  ◊l5, 
 
I think we have (at the very least) a secunda facie a priori (given the further 
reasoning of Riemann and Lobachevsky) and so (less fallibly) metaphysically 
necessary proposition. Other examples (as noted by the likes of BonJour)227 of 
secunda facie (but arguably genuine) a priori propositions would be 
mathematical truths, non-controversial geometric truths (such as e1 to e4 of 
Chapter 2), logical necessities, some central truths of metaphysics (every object 
is necessarily self-identical, for potential example) and more general 
propositions such as the colour exclusion principle and the four-colour theorem 
(perhaps). So, I claim, secunda facie a priori propositions are extremely good (if 
fallible) guides to metaphysical necessity; but if p is genuinely a priori, it must 
be a metaphysically necessary proposition/circumstance. 
Briefly returning to the ‘how’ question from a few paragraphs above, this is 
for the following reasons. A priori propositions such as p5* are rationally 
necessary propositions, which, being propositional in nature provide mediate 
                                                         
227 BonJour 1998, p. 2-6 and 100-6; cf. 2005, pp. 100-1. 
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access to metaphysical necessities. Although mediate, such propositions assert 
necessary relations, holding between objects and attributes; they assert 
necessary circumstances and this is knowable on an a priori basis—it is 
(fallibly) rationally necessary, I claim, that p5* (and similar) concern abstract, 
necessary entities such as lines and points, and attributes such as intersecting 
and being parallel (or not). So, whilst apriority qua rational necessity is not 
coextensive with metaphysical necessity simpliciter, successful a priori 
reasoning should result in knowledge of metaphysically necessary 
circumstances. The key point to understand is that apriority concerns rational 
necessity, whereas the metaphysical necessity of a proposition is determined by 
the necessity of the asserted circumstance; i.e. the holding of necessary 
relations between objects and properties. 
Having so concluded that genuine a priori reasoning, justification or 
knowledge should result in metaphysical necessity, we now need to turn to the 
a posteriori and, more importantly, conceivability. If genuine apriority entails 
necessity, perhaps aposteriority entails contingency and, most importantly, 
perhaps conceivability entails possibility. These issues, and especially the latter, 
are the topics of the next part of the thesis. 
 
  
 
 
 
PART II 
 
 
 
RATIONALITY AND MODALITY 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
 
 
The Necessary A Posteriori, 
Conceivability and Possibility 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In previous chapters I discuss the relationship between the a priori and 
modality. Specifically I claim that apriority should be understood in terms of 
rational necessity and that this modality is further grounded in the 
metaphysical; strictly, p is justifiable a priori only if p is necessary. I also suggest 
an account of conceivability in terms of ‘a priori (or rational) possibility’. In this 
and the following chapters I want to conclude the discussion of the relationship 
between the rational and the modal; I want to understand whether (CT2) holds 
and whether there are necessary a posteriori propositions. Moreover, and most 
importantly, if there are necessary a posteriori propositions, given the 
importance of the conceivability-possibility form of reasoning in general, I want 
to know what relationship holds between conceivability and possibility. If, for 
example, there are necessary propositions only knowable on an a posteriori 
basis, are the negations of these propositions conceivable, or is there any sense 
of ‘conceivability’ such that it entails (or is a strong guide to) possibility? 
As in previous chapters, my main motivation is to understand the 
relationship between the rational and the modal, rather than to provide 
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detailed exegesis. Clearly however, a discussion of conceivability, possibility 
and the necessary a posteriori can hardly proceed without some consideration 
of the work of Kripke. In particular, Kripke spends much of Naming and 
Necessity arguing that there are necessary a posteriori propositions (or 
sentences)228 and that the necessary a posteriori poses a serious problem for 
any argument that aims to proceed from conceivability to possibility.229 The 
point being, if p is necessarily true yet only knowable on an a posteriori basis, it 
would appear that ¬p might be ‘conceivable’ (i.e. ‘a priori’ or ‘rationally’ 
possible) yet metaphysically impossible; conceivability might be a very poor 
guide to metaphysical possibility. Whilst it is difficult to come to a complete 
understanding of Kripke’s position here without a detailed discussion of the 
arguments of Naming and Necessity, the necessary a posteriori has received 
sustained discussion in the literature, so a fully exegetical treatment would 
require detailed discussion of a lot of secondary material. Given that I want to 
advance a novel and interesting thesis on rationality and modality, I aim to 
avoid detailed exegesis in much of what follows. In place of this, I discuss a 
generic, Kripkean argument for the existence of the necessary a posteriori (§2), 
before advancing my own response to the (alleged) phenomenon (§§3-4). I 
shall argue that, strictly, there are no necessary a posteriori propositions; if a 
proposition is essentially justified on an a posteriori basis, that proposition 
must be (or assert a) contingent (circumstance). Since there is a lot to be 
unpacked here however, I spend some time disambiguating, as much as arguing 
for the claim that there are no genuinely necessary a posteriori propositions. In 
particular, I suggest that alleged necessary a posteriori sentences analyse out 
into (at least or at best) two propositions, one necessary and a priori, and 
                                                         
228 The many discussions of the necessary a posteriori are too numerous to cite, but see in 
particular, Kripke 1980, pp. 100-5, 107-15 and 140-55. 
I am well aware that Kripke is “unsure that the apparatus of ‘propositions’ does not break 
down in this area” (1980, p. 21). 
229 Kripke does not put it this way but see especially Kripke 1980, pp. 102-5, 108-9, 140-4 and 
150-3. In particular, the discussions of ‘qualitatively identical epistemic situations’ and things 
that ‘might have turned out’ otherwise, are, to my mind, discussions of ‘conceivabilities’ 
(epistemic possibilities) which are (as described) not genuine, metaphysical possibilities; hence 
the apparent problem for conceivability-possibility reasoning. Having said this, there is 
arguably a strong sense in which Kripke is saying that (genuine) conceivability entails 
possibility, since whilst a ‘qualitatively identical epistemic situation’ (such as that represented 
by ‘Hesperus is not Phosphorus’) might be ‘epistemically possible’, it is, in fact a misconception; 
if Hesperus is Phosphorus, this is necessarily so and any conceiving or imagining to the 
contrary must therefore be mistaken. 
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another a posteriori but contingent (§3). I then present an apparent second 
argument for the phenomenon and my response to this (§4), before an interim 
conclusion concerning the necessary a posteriori, conceivability and possibility 
(§5). 
As I shall suggest throughout, the issue of conceivability-possibility 
reasoning, although deeply related to that of the necessary a posteriori, requires 
a consideration of Frege and Kripke’s problems before a complete solution can 
be offered. This being the case, although I present conclusions towards the end 
of the present chapter, these are to be taken in conjunction with those of the 
following chapter. In addition to this, since the notion of conceivability is clearly 
very relevant to the present and following chapters, before beginning any of the 
aforementioned tasks, let me first make some preliminary remarks concerning 
conceivability, epistemic and rational modalities. 
Very much in line with what I say about apriority, epistemic and rational 
necessities in the previous chapter, I now want to insist on a clear bifurcation 
between conceivability qua a priori (or rational) possibility and so-called 
‘conceivability’ qua mere, subjective, epistemic possibility (i.e. what might be 
called ‘conceivability-for-all-I-know’).230 As throughout the previous chapters, 
where the motivation for the prima facie/genuine (or at least secunda facie) 
apriority distinction traded on the difference between a proposition’s being 
justified (or not) on further rational reflection, the present distinction is 
grounded in the claim that whilst the negation of a necessary truth might 
appear ‘conceivable’ (for all the subject knows—i.e. epistemically possible), 
strictly, if p is necessary, the negation of p is not a genuine possibility; thus ¬p is 
not conceivable. The point being, if conceivability is best understood as being 
grounded in rational and so metaphysical possibility, and if p is metaphysically 
impossible, then p is strictly, rationally impossible or inconceivable; if p is 
impossible, it is not genuinely possible to conceive of a situation where p is the 
case—it is not possible to conceive of the relevant arrangement of objects and 
attributes. As with the a priori itself, if p is merely epistemically necessary (or 
possible), it is not genuinely a priori (or conceivable); only if p is metaphysically 
                                                         
230 For a useful and interesting survey of some of the issues of conceivability and possibility see 
Gendler and Hawthorne 2002 (esp. pp. 3-12); cf. Van Cleve 1983; Yablo 1993; and Chalmers 
2002. On the specific issue of conceivability and epistemic possibility, see Fiocco 2007. 
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and rationally necessary (or possible) can it be a priori (or conceivable). I make 
much of such claims in what follows, so for now it will suffice merely to note 
that there are potentially two separate notions of ‘conceivability’ in the area; 
one based in epistemic possibility (which might be called ‘weak’ conceivability) 
and one based in the rational (‘strong’, or just conceivability).231 
 
  
2 A Kripkean argument for the necessary a posteriori  
 
In many ways, the necessary a posteriori can be seen as an explicit response to 
Frege’s problem; specifically concerning the possibility of true but informative 
identity statements. Since Frege’s discussion in ‘Sense and Reference’,232 it was 
widely held that if the sole semantic or cognitive value of a name is its 
reference, then a true identity statement such as 
 
(1) ‘Eminem is Slim Shady’, 
 
should express the same proposition as the true but non-informative 
 
(2) ‘Eminem is Eminem’, 
 
i.e. something like the necessary, a priori and presumably analytic proposition, 
(2a) e = e. 
 
The point being, if names are thoroughly ‘Millian’—i.e. if they are ‘mere 
tags’233—then a statement of the form ‘a = b’ should be cognitively and 
semantically equivalent to one of the form ‘a = a’, which, at least superficially, 
seems deeply problematic. Frege, of course, responded to the Millian semantic 
theory by proposing his well-known sense-reference distinction; whilst (2) is 
analytic and a priori, (1) is informative and a posteriori in virtue of the names 
                                                         
231 I am aware that both Van Cleve (1983) and Chalmers (2002) use similar ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ 
terminology. My usage is closer to Van Cleve’s than to Chalmers’s. 
232 Frege 1892. 
233 To borrow Barcan Marcus’s (1961) phrase. 
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‘Eminem’ and ‘Slim Shady’ contributing their ‘senses’ as modes of presentation 
of the reference; the object, Marshall Mathers III. Very briefly then, the full 
‘meaning’ of a name must be understood in terms of both sense and reference, 
with the former determining the latter, and (1) must express a proposition 
distinct from (2a); namely,      
 
(1a) e = s. 
 
Famously, in Naming and Necessity Kripke presents three sets of 
arguments—the modal, epistemic and semantic234—designed to show that 
names cannot mean the same as their (allegedly) descriptive senses and that 
speakers cannot simply associate such senses with names, whether or not 
sense determines or fixes reference. This being the case, it might appear that 
Kripke is urging a return to the pre-Fregean, and specifically the Millian theory 
of semantics adverted to above, whereby a name’s only semantic and epistemic 
contribution is its reference.235 In light of this, the Kripkean needs to say 
something about the apparent informativeness and aposteriority of identity 
statements such as (1) and associated propositions such as (1a). 
One of the main aims of the necessary a posteriori then, is to motivate a 
bifurcation of metaphysical and epistemic modalities so as to show just how 
identity statements involving co-referring names assert necessary, yet 
informative and a posteriori identities. In brief detail, the outline of the 
Kripkean argument for the necessary a posteriori is as follows: 
 
(A) Identity is metaphysically necessary; for any (objects) x and y, if x = y 
then necessarily x = y (formally: xy (x = y  x = y)).236 
(B) Ordinary proper names are ‘rigid designators’; a name (n) refers to 
the same object in all counterfactual situations.237 In de re terms, 
concerning objects and their attributes, names function like logical 
                                                         
234 Here I follow Salmon 1981. 
235 Of course that Kripke “never intended to go so far” (1980, p. 20) is no bar to some of his 
followers doing just that. 
236 The most explicit appearance of this claim is at Kripke 1971, p. 67; but cf. 1980, pp. 3-5 and 
97-110. 
237 I use this phrase (pending some discussion of possible worlds in the final chapter) in line 
with Kripke’s advice at 1971, p. 82. 
 146 
 
 
 
constants; so n and m are substitutable for x and y in (A). 
(C) Given (A) and (B), true identity statements involving proper names 
express metaphysically necessary propositions. Given (B), if n = m 
then n and m both refer to the same object. So, given (A) and (B), if n = 
m, then necessarily n = m.238 
(D) Despite (C), since it is possible for a speaker to know that n = n, 
without thereby knowing that n = m, identity statements such as the 
latter (and (1)) are not knowable on an a priori basis; they require 
empirical, a posteriori justification. 
(E) Given (C) and (D), statements such as (1), ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ 
and ‘Cicero is Tully’239 are examples of the necessary a posteriori. 
Despite appearing to express only the necessary proposition (2a), 
‘Eminem is Slim Shady’ is only knowable on an a posteriori basis. (1) 
then appears to express a metaphysically necessary proposition that 
is only knowable on an a posteriori basis, (1a). 
(F) As a corollary to (E), the existence of the necessary a posteriori 
highlights a clear bifurcation in the metaphysical (modal) and 
epistemic domains. The necessary, contingent, possible and 
impossible are modal categories belonging to the subject of 
metaphysics. The a priori and a posteriori concern knowledge and 
justification; they belong to epistemology. 
 
Now, my main topic is the relationship between rationality and modality; 
hence theses (E) and (F) are particularly interesting. In terms of modality, 
aposteriority and conceivability, if the necessary a posteriori is a genuine 
                                                         
238 Kripke 1971, p. 78 (rigid designation) and p. 89 (rigid identity statements) are two of the 
most explicit statements of theses (B) and (C); cf. 1980, pp. 48ff and 97-110. I realise there is an 
issue concerning the strength of the designation here; does a name refer to the same object in 
all situations tout court or only all situations in which that object exists? For present purposes I 
assume ‘weak’ rigidity, whereby a name only refers to the same object where that object exists; 
thus it is a conditional such as ‘if n and m exist, then if n = m, necessarily n = m’ that is putatively 
necessarily true, given the argument from (A) to (C). See McLeod 2008a for a good discussion of 
potential problems with even the ‘weak necessity’ reading of (1) and the like. 
239 Or, assuming it is even an identity statement, ‘water is (composed of) H20’—but there is a 
big question here as to whether identity is ever the same relation as composition. There are, of 
course, several other big questions, such as whether water is composed of H20; the nature (and 
necessity) of scientific identity/composition statements involving elements (never mind 
compounds); and, whether ‘water’ and ‘H20’ are ‘rigid designators’. As some of these issues are 
sufficiently vexed with respect to ‘simple’ names, I focus on the latter presently. 
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phenomenon, (E) and (F) pose a serious threat to the coincidence thesis 
discussed in previous chapters. Moreover, (E) has serious implications for 
patterns of reasoning from conceivability to possibility. In detail, if and where a 
necessary identity is established on an a posteriori basis (as (1) is alleged to 
be), the negation of that identity (e.g. ‘Eminem is not Slim Shady’) appears to be 
entirely possible on an a priori basis—i.e. it appears to be rationally possible or 
conceivable. Given that the original statement expresses a necessary 
proposition however, that negation must be impossible. Hence (allegedly) 
conceivability does not entail possibility. 
Before analysing any of this in detail, let me first indicate what I want to 
discuss in (and what I leave out of) the remainder of this and the following 
sections. I have already discussed (F) with respect to the contingent a priori in 
Chapter 3; I now discuss (F) in a little detail vis-à-vis the necessary a posteriori; 
only returning to the coincidence thesis and (CT2) in particular, following the 
discussion of Frege and Kripke’s puzzles, towards the end of the following 
chapter. My main concern then is (E), the necessary a posteriori and its 
implications for conceivability and possibility. This being the case, I want to 
focus on the argument for (E); the modus ponens-style argument from (A) to (C) 
(this section), together with thesis (D) (§3). In the remainder of this section 
then, I question whether the theses of the necessity of identity and rigid 
designation are sufficient to show that identity statements involving proper 
names express necessary propositions. 
Since other philosophers have rejected explicitly Kripkean arguments for 
(A), (B) and (C),240 I shall only touch on the details of those debates below. With 
respect to the argument for the rigidity of names, a full discussion of this would 
involve a diversion into Kripkean (and ‘anti-descriptivist’ versus ‘descriptivist’ 
semantics). This debate is live,241 but given my conclusions below, I feel that the 
                                                         
240 Versus the argument for (A): Lowe 1982, 2002, ch. 5, 2005 and 2007a. Versus (B): Chandler 
1975; Zemach 1976; Mellor 1977; Searle 1983; and Evans 1973 (especially the ‘two babies’ 
case at pp. 11-12). Versus (A) and (B) (i.e. versus (C)): Gibbard 1975; Chandler 1975. I do not 
mean to endorse any of these positions (in particular that of Gibbard 1975, which to my mind 
rests on a conflation of identity and composition). 
241 On the ‘descriptivist’ side, see some of the ‘Versus (B)’ references in the previous note, and 
more recently, (i) causal-descriptivists such as Evans 1982; Kroon 1987, 2004; Braddon-
Mitchell 2004; (ii) ‘rigidified descriptivists’ such as Dummett 1991; Stanley 1997; Nelson 2002; 
Pettit 2004; and (iii) ‘two-dimensionalists’ such as Stalnaker 1978; (arguably) Evans 1979; 
Chalmers 1996, 2002, 2006a, 2006b; and Jackson 1994, 1998, 2004. 
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details are neither deeply relevant nor to the point, since one must do one’s 
ontology in advance of deciding whether names are rigid or otherwise; one 
must do metaphysics in advance of semantics.242 So, I shall not be discussing 
Kripke’s positive ‘theory’ of reference in great detail. What I shall discuss are 
(A) to (C) from the perspective of their use in the argument for (E). 
Whilst discussing (E) I begin to raise some questions as to the tenability of 
(D). In §3 I go on to claim that there is a strong sense in which apparently 
necessary a posteriori sentences express more than one relevant proposition; 
and, on further analysis, such propositions are either necessary and knowable a 
priori, or a posteriori but contingent. As indicated, my main concern is 
rationality and modality, and specifically here, conceivability-possibility 
arguments in particular. This being the case, after completing my analysis of the 
necessary a posteriori (§4), I then discuss further the alleged problem that the 
necessary a posteriori poses for conceivability (§5). As I indicate in the 
introduction however, a full response to the latter problem requires a 
consideration of Frege and Kripke’s puzzles; hence a complete conclusion must 
wait until after that discussion. 
Beginning with (A) and (B) then, note that in (B) I try to make it clear that 
there is slightly more required to generate (C) than just the simple claim that 
names are rigid designators. If this is all that (B) stated then the argument for 
(C) would require an additional premise such that rigid designators are 
logically proper names or constants, thereby allowing substitution for x and y in 
(A). Of course, there is an issue in the background here; namely Frege’s 
problem. Notoriously, Kripke is exceptionally careful not to commit to a 
solution or dissolution of the problem in Naming and Necessity. He does, of 
course, discuss it in his related ‘A Puzzle about Belief’;243 once again appearing 
to endorse his ‘propositional breakdown’ view,244 whereby there is no clear, 
obvious solution to the problem. This issue remains in the background in the 
remainder of this section; as advertised several times already, I return to it in 
the following chapter. 
                                                         
242 On which point I am in broad agreement with philosophers such as Brody 1980, Salmon 
1981, 2003, Lowe 1998, 2006 and Oderberg 2001, 2007. 
243 Kripke 1979. 
244 See n. 1. 
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So precisely how does the claim that names are rigid designators figure in 
the argument for (C) (and (E))? In order to understand this we need to set out 
the ‘A-argument’ in a little more detail:245 
 
(A1) a = b [Assumption concerning object(s) a, 
b] 
(A2) xy (x = y  F (Fx  Fy)) [Leibniz’s Law, where x and y are 
objects and F quantifies over 
properties] 
(A3) x x = x [The necessity of (self-)identity] 
(A4) a = a [Particular instantiation on (A3)] 
(A5) a = b  F (Fa  Fb) [Particular instantiation on (A2) via 
(A1)] 
(A6) a = b [Modus ponens on (A5), (A1) and 
(A4)] 
Therefore, 
(A7) a = b  a = b 
 
The main problem with this argument is the modus ponens at (A6), and 
crucially, the premises (A4) and (A3); the latter being deeply equivocal.246 If 
(A4) asserts the necessity of self-identity (as I suggest in the parenthesis for 
(A3)), then all that should follow from (A5), (A1) and (A4) is the trivial, 
necessary self-identity, b = b. That is, the modus ponens should be as follows: if 
a is identical to b, then a and b share all properties; a is identical to b; a is 
necessarily self-identical, so b is necessarily self-identical. In order to obtain the 
substantive conclusion (A6) however (i.e. that a is necessarily identical to b) 
(A4) must be read as asserting the non-trivial, substantive premise that object a 
has the property of being necessarily identical to a. That is, in order to entail the 
non-trivial essentialism required by (A6), (A4) must be read as asserting a 
deeply non-trivial property; something like an individual essence or haecceity. 
All of this being the case, we ought not to accept the argument for (A), in the 
                                                         
245 My discussion here borrows from both Kripke’s presentation (1971, 1980, p. 3) and Lowe 
(1982, 2002, ch. 5). 
246 As urged by Lowe 1982. 
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absence of the substantive metaphysics required for the relevant interpretation 
of (A4).247 
As suggested then, for the A-argument to generate its substantive 
metaphysical conclusion, some substantive metaphysics must occur in the 
premises. Thus we must see whether the argument can be ‘rescued’ by means 
of thesis (B). The point being, whilst the A-argument might be accused of 
attempting to derive metaphysics from purely logical premises, perhaps (B) can 
be made to import the relevant metaphysical assumptions. In response to this I 
aim to show that there are three main interpretations of thesis (B) such that it 
is either (i) a priori and too logico-semantic to do the required metaphysical 
work; (ii) a priori and sufficiently substantive but thereby reliant upon the 
required metaphysics; or (iii) similarly substantive but a posteriori. 
Unfortunately for the Kripkean, none of these options can steer between the 
Scylla and Charybdis of trivial, logico-semantic premises failing to support 
substantive, metaphysical conclusions and substantive (but unargued-for) 
metaphysics being imported to generate the relevant conclusions. In this way I 
aim to support a line of thought I have suggested several times already; that 
you cannot generate substantive, metaphysical conclusions from trivial logico-
semantic premises—you only get metaphysical conclusions from metaphysical 
premises.248 In particular, I aim to show that thesis (B) does attempt to import 
the relevant metaphysics,249 but that this is a largely tacit and unargued-for set 
of assumptions behind the thesis of rigid designation. In response to all of this, 
my account (of both the contingent a priori and the necessary a posteriori) is 
sufficiently metaphysical (and epistemic) to do the work required to explain the 
relevant, alleged phenomena; i.e. to generate the relevant metaphysical (and 
epistemic) conclusions. 
                                                         
247 For what it is worth, I do accept the necessity of identity for objects, but think that this is a 
deeply, non-trivial (but a priori) essentialist thesis about the nature of objects; and importantly, 
a thesis that is not derivable solely from trivial, logical premises such as (A2) and (A3). 
248 I echo Lowe (2007a, p.31 in particular) here. 
249 Following Salmon 1981, 2003 and Lowe 1982, 2005, 2007a and 2007b to a certain extent. 
Having said this, Salmon claims that the “theory of direct reference...has at least some 
essentialist import” (1981, pp. 82-3). He goes on to claim that it implies only the “trivial” 
essentialism whereby (for example) Hesperus has the property of being Phosphorus. To my 
mind however this is precisely the kind of property (i) that is not derivable from simple logico-
semantic premises and (ii) is non-trivially essentialist. This being the case, I agree with Salmon 
in spirit but very much not in the details; the rabbit Kripke attempts to pull out of the hat is 
more substantive than the one Salmon envisages. 
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So, can thesis (B) be made to support (A) by plugging the hole in the 
foregoing A-argument? The first thing to note is that if we are to move from (A) 
to (C) (in the original argument), then we need to move from talk of the 
necessary identity of objects in (A) to that involving rigid designators in (C). 
Here, my claim is that the main function of thesis (B) (that names are rigid 
designators) is to replace premise (A1) above, with a new premise concerning 
rigidly designating names: 
 
(B1) a = b [Assumption concerning rigidly designating names a and b] 
 
The problem with this is that there appear to be only three options as to how 
(B1) would remedy the A-argument. That is, there are effectively only three 
main options as to the philosophical force of the thesis of rigid designation, (B), 
with respect to its use in the argument for the existence of the necessary a 
posteriori. First, (B) could be an (allegedly) a priori and trivial, logico-semantic 
thesis, such that (B1) asserts the identity of the object rigidly designated by ‘a’ 
with itself; 
 
(B1`) a = a.250 
 
What I am suggesting is that if the thesis of rigid designation is purely 
(allegedly) a priori, and purely based in logico-semantic premises and 
assumptions, then there is a strong sense in which the claim that a (i.e. b) refers 
to the relevant object (a) rigidly can only be viewed as a kind of trivial, 
linguistic stipulation; names are (by definition?) rigid designators that refer to 
the relevant objects directly and in all world-states (in which they exist). The 
point being that if we introduce a term a (or b) as rigidly designating some 
particular a, and if we then insist that this is all there is to the meaning of a (or 
b)—i.e. if we insist that this is what it is to be a rigid designator—then, whilst 
thesis (B) might be made to smooth the passage from talk of names to talk of 
objects in the A-argument, we are in danger of espousing a very strong Millian 
thesis with respect to names. That is, we reduce the apparently informative 
                                                         
250 I make the same name/object distinction as in chs. 3 and 4—this continues throughout. 
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(B1) to the trivial (B1`)—and Frege’s problem looms large. Indeed, this option 
has the additional disadvantage of potentially rendering the A-argument invalid 
(depending on whether it is (B1) or (B1`) that we take as the relevant premise). 
If it is (B1`), then the modus ponens at (A6) simply does not follow, since there 
is now no mention of the rigidly designating term ‘b’ in the relevant supporting 
premise. If on the other hand we are to take (B1) as the key premise (yet as 
asserting (B1`)), the argument would be valid, but, very importantly, some 
extremely nimble argumentative moves would need to be made so as to explain 
the relevant substantiveness of (B1), and of the argument as a whole, in view of 
the apparent triviality of (B1`). The point being, if the thesis of rigid designation 
is purely logico-semantic, the (alleged) apriority (and triviality) of the thesis 
looks very much like rendering it a linguistic stipulation that names rigidly 
refer. This being the case, as much as (B1`) might smooth the passage from (A) 
to (C), in talking of such rigid names, it very much looks as though we are just 
talking about the relevant, rigidly designated objects. Thus we are (i) in danger 
of collapsing back into an extremely strong Millianism, which, paradoxically (ii) 
might then invalidate the A-argument, in addition to rendering the question as 
to whether ordinary proper names are rigid designators as an empirical, rather 
than an a priori, matter. 
As I suggest above then, there is perhaps a tension between (B) qua a 
priori, trivial and logico-semantic thesis and qua a priori, substantive, 
metaphysical one. Now, the thesis of the necessity of identity is a very 
substantive, metaphysical conclusion (potentially leading to the existence of the 
necessary a posteriori and substantive essentialisms, for example); if (B1) is a 
mere linguistic stipulation, it is difficult to see how such substantive 
conclusions would follow. Moreover, it is even debatable that such a thesis 
could be more widely (i.e. interestingly and non-trivially) ‘a priori’; it is hardly 
rationally necessary, or knowable independently of experience, that ordinary 
names do operate in the advertised manner—hence my suggestion that (B1) is 
not so clearly a priori, trivial and stipulative. Instead of this, if (B) is to do the 
required work of strengthening the A-argument, it must link names and their 
rigidly designated objects in a deeply non-trivial and non-stipulative manner. 
Moreover, if (B) is to be a philosophical thesis, then (on a certain, traditional 
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understanding of philosophy) it ought perhaps to be an a priori justifiable 
thesis. This leads directly to the second (and third) option(s) for the correct 
interpretation of (B)/(B1). 
Second then, (B) could be an a priori but substantive philosophical thesis, 
such that (B1) asserts what it appears to assert (that a = b), but that it just is a 
priori that names are so closely tied to objects that the former are rigid 
designators of the latter. Now I must admit that this reads clumsily, which is not 
surprising given the difficulty of the idea being expressed; i.e. an a priori thesis 
that the rigid names a and b refer to the same object a/b but that this/these are 
sufficiently distinct such that (B1) does in fact assert the non-trivial proposition 
a = b (as distinct from a = a). The point being, as I suggest throughout, if 
thesis (B) is to justify the move from (A) to (C) in the original argument, names 
have to be sufficiently rigid so as to justify the move from an object-involving 
premise, (A), to a name-based conclusion, (C), whilst at the same time being 
sufficiently, semantically ‘fine-grained’ so as to avoid issues such as Frege and 
Kripke’s puzzles—not to mention the related problems of opacity, empty 
reference and true negative existentials. So, assuming the relevant theoretical 
explanation, might this second option allow there to be a sufficiently strong 
semantic tie so as to support the relevant argumentative move, whilst allowing 
a sufficiently weak tie so as to avoid the traditional, semantic problems? In 
short, what is at issue is the original problem of the interpretation of (A4) as 
ascribing the property of being necessarily identical with a to the object a. The 
point being, if rigid designation does shore up the relevant argumentative 
move, then it is difficult to see how names can be viewed as anything other than 
rigid, logical constants. Whilst this kind of assumption might (assuming certain, 
rather essentialist theories about objects) bolster the interpretation of (A4) as 
concerning the relevant, substantive, essentialist property, it would, at the 
same time, run straight into Frege’s problem; names would be so rigid that 
sentences such as ‘a = b’ would assert nothing more than the proposition a = 
a. What I am suggesting is that the kind of thesis required here would involve 
several large, metaphysical assumptions about names, designation, 
propositions and the nature of objects. Specifically, there would need to be a 
strong distinction between the original, rigid, name-involving sentence and the 
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proposition (and so circumstance or arrangement of objects and attributes) 
asserted thereby. This is precisely the kind of theory I try to motivate in both 
the current and previous chapters, but (I readily admit) this would be a 
substantive, metaphysical (as opposed to a purely logico-semantic) thesis. The 
general point being, if (B) sufficiently ties (rigid) names to the relevant, 
designated objects, then it is difficult (without some quite deep metaphysics) to 
see how a = b does not simply assert a = a (or a = a); it is difficult to see how 
Frege’s problem is avoided.251 Now I don’t want to dwell on this issue presently, 
since I return to Frege’s problem below. Suffice to say, some serious 
metaphysical manoeuvres are required in order to render the A-argument 
successful. In short, the argument either attempts to derive serious 
metaphysics from trivial logic and semantics (unsuccessfully) or it imports the 
serious metaphysics (without the required philosophical argument). 
Quite apart from the difficulty of offering a purely a priori, logico-semantic 
thesis that will do all of the required work, it is also not entirely clear that (B) is 
a purely a priori, philosophical thesis. On the contrary, I think that work in this 
area is more an issue for psycho- or socio-linguistics, as opposed to belonging 
purely to the domain of (a priori) philosophy of language—or especially of 
metaphysics. The point being, in order to see whether names are rigid, as much 
as intuitions either side are telling, we might also need to look at how people 
tend to use names; and here, the evidence, although often favourable to (B), 
suggests that names can be used non-rigidly. The third and final option with 
respect to (B) then, is that it might be a substantive but a posteriori thesis. This 
option might allow (B1) to assert the proposition a = b, thereby avoiding 
some of the traditional problems already mentioned. This would only be the 
case however, providing there were adequate theoretical explanation so as to 
allow a sufficiently loose tie between names and objects, such that (B1) did not 
express the a priori proposition a = a. The problem with this version of (B) 
however is with its epistemic status as a posteriori. The point being, if this is all 
there is to the thesis of rigid designation, then (i) the aposteriority of the thesis 
                                                         
251 Clearly, some philosophers (such as Salmon 1986 and Soames 2002) also acknowledge this 
point but offer attempted solutions to Frege’s problem whereby the ‘two’ propositions do, 
effectively, say the same thing, such that a = b is, in some sense necessary and a priori. Salmon 
1986 is clearer on this point; I discuss Soames in more detail below. 
 155 
 
 
 
would be in danger of rendering it philosophically unilluminating—i.e. some 
names just happen to be (contingently?) rigid designators—and (ii) the 
‘sufficiently loose tie’ between names and their references, generated by the 
aposteriority (and so the already suggested contingency) of the thesis, would be 
in danger of challenging the putative necessity of identity for names. Thus, if the 
upholder of rigid designation is seeking to use (B) to justify the move from (A) 
to (C), it must be viewed as a philosophically interesting (that is necessary, a 
priori yet substantive) thesis. 
All of this being the case, although the first and second options are the most 
philosophically interesting versions of thesis (B) (in virtue of being broadly a 
priori and arguably necessary theses, as opposed to empirical generalisations), 
the first is too trivial to generate substantive metaphysical conclusions, whilst 
the second, albeit sufficiently strong thesis, imports unsupported metaphysical 
premises and assumptions. Therefore, the thesis of rigid designation alone is 
not strong enough to justify the move from (A) to (C) (and so conclusion (E)).252 
 
 
3 How many propositions? 
 
So far I have resisted the main argument for (A), rejected the idea that (B) can 
combine with (A) to generate (C) (and so (E)) and suggested that the idea that 
names are (interestingly, necessarily, philosophically) rigid designators is very 
problematic. Might there not still be a case for the existence of necessary a 
posteriori identity statements involving names? Let us return to example 
 
(1) ‘Eminem is Slim Shady’. 
                                                         
252 Kripke (1980, p. 49) remarks that those who argue that we need to make sense of 
transworld identity in advance of insisting that names are rigid designators “have precisely 
reversed the cart and the horse”. In response to this, whilst I do think that we need to make 
sense of modality (metaphysics) in advance of rigid designation (semantics), I would not urge a 
pre-requisite understanding of ‘transworld identity’ since I am sceptical of the notion of a 
‘possible world’ and so of ‘transworld identity’—the former of which I return to in ch. 7. To 
repeat a theme, to derive the necessity of identity for objects (metaphysics) from the thesis of 
rigid designation (semantics) is precisely to reverse the cart and the horse! So there is a sense 
in which I follow Brody (1980, pp. 107-12) here, in that I claim that if it is to be made to do the 
work it is intended to do, the thesis of rigid designation must be seen as making certain 
strongly essentialist assumptions. 
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Here, the friend of the necessary a posteriori might argue that (1) is clearly only 
justifiable on a posteriori grounds, yet it asserts a necessary circumstance; the 
identity of Eminem with Slim Shady, or the being of Slim Shady by Eminem. 
That is, given some a priori, philosophical essentialism, plus the purely 
empirical information that Eminem is identical to Slim Shady,253 (1) asserts a 
necessary truth, only justifiable a posteriori. 
In order to settle this issue we need to understand precisely which 
propositions (1) might assert, and we need to see whether any of these might 
be necessarily true and only justifiable a posteriori. As argued already, Kripkean 
considerations concerning the (logical, Barcan) necessity of (self-)identity in 
conjunction with the thesis of rigid designation are insufficient to generate the 
substantive (and allegedly a posteriori) necessity of, for example, Eminem’s 
essentially being Slim Shady. Assuming a broadly Kripkean, direct theory of 
reference, if ‘Eminem’ and ‘Slim Shady’ are purely referential, then (1) ought to 
assert something like, 
 
(1a) e = s.254 
 
That said, if e and s here are purely referential, rigid designators, then arguably, 
(1a) effectively amounts to, or just is, 
 
(2a) e = e, 
 
given that, purely in terms of the arrangement of objects and attributes 
asserted, since e is identical to s, (1a) simply asserts the self-identity of the 
object Eminem (or Slim Shady/Marshall Mathers III). Clearly however, this 
proposition is necessarily true and justifiable a priori; it is a mere instantiation 
of the logical necessity of self-identity. 
                                                         
253 If this can be correctly described as ‘purely empirical’. I begin to question this notion in the 
present section; and continue, more forcefully, in the following. 
254 As before, I ignore Eminem’s potential non-existence here. I.e. it is a conditional more akin to 
xy [(x = y  x = e  y = s)  (e = s)] 
that we should be looking at. Of course, if the consequent here is necessary, that the proposition 
as a whole is then just a complicated version of the (Barcan) necessity of identity is pertinent. 
I.e. in what sense would this proposition be both (non-trivially) necessarily true and a 
posteriori?  
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So, (1a) qua (2a) cannot be an example of the necessary a posteriori. Only if 
(1a) is interpreted as some stronger, substantive, essentialist claim, is it even 
an apt, candidate, necessary a posteriori proposition. Moreover, only if there is 
some stronger, essentialist and a priori justification, equivalent to the Kripkean 
(A) to (C), would the interpretation of (1) qua the substantive (1a) be justified. 
Now, as hinted in the previous section, I am more than sympathetic to the idea 
that object-identity is necessary, as long, of course, that this is regarded as an a 
priori, substantive and essentialist thesis about the nature of objects. The point 
being, whilst the necessity of (self-)identity, Leibniz’s law plus rigid designation 
is insufficient to support the kind of substantive essentialism255 required to 
generate cases of the necessary a posteriori, some other argument might do this 
work. There are perhaps two potential candidates for such an argument; 
general essentialism and individual essentialism (or haecceitism). In what 
follows I discuss these relatively briefly, as I return to the issue of essentialism 
in more detail in both the following section and in the concluding chapter. 
Beginning with the general case, there are perhaps two main, metaphysical 
and a priori motivations for the kind of essentialism that would justify a 
substantive necessity of identity—and so provide a potential basis for cases of 
the necessary a posteriori. These are the general, a priori claims that (i) all 
objects are essentially the objects that they are; and that (ii) qua objects, if x 
and y are identical then they are essentially identical. Now, although these two 
claims (and especially the latter) sound extremely close to the logical necessity 
of self-identity, which I reject as supporting the necessary a posteriori, note that 
there is no mention of names and rigid designation here. Instead, all that is 
involved are the notions of identity, objects and the essential natures thereof. 
Moreover, if at all justifiable, the justification for (i) and (ii) must be fully a 
priori. In addition to this, it is highly questionable that such a general 
essentialism would support the kind of substantive, particular claim concerning 
individual objects, required to generate the necessary a posteriori—a complex 
point to which I return below. 
Moving to the second candidate essentialism, as suggested in my initial 
                                                         
255 The kind of essentialism I am hinting at is that of the Aristotelianism discussed by Salmon 
1981, 2003, and more clearly endorsed by Brody 1980, Fine 1994, Lowe 1998, 2006, and 
Oderberg 2001, 2007 (amongst others). 
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discussion of the Kripkean argument, if it is to succeed, the relevant move (from 
the logical necessity of identity to the conclusion that identity statements 
involving rigid designators assert necessary and so essentialist identities) 
would appear to involve an appeal to a very substantive brand of essentialism; 
an individual essentialism or haecceitism. If a particular claim about individuals 
a and b is to assert a necessary identity, this must involve the individual 
necessity of identity, entailed by the individual essentialism that (for example) 
a is essentially a; only then can we assert that a = b, on the allegedly, purely 
empirical grounds that a = b. As with the first kind of essentialism however, this 
brand would require a priori and metaphysical motivation; moreover, it would 
require a much stronger form of argument than is offered in the previous 
paragraph. The basic line would be something akin to the following: for any 
object a, it is part of a’s essence to be a. Thus, if a = b, given that a essentially 
has the property of being identical to a, b is also essentially identical to a; i.e. 
essentially (and so necessarily), a = b. Now, I am in no position to evaluate the 
details of this argument as it is both complex and extremely contentious, and 
more importantly, since my present focus is on the existence of the necessary a 
posteriori, as opposed to the nature of essentialism—as indicated, I return to 
essentialism below. Suffice to say, whichever stripe of essentialism one chooses 
(as replacing the Kripkean argument from (A) to (C)), no thesis about names is 
mentioned and, crucially, the justification of such essentialisms is fully 
metaphysical and a priori; i.e. if it is justifiable, philosophical essentialism is 
justifiable only a priori. The point being (as I discuss below), the allegedly, 
purely empirical nature of statements such as ‘a = b’ would be negated. 
Now, towards the beginning of this section I claim that in order to settle the 
issue of the necessary a posteriori, we need to understand which proposition(s) 
(1) might assert and which proposition(s) we are taking (1a) to be. So far, I 
have suggested that the Kripkean is only entitled to claim that (1a) is, 
effectively, the necessary and a priori (2a). Only if some stronger, philosophical, 
metaphysical and fully a priori essentialism is to replace the Kripkean premises 
(A) to (C), might we take (1a) to be some stronger, more substantive, necessary 
(and potentially a posteriori) proposition. Now the issue of the nature of (1a) is 
complex and, since it applies to further potential examples of the necessary a 
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posteriori (which I discuss in the following section), I set this aside presently; 
only returning to the discussion towards the end of the current section. This 
being the case, I now consider the issue of aposteriority; assuming that some 
kind of essentialism might be made to stand in place of the Kripkean (A) to (C), 
what about thesis (D)? Assuming some a priori route to the necessity of 
identity, is it possible to insert a purely empirical identity statement into such 
an argument, so as then to generate substantive, essentialist cases of the 
necessary a posteriori? 
As before, in order to answer such questions we need to understand the 
nature of the relevant proposition(s). So far, I have remained within a broadly 
Kripkean, direct account of semantics. Indeed, with the exception of various 
two-dimensionalist analyses of Kripke’s work (which I criticise in the 
introductory chapter), most commentators on the necessary a posteriori 
assume that true identity statements such as (1) assert simple, singular 
propositions, which (for the usual Kripkean reasons) are necessarily true, yet 
only knowable on an a posteriori basis. I have already suggested that things are 
not quite so clear, even on the ‘wide’ aspect of proposition-expression; I now 
turn to what I call the ‘narrow’ aspect of meaning.256,257 Here, things are even 
less favourable for the Kripkean. 
‘Narrowly’ understood then (i.e. in terms of objects, attributes and the way 
these are designated or referred to), (1) might also express the following 
propositions: 
 
(1b) xy (Ex  Sy  x = y) 
                                                         
256 I use the (hopefully) neutral terms ‘narrow’ and ‘wide’ here to avoid a detailed discussion of 
the de re/de dicto distinction. As shall become apparent, the traditional distinction is very much 
in the background, even if not precisely analogous to the one I intend. In very brief detail, the 
‘wide’ aspects of proposition-expression or sentence meaning are closer to the direct, Kripkean 
and standardly de re, in that I am assuming names to be broadly, directly referential and so on. 
The ‘narrow’ aspects of meaning are close to the de dicto but are not fully so; they are not 
purely about language, propositions, sentences and so on. Instead, the ‘narrow’ still concerns 
objects, attributes and similar but allows for a less rigid, less direct form of reference than with 
the wide. 
257 In terms of semantics (and names), I note that my position has some affinities with those of 
Tichý 1983 and perhaps Burge 1973, 1977—although my eventual picture is more ‘direct’ than 
the latter, in that I admit two aspects of the meaning of names. My account also has some 
similarities to that of Reimer 2002, although we differ on the correct analysis of the necessary a 
posteriori. Cf. McDowell 1977; Kaplan 1978, 1989; Schiffer 1978; Evans 1979, 1982; Forbes 
1989, 1990; Richard 1990; Crimmins 1992, pp. 82ff.; Perry 1993; Recanati 1993 (esp. pp. 37, 
136ff. and 155-63); Wong 1996, 2006; Michael 1998; Elugardo 2002. 
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or, more simply, 
 
(1c) !x (Ex  Sx).258 
 
Now, why do I claim that the apparently straightforward sentence ‘Eminem is 
Slim Shady’ might express more than the simple, singular proposition(s) (1a) or 
(2a)? And why do I use predicates for the relevant names in (1b) and (1c)? 
Well, taking the latter question first, I use predicates in order to stress the 
‘narrow’ aspects of meaning; i.e. to avoid the stipulation that names are 
(necessarily) rigid designators. Thus the two propositions might be rendered 
back to English as follows (respectively): ‘There are (apparently) two objects, x 
and y; x is called ‘Eminem’, y is called ‘Slim Shady’, but they are identical’; or 
‘There is one thing, x, called ‘Eminem’ and ‘Slim Shady’’. By way of providing 
further explanation for all of this, let me turn to the former question. 
As indicated above, although on a simple, ‘wide’, direct reading, such 
assertions only concern the relevant objects and self-identity, that reading, I 
suggest, is too simple, too rigid and too directly referential; in short, too 
question-begging in favour of a Kripkean, rigid designation thesis. Accordingly, 
in such cases we need to take into consideration such things as the utterer’s 
intention to communicate and how else names (and predicates) might function. 
So for example, if a utters (1) to a friend, who is unaware that Eminem is also 
called ‘Slim Shady’, it is highly unlikely that a is trying to communicate an 
instantiation of the law of the necessity of self-identity or any relevant, stronger 
essentialism—at least outside of a philosophy class, perhaps. Instead, it is 
highly probably that a is trying to say precisely that Eminem also happens to be 
called ‘Slim Shady’ or that the two names are co-referential; it is this kind of 
intuition that I attempt to capture with (1b) and (1c). The point being, a correct 
understanding of the (alleged) necessary a posteriori must take into 
consideration relevant modal, rational, communicative and pragmatic issues; it 
is not a case of mere semantics. There are, for example, such issues as the 
speaker’s intention to communicate an idea (or perhaps ‘narrow’ belief), which 
                                                         
258 I very much explain the use of predicates for the relevant names here in the main body 
below. 
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might in turn cause changes of belief and action in the hearer. The 
understanding of such cases purely in terms of direct (Millian) semantics, 
modality and truth-conditions is too ‘external’, too ‘wide’; in addition, we need 
to think about the narrower aspects of communication such as speakers’ 
intention, hearers’ assumptions and how else names (predicates and so on) 
might function. On the latter aspect (which I label ‘narrow’ throughout), names 
are much less clearly direct and rigid; they are very arguably quite loose and 
broadly descriptive, whilst still involving relevant objects and attributes (hence 
my describing the ‘narrow’ as less clearly de dicto; less clearly merely about 
words, sentences and so on). 
All of this said, the problem with taking sentence (1) as expressing (1b) and 
(1c) is that neither of the latter two propositions can be viewed as being both a 
posteriori and necessarily the case. The point being, both (1b) and (1c) are 
quite clearly existential claims regarding particular property instantiations. 
This being the case, they are (thereby) a posteriori but contingent propositions; 
I need some empirical evidence to know that x (contingently) happens to be 
called ‘Eminem’. 
Here of course, the friend of the necessary a posteriori might object that I 
have gerrymandered (1) to express clearly a posteriori but contingent 
propositions; i.e. I am assuming that ‘aposteriority entails contingency’ (or 
similar) so as to interpret (1), somewhat artificially, as the clearly contingent 
(1b) and (1c). Against this, I must stress that the general form of the alleged 
argument required to generate the necessary a posteriori is as follows: A priori, 
philosophical, essentialist and so necessary, major premise; purely a posteriori 
or empirical, minor premise; ergo necessary a posteriori conclusion. This being 
the case, since we are now considering the relevant purely empirical minor 
premise, we must insist that no a priori, philosophical essentialist assumptions 
are built into the relevant proposition. So, if (1) is to assert a relevant, 
candidate, a posteriori proposition, this must be a purely a posteriori 
proposition. Now the best, relevant examples of these, I claim, are precisely the 
‘narrow’, quasi-pragmatic, declarative propositions, (1b) and (1c). If we are to 
understand (1) as purely empirical, we must be thinking of the kind of claim 
whereby the speaker is asserting the existence of some x (and some y) called 
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‘Eminem’, who is also called ‘Slim Shady’—and either x = y (as per (1b)) or the 
speaker is only asserting the existence of x (as per (1c)). Clearly however, as 
stressed above, such propositions would be a posteriori but only contingently 
true. 
What I am suggesting then, is that no such purely empirical proposition can 
be used to generate a necessary truth, via insertion into an a priori argument 
for philosophical essentialism. The key point being, the essentialism and so the 
necessity involved in the likes of (1) must come from the relevant 
philosophical, metaphysical and a priori, essentialist major premise, as opposed 
to the purely empirical minor one. All of this being the case, (1b) and (1c), even 
though fully a posteriori, cannot be so inserted into an a priori, essentialist 
argument, so as to generate substantive and particular a posteriori, essentialist, 
necessary propositions. 
As a brief stock-taking, I have considered three examples of the kind of 
proposition that (1) might assert, and which might be thought to be both 
necessary and a posteriori. Clearly (1a), when considered in purely Kripkean, 
direct terms (i.e. as derived from the Barcan necessity of identity plus rigid 
designation) is the same proposition as (2a), so necessary and a priori. On the 
other hand, (1) qua (1b) or (1c), as potentially to be inserted into some a priori 
essentialist argument, so as to generate a necessary a posteriori proposition, 
would be a posteriori but entirely contingent—and so, crucially, not apt for 
providing examples of the necessary a posteriori. This just leaves (1a), (as 
distinct from (2a)), as the only candidate necessary a posteriori proposition. As 
adverted above however, the nature of this proposition is quite complex; it is 
potentially, on a purely Kripkean understanding of naming and necessity, the 
same proposition as (2a)—but, on a deeper understanding of essence and 
necessity, perhaps, it is distinct from the latter proposition. Hence, only now do 
I begin to discuss its nature in any detail—before moving on (in §4) to consider 
a further argument for the necessary a posteriori, involving additional 
essentialisms of, for example, kind-membership, origin and composition. 
As I indicate, matters are a little more complicated with respect to the 
interpretation of (1a); there is a strong sense in which the issue of the 
necessary a posteriori (or otherwise) status and informativeness of the original 
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(1) re-surfaces in this particular case. The point being, at least superficially the 
proposition(s) (2a) and (1a) do not look the same—and it might be possible for 
someone to grasp (2a) without thereby grasping (1a). Thus, (1a) might not 
share (2a)’s necessary and a priori status; perhaps (1a) is an example of the 
necessary a posteriori after all. In order to see if this is the case, we need to 
understand (as before) precisely what is necessary and what is a posteriori with 
respect to (1a). Now, I claim, the necessity involved in (1a) derives from one of 
two sources; either it comes from the trivial (and a priori) essentialism of the 
logical necessity of self-identity or it comes from one of the more substantive, 
general essentialisms discussed above. Either way, what is necessary about 
(1a) (and similar propositions) is the relevant general arrangement of objects 
and attributes that are involved; if Eminem is identical to Slim Shady, clearly 
this circumstance is necessarily the case in virtue of the general necessity of 
identity (i.e. for all objects), be that trivially or, more deeply, essentialist. In the 
first case, I claim, we have the trivially necessary and a priori (1a) qua (2a) qua 
the general Barcan necessity of identity; in the second case, we have a distinct 
proposition, (1a`) say, that is substantively, necessarily the case, but still, 
essentially, justifiable on an a priori basis, given some general essentialism 
about object identity (for all objects). 
In slightly more detail (and as paving the way for the discussion in the 
following section), the kind of essentially, a priori justificatory considerations 
that I am suggesting are as follows: If sentence (1) is to assert a necessary (and 
arguably essentialist) proposition—either as (1a`) or via some essentialist, 
major plus an empirical, minor premise—then that proposition itself already 
requires some necessary (or essentialist) justification. The point being, if (1) is 
viewed as a ‘purely empirical’ proposition, then as before, there is no 
motivation for that proposition’s then being essentially the case—it must then 
be (purely) contingent. If on the other hand, (1) is taken to be a genuine 
identity-involving (or, as I suggest below, otherwise essentialist) proposition, 
then it must rely for its justification on the relevant identity-involving general 
essentialisms. To know that ‘two’ objects are (necessarily) identical, it is 
necessary to know, for example, that (i) only objects of the same kind can be 
candidate identical objects; (ii) that no two objects of the same kind can occupy 
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the same region of space, at the same time; so (iii) that such same-kind objects 
so occupying the same space, at the same time, must be identical; and (iv) that 
any identical objects are necessarily identical.259 
Clearly, the kind of essentialism am I suggesting here is broadly 
Aristotelian. As with the ‘stronger’ essentialism I mention during the discussion 
of (1a) qua (2a) above, justification here (i.e. on points such as (i) to (iv) in the 
previous paragraph) is a thoroughly a priori issue, which is not to say that 
either form of essentialism is correct, merely that if it is correct, this is an a 
priori, philosophical and metaphysical matter; essentialism and necessity are 
justifiable on an a priori basis, if at all justifiable. 
 
 
4 Another argument? 
 
So far I have discussed a Kripkean argument for the necessary a posteriori, 
suggesting that strictly there are no such propositions—at least as regards the 
standard, name-involving, identity statement examples. Apparently necessary a 
posteriori sentences can express several propositions, all of which either assert 
contingent circumstances only knowable on an a posteriori basis, or necessary 
circumstances essentially knowable a priori.260 Now, I realise I have left matters 
rather sketchy at this point. This is because it is arguable that some of the 
considerations of the previous section constitute a ‘second’ argument for the 
necessary a posteriori. I now discuss this argument in a little more detail, very 
much returning to the theme of the source of apriority in the likes of (1a`) and 
other allegedly a posteriori essentialisms. 
                                                         
259 As noted previously, I am influenced by the likes of Brody, Salmon, Fine, Oderberg and Lowe 
here. See previous notes for detailed publications. 
260 A potential objection here is as follows: Even though there might not be any necessary a 
posteriori ‘propositions’, there remain necessary propositions, asserted by ‘a posteriori 
sentences’; hence ‘necessary a posteriori sentences’. In response to this, I would argue that 
there are indeed two elements to a ‘necessary a posteriori sentence’; a wide, necessary and a 
priori proposition, and a narrow contingent and a posteriori one. Against the intuition that 
apriority, aposteriority and knowledge in general occur at the sentential level (as urged by 
Wong 1996, 2006 for example), I would also argue that the whole idea of proposition-talk is 
based on the idea of abstracting away from sentential knowledge, belief and justification. Very 
briefly for example, if I know that ‘Snow is white’, it is not the natural, English sentence that I 
know (and mutatis mutandis for ‘Schnee ist weiβ’, ‘La neige est blanche’), it is the proposition or 
circumstance; that the stuff, snow, has the property, whiteness. 
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This alleged second and more general argument for the existence of the 
necessary a posteriori is said to have something like the following, modus 
ponens-based form: 
 
(MP1) p  p [a priori, essentialist claim] 
(MP2) p [a posteriori claim] 
(MP3) p [a posteriori conclusion, given the a posteriori 
(MP2)]261 
 
Now, there is some debate262 as to whether this kind of argument is clearly 
distinct from the first, considered above, but for present purposes I treat the 
arguments as separate. So for example, using the e = s proposition (1a), 
discussed throughout, (allegedly) we know a priori that if (1a) then necessarily 
(1a); we know that (1a) on a posteriori grounds; therefore we know a posteriori 
that (1a) is necessarily the case; (1a) is a necessary a posteriori proposition. 
Note however that this form of argument is not universal; it will not work for 
any old p—presumably there is a certain class of ps such that (MP1) to (MP3) 
apply. I return to this important point below. 
Accordingly, this kind of argument can be used to generate putative cases 
of the necessary a posteriori in addition to the examples we have considered 
already. Specifically, the argument allegedly generates necessary a posteriori 
statements, which assert substantive essentialisms such as those of kind-
membership, origin and composition or constitution—as well as those of 
identity (and diversity) already discussed. Some potential examples are as 
follows: 
 
 
                                                         
261 This argument is similar in form to the kind of argument assumed by those who would argue 
for ‘actually’-based necessary a posteriori propositions; for any (a posteriori) p, Ap being such 
an alleged case. As per the related discussion in ch. 3, I take such examples to be entirely 
artificial and insubstantive, as well as relying on an illegitimate notion of possible (and of the 
‘actual’) worlds—all of which I discuss in the concluding chapter. 
262 Vaidya (2008, §3) simply states this argument as the general form of the argument I present 
in §2. Soames (2006b, p. 292) presents my ‘second’ argument as his first and distinguishes this 
from another concerning the empirical evidence required to ascertain co-referentiality (pp. 
298-9)—which I take to be related to the rigid designation argument I provide in §2. 
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Kind-membership: 
(K1) If Aristotle exists, then Aristotle is a person.263 
(K2)  Whales are mammals. 
 
Origin: 
(O1) This tree originates from acorn a. 
 
Composition: 
(C1) Water is composed of H20. 
 
So how do such statements (allegedly) express necessary a posteriori 
propositions? Well, similar to the (1a) case discussed above and according to 
the form of (MP1) to (MP3), (supposedly) we know that the conditional (K1), 
for example, is necessary since it is an instance of the a priori, essentialist 
principle that if an object x is a member of kind K, then necessarily x is a 
member of K—and mutatis mutandis for origin and composition. 264 
Nevertheless, discovering that Aristotle is a person, that this tree comes from a 
particular acorn or that water is composed of H20, requires empirical 
investigation; hence, allegedly, each of the above examples assert necessary a 
posteriori propositions. 
Now precisely as with previous examples of the necessary a posteriori, if 
genuine, these examples would cause problems for the conceivability-
possibility form of reasoning. Very briefly, if we need empirical information to 
know that Aristotle is a person (p), or that this tree comes from acorn a (q), 
then, as before, the negations ¬p and ¬q appear to be entirely a priori or 
rationally possible; i.e. conceivable. Given, that p and q are necessary 
propositions however, their negations are impossible; hence, goes the 
argument, conceivability does not entail possibility. 
All of this being the case, we must see whether this second argument is 
                                                         
263 As noted with the previous, putative examples of the necessary a posteriori, I use the 
conditional here to avoid problems concerning necessary propositions involving contingent 
objects. I drop the conditionalisation in the other examples for ease of expression. 
264 I am not disputing the relevant essentialist theses, Kripke’s arguments for which appear at 
1971, pp. 86-88 and 1980, pp. 47ff. What I am disputing is whether there is a clear, single, a 
posteriori proposition that we know to be necessarily true solely on the basis of its being an 
empirical truth. 
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more powerful than the first. Does it provide genuine cases of the necessary a 
posteriori? Does it generate the interesting and substantive essentialisms 
adverted to? And if so, does it succeed in demonstrating that there is a 
significant gap between conceivability and possibility? Very much as before, all 
of this turns on the nature of the propositions and circumstances asserted by 
the original sentences; on what is taken to be necessary and what is allegedly a 
posteriori. That said, my position here is a little more complex than before, as I 
first want to examine the nature of the relevant proposition p with respect to 
the form of the argument (MP1) to (MP3), and second, I want to go into a little 
more detail on an objection I raised against the first argument for the necessary 
a posteriori, towards the end of the previous section (since this objection 
applies even more clearly here), before fully extending my ‘multiple 
proposition’ response to the current kind of example. 
First then, recalling a point I make above, note that the form of the 
argument (MP1) to (MP3) is not universal—it would not extend to all ps such 
that p is justifiable on an a posteriori basis. Quite clearly (unless some extreme 
necessitarianism obtains), that I had cornflakes for breakfast is not the kind of 
proposition that might be inserted into such a modus ponens argument form to 
generate a necessary a posteriori conclusion, since (i) such a proposition is 
(standardly understood) to be both empirical and completely contingent (so 
there must be something special about the relevant kind of p that can be so 
used to generate necessary a posteriori propositions) and (ii) this special 
quality is, I claim, extremely elusive—to the effect that no single proposition 
can do the relevant work.  
In slightly more detail here, even assuming ‘I had cornflakes for breakfast 
this morning’ were such a proposition (i.e. assuming there were some relevant 
(MP1)-style essentialism about breakfast items), I now hope to show that the 
key to the (failure of) the second, and general, form of argument for the 
necessary a posteriori concerns the nature of the relevant, a posteriori minor 
premise. My contention is that the relevant claims are either already fully 
necessary (or essentialist) but a priori truths, or they are fully empirical but 
contingent ones; and essentially, in neither case does the MP argument 
generate necessary a posteriori propositions. Using the ‘cornflake’ example very 
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briefly, my point can be illustrated as follows. If the relevant (MP1)-style 
essentialism were to obtain then my simply, empirically observing my having 
cornflakes for breakfast neither generates a necessary proposition nor is it 
what justifies the relevant necessary proposition (i.e. the relevant cornflake 
essentialism); it is a mere instantiation of a more general necessitarianism 
(assuming such obtains). What would be necessary then, and what would do 
the justificatory work, would be a general conditional such as ‘anything that has 
cornflakes for breakfast on such-and-such a date, necessarily has cornflakes for 
breakfast...’. So, what I am suggesting is that there is no such thing as a simple, 
empirical (MP2)-style proposition that is fully empirical (but tacitly necessary), 
which can be so used to generate and justify the necessary a posteriori. Instead 
there are, I claim, several relevant propositions, which will be contingent 
instantiations (e.g. ‘(I am currently observing/I am aware/I know that) this 
particular, contingent thing happens to be having cornflakes now’) of related 
necessary truths (such as ‘anything that has cornflakes...’). In short, it is not 
some ‘fully empirical’ (MP2) that generates the relevant necessity (and 
necessary a posteriori) but instead either the MP argument fails (where p is not 
necessary and (MP1) does not obtain) or p is a conflation of an empirical but 
contingent proposition and the original (MP1)-style general, necessary/ 
essentialist conditional.  
In order to make myself more clear on this issue, let me return to a more 
likely candidate necessary a posteriori proposition (the Eminem-Slim Shady-
(1a) case) before extending my argument to the current, essentialist examples. 
As noted above, inserting proposition (1a) into the (MP1) argument, we get the 
following: 
 
(MP1a) e = s  e = s 
(MP2a) e = s 
(MP3a) e = s 
 
But here we must ask, precisely what is the nature of proposition (1a) in 
(MP2a) and as inserted in (MP1a)? My contention (as I suggest above) is that 
there are two main options; either (1a) is a simple, empirical claim, for 
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example, that a particular, contingent object happens to have two names, or it is 
already an essentialist, necessary conditional (such as that all objects are self 
identical, all objects are essentially the objects that they are or, more 
contentiously perhaps, that objects have the property of being essentially the 
objects that they are). The point being, if we take the first option, given that it is 
a clearly existential, empirical claim (1a)—qua (1b), for example—is going to 
be a contingent truth, unable to operate in conjunction with (MP1a), so as to 
generate (MP3a). To see that this is the case, imagine substituting (1a)—qua 
(1b)—into the (MP1) argument. Quite clearly this would not generate a 
necessary proposition; that an object has two or more names (p) does not 
imply that p is necessarily the case. If on the other hand we take the latter 
option, being a necessary, essentialist claim, (1a)—qua (2a) or qua the relevant, 
stronger essentialism—is going to be necessarily true with or without the 
assistance of (MP1a); i.e. in virtue of being (or relying) on the relevant 
essentialism (MP1a) is meant to express. Moreover, of course, such an 
essentialism would be justifiable and knowable (if justifiable) on an entirely a 
priori basis. 
So what is it about (1a) (qua essentialist identity proposition) that makes 
(MP3a) necessarily the case? And, why do we know this on an a priori basis? 
Here, I claim, it is the fact that (1a) (qua (2a) or stronger) is already a 
necessary, essentialist identity claim that makes (1a) a necessary truth (and so 
justifies (MP3a)); if it is a genuine identity proposition, there are some 
important a priori and essentialist assumptions already built into (1a). 
Assuming (as I do) the necessity of identity for objects, if (1a) is a genuine 
identity claim, then it must be a necessary, essentialist truth; (trivially) every 
object is necessarily self-identical (i.e. (2a)); (more contentiously) it is 
impossible for two distinct objects to be identical; it is further impossible for 
two objects of the same kind to occupy the same region of space, at the same 
time; and (slightly more contentiously) every object is essentially the object 
that it is. Putting all of this together, either we get the fairly trivial essentialism 
of necessary self-identity, (2a), or one of the stronger essentialisms I take (1a) 
(qua distinct proposition) to assert. Nevertheless, all of these essentialist 
principles are (if at all justifiable) essentially justifiable on an a priori basis; not 
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via the conjunction of the logico-semantic (MP1a) and the purely empirical (1a) 
qua (1b). Hence, either (1a) is purely empirical, thereby contingent and so 
unable to generate a necessary truth in conjunction with the relevant modus 
ponens, or (1a) is already an essentialist truth—but it is an essentialist and 
necessary truth that is justified a priori. 
Concluding my first point, I think it is fairly clear how the foregoing 
argument extends to the Aristotle-(K1) and other essentialist cases. If, for 
example, (K1) is to be slotted successfully into the (MP1) argument, then it 
must be a certain kind of proposition; an essentialist, necessary truth (already). 
There are several options as to actual the nature of (K1); either it could be a 
simple empirical claim along the lines of (my analysis of (1a) qua (1b)), there 
is an object x, x is called ‘Aristotle’ and x is a person, or it could be the kind of 
essentialist truth we are looking for, something along the lines of, if x is a 
person/kind member then x is necessarily a person/kind member. Clearly, 
again, the former option cannot work in conjunction with (MP1) to generate 
(MP3); whereas the latter option is (very arguably) already a general, necessary 
truth, essentially knowable on an a priori basis. What I am getting at, again, is 
that even with more complex and substantive essentialisms, there are built-in a 
priori and philosophical assumptions that justify the relevant essentialist 
necessity. That an individual named ‘Aristotle’ happens to instantiate 
personhood is not (at all) what justifies the essentialist conclusion that 
Aristotle (qua person) is necessarily a person. Instead, what justifies the latter 
is the essentialist and a priori claim that whatever is a person/kind member is 
necessarily a person/kind member. 
Now I realise this might sound a little artificial and that I might be accused 
of gerrymandering what (K1) expresses to suit my conclusion, but this is what I 
think is going on in such cases. If we have a truly contingent truth, then (as per 
ch. 3) it must be knowable on an a posteriori basis only; in the present chapter I 
am arguing that if we have a genuinely essentialist or necessary truth, the real 
justification thereof must come from an a priori, as opposed to a simple, a 
posteriori source. That said, there will be readers unconvinced at this point. 
This being the case, I now turn to my second main point, before fully extending 
the multiple proposition analysis of the necessary a posteriori to cases such as 
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(K1). 
Second then, I want to extend the foregoing points in order to return to an 
objection that was raised against (1a) as necessary and a posteriori towards the 
end of the previous section. In very brief detail, what I aim to show is that (a) 
the alleged necessary a posteriori status of the likes of (1a) (and the above, 
essentialist statements) very much turns on their asserting wide (necessary 
and a priori) propositions that can be confused with particular, narrow (a 
posteriori) graspings of instances of the relevant necessary and a priori 
knowable philosophical theses; i.e. like applied mathematical truths, they can 
be known on an a posteriori basis, but the wider, general, mathematical truths 
themselves are essentially justified a priori. I then want to support further the 
claim that (b) it is the relevant (a priori and necessary) philosophical theses 
that are what is widely asserted by the relevant sentences, whereas what is 
grasped on occasion of particular instances of such wider claims, are narrow, a 
posteriori but contingent propositions. It is then the conflation of the wide and 
narrow propositions asserted by the likes of (K1) to (C1), which leads to the 
postulation of the necessary a posteriori. 
Turning to issue (a), the main problem with the (MP) argument for the 
necessary a posteriori concerns the justification of the relevant necessity and 
the objection that the relevant (MP2), ‘purely empirical’ premise, cannot be an 
instantiation of such a necessity, in virtue of being purely empirical, a posteriori 
and so contingently, as opposed to necessarily the case. The point being, 
something must justify the move from the (allegedly) purely empirical p to the 
necessitation thereof. The Kripkean (as I suggest) would appeal to the relevant 
essentialist necessity’s being available on an a priori basis and thereby 
providing the relevant major premise for the modus ponens—as per (MP1) to 
(MP3). The problem with this concerns the difference (discussed in ch. 2) 
between the justification and knowledge of general necessary truths and of 
particular ‘graspings’ of instances (or applications) of such truths. As with my 
case against the necessary a posteriori status of ‘Eminem is Slim Shady’ in the 
previous section, where I claim that there is a strong sense in which (1) is an 
instantiation of a wider essentialist truth (that objects are self-identical, or, 
more contentiously, that they are essentially objects), the relevant, putative 
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necessary a posteriori and essentialist propositions here, are instances of 
deeper essentialist truths, the latter of which require a priori philosophical 
justification. In general, as we have seen, the Kripkean attempts to justify the 
necessity of such statements in terms of a priori, philosophical analysis but then 
claims that the epistemic status of the relevant propositions is a posteriori, 
since empirical investigation is required to determine the truth of the relevant, 
non-modal proposition. Against this, I claim they should instead be justified on 
the basis of the relevant essentialist premise; since such claims rely on deeper 
essentialist truths whose justification, qua essentialist, metaphysical, 
philosophical thesis, must be on a priori, rational grounds. 
To make this explicit, let us consider an example: 
 
(MP1b) If two pebbles plus three pebbles is five pebbles (p), then 
necessarily two pebbles plus three pebbles is five pebbles (p). 
(MP2b) Two pebbles plus five pebbles is five pebbles (p). 
So, 
(MP3b) necessarily two pebbles plus three pebbles is five pebbles (p). 
 
Whilst the occurrent grasping in (MP2b) that p is true is a largely empirical 
matter (and mutatis mutandis for other a posteriori ways of understanding 
particular mathematical propositions), what justifies the move from p to p in 
(MP1b) itself is the a priori, philosophical point that mathematical truths are 
necessary truths. Thus, whilst ‘workings out’ of mathematical (or essentialist) 
truths can be grasped in a quasi-empirical fashion, they are justified—both in 
terms of their being truths and their being necessary truths—on an a priori 
basis, and in virtue of philosophical argument concerning the nature of 
mathematics (and mutatis mutandis for kind membership, origin, composition 
and identity or diversity). Clearly, what I am suggesting is that this argument is 
precisely parallel with the kind of alleged necessary a posteriori, non-trivial, 
essentialist truth-generating argument (MP1) to (MP3). It is not the 
(allegedly—but not fully, as discussed below) a posteriori instance (p) that 
‘Aristotle is a person’, ‘this tree comes from acorn a’, or ‘water consists of H20’ 
(or, indeed that ‘Eminem is Slim Shady’), which generates the relevant 
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necessity (p); instead it is the a priori, philosophical argument justifying the 
necessity itself, and this depends on the natures of the relevant objects, kinds 
and attributes, be they mathematical, natural kind-substantial, physico-
chemical-substantial or, indeed, everyday objects.265 
There is of course, an apparent objection to this line of argument. The 
adherent of the modus ponens-based argument for the necessary a posteriori 
might argue that there is a clear disanalogy between the mathematical case I 
use and the standard Kripkean, essentialist but a posteriori examples; the 
mathematical case is justified a priori (both in terms of the initial p and its 
necessitation), whereas the essentialist necessary a posteriori statements are, 
as per the argument, empirical. Very briefly against this line of objection, I 
would repeat points made both above and in previous sections; whilst 
occurrently grasping that e = s or 2 + 3 = 5 requires some empirical 
information, justifying the latter is certainly an a priori matter and, as I stress 
throughout, so, ultimately is the former—at least in terms of its wide variants, 
such as that all objects are self-identical. The point being, in order to judge that 
x = y, we need to know (at least) that all objects are self-identical; every object 
is essentially the object that it is; (more contentiously) for any x and y, if x = y, 
then x and y must be the same kind of object with the same criteria of identity 
and persistence; and (for example) that no two objects of the same kind can 
occupy identical regions of space. All of the foregoing require a priori, 
philosophical argument and justification.266 In addition, and perhaps more 
                                                         
265 Against this kind of objection to the necessary a posteriori, Soames (2006a, pp. 278-89) 
argues that a supporter of Kripke has a clear choice of rejecting either: 
“P1. When empirical evidence is required for knowledge of p its function is to rule out 
possibilities in which p is false” 
or 
“P2. All epistemic possibilities are genuine, metaphysical possibilities…”. 
With Soames, I agree that the two-dimensionalist interpretation of Kripke is to accept (a 
modified) P1 and, more or less, a conflation of epistemic and metaphysical modality as per P2. 
Also with Soames (and thereby distinguishing my position from two-dimensionalism) I reject 
P2 but, since apriority is to be understood in terms of rational (as opposed to epistemic) 
possibility, the question of whether the epistemic and the metaphysical are coextensive is a side 
issue that does not touch my argument against the necessary a posteriori. 
266 I am aware of the relevant Bird-Lowe exchange here (Lowe 2007b, 2008a; Bird 2008). With 
Lowe, I see Bird’s 
 (2†) Dthat (John’s father) is Fred 
as pivotal. Going beyond Lowe (and in line with my general analysis), I view (2†) as expressing 
two propositions; one wide, necessary and a priori, Fred = Fred (for example); and another 
narrow, a posteriori but contingent, xy [John(x)  Dthat[FatherOf(yx)]  Fred(y)] (for 
example). 
 174 
 
 
 
simply, if the relevant propositions e = s and 2 + 3 =5 are assertions of 
necessary circumstances, such as (in the former case) the self-identity of e, or 
more contentiously the being of e by e/s, then, these being necessary and 
essentialist theses, they are only going to be justifiable (if at all justifiable) on 
an a priori basis. If we are to know that e is identical to s, we must already know 
that e is necessarily and essentially e; we must know that e is essentially s (qua 
e!); we must grasp a necessary truth, and, importantly, one that is justified on 
an a priori basis. 
Turning to issue (b) mentioned a few paragraphs above, and by way of 
expanding on the foregoing, I now aim to show how instances of such necessary 
and a priori truths do have an a posteriori element—and how this might be 
taken (confusedly) to show that these are necessary a posteriori propositions. 
Very much as before, my claim is that there are (at least) two potential 
propositions in the vicinity; one necessary and a priori, and another which is a 
posteriori but contingent. It is the conflation of such propositions that leads to 
the postulation of the necessary a posteriori. What I am saying here is very 
much in line with my position on the first version of the necessary a posteriori; 
example statements such as (K1) to (C1) either assert wide, necessary and a 
priori propositions, or they assert narrow and a posteriori but contingent ones. 
So what are the relevant wide propositions in such cases? Here, my claim is that 
what is widely asserted is nothing less than the relevant essentialist thesis; 
something along the lines of (for (K1)): 
 
(K1a) if there are persons, anything that is a person is necessarily a 
person, 
 
or, 
 
(K1b) anything that is a K-member is necessarily K-member. 
 
The point being, when considered widely, the necessary truth(s) asserted by 
the likes of (K1) must be something akin to the general, philosophical, 
essentialist theses (K1a) or (K1b); which are justifiable on an a priori basis (if at 
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all justifiable). Considered narrowly however, the relevant proposition would 
be something like; 
 
 (K1c) x (Ax  Px), [I use the predicate form here, for reasons 
explained in the main body after the introduction 
of proposition (1c) above] 
 
which, quite plainly, being an existential statement, is going to be knowable 
only on an a posteriori basis but one that asserts a metaphysically contingent 
circumstance. 
In this way then, there is a very weak sense in which the original sentences 
(K1) to (C1) (and similar) are ‘necessary a posteriori’; they assert necessary 
(and a priori) wide propositions, but a posteriori (and contingent) narrow ones. 
That said, there is no single proposition asserted that is both necessary and 
knowable only on an a posteriori basis. 
 
 
5 The necessary a posteriori conceivability and possibility 
 
With respect to the necessary a posteriori then, I discuss and reject the two 
main and leading arguments for the existence of the alleged phenomenon. First, 
the standard, Kripkean argument moves from logico-semantic premises to 
substantive, metaphysical conclusions; the wrong order of explanation. In 
particular, the Barcan necessity of identity, rigid designation plus Leibniz’s law 
is insufficient to demonstrate that identity statements involving names express 
necessary a posteriori propositions and especially, a posteriori essentialisms. 
Second, even if it is a distinct argument, a modus-ponens style move from an 
a priori, essentialist and so necessary conditional, via a fully empirical minor 
premise, also fails to demonstrate the alleged conclusion that there are 
necessary a posteriori, essentialist propositions. Instead, it is highly 
questionable that the a priori, philosophical and essentialist major premise is of 
such a simple, conditional form—much deeper metaphysical and a priori 
reasoning is required to substantiate such claims. It is also highly questionable 
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that a ‘purely empirical’ minor premise can be substituted into any such a priori 
and necessary conditional. Instead, I argue that if the relevant p is fully a 
posteriori, then it must be some kind of existential, individual-introducing and 
so contingent truth; whereas if p is the kind of proposition that could be 
inserted into the relevant a priori essentialism, it would already require a priori 
justification for its essentialist status. 
In summary then, the illusion of the existence of necessary a posteriori 
propositions rests on the conflation of wide (necessary, a priori) and narrow 
(contingent, a posteriori) propositions, which are expressed by single, 
‘necessary a posteriori sentences’. For example, taking one of the examples 
from above, 
 
(K2) whales are mammals, 
 
that there are some objects called ‘whales’, some called ‘mammals’, and that all 
those of the former are of the latter (p), cannot be simply inserted into a modus 
ponens-style argument generating a necessary conclusion (p), without there 
being some reason as to why p  p is valid. The reason, I claim, is that 
something in the region of (K2) is already an essentialist and so a necessary 
truth, without the support of the modus ponens p  p; this is something like 
the proposition, 
 
(K2a) if there are any whales (and if whales are a kind), then all whales 
(qua kind members) are necessarily whales (or kind members). 
 
The point being, the original p here, being a mere empirical proposition, is not 
(as per my eating cornflakes for breakfast) the kind of thing that can simply be 
inserted into a modus ponens-style argument to generate a necessary 
conclusion; there must be some justification for that necessity. This justification 
must come from the philosophical, essentialist and a priori proposition that all 
kind members are necessarily kind members (or similar). Moreover, it is the 
confusion of these (or similar) propositions that leads to the illusion of the 
necessary a posteriori. There can then be ‘necessary a posteriori sentences’, but 
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these are conflations of necessary (but a priori) wide and a posteriori (but 
contingent) narrow propositions. 
In slightly more detail, and returning to some of the previous examples,  
 
(1) ‘Eminem is Slim Shady’ 
 
and 
 
 (K1) ‘Aristotle is a person’, 
 
I claim that these analyse out into (at least) two separate propositions. These 
are either wide, necessary and a priori propositions (or essentialist theses), 
such as 
 
(1a) e = s, 
 
understood along the lines of 
 
(2a) e = e, 
 
and 
 
(K1b) anything that is a K-member is necessarily K-member, 
 
respectively, or they are narrow, contingent and a posteriori propositions, such 
as 
 
(1a) e = s, 
 
qua 
 
(1b) xy (Ex  Sy  x = y, 
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or 
 
(K1c) x (Ax  Px).267  
 
All of this being the case, I suggest that there is no real gap between what is 
genuinely conceivable and what is metaphysically possible; something is 
conceivable (rationally possible) only if it is metaphysically possible; it is just 
not possible to conceive of an impossible arrangement of objects and attributes. 
Very much as with apriority and necessity then, genuine conceivability entails 
possibility. Similarly, if something is metaphysically necessary (and knowable), 
its negation is rationally impossible—in virtue of being metaphysically 
impossible.268 For example, if (widely) Eminem is self-identical, or if Aristotle is 
a person, given certain (a priori) essentialist premises, the relevant (wide) 
propositions are metaphysically necessary. Consequently, the negations of the 
relevant propositions are metaphysically impossible and so, strictly, rationally 
impossible as well; it is just not possible to conceive of Eminem’s not being self-
identical or of Aristotle qua person, not being a person. 
So why do some philosophers claim that such negations are ‘conceivable’ 
and so (assuming they are realists about metaphysical modality) that 
‘conceivability’ is a very poor guide to metaphysical possibility? My analysis is 
that despite the foregoing necessity of (wide) propositions such as (1a) qua 
(2a) and Hesperus is Phosphorus, the ‘conceivability’ of the relevant 
negations rests on a confusion of the relevant, negated, narrow proposition for 
the negation of the original, wide proposition. In such cases it is the negation of 
the relevant, narrow propositions (and relevant circumstances), which is being 
taken to be conceivable. So for example, although (2a) is necessarily the case, 
narrowly understood (1a) qua (1c) states that there is a single thing called 
‘Eminem’ and ‘Slim Shady’; this being an existential, contingent-property-
involving and, quite clearly, a contingent a posteriori proposition, its negation is 
entirely metaphysically and so a priori or rationally possible (it is entirely 
                                                         
267 I explain the use of ‘predicate-names’ in the notes and main body surrounding the 
introduction of proposition (1c) in §3 above. 
268 I realise there is a large, potential issue with respect to necessary (and contingent) but 
‘unknowable’ propositions here—hence the parenthesised ‘knowable’. I clarify this issue with 
reference to Goldbach’s conjecture, in the final section of the following chapter. 
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conceivable that Eminem might not have been named ‘Slim Shady’—or vice 
versa, or that there might have been no such thing or more than one such 
thing). Similarly, whilst ‘Aristotle is a person’ might assert a (widely) necessary 
proposition, that a thing named ‘Aristotle’ happens to instantiate personhood, 
is contingent and a posteriori, so its negation is rationally possible or 
conceivable. 
So, the illusion of the necessary a posteriori (and relatedly, of the 
‘conceivability’ of the negations of such propositions) rests on the conflation of 
separately expressed wide and (negated) narrow propositions. Where an 
alleged necessary a posteriori sentence s expresses two (or more) propositions 
p (widely) and q (narrowly), p is necessary but a priori, whereas q is a posteriori 
but contingent. Thus despite p’s being both metaphysically and rationally 
necessary, since q is both contingent and knowable on an a posteriori basis, its 
negation is both metaphysically and rationally contingent. It is the conflation of 
such wide and narrow propositions that leads to the alleged phenomenon of 
the necessary a posteriori; relatedly, it is the confusion of the ‘conceivability’ 
(i.e. epistemic possibility, as I explain below) of ¬p with the genuine 
conceivability of ¬q that leads to the idea that ‘conceivability’ (qua epistemic 
possibility) is a poor guide to metaphysical possibility (since ¬p is epistemically 
but not metaphysically—or rationally—possible). That is, ¬p is ‘weakly’ 
conceivable but neither genuinely possible nor genuinely or ‘strongly’ 
conceivable. Consequently, given the failure of the necessary a posteriori, there 
is no real gap between genuine conceivability (qua rational or a priori 
possibility) and metaphysical possibility.  
My response to such examples and the general problem then, is that 
current, standard (and I include two-dimensional) understandings of 
conceivability are very much cashed out in terms of epistemic possibility 
(and/or imaginability)—viz qualitatively (or epistemically) identical 
situations—and where something is deemed epistemically possible and so 
‘conceivable’, this is ‘possible’ only in the weakest, epistemic sense; ‘possible-
for-all-I-know’. This kind of ‘conceivability’ is an excellent guide to ‘epistemic 
possibility’ then; just not to any genuine kind of real or metaphysical 
possibility. The present account (with respect to rational and metaphysical 
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modality, as I have been suggesting throughout) is that conceivability should be 
understood in terms of a priori or rational possibility, which is a much more 
objective modality, grounded ultimately in the metaphysical. With this 
understanding in place, p is (genuinely) conceivable only if p is metaphysically 
possible (in much the same way as I argue that p is—genuinely—a priori only if 
p is necessary, in previous chapters). On this understanding, the relevant kind 
of conceivability is a very good guide to the genuine (and philosophically 
interesting) kind of possibility; metaphysical possibility.269 
 
  
                                                         
269 As it happens, my position here is close to the line Kripke himself appears to take at several 
places in Naming and Necessity. In discussing the possibility of Hesperus’s not being 
Phosphorus (1980, pp. 140-44 for example), Kripke argues that if h = p then h = p, thus it 
is, strictly, impossible and inconceivable that ¬(h = p); the illusion of the relevant ‘possibility’ 
rests on the confusion of a qualitatively identical epistemic situation ((i.e. epistemic 
possibility)) where some impostor ‘Hesperus’ is not Phosphorus) for the genuine, alleged (but 
false) metaphysical possibility that Hesperus is not Phosphorus. 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
 
 
 
Frege and Kripke’s Problems, 
Conceivability and Possibility 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter I discuss the necessary a posteriori with respect to 
conceivability and possibility, drawing the interim conclusion that—strictly—
there are no necessary a posteriori propositions and that genuine conceivability 
entails possibility. Along the way I mention Frege’s problem and Kripke’s 
puzzle, suggesting that a more complete understanding of conceivability and 
possibility can only be reached after a consideration of the two problems. In 
this chapter, I propose to do just that; to extend my thoughts on the necessary a 
posteriori and conceivability to Frege and Kripke’s problems; and to draw a 
final conclusion about the nature of conceivability and its relation to the a priori 
and metaphysical modality. 
With respect to the two problems—both of which are very much 
addressed, yet left unsolved, by both Kripke and his followers270—as with the 
                                                         
270 Especially Salmon 1986 and Soames 2002. Salmon (1986, p. 2) for example, claims that 
‘Hesperus (if it exists) is identical to Phosphorus’ is necessary but a priori and even analytic. A 
potential objection to my final position on the necessary a posteriori is that I say very much the 
same as does Salmon. Against this I claim that (at best) putative necessary a posteriori 
sentences express (at least) two propositions, neither of which is fully analytic (see ch. 4, §3, for 
further discussion of analyticity). 
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necessary a posteriori, I aim to advance a novel and interesting solution. 
Following Lowe (2007a), and given my points on semantics, pragmatics and 
metaphysics in the previous chapter, I am not entirely convinced that the issue 
between direct and descriptive theories of reference is of great philosophical 
significance. That said, in the course of responding to the necessary a posteriori, 
I make certain semantic background assumptions, thereby suggesting what 
might be considered a mixed or hybrid account of communication.271 Whilst my 
account does solve these traditional problems in a novel and interesting 
manner, it also helps to show that a key assumption (that it is clear what 
sentences express or assert—and so, relatedly, what an agent believes when he 
assents to a sentence) is common to both sets of problems; Frege and Kripke’s 
problems and the necessary a posteriori. In qualifying this assumption (as I do 
in §2 below) one solves both sets of problems, thus paving the way for a 
positive conclusion on conceivability and modality (§3). 
Regarding the necessary a posteriori, conceivability and possibility, I argue 
that there are (at least) two senses of conceivability; one grounded in mere 
epistemic possibility, which is a very poor guide to metaphysical possibility; and 
a second, rational possibility, which is broadly grounded in the metaphysical 
and is thus a very good guide to metaphysical possibility. I began this 
discussion towards the end of the previous chapter, but can only bring matters 
to a conclusion here (§3.1) after the discussion of Frege and Kripke’s problems. 
Finally, having concluded that neither the necessary a posteriori nor Frege 
and Kripke’s problems pose a problem for conceivability-possibility claims, I 
conclude by summarising my position on conceivability and possibility (§3.2). I 
do this by way of a return to a case and a related set of potential issues that I 
highlight in several sections of the thesis so far; Goldbach’s conjecture and 
coextensiveness. 
 
                                                         
271 Like Kripke (but for different reasons—e.g. I am not at all sure that ‘sentence meaning’ is a 
fully philosophical qua a priori matter), I am wary of describing the semantic aspects of my 
position as a (philosophical) theory of reference. The point being, many writers would argue 
that my objections to strongly direct theories of reference boil down to a confusion of 
pragmatics for semantics. In response to this, I would reply that a successful, general account of 
communication (and so of what is believed, asserted and acted upon, for example) must involve 
both semantics and pragmatics (as well as metaphysics). 
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2 Frege’s problem and Kripke’s puzzle 
 
In the previous chapter I remain fairly close to the issue of the necessary a 
posteriori, whilst touching on Frege’s problem, as well as the central topic of 
conceivability and possibility, throughout. As I suggest, a full treatment of the 
latter involves a discussion of precisely what is being conceived as being 
possible; what is being imagined or thought (possibly) to be the case. This issue 
is undeniably both epistemic as well as metaphysical, involving as it does the 
central notions of conception, thought, belief and, ultimately (once again) 
propositions and circumstances. Consequently, I now focus in slightly more 
detail on the related problems commonly referred to as ‘Frege’s problem’ and 
‘Kripke’s puzzle’. Clearly there is a great deal of overlap between (at least) the 
first of these problems and the necessary a posteriori; if a proposition is 
necessary but a posteriori, this might go some way towards explaining how (for 
example) a = b might have the same modal status as a = a and yet differ in 
terms of cognitive significance; since the former might be a posteriori whereas 
the latter is a priori. Of course, in the previous chapter, I very much argue that 
the necessary a posteriori cannot do such work. This being the case, I now 
intend to work through the implications of my response to the necessary a 
posteriori with respect to Frege’s problem (§2.1) and then Kripke’s puzzle 
(§2.2). 
 
 
2.1 Frege’s problem 
 
In very brief detail, Frege’s problem centres upon the cognitive significance of 
true identity statements involving co-referring terms.272  For example, if ‘a = b’ 
and ‘a = a’ are both true, then how can the former differ from the latter in terms 
of truth, proposition (or circumstance) asserted and so cognitive significance? 
If a is identical to b, then, presumably, ‘a = b’ and ‘a = a’ say the same thing, 
assert the same proposition. Of course, the Kripkean response to these 
                                                         
272 Although the problem can also apply to standard, subject-predicate statements involving co-
referential terms. 
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questions might be something along the lines of the following. Whilst ‘a = b’ and 
‘a = a’ have the same modal value (they are both necessary truths), they have 
different epistemic and cognitive values; they are (necessary) a posteriori and a 
priori sentences respectively—thereby studiously avoiding the issue of 
propositions, perhaps. Now, as I suggest throughout the foregoing, this very 
much fails to answer the Fregean problem; if ‘a = b’ and ‘a = a’ have the same 
modal value, if they are (or express) the same truth, circumstance or 
proposition (i.e. if they say the same thing; if they assert the very same 
arrangement of objects and attributes), and if propositions are the objects of 
belief, there is, fairly clearly, a strong sense in which they ought to have the 
same epistemic and cognitive value as well.273 As I try to demonstrate 
throughout the previous chapter, this kind of response will not do. Very much 
in line with Chapter 5 then, my initial response to Frege’s problem is as follows. 
Widely understood, ‘a = b’ and ‘a = a’ express effectively the same (wide) 
proposition; they assert the same arrangement of objects and attributes, 
namely the self-identity of whatever object is named by a (or more 
contentiously the being of a by the object named by a/b); i.e. a = a or a = a. 
This proposition, of course, is necessarily true but also knowable on an a priori 
basis. Narrowly understood, on the other hand, ‘a = b’ and ‘a = a’ express 
different (narrow) propositions—they assert different circumstances; namely 
that some differently named object is (self-) identical (‘a = b’: xy [Ax  By  x 
= y]) or (arguably) that an identically named object is (self-) identical (‘a = a’: 
x [Ax  x = x]).274 Narrowly then, the relevant propositions are contingent 
and a posteriori (as per my analysis of the necessary a posteriori). So my 
response to Frege’s problem is that there are (at least) two propositions, one 
necessary and a priori, and the other contingent but a posteriori. Widely, both 
assert the same necessary but a priori circumstance; narrowly, however, they 
express distinct but jointly a posteriori and contingent circumstances. So my 
analysis of Frege’s problem depends on which proposition ‘a = b’ is taken to 
                                                         
273 Unless of course, some difference in proposition is read off the apparent difference in 
cognitive value. I also stop short of attributing any of this to Kripke, who states suspicion about 
propositions (1980, pp. 20-1) and refrains from offering a solution to his own version of the 
puzzle (1979, pp. 259 and 267 for example). Hence the ‘Kripkean’, in the main text, above. 
274 Or, mutatis mutandis, !x... for both. I explain the predicate form (for the names) in the 
notes and main body surrounding the introduction of proposition (1c) in §3 of ch. 5. 
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assert. Widely it is the same proposition as ‘a = a’; narrowly however, it is not—
and this is where the cognitive difference applies, since narrowly ‘a = b’ 
expresses an a posteriori as opposed to an a priori proposition. 
Originally of course, Frege’s problem was posed as a question concerning 
the cognitive significance of true identity statements. If, on a fully worked out 
and very direct—‘Millian’—theory of reference, ‘a = b’ and ‘a = a’ express the 
same proposition, then we (or rather the Millian) would appear to be straight 
back at the beginnings of Frege’s problem. This being the case, the (very much 
related) problem of the intersubstitutivity of proper names in belief reports is 
often employed by Millians, so as to understand how ‘a = b’ and ‘a = a’ might 
express the same proposition, whilst differing in cognitive value or, perhaps 
better (according to such Millians), pragmatic significance.275 Such accounts 
usually involve a three-way belief relation involving the original propositions 
as the ultimate objects of belief, with ‘guises’, ‘modes of presentation’ or ‘ways 
of believing’ acting as intermediaries between these and the believer a. So, 
returning to the Eminem and Slim Shady example, if a believes, 
 
(2a) e = e 
 
in virtue of assenting to, 
 
(2) ‘Eminem is Eminem’, 
 
a thereby also believes (however counter-intuitive it might appear prima facie) 
 
(1a) e = s, 
  
i.e. what is expressed by 
 
(1) ‘Eminem is Slim Shady’, 
 
                                                         
275 I am thinking of course of theorists such as Salmon 1986, Soames 2002 (pp. 140-6 in 
particular) and even (although he claims to be offering a solution at odds with Salmon’s) Braun 
1998. 
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even if he does not assent to, or even dissents from, (1), since (2a) and (1a) are 
(pace a lot of what I have said so far) simply one and the same, singular 
proposition. 
The counter-intuitiveness suggested above is simply the idea that the very 
fact that a would not assent to, or would dissent from (1), is perhaps evidence 
that (2a) and (1a) are not precisely the same proposition; and consequently that 
(2) and (1) are not simply different modes or ways of believing ‘that’ singular 
proposition. Instead, I argue, the fact that a assents to (2) but not to (1) and that 
he is surprised to learn (1), reads some popular music press, updates his music 
collection (etc.), is strong evidence that (2a) and (1a) are, in some (narrow) 
sense, different propositions—even if they (widely) say the same thing. What I 
am getting at here is that in such cases, if a is insisting that he believes (2) and 
does not believe, or even disbelieves (1), I think that someone who refuses to 
give any credence to a’s reports of his own belief (and consequent action) 
states, must be in the grip of a philosophical theory; and the level of counter-
intuitiveness is just too high a price to pay to secure such a theory. Instead, if a 
insists that he does not believe, or disbelieves (1) and especially if he then goes 
out of his way to understand whether (1) is true, there must be some (however 
narrow) truth to the claim that a believes (2)/(2a) and does not believe 
(1)/(1a); i.e. that (2a) and (1a) are distinct propositions (in some sense). After 
all, in such a scenario, a is very likely to assent to (2) and ¬(1). If ¬(1) asserts 
¬(1a) (which seems very likely) and (2) asserts (1a) (which the defenders of 
the relevant theory would agree on, since they claim that (1a) is the same 
proposition as (2a)), then, quite clearly, a believes (1a) and ¬(1a), which is 
clearly problematic.276 
As I suggest above, there is perhaps a way out of this apparent 
contradiction that is discussed in the literature. Salmon (2006) and Braun 
(2006) effectively insist that a (‘unaware’277 perhaps, that Eminem is Slim 
Shady) could believe (1a) under one ‘guise’, mode or way, and disbelieve it 
                                                         
276 There is a sense here in which I am endorsing what Kripke calls the principle of disquotation 
(DP). Since I discuss this with respect to Kripke’s puzzle, below, I set this issue aside for now. 
Suffice to say that belief (and precisely what sentences assert) is a very complex matter and 
there is a sense (the wide one) in which (DP) might be false, and another (narrow) in which it 
might apply. 
277 I realise this is a contentious way of describing it. 
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under another; hence he would be ‘illogical, but not irrational’ (as per the title 
of Braun’s paper), in virtue of not believing a contradiction—at least not in an 
open, obvious manner. Schiffer (2006) replies that the contradiction cannot be 
so easily avoided, since it would be possible for b (aware that Eminem is Slim 
Shady) both to believe and disbelieve of a that a believes that Eminem is Slim 
Shady; thus the contradiction would resurface—b would be illogical and 
irrational, since b would not possess the relevant, different guises required to 
explain the contradiction. In slightly more detail, my version of this exchange is 
as follows.278 
Alan and Brenda are two equally gifted logicians. Alan is unaware that 
‘Eminem’ and ‘Slim Shady’ are co-referential, hence he is unwilling to assent to, 
and in fact denies, (1), whilst at the same time assenting to (2). Brenda is aware 
of the relevant co-referentiality and so assents to both (2) and (1). Applying the 
apparently uncontroversial principle of disquotation, 
 
(DP) if an agent a sincerely and reflectively assents to a sentence s (in a 
context c), then a believes, at the time of c, what s expresses in c,279 
 
it seems fair to conclude that Alan believes (2a) and disbelieves (1a), whilst 
Brenda believes both (2a) and (1a). This is perhaps a standard argument for a 
more descriptivist account of the significance of names; since it is possible to 
believe (2a) and disbelieve (1a), there must be a sense in which they are not the 
same proposition. In response to this however, the direct reference theorist can 
insist that Alan, whilst appearing to be illogical, is not in fact irrational, since he 
can ‘take’ Eminem to be identical to Slim Shady under one guise or mode of 
presentation, but not identical to Slim Shady under another; he can ‘take’ 
Eminem to have the property of being self-identical, even if he ‘takes’ Eminem 
to be distinct from Slim Shady.280 At this point, Schiffer objects that it would be 
entirely possible that 
 
                                                         
278 As well as the authors cited in the text here, see Perry 1977 and Kaplan 1969. 
279 Suitably amended from the original, to deal with sentences and what they might express in 
different contexts and times. See Kripke 1979, pp. 248-9. 
280 Salmon (2006, pp. 369-70) is very clear on this point. 
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(3) Brenda believes that Alan believes that Eminem is Eminem and that 
he disbelieves that Eminem is Slim Shady, 
 
but of course, since Brenda is aware that Eminem is Slim Shady, and since, 
according to the Millianism that Salmon advocates, she therefore does not 
possess two guises of Eminem. Therefore (3) appears to imply that 
 
(4) Brenda believes and disbelieves that Alan believes that Eminem is 
Slim Shady. 
 
The apparent problem, of course, is that because Brenda does not possess the 
two, distinct guises of Eminem, (4) does appear to attribute irrationality to 
Brenda. The suggested resolution being to adopt something more akin to a 
descriptivist semantics. Unfortunately for Schiffer, the argument here is a little 
quick. The point being, what (3) really implies is not (4) (at least not without a 
great deal of detailed debate) but something more like 
 
(5) Brenda believes that Alan believes that Eminem is Eminem (under 
Alan’s guise of ‘Eminem’) and that Alan believes that Eminem is not 
Eminem (under Alan’s guise of ‘Eminem,’ and ‘Slim Shady’), 
 
which, of course, is fairly innocuous for the direct reference theorist.281 
Now, it would be possible to spend much time debating the intricacies of 
this argument. In what follows, I set this debate aside, focusing instead on a 
simpler, clearer and more direct objection to simple Millianism, as follows. If 
we accept (DP) in addition to all of the assent claims (prior to (3)) above, as 
well as a Salmonesque Millianism about proper names, we get the following 
situation: 
 
(6) Alan assents to (2) [Premise] 
(7) Alan believes (2a) [From (DP) and (6)] 
                                                         
281 Even if there is a deeper issue as to the nature of guises. As I am not a (simple) direct 
reference theorist, and as the ‘descriptive’ aspect of my account deals with this issue, I set this 
worry aside presently. 
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(8) (2a) is the same proposition as (1a) [Millianism] 
(9) Alan believes (1a) [(7) and (8)] 
(10) Alan does not assent to (1) [Premise] 
(11) Alan does not believe (1a) [Salmon’s claim.282 Also deriv-
able from a suitably modified 
(DP)283 and (10)] 
 
This is all well and good so far, since the Millian can make the same points 
concerning belief and non- (or dis-)belief of (1a) as before; (9) and (11) do not 
expose an irrationality, since Alan believes and disbelieves (1a) under different 
guises. Having said this however, accepting all of the same points and 
principles, we also get: 
 
(12) Alan assents to ¬(1) [Premise] 
(13) Alan believes ¬(1a) [(DP) and (12)] 
(14) ¬(1a) is the same proposition as ¬(2a) [Millianism] 
(15) Alan believes ¬(2a) [(13) and (14)] 
 
In short, the anti-Millian urges that given all of the relevant assumptions, a case 
can be made for the claim that Alan believes (2a), (1a), ¬(1a) and ¬(2a) (and 
despite the sentence expressing ¬(2a) appearing to be very clearly a priori).284 
At this point the Millian might attempt to make all of the same manoeuvres 
as before—Alan believes the relevant ‘contradictions’ under suitable guises, 
                                                         
282 Salmon 2006, pp. 369-70. 
283 Perhaps: 
(CON-DP) If an agent a sincerely and reflectively denies (or withholds assent from) a 
sentence s (in a context c), then a disbelieves (or does not believe), at the time 
of c, what s expresses in c. 
284 McKay and Nelson (2008, §5) introduce a similar objection; if Lois Lane believes that (a) 
Superman is stronger than Clark Kent, and if names are inter-substitutable salva veritate, then 
Lois also believes that (b) Superman is stronger than Superman and (c) Kent is stronger than 
Superman. Salmon (1992) and McKay (1991) attempt to resolve this paradox, but, to my mind, 
both papers fail to address the central concern; that there is no clear, Millian reason for 
favouring Lois’s (or Alan’s) rational beliefs over her ‘irrational’ ones. In addition, as I urge 
throughout (and as McKay and Nelson admit), that Lois would seek help from Superman, but 
not Kent, in strength-requiring situations, is at least prima facie evidence that she believes (a) 
but not (c)—or (b) for that matter. As McKay and Nelson also go on to suggest, the force of the 
objection rests on the strength of the claim that explanatory, predictive and rational concerns 
are an essential part of a full solution to Frege’s problem (and Kripke’s puzzle); a claim which I 
argue for throughout. 
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thereby retaining his rationality—however, the problem now is that applying 
Millianism and (DP) alone, does not appear to provide any reasoned motivation 
for favouring Alan’s belief in (2a), say, over his belief in ¬(2a), or his belief in 
¬(1a), for example, over his belief in (1a) (both of which choices would resolve 
the apparent contradiction). My account on the other hand, can motivate just 
such reasons; I can argue that there is a strong (narrow) sense in which (2a) 
and (1a) are distinct propositions, and in which Alan’s assent to (2) but not (1) 
is strong evidence that he (narrowly) believes (2a) and ¬(1a); hence Alan 
(narrowly) believes neither (1a) nor ¬(2a). In addition, since rationality is 
grounded in the metaphysical and since Alan is rational, I can claim that there is 
a strong sense in which Alan cannot (rationally and widely) believe either ¬(2a) 
or ¬(1a), since (widely) both ¬(2a) and ¬(1a) are metaphysically impossible; 
and Alan cannot be rational and believe an impossibility. Thus I can argue that 
(11) and (15) do not follow; (8) and (14) (i.e. strong Millianism) should be 
rejected at the expense (at least initially, or perhaps widely) of (DP).285 That 
said, the issue of (DP) and its narrow and wide truth or falsehood very much 
concerns Kripke’s puzzle. So, having discussed Frege’s problem and its 
propositional attitude-ascriptional variant, let us move on to this second puzzle, 
and the nature of (DP), in slightly greater detail. 
 
 
2.2 Kripke’s puzzle 
 
Kripke’s puzzle286 can be viewed very much as a response to some of the 
implications of the ‘picture’ of reference painted in Naming and Necessity, and 
especially of the direct reference theories inspired by that work. In short, if a 
name’s only semantic contribution is its reference, then it would appear that 
sentences such as (1) ‘Eminem is Slim Shady’ and ‘Cicero was bald’, have the 
same alethic, modal and cognitive, epistemic values as (2) ‘Eminem is Eminem’ 
and ‘Tully was bald’287 respectively. That is, if a strong version of the theory of 
direct reference obtains and if propositions are the objects of belief, then we 
                                                         
285 Although, as below, there is good reason to suspect (DP) more widely. 
286 Kripke 1979. 
287 As discussed by Kripke 1979, pp. 239-41. 
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run straight back into Frege’s problem—as first advanced by Frege against the 
Millian theory of reference. 
Now, as much as many of the arguments of Naming and Necessity are 
advanced to demonstrate that that sentences such as (1) and (2) have the same 
alethic and modal status, clearly that work also seems to suggest that, in some 
sense at least, they have different cognitive values; (1) is, for example, a 
posteriori whereas (2) is a priori; it might be possible to believe (2) whilst not 
believing (1). In terms of propositions of course, this is perhaps confusing, since 
if (1) and (2) have the same alethic and modal status, they ought to express the 
same, singular proposition; but, if they express the same proposition, and if 
propositions are the objects of belief, then it ought to be impossible to believe 
(2) whilst not believing or disbelieving (1). Indeed, recalling his remarks about 
the ‘apparatus of propositions’ breaking down in this area, the lesson Kripke 
takes from ‘A Puzzle about Belief’ is not as positive as the picture from Naming 
and Necessity might suggest—the puzzle is a puzzle, and Kripke is not at all sure 
how to solve it.288 That said, the puzzle is perhaps best seen as a response to 
some of the implications of the direct theory of reference. The point being, 
whilst Millianism appears to run straight into Frege’s problem, Kripke’s puzzle 
is both directly analogous to this and (according to Kripke) not ruled out by 
either direct or descriptive theories of reference. Indeed, given that the issue 
does not turn on substitutivity, but on (DP)289 as above, it is fairly clear that 
Kripke aims to replace Frege’s problem with his own puzzle. Moreover, as we 
shall see below, turning as it does on (DP), the puzzle is perhaps more strongly 
entailed by descriptivism (if this endorses (DP)) than it is by Millianism (which 
might suggest that (DP) is false290). Consequently, given the barrage of 
criticisms of descriptivism in Naming and Necessity, perhaps Kripke’s strongest 
conclusion from the ‘Puzzle’ is that even if both descriptivism and Millianism 
entail the puzzle, the latter is better placed with respect to the modal, epistemic 
                                                         
288 Kripke 1979, pp. 267 and 259. Indeed, Kripke spends some time discussing (but ultimately 
rejecting) the possibility that his earlier (1972/1980) picture/theory was a kind of hybrid 
theory (modally Millian but epistemically Fregean); see 1979, pp. 243-4 (for the discussion), n. 
10 (for the initial rejection) and pp. 247-8 (for the outright rejection). 
289 As urged by Kripke at 1979, p. 268. 
290 Although this is a conclusion that Kripke stops short of in the ‘Puzzle’.  
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and semantic arguments.291 
Kripke introduces the puzzle by way of the Frenchman Pierre’s belief(s) 
about the pulchritude of Londres/London. As this version of the puzzle relies 
on both (DP) and what Kripke describes as the principle of translation, and as 
there is a second version of the puzzle that only involves (DP), I focus on the 
latter version, so as to isolate the problem with respect to Millianism, 
descriptivism and (DP). Here then is the puzzle.292 Peter, who we are to assume 
is a fully rational and logically astute language user, learns that someone called 
‘Paderewski’ is a famous pianist. He thereby assents to 
 
(16) ‘Paderewski has musical talent’, 
 
which via (DP) appears to allow us to conclude that 
 
(17) Peter believes that Paderewski has musical talent. 
 
Later, Peter hears about someone called ‘Paderewski’ who is a Polish politician. 
Believing politicians to have no musical ability, Peter assents to  
 
(18) ‘Paderewski has no musical talent’, 
 
which, as before, via (DP) entails 
 
(19) Peter believes that Paderewski has no musical talent. 
 
Of course, ‘Paderewski’ happens to name just one man, who is both a politician 
and a talented pianist. Thus, since we seem to have two identical tokens of a 
single name, (17) and (19) appear deeply contradictory; Peter appears to 
believe both that  
 
                                                         
291 As very much hinted at 1979, pp. 269-70. 
292 Kripke notes at several places (e.g. p. 242 and p. 249, n. 22) that the puzzle only concerns de 
dicto belief. As this is a large assumption that, I think, impinges on the best response to the 
puzzle, I do not share it. 
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(20) Paderewski has musical talent 
 
and, 
 
(21) Paderewski does not have musical talent.293 
 
Since Peter does assent to (16) and (18), according to Millianism and (DP), 
he would appear to believe (20) and (21). Accordingly, there appears to be no 
simple solution to the puzzle in which (20) is denied and (21) accepted (or vice 
versa); if we are to accept (DP) and a Millian, direct theory of reference, then we 
seem compelled to believe that Peter holds contradictory beliefs concerning 
(the individual) Paderewski. This then is the puzzle; Peter, who is fully logical 
and rational, appears to hold contradictory beliefs, and all apparently because 
he is not aware that Paderewksi (the musician) is Paderewski (the politician) 
(as Peter might put it), or that ‘Paderewksi’ is a single, directly referential 
name, picking out a single individual who is both a musician and a politician (as 
the Millian might put it). 
All of this being the case, we would appear to have two (or three) options; 
deny (DP) or deny Millianism (or perhaps both). Now, as I have stated several 
times already, my aim is not to provide detailed exegesis of Kripke’s position 
and theories. So far I have more or less kept to this aim but now I must discuss, 
in a little detail, what I think were Kripke’s aims and conclusions in setting out 
this paradox. What is at issue is the status of the direct theory of reference as 
against its main opponent, which Kripke describes occasionally as 
‘descriptivism’, ‘Fregeanism’ or ‘the Frege-Russell view’. Now, as before, I am 
perhaps less interested in which, if any, of these views is correct, than I am in 
the epistemology and metaphysics of rationality and modality, and in particular 
                                                         
293 See the previous note. The apparent contradiction is clearest if the beliefs are wide and de re, 
since it then appears that Peter (widely) believes both that Paderewski has musical talent and 
that Paderewski does not have musical talent. As I suggest below (despite Kripke’s insistence 
that the contradiction arises in cases of de dicto belief), things are not at all so clear with what I 
call ‘narrow’ beliefs (although as I urge elsewhere, the narrow is not precisely the same as the 
de dicto). It seems entirely possible for example, for Peter to believe that something called 
Paderewksi is musical and something called Paderewksi is not musical, where the two 
‘Paderewskis’ are (at least taken as) different names. I explain this in much greater detail 
below. 
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now, in precisely what is being conceived of as being possible.294 So, whilst I 
appear to argue for a ‘hybrid’ semantics in what follows, this is to be viewed 
very much as being argued for from a metaphysical perspective; there are 
certain alethic, modal and cognitive conditions that a suitable solution to this 
puzzle must satisfy. Purely in terms of objects and their attributes (that is, in 
wide, de re terms), the best approach to semantics and belief would appear to 
be broadly Millian; but with respect to how we have these beliefs, that is, in 
terms of particular individuals (narrowly) believing that Eminem is/is not Slim 
Shady, or that Paderewski is/is not musical, for example, the best solution 
might well be more ‘descriptivist’ (if not in the ‘Fregean’ sense that Kripke 
appears to intend).295 Hence, in what follows, I argue for a mixed or ‘hybrid’ 
approach to semantics. That said, I will need to discuss some of Kripke’s 
assumptions and arguments, and make some additional ‘Kripkean’ implications 
(that is, to extend Kripke’s thoughts perhaps a little beyond what he writes in 
the ‘Puzzle’, since he is—as ever—quite reticent in advancing a position), in 
order to set out my own arguments and conclusions. 
So what is Kripke trying to do in the ‘Puzzle’? If there is (or appears to be) 
no solution to the paradox, shouldn’t we reject (DP) and/or Millianism? Well, 
this is not quite the conclusion that Kripke opts for. Instead he suggests, first, 
that (his version of) Fregeanism and Millianism are equally placed with respect 
to Kripke’s puzzle. Either theory, in addition to (DP), appears to result in the 
paradoxical sets of beliefs and belief attributions, and it “is wrong to blame 
unpalatable conclusions...on substitutivity” (i.e. Millianism); it is principles such 
as (DP) that are perhaps questionable.296 Second, presumably Kripke is urging 
that his puzzle replaces Frege’s problem as the prime paradox that “any theory 
of belief and names must deal with”.297 Moreover third, since the arguments of 
Naming and Necessity are deeply telling against the modal metaphysics, 
epistemology and semantics of descriptivism(s) (since Kripke takes Fregeanism 
                                                         
294 And since I take what is rational to depend, ultimately, on metaphysical modality, my 
concerns are very arguably more metaphysical than epistemic. 
295 In what follows, Kripke claims to be attacking a ‘Fregean’ descriptivism, which might not be 
a position thoroughly attributable to Frege. I use ‘Fregeanism’ (occasionally with explicit 
quotation marks) to label this position and ‘descriptivism’ to indicate a wider position, 
potentially stronger than the one Kripke attacks. 
296 1979, pp. 267-8. Sosa 1996 presents a similar interpretation of Kripke’s aims here. 
297 Kripke 1979, p. 267. 
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to be so definitive), we ought to prefer Millianism, even if it appears to be 
equally badly placed with respect to Kripke’s puzzle. 
As it happens, Kripke could perhaps have gone further than this, since (i) 
some versions of Millianism might be able to avoid the puzzle in being 
committed to a very much qualified version of (DP), and (ii) Fregeanism is 
arguably more committed to (DP) (and so the puzzle) than is Millianism.298 
Dealing with (i) first, on a simple reading of Millianism conjoined with (DP), 
that Peter assents to (16) and (18) does seem to imply that he believes (20) and 
(21)—i.e. a paradox, since (according to Millianism) (21) is the same 
proposition as ¬(20). The versions of the theory that might avoid this 
conclusion299 would qualify (DP) by claiming that Peter’s assent to (16) and 
(18) only entails that he believes (20) under one guise or mode (of Paderewski 
or of the whole proposition) and (21) (or ¬(20)) under another; thus Peter is 
‘illogical but not irrational’. So, the qualified (Millian-DP) would add a clause 
concerning a’s belief of what s expresses under a guise to the original (DP). 
Kripke, of course, does not make this kind of move—I raise the point merely to 
suggest a potential strengthening of his position.300 
Turning to (ii), the point here is that it is Peter’s assent to (16) and (18), 
plus the ‘Fregean’ idea that sense determines reference and so generates two 
contradictory beliefs about the same object, Paderewski, which lies at the 
heart of the paradox. That is, it is the claim (the Fregean version of (DP) 
effectively) that Peter appears to have two beliefs, plus realism about what 
Peter has those beliefs (namely Paderewski’s musical talent or otherwise) that 
generates the paradox. The point being, according to Kripke’s Fregean, if Peter 
assents to (16)/(18) he believes (20)/(21) qua distinct propositions, but, of 
course, since Paderewski is the thing that satisfies both senses of ‘Paderewski’ 
in (16) and (18), really, Peter believes (20) and ¬(20) (or, of course, ¬(21) and 
                                                         
298 Having said this, concerning (i), whilst Millianisms might avoid the puzzle, there is a strong 
sense in which they cannot successfully respond to it, and, with respect to (ii), descriptivism, 
more widely construed, might be able both to avoid and explain the puzzle. I explain both 
points throughout what follows. 
299 I am thinking of positions advanced by Perry (in several articles of his 1993), Salmon 1986 
and Soames 2002. 
300 In fact, I criticise this position (using points from the Schiffer-Salmon exchange discussed 
above) in what follows; effectively I urge that Millianism avoids but cannot satisfactorily 
respond to Kripke’s puzzle, in an exactly parallel way to my analysis of Millianism and Frege’s 
problem above. 
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(21)). In this way, Kripke might have argued that Fregeanism plus a simple 
realism about the ultimate objects of belief (i.e. individual objects and their 
attributes), is sufficient to generate the paradox; hence (although some 
Millianisms appear to entail Frege’s problem), perhaps Fregeanism is more 
strongly committed to (DP) and Kripke’s puzzle than is Millianism (as qualified 
above)! The idea then is that, strictly, Kripke’s puzzle exposes the problematic 
assumption at the heart of Frege’s problem, (DP), and Fregeanism is at least as, 
if not more committed to (DP) than is Millianism.301 Now, if the anti-Fregean 
themes of Naming and Necessity were added to this argument, Kripke would 
have an even stronger position against Fregeanism and in favour of suitably 
qualified Millianisms.302 
Having said all of this, even if the Kripkean argument can be thus 
strengthened, it is possible to argue against all of the relevant, positive claims of 
Naming and Necessity, much as I have done above, such that a ‘hybrid’ account 
with a ‘descriptivist’ aspect, is preferable to either a fully fledged Fregeanism 
or, indeed, a direct Millianism. So whilst one might accept the first, main point 
(of Kripke’s argument, outlined a few paragraphs above), that Millianism is at 
least as well placed as is Fregeanism with respect to Kripke’s puzzle, the third, 
main point, that Naming and Necessity undermines (all) descriptivism(s) is not 
as well supported. Thus the status of the second point (that Kripke’s puzzle 
somehow replaces Frege’s problem) is also unclear; and the conclusion, that we 
should adopt Millianism, is unsound. Instead of this line of reasoning, I would 
argue as follows. As much as Millianism might be as well placed as is (or 
perhaps better than) Fregeanism with respect to Kripke’s puzzle, it is still badly 
placed, since it offers no appealing solution. The point is, even if we argue that 
Fregeanism is committed to (DP) and thereby might run straight into Kripke’s 
puzzle, if Millianism denies (DP),303 it is then in no good position to suggest 
which of, for example, Peter’s ‘beliefs’ (20) and (21) we should respect; which 
                                                         
301 All of this said, note that Frege’s problem might still lurk in the background—even if 
Kripke’s puzzle is separately entailed by ‘Fregeanism’, it is not entirely clear that Millians can 
successfully respond to Frege’s problem, as I argue above, and suggest again below. 
302 Having said this, I am not entirely sure that this paragraph would best represent Frege’s 
response to Kripke’s puzzle. That is, I am not sure that Fregean (or other) descriptivisms do fall 
foul of the puzzle (notwithstanding the results of the modal, epistemic and semantic arguments 
of Naming and Necessity). 
303 Which (Millian-DP) effectively does, and which Kripke only just stops short of admitting in 
the ‘Puzzle’. 
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of his assentings to (16) or (18) we should prefer; i.e. (to paraphrase Kripke) 
does Peter believe that Paderewski is musical or not? What I am getting at, of 
course, is that even if Fregeanism entails Kripke’s puzzle, Millianism goes no 
way towards resolving it; without something like (DP), we are in no clear 
position to say what Peter believes. 
So, if Fregeanism entails Kripke’s puzzle and Millianism fails to solve it, 
perhaps what is needed is an account that (i) respects some of the wide 
(perhaps de re) aspects of the puzzle, whilst at the same time (ii) admits that 
something like (DP) is a requirement of our (narrow) belief-attributional 
practices. To this end, first, I suggest that widely we ought to deny (DP) and 
argue that, with respect to Paderewski, Peter believes neither that he is 
musical nor that he is not musical. How might we say this? Well, unlike 
standard Millianism, a correct account of the wide, metaphysical and rational 
aspects of the puzzle, must clearly deny (DP). I say this for the following 
reasons. As with the e = s case, where a full, wide understanding of that 
proposition is an understanding that it is the same proposition as e = e (either 
it asserts the self identity of Eminem, or it asserts the being of Eminem by Slim 
Shady/Eminem—all understood widely qua objects), a full, wide understanding 
of (20), would (qua full, wide understanding), rule out the possibility of (21) 
(and vice versa).304 Consequently, if Peter truly believes (20) he cannot 
(rationally) believe (21) at the same time (and vice versa). Thus there must be 
something wrong with the conclusion that Peter is rational and believes both 
(20) and (21). That he is rational is an assumption; rejecting either of (20) or 
(21) would be ad hoc. We have already seen that (DP) is deeply suspect; so it is 
this thesis that ought to be rejected—at least on the wide aspect of meaning. 
That Peter assents to (16) and (18) does not therefore justify either (17) or 
(19). If Peter (rationally) believed either (20) or (21) he ought, at the same 
time, to believe the negation of the contrary proposition. 
As indicated above, the main benefit of this account of the wide aspects of 
belief over its Millian rival, is that the latter cannot account for what Peter 
believes. Very much in line with Kripke, we are still left with that very question, 
I argue, by both standard and guise- Millianism. My account on the other hand, 
                                                         
304 Ignoring issues of time and tense. 
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in basing what it is rational to believe in wider, metaphysical modality, has it 
that it is impossible to (rationally) believe (and impossible to conceive of) a 
proposition (or circumstance) that is metaphysically impossible. Now, 
Paderewksi’s being musical and not being musical (at the same time) is 
logically and metaphysically impossible; it is therefore not possible to 
(rationally) believe the proposition and to conceive of the relevant 
arrangement of objects and attributes. 
Now, second (as mentioned above), there is still something in the region of 
this paradoxical belief that we can say Peter believes. What is it then that Peter 
(narrowly) believes? As hinted above, if we respect the narrow aspects of 
belief-attribution, it is possible to retain something like (DP) and to argue that 
Peter does, indeed, believe something like the conjunction of (20) and (21). He 
does not, however, believe the (irrational) conjunction of the wide versions of 
(20) and (21); instead he believes that something called ‘Paderewksi’ is musical 
and something (else) also called ‘Paderewski’ is not musical; formally, 
 
(22) xy (Px  Py  Mx  ¬My  ¬(x = y)).305 
 
In short then, Peter (narrowly) believes the conjunction of two propositions 
(derivable from his assent to (16) and (17) plus (DP)), which are not mutually 
contradictory; it is entirely metaphysically possible that two identically named 
but distinct things have ‘contradictory’ properties. 
Just to tidy up, in terms of the name(s) ‘Paderewski’, depending of course 
on the subject and context, it is also entirely possible that Peter believes that 
the two ‘Paderewskis’ are different tokens of the same name, referring to 
different men, or that he believes that ‘Paderewski1’ (the musician) is simply a 
different name from ‘Paderewski2’ (the politician)). Either way, narrowly Peter 
can believe both (20) and (21) and that ‘Paderewski’ names two, distinct men. 
This being the case, at least narrowly, the two relevant beliefs are distinct (even 
if widely (20) is the same as ¬(21)). This both explains and resolves the paradox 
at the heart of Kripke’s puzzle.306 
                                                         
305 As before, I explain the use of ‘predicate-names’ in the notes and main body surrounding the 
introduction of proposition (1c) in §3 of ch. 5. 
306 In response to someone (like Sosa 1996) who would object that I am simply denying (DP), I 
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In very brief summary, what I am saying is that we need both wide and 
narrow aspects of belief in order to capture both the (wide) object-involving 
(i.e. de re) and the (narrow) cognitive and pragmatic (but also, ultimately, 
object-involving) elements of rationality and belief attribution. Whilst a simple 
Millianism still runs straight into Frege’s problem (and Kripke’s puzzle), even if 
Fregeanism (and not guise-Millianism) similarly runs into Kripke’s puzzle, since 
(guise-)Millianism does not resolve the issues at the heart of the puzzle and a 
hybrid position does, we ought to adopt the hybrid position. In this way then, I 
very much agree with Kripke; on both Fregeanism and Millianism, Kripke’s 
puzzle is a puzzle and there is no clear solution. Combining very much qualified 
versions of both theories, the puzzle is resolved; there is a solution. Very much 
as with the contingent a priori and the necessary a posteriori, the apparent 
paradox results from a confusion of the wide, de re level (where proposition 
(20) is a contradiction of (21)), with the narrow level (where relevant versions 
of (20) and (21) are not contradictory). Since belief also operates at both levels, 
it is at least clear that Peter is not at all (narrowly) irrational, since even if his 
beliefs appear widely contradictory, narrowly this is not at all the case—he is 
simply unaware that the two ‘Paderewskis’ name the same man and so cannot 
be said (widely) to believe (20) and (21). That said, if Peter is rational, then the 
appearance of irrationality at the wide level is illusory; if (arguendo) Peter is 
rational, then if he believes (20) he cannot believe (21), and vice versa. Since 
there is no clear motivation for denying that Peter believes either particular 
proposition and since (as I have argued above) (DP) is highly suspect (on the 
wide aspect), we should reject (DP) and conclude that Peter does not believe 
either proposition; he merely has an incomplete grasp of the nature of 
Paderewksi and so cannot be said to believe very much about Paderewski at 
all. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
would reply that I am both denying that principle (widely) and accepting it (narrowly). In 
addition (pace Sosa 1996, pp. 384-5), I am not sure that the puzzle can be posed without (DP), 
since if I think I believe John Glenn (the astronaut) has been to space and John Glenn (the 
politician) has not (where I am unaware that the two names are co-referential), then in one 
(wide) sense I am mistaken, since I cannot (rationally) believe such a proposition, yet in 
another (narrow) sense I can and do believe such a proposition. That is, belief is a lot more 
complicated than it appears at first glance! As well as to Sosa 1996 (and some of the writers 
mentioned in n. 36 of the previous chapter), my discussion of the puzzle is indebted to Perry 
and Crimmins 1989. 
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3 Conceivability, rational and metaphysical modalities 
 
Whilst the main issue of the thesis is the relationship between rationality and 
modality, in this and the previous chapter I have focused on two apparently 
tangentially related sets of problems; the necessary a posteriori and 
Frege/Kripke’s problems. I focus on these problems as I believe they must be 
resolved in order to understand fully the relationship between conceivability 
and possibility. In the previous chapter, I outline the relevance of the necessary 
a posteriori (in terms of the apparent ‘conceivability’ of metaphysically 
impossible circumstances); in the present chapter I discuss Frege/Kripke’s 
problems (with respect to getting clear on the nature of—rational—belief and, 
relatedly, of precisely what is being—widely or narrowly—conceived). It is 
now time to bring together what I say on these related sets of problems (in §3.1 
below). After discussing conceivability and possibility, I turn to a potential 
objection that there is an unresolved tension in my position; namely that with 
respect to the necessary a posteriori, I claim that it is clear what sentences 
express, whereas vis-à-vis Frege and Kripke’s problems I deny this intuition. In 
order to resolve this apparent tension I discuss the distinction between 
semantics and pragmatics, arguing that my hybrid position is the best one can 
do in response to the necessary a posteriori, but that Frege and Kripke’s 
problems very much show that the issues of sentence-expression and belief 
attribution are not at all clear-cut. 
Given my position on conceivability and possibility, there appears to be one 
final tension in my position; I appear to claim that impossibility entails 
inconceivability, yet metaphysical modality more generally does not entail the 
relevant, rational modality—as evinced by the likes of Goldbach’s conjecture 
(GC); i.e. necessary but unknowable propositions. In order to resolve this 
tension, (in §3.2) I return to the discussion of (GC) and the coincidence thesis, 
and of ‘conceivability’ qua epistemic and rational possibility (from both this and 
previous chapters). In short, I accept a much attenuated version of the 
coincidence thesis, but argue that the modal and rational domains, whilst very 
closely tied, are not coextensive.307 
                                                         
307 In order to account for modal error (given such close ties), I argue that the notions of 
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3.1 The problems, conceivability and possibility 
 
Beginning with Frege and Kripke’s problems, very much in line with my 
position on the necessary a posteriori, taking the most problematic case (Peter’s 
‘believing’ that Paderewksi is both musical and not musical), I argue that a 
precisely analogous confusion obtains. Since Paderewski cannot be both 
musical and not musical (at the same time), as this would be a metaphysical 
impossibility, it is—strictly—not possible for Peter to fully and rationally 
believe a proposition asserting such a circumstance. Now, as much as it appears 
that Peter believes that Paderewski is musical (i.e. (20) above) and that 
Paderewski is not musical ((21) above), since (20) and (21) are contradictory, 
if Peter genuinely believed (20) he would thereby believe ¬(21)—and vice 
versa. Thus, effectively denying (DP), I claim, Peter (widely) believes neither 
(20) nor (21)—even if he does believe distinct, narrow versions of the two 
propositions. All of this being the case, since Paderewski’s being both musical 
and not musical is (logically and) metaphysically impossible, it is also—
strictly—rationally impossible; it is possible neither to rationally believe, nor to 
conceive of the relevant proposition and arrangement of object and attributes. 
Throughout this chapter, I make use of a distinction between semantics and 
pragmatics—effectively appearing to assume that the semantics of the 
necessary a posteriori are reasonably clear (in that relevant sentences clearly 
express both wide and narrow propositions), yet denying (DP) with respect to 
the wide aspect of my analysis of Kripke’s problems (arguing that it is not 
entirely clear what a believes when a assents to a sentence). A potential 
objection at this point is that this reveals an unresolved tension, whereby I am 
saying that the semantics of the necessary a posteriori are clear, whereas those 
of Kripke’s puzzle are not; i.e. in effect, I am offering different solutions to the 
two sets of problems. 
In response to this, as I state several times during my initial analysis of the 
                                                                                                                                                              
epistemic and rational possibility are both central, and, crucially, distinct; the former is both 
clearly non-coextensive with, and a very poor guide to, metaphysical possibility; whereas the 
latter (a priori or rational) possibility, whilst not fully coextensive with, is an exceptional guide 
to metaphysical possibility—genuine conceivability, qua rational possibility, entails 
(metaphysical) possibility. As my treatment of modal error pertains to the rational domain as a 
whole, I deal with this issue more fully in the concluding chapter. 
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necessary a posteriori, it is arguable that sentences such as (1) express (at 
best,308 at least) two (but depending on context and pragmatics, very possibly 
more) propositions; some wide, necessary and a priori, like (2a), and others 
narrow, contingent and a posteriori like (1b) and (1c). What I am saying then, is 
that going along with some of the background assumptions of Naming and 
Necessity, and of the ensuing direct-descriptivist debate on the theory of 
reference, the best one can argue for is a mixed, hybrid ‘direct’ (wide) and 
‘descriptive’ (narrow) account. Throughout the relevant sections however, I do 
remind the reader that all of this is very much in line with such background 
assumptions and that these assumptions are to be challenged later on. 
Whilst discussing Frege and Kripke’s problems, I very much begin to 
question such background assumptions, and especially (DP). What I say there, 
is that if we accept (DP) and Millianism (or (DP), ‘Fregeanism’ and realism 
about reference determination), then we very much get the paradoxical result 
that a rational agent a can believe of Paderewski that he is both musical and 
not musical, or, similarly, that a can (rationally) believe (the logical and 
metaphysical impossibility) ¬(2a). This being the case, as (DP) is the common 
(and clearly problematic) assumption, and as both simple Millianism and 
descriptivism are otherwise problematic (Millianism falling foul of Frege’s 
problem; descriptivism arguably running into at least Kripke’s three central 
objections), I urge that we reject all of these assumptions and theories. Instead, 
we should accept a hybrid account of reference as outlined above, together with 
the more a priori and philosophical claim that the rational and the modal are 
extremely closely tied. Moreover, whilst the hybrid account of reference is 
relatively interesting and is perhaps the most plausible response to both the 
necessary a posteriori and Frege/Kripke’s problems, it is the a priori and clearly 
philosophical claims about metaphysical and rational modalities that are at the 
heart of this thesis. So, from previous chapters, genuine apriority entails 
necessity and now, genuine aposteriority entails contingency; strictly, there are 
no necessary a posteriori propositions. In addition, I also argue that if 
something is metaphysically impossible, then (strictly) its negation is 
inconceivable; in virtue of being metaphysically impossible, it is also (strictly) 
                                                         
308 Which was intended (in earlier sections) to indicate that I was aware of the pragmatic issues 
all along. 
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rationally impossible. That is, something is genuinely conceivable only if it is 
possible; genuine conceivability entails possibility. 
 
 
3.2 (In)conceivability and (im)possibility: Goldbach’s conjecture 
again 
 
As noted above, there is perhaps something to say about the likes of Goldbach’s 
conjecture (GC) and other potentially necessary but unknowable truths here—
and the same points apply, mutatis mutandis, for contingent but unknowable 
truths such as (CGC)—as per Chapter 3. The point being, if my conclusions 
concerning the contingent a priori, the necessary a posteriori and Frege/ 
Kripke’s problems apply universally (that is, if genuine apriority entails 
necessity, if aposteriority entails contingency and, especially now, if 
conceivability entails possibility—and by contraposition,309 if impossibility 
entails inconceivability), there would appear to be a potential and very 
problematic tension at the heart of my position. This is that such necessary but 
unknowable truths as (GC) are presumably not a priori (given their status as 
currently unknown and potentially unknowable)310 but (given what I say on 
(in)conceivability and (im)possibility above) their negations appear to be 
inconceivable, in virtue of being metaphysically impossible. The tension then 
being that (GC) is not a priori; ¬(GC) is impossible, so inconceivable (or 
rationally impossible); and, presumably, the negation of an inconceivability (or 
rational impossibility) being (rationally necessary or) a priori; (GC) is both a 
priori and not a priori? So, either there is a contradiction within my position, or 
one of the above clauses must give. 
The point here is vital to the conclusion of my thesis, so let me go into a 
little more detail. On the assumption that (GC) is true, it is a mathematical and 
so a necessary truth; accordingly, its negation ¬(GC) is going to be necessarily 
false or metaphysically impossible—given the modal principle p  ¬◊¬p. On 
the additional assumption that the alethic status of (GC) is not only currently 
                                                         
309 This point is not so clear-cut. I discuss the issue of (in)conceivability, (im)possibility and 
contraposition throughout the following. 
310 And as I readily admit with respect to (CT3) in ch. 3. 
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unknown but absolutely unknowable, qua unknowable proposition it would not 
be at all justifiable on an a priori basis. Now, whilst in previous chapters I 
explicitly endorse versions of (CT1) (such that genuine apriority entails 
necessity and prima/secunda facie apriority weakly imply necessity) and 
strongly suggest similar versions of (CT2) (such that genuine aposteriority 
entails contingency311), I do admit that necessity does not entail apriority (i.e. 
¬(CT3)) simpliciter, given the possibility of the kind of case under discussion. 
Whilst metaphysical modality is exhaustive (all true propositions are either 
necessarily or contingently the case), rational modality is not (some true 
propositions are neither a posteriori nor a priori), so there are metaphysically 
necessary truths that are not justifiable on an a priori basis—and mutatis 
mutandis for contingency and aposteriority. Despite all of this, I also claim that 
the rational is grounded in the metaphysical; genuine apriority entails 
necessity, conceivability entails possibility and, importantly (and by apparent 
contraposition), impossibility appears to entail inconceivability; p is 
conceivable only if p is possible. All of this being the case, given that ¬(GC) is 
impossible, it would thereby appear to be rationally impossible or 
inconceivable. On the further assumption (and I think an extremely plausible 
one) that something is rationally necessary or a priori iff its negation is 
rationally impossible or inconceivable (i.e. the rational equivalent of p  
¬◊¬p), it would appear that (GC), despite being unknowable, is justifiable a 
priori after all. But a proposition cannot be both justifiable and not justifiable 
on an a priori basis; something must give. In order to see what this must be, let 
us return to the central theses we have considered already, (CT) qua (CT1) to 
(CT4), together with some conceivability-possibility theses suggested by my 
thoughts on the necessary a posteriori, in addition to some fairly standard 
modal principles and their potential rational equivalents. 
With respect to 
 
(CT1) apriority entails necessity, 
 
                                                         
311 Fallibility is less of an issue here, since unsuccessful a posteriori reasoning will still result in 
a false but contingent conclusion. 
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and 
 
(CT2) aposteriority entails contingency, 
 
as per Chapters 3, 5 and as above, I now accept both theses, as per the amended 
 
(CT1*) if p is a genuinely a priori justifiable proposition, then p must 
assert a metaphysically necessary circumstance, 
 
and 
 
(CT2*) if p is a genuinely a posteriori justifiable proposition, then p must 
assert a metaphysically contingent circumstance. 
 
As regards 
 
(CT3) necessity entails apriority, 
 
and 
 
(CT4) contingency entails aposteriority, 
 
as per Chapters 2 and 3, I deny both theses in the light of counter-examples 
such as (GC) and (CGC). Having said this, at various places in the thesis I do 
suggest that versions of (CT3) and (CT4) would be the case for (i) an ideal 
rational agent (God for example, would know all of the necessary truths on an a 
priori basis), or for (ii) knowable a priori (and a posteriori) truths. That is, (CT3) 
and (CT4) would hold (as they stand) for an extremely idealised notion of 
rational modality, and, more importantly (given the obvious problems of the 
relevance of such a notion), attenuated versions thereof would also hold for all 
knowable truths. That is, given the existence of the likes of (GC) and (CGC), in 
place of (CT3) and (CT4), I would be prepared to endorse versions of those 
theses along the following lines: 
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(CT3*) if p asserts a metaphysically necessary circumstance and if p is 
knowable, then p must be an a priori justifiable proposition, 
 
and, 
 
(CT4*) if p asserts a metaphysically contingent circumstance and if p is 
knowable, then p must be an a posteriori justifiable proposition. 
 
In addition to (CT1*) to (CT4*), given what I say about the necessary a 
posteriori, conceivability and possibility, and especially about inconceivability 
and impossibility, the following theses also appear to be quite clear, natural 
corollaries (setting aside the proposition/circumstance qualification presently, 
for ease of expression): 
 
(CON) if p is conceivable, then p is possible; 
(INC) if p is inconceivable, then p is impossible; 
(POS) if p is possible, then p is conceivable; 
(IMP) If p is impossible, then p is inconceivable. 
 
In terms of what I say above, I certainly seem to accept both (CON) and its 
apparent contrapositive (IMP); I claim throughout that p is conceivable only if p 
is possible (i.e. (CON) itself) and that (either as a direct, separate claim or 
perhaps as justifying (CON) by contraposition) if p is impossible, p is not 
conceivable—in that it is not possible to conceive of a metaphysically 
impossible arrangement of objects and attributes. Perhaps as with the original 
(CT3) and (CT4), there are clear problems with (INC) and (POS) (concerning 
both the limitations to and exaggerated expectations of human reasoning), 
which render a simple acceptance of these as problematic; there might be both 
possibilities of which we ‘cannot conceive’ and things we take to be 
‘inconceivable’, despite their being possible. This being the case, I return to 
these both below and in the concluding chapter. For now then, let us 
concentrate on (CON) and (IMP) as related to and perhaps as in tension with 
my claims about (CT3) and (GC). The point being, as indicated above, I deny 
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(CT3) in the light of (GC), endorsing instead (CT3*) and the claim that (GC) is 
not justifiable a priori, whereas I appear to accept (CON) and (IMP) more 
clearly, arguing (for example) that if a proposition such as (1a) qua (2a), e = e, 
is necessarily the case, then it is impossible to conceive of its negation. If (CON) 
and (IMP) then apply universally, the paradox becomes clear; (GC) qua 
unknowable proposition is not a priori, but ¬(GC) qua necessarily false 
proposition is inconceivable; and if (as I suggest above) the rational parallels 
the metaphysical-modal (where p  ¬◊¬p), then it is highly arguable that if ¬p 
(¬(GC) for example) is inconceivable (rationally impossible), its negation p (GC) 
is a priori (rationally necessary). This then is the crux of the tension; is rational 
modality ‘grounded in’ or does it ‘parallel’ the metaphysical, and if so, how? 
I suggest throughout the thesis that ‘rational modality is grounded in 
metaphysical modality’ and perhaps now, even more strongly, that ‘the rational 
parallels the metaphysical’. In line with my present summary of (CT) and the 
related theses (CON) to (IMP), it is now time to further clarify such remarks, 
and concomitantly, to resolve the apparent tension between the denial that 
(GC) is justifiable on a priori grounds and the potential claim that since ¬(GC) is 
inconceivable, (GC) is presumably rationally necessary or a priori. By way of 
beginning this task I now set out a series of metaphysical-modal principles (or 
definitions perhaps—i.e. as assumed by a standard set of modal logics from K to 
S5) in order to compare these with a potentially equivalent set of rational-
modal ‘principles’ or ‘definitions’:312 
 
(M1) p  ¬◊¬p [Necessity] 
(M2) ◊p  ¬¬p [Possibility] 
(M3) ¬p  ◊¬p [Non-necessity] 
(M4) ¬◊p  ¬p  [Impossibility] 
                                                         
312 I label these (Mn) qua metaphysical-modal principles and in preparation for comparison 
with the potentially equivalent rational-modal principles (Rn) below. The symbols  and ◊ 
represent metaphysical necessity and possibility respectively, so ‘p’ should be read as 
‘(metaphysically) necessarily p’ or ‘p is (metaphysically) necessarily’ the case. I realise that  
and ◊ are inter-definable, and that the choice of left-hand side symbol for (M1) to (M4) is 
arbitrary. I begin with  and ◊ for later comparison with rational necessity (apriority) and 
possibility (conceivability) respectively. I continue with ¬ and ¬◊ qua clear negations of and 
◊, and as the clearer, symbolic representations of the intuitive English ‘non-necessity’ and 
‘impossibility’. For details of the relevant modal systems, see Chellas 1980; Hughes and 
Cresswell 1968, 1996; as well as various texts referred to in Garson 2008. 
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I also introduce a further principle (and symbol ‘’) for ‘general’ 
contingency,313 qua the conjunction of the negations of necessity (i.e. ¬p) and 
impossibility (¬¬◊p)—or equivalently, the conjunction of non-necessity and 
possibility: 
 
(M5) p  ¬p  ◊p [Contingency (general)] 
 
In addition to endorsing the likes of the suitably attenuated (CT) and (CON) as 
above, one of the things I might be taken to mean by the claim that rational 
modality is grounded in the metaphysical (and especially by the claim that the 
former parallels the latter) is that rational modality operates in precisely the 
same way as does the metaphysical. That is, there is a set of ‘definitions’ of 
rational modality, (more or less) equivalent to the metaphysical (M1) to (M5), 
as follows: 
 
(R1) Rp  R¬◊¬p314 [Apriority] 
(R2) R◊p  R¬¬p [Conceivability] 
(R3) R¬p  R◊¬p [Not-apriority315] 
(R4) R¬◊p  R¬p  [Inconceivability] 
(R5) Rp  R¬p  R◊p [Aposteriority] 
 
There are then at least two central points under discussion here. First, there is 
the general claim that the rational parallels, or is grounded in, the metaphysical 
(qua conjunction of all of the above, relevant theses); and second, there is the 
                                                         
313 I.e. concerning a proposition that could be true or false; as opposed to a contingent truth, 
which concerns propositions that are true but not necessarily so. 
314 The superscripted ‘R’ is intended to indicate ‘rationally’, as an adjunct to the relevant modal 
operator. So ‘Rp’ should be read as ‘rationally-necessarily p’ or ‘p is rationally-necessarily the 
case’. Since I take ‘R’ to be a modifier of necessity, as opposed to a clear, ontological kind of 
necessity, the ‘R’ is better placed before any negations; if something is (strictly) not a priori or 
inconceivable, it is better formalised as rationally-not-necessary or rationally-not- (or im-) 
possible, respectively. I leave the operators in the various ‘M’ theses as standard (i.e. with no ‘M’ 
superscripts), following the usual practice for representing metaphysical modality. 
315 See the previous note and the discussion in the main body below. The point concerns the ‘in-
exhaustiveness’ of both apriority and conceivability. In short, unlike as with necessity and non-
necessity, I argue that—strictly—there are three relevant categories; apriority/conceivability, 
non-apriority/conceivability and not-apriority/inconceivability. I explain all of this and suggest 
lengthier but less awkward terminology below. 
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issue of the alleged tension within my position (given my apparent 
commitment to versions of many of said theses). I now deal with these in turn; 
beginning with the first but (as the two are deeply related) quickly moving on 
to a discussion of the two points in tandem. 
As is evident throughout the thesis, in claiming that genuine apriority 
entails necessity, and similar for aposteriority-contingency and conceivability-
possibility, I am quite deeply committed to some thesis in the region of the 
point currently under discussion; that rationality is ultimately grounded in the 
metaphysical. Moreover, given such strong ties between the rational-modal and 
the metaphysical-modal domains, it would perhaps be odd to insist on the likes 
of (M1) to (M5), whilst at the same time denying (R1) to (R5). Indeed, it is quite 
evidently a cornerstone of my thesis that apriority consists in rational 
necessity—and mutatis mutandis for aposteriority-rational contingency and 
conceivability-rational possibility. So there must be a sense in which (R1) to 
(R5) obtain, and so in which the (R) theses ‘parallel’ the (M) ones. Now is the 
time to fill out the details of that sense. Let me begin by making a distinction 
that will help clarify the ensuing discussion; that between ‘ideal’ rationality and 
‘human’, or rather what I call ‘strict’ rationality. In terms of ideal rationality, as I 
have suggested several times throughout, I accept more or less unadulterated 
versions of all of (CT), (CON) to (IMP), and the (R) theses (the (M) theses, qua 
almost definitional of metaphysical modality, are not under dispute). That is, 
for an ideal reasoner, apriority entails necessity, aposteriority-contingency, 
conceivability-possibility, inconceivability-impossibility, and vice versa; the 
(ideal) rational is grounded in the metaphysical to the extent that they are 
coextensive—God (for example) would know all of the necessary truths on an a 
priori basis. Of course, even if this set of claims holds, it is perhaps extremely 
unhelpful; if we are interested in philosophical (and scientific) qua human 
reasoning from apriority to necessity (aposteriority to contingency) and 
conceivability to possibility or otherwise, ideal rationality is not going to be 
very enlightening as a definitive analysis. So with respect to ‘human’ or ‘strict’ 
rationality, in what sense, if any, do the (R) theses obtain? 
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to resolve the alleged 
tension that I have been suggesting all along. So let us return to that issue, after 
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stating an interim position on the ‘strict’ (R) theses. For now then, let us assume 
that the (R) theses are ‘definitional’ of (strict) rational modality, in the same 
way as are the (M) theses for metaphysical modality. This being the case, let us 
assume, for present purposes, that I am even more committed to (R1) to (R5) 
than I am to the likes of (CT1*) to (CT4*); if (strict) apriority consists in rational 
necessity, then if p is rationally necessary (a priori), the negation of p is going to 
be rationally impossible (inconceivable)—and vice versa—i.e. (R1). In addition 
and contraposing, if p is conceivably not the case (R◊¬p), then p must be ‘not-a 
priori’316 (R¬p)—and vice versa—i.e. (R3). Similarly, if p is conceivable (R◊p), 
¬p must also be ‘not-a priori’ (R¬¬p)—and vice versa—i.e. (R2). Finally and by 
contraposition, if p is inconceivable (R¬◊p) then ¬p is a priori (R¬p)—and vice 
versa—i.e. (R4). Regarding rational contingency, aposteriority and (R5), as with 
(M5) above, this would then be a conjunction of the negations of apriority (i.e. 
R¬p) and inconceivability (R¬¬◊p)—or equivalently, a conjunction of ‘not-
apriority’ and conceivability. Without a great deal of argument for now then, if I 
am committed to the likes of (CT1*) to (CT4*), I think I am even more clearly 
committed to (some versions of) (R1) to (R5); and this is what I take claims 
such as ‘the rational parallels the modal’ to entail. That said, as I indicate 
several times in the main body and notes, there is a lot more to be unpacked 
here, before a final endorsement of the (R) theses can be made. As mentioned 
above then, let us now turn to the resolution of the alleged tension in my 
position. 
Putting all of the foregoing together, the tension is quite clear. Given a 
denial of (CT3) in the light of (GC), together with an acceptance of (CON) and 
especially (IMP), (GC) clearly appears to be not justifiable on a priori grounds, 
whereas ¬(GC) appears to be impossible and so, clearly, inconceivable. With the 
addition of (R1) however, if ¬(GC) is inconceivable, (GC) must be a priori; a 
problem. Now there are perhaps two initial ways of resolving this tension; 
either one could argue that ¬(GC) is inconceivable, (GC) is not a priori and that 
there is an incongruity in the relationships obtaining between what might be 
called ‘negative’, metaphysical impossibility and inconceivability on the one 
hand, and ‘positive’, metaphysical and rational modality on the other, or one 
                                                         
316 See several of the foregoing notes, as well as the remainder of the main text. 
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could claim that (GC) is both metaphysically necessary and a priori—qua 
rationally necessary—in some (however convoluted) sense. The problem with 
taking the first fork is that such an incongruity might appear to be an ad hoc 
manoeuvre made solely to save a theoretical position; moreover, given my 
apparent, clear adherence to (R1) to (R5) above, this option would not even 
appear available. The problem with taking the second fork is that since (GC) is 
(by assumption) an unknowable proposition, such a claim seems deeply 
counter-intuitive—especially given that we are talking about strict, as opposed 
to ideal rationality. So, just what ought to be said about the apparent tension?  
Well, I claim, the solution concerns the very notions of apriority, 
aposteriority and conceivability (i.e. rational modality in general, and what this 
consists in), and turns on the distinction between ideal and strict (or human) 
rationality I introduce above, or relatedly, that between knowable and 
unknowable (or conceivable and ‘undecidable’) propositions.317 The point is, 
very much as I deny the original versions of (CT3) and (CT4) in the light of (GC) 
and (CGC) qua unknowable propositions, I think the right move here is to deny 
(CON) and (IMP) with respect to the negations of such unknowable 
propositions—what I shall call ‘undecidable’ propositions. That is, although (on 
the assumption that (GC) is necessarily true) ¬(GC) is impossible, it is only 
ideally inconceivable—only an ideal rational agent would be able to reason to 
the impossibility of ¬(GC)—and, importantly, of course, for such an agent, (GC) 
itself would be justifiable on an a priori basis (as well as being conceivable). So, 
as already indicated, for an extremely idealised notion of rational modality I 
would accept all of the original (CT1) to (CT4) and (CON) to (IMP), together 
with all of the rational, modal definitions (R1) to (R5). On this account (CT3) 
does obtain, as does (R1); (GC) is ideally a priori and ¬(GC) is ideally 
inconceivable. Of course however, such a notion of rationality (apriority, 
aposteriority and conceivability) is, quite clearly, going to be of little use for 
cognitively limited beings such as human beings. This being the case, instead of 
talking about ideal, rational modality, we should talk about strict apriority, 
aposteriority and conceivability; and, in terms of human rationality, (GC), ¬(GC) 
and similar are, with respect to the a priori and a posteriori, strictly, 
                                                         
317 I am indebted to Yablo (1993, pp. 21-2) on ‘undecidability’. 
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unknowables (they are, strictly, neither a priori nor a posteriori), and, in terms 
of conceivability and inconceivability, they are ‘undecidables’ (they are, strictly, 
neither conceivable nor inconceivable). That is (as I suggest in ch. 3), even for 
true propositions, apriority/aposteriority are not exhaustive; some true 
propositions are justifiable on an a priori basis (knowable, necessary truths), 
some are a posteriori or ‘not-a priori’ (knowable, contingent truths) and some 
are ‘non-a priori’; neither a priori nor a posteriori/‘not-a priori’ (i.e. the 
unknowable necessary truths, such as (GC)). Now with respect to 
conceivability, such unknowables and their negations should be viewed as 
‘undecidables’; just as with apriority then, there are conceivabilities (knowable 
possibilities), inconceivabilities (knowable impossibilities) and non-
conceivabilities (unknowable (im)possibilities whose rational-modal status is 
undecidable; they are neither conceivable nor inconceivable). (GC), ¬(GC) and 
any necessary/necessarily false but unknowable proposition (there is a God 
for potential example) will fit this pattern; they will be necessarily true/false 
but rationally undecidable—neither a priori/a posteriori nor conceivable/ 
inconceivable.318 
In summary then, if we are to employ a notion of rational modality that is to 
be of use for philosophers (and more generally), I urge that we adopt more or 
less unamended versions of the (R) theses as definitional of rational modality, 
but that we bear in mind that this is human or strict rational modality, which 
means that the categories of apriority-aposteriority and conceivability-
inconceivability are not exhaustive, and that we must be careful with the 
placement of the negation sign in the relevant theses—and with respect to a 
priori/conceivability claims in general. What I mean here is that even for true 
propositions, non-apriority (or non-conceivability) is not the same as not-
apriority—i.e. aposteriority—(or inconceivability). So, for true propositions, 
where ¬R (and ¬R◊) might formalise the former, wider and more vague 
                                                         
318 Unfortunately, of course, many central philosophical (qua putatively a priori-necessary or 
conceivable/possible) propositions that will also fit the pattern. One research question that is 
beyond the scope of this thesis is, ‘which are the decidable philosophical propositions?’—itself, 
presumably one of the undecidables. Which is, of course, the joy of philosophy. 
Similarly, whether (GC) is knowable (or not), is a deeply complicated issue, being as it is 
embedded in the issue of whether (GC) is itself justifiable on an a priori basis. The point being, if 
(GC) is knowable, then a (successful) proof of the conjecture would be both a demonstration of 
(GC) and of the fact that it is knowable; i.e. both its apriority and its knowability are conditional 
on the possibility of its proof. 
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category, R¬ (and R¬◊) are better formalisations of rational-not-necessity—i.e. 
aposteriority—(and rational impossibility—i.e. inconceivability). As before 
then, some true propositions are rationally necessary/a priori (or rationally 
possible/conceivable), some are rationally or knowably not-necessary/a 
posteriori (or rationally impossible/inconceivable) and some are neither a 
priori nor a posteriori (or neither conceivable nor inconceivable), such as (GC), 
(CGC) and (GC)/¬(GC), where (GC)/(CGC) are unknowable. 
So, by ‘definitional’ of strict rational modality, what I mean is that just as 
with genuine, strict apriority and 
 
(R1) Rp  R¬◊¬p, 
 
since p’s apriority entails ¬p’s rational impossibility/inconceivability, and vice 
versa, if p is genuinely, strictly conceivable, its negation must be not-a priori, 
and vice versa; i.e. 
 
(R2) R◊p  R¬¬p. 
 
Moreover, I would make precisely analogous claims for p’s (genuine, strict) 
‘not-apriority’ and ¬p’s conceivability, p’s inconceivability and ¬p’s apriority, 
and p’s aposteriority/‘not-apriority’ and conceivability; I accept all of  
  
(R3) R¬p  R◊¬p 
(R4) R¬◊p  R¬p  
(R5) Rp  R¬p  R◊p, 
 
respectively—as long as the relevant assumptions concerning strict and 
genuine rationality are made. 
With the (R) theses as definitional of rational modality then, and as 
substantiating the claim that the rational-modal is grounded in the 
metaphysical-modal, I also urge that we accept all of the relevantly amended 
versions of (CT), i.e. (CT1*) to (CT4*), as well as similarly amended versions of 
(CON) and (IMP), as follows: 
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(CON*) if p is a (genuinely) conceivable proposition, then p must assert a 
knowable/justifiable, metaphysically possible circumstance;319 
(IMP*) if p asserts a knowable/justifiable, metaphysically impossible 
circumstance, then p must be an inconceivable proposition. 
 
This just leaves the matter of (INC) and (POS), which I had adverted above as 
being similarly problematic as the original (CT3) and (CT4). Very much in line 
with the foregoing, I accept suitably amended theses, as follows: 
 
(INC*) if p is a (genuinely) inconceivable proposition, then p must assert 
a justifiable, metaphysically impossible circumstance; 
(POS*) if p asserts a justifiable, metaphysically possible circumstance, 
then p must be a conceivable proposition. 
 
In this way, I both substantiate the claim that the rational parallels the 
metaphysical and resolve the issue of the alleged tension in my position. 
Moreover, I begin to suggest final analyses of apriority, aposteriority, 
conceivability and inconceivability. In the suitably qualified senses, apriority 
entails necessity, aposteriority-contingency and (in)conceivability-(im)possibil-
ity; moreover, (knowable/justifiable) necessity entails apriority, and similarly 
for contingency-aposteriority and (im)possibility-(in)conceivability. 
 
 
  
                                                         
319 The parenthesised ‘genuinely’ is to suggest the same prima and secunda facie sub-theses as 
with (CT1*). This applies mutatis mutandis to (INC*), below. 
 
 
 
Chapter 7 
 
 
 
Rationality, Modality and Essence 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In this closing chapter I provide a brief discussion of the nature of modality; 
that it is grounded ultimately in the natures or essences of things most widely 
understood (§2). As shall become apparent, such topics are large and vexed, so 
many of my remarks here should be considered as promissory and as 
suggestive of areas for future research. I then offer a final summary of my 
position on rationality and modality (§3), before discussing potential issues 
with and objections to my position (§4)—such as fallibilism, circularity and 
two-dimensionalism (§4.1), and modal error (§4.2). 
 
  
2 The nature of metaphysical modality 
 
As I have indicated throughout, much of what I say hangs on my approach to 
modality. I now offer such a discussion, although, as there is insufficient space 
for a substantive account, my discussion is tentative and occasionally 
promissory—I indicate directions for future research where necessary. I begin 
with a critical introduction to the notion of ‘actual’ and ‘possible’ worlds (§2.1) 
followed by a discussion of ‘possibilism’ and ‘realism’ (§2.2). I then discuss 
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what is usually called ‘possible-worlds realism’ (but which I label 
‘possibilism’—to cover both ‘ersatz’ and ‘genuine’ theories), as opposed to what 
I view as genuine modal realism, ‘modalism’ (§2.3).320 I conclude with the most 
exploratory discussion; the grounding of modality in natures and essences 
(§2.4). 
 
 
2.1 ‘Actual’ and ‘possible’ worlds 
 
In earlier sections of the thesis, I claim that ‘actually’-based (and similar, 
indexical-involving), putative cases of the contingent a priori (e.g. p  Ap, for 
a contingently true p) and necessary a posteriori (e.g. Ap, for a true, a 
posteriori p) are entirely artificial examples of the alleged phenomena. 
Occasionally I go on to claim that ‘actually’ (and cognates) should be viewed as 
a rhetorical device, as opposed to a genuine modal predicate—in the absence of 
any deep, metaphysical argument for the existence of the relevant actual (as 
opposed to possible) world(s), such that A predicates a genuine, modal 
property. I make more of such claims with respect to the contingent a priori (as 
I deal with the issue there first) but during my discussion of the necessary a 
posteriori, I try to make it clear that similar conclusions apply.321 In both places 
I make promissory comments with respect to providing further argument 
concerning the illegitimacy of both the A-based problem cases and the (two-
dimensional) possible-worlds framework in which it occurs. I now begin both 
of these tasks, focussing on ‘actually’ and A presently and on possible worlds in 
the following sections. 
As suggested above, there are two main ways of viewing ‘actually’; (i) as a 
rhetorical device stressing (for example) the commitment of the speaker to the 
relevant proposition or (ii) as a genuine predicate, introducing a real property 
of ‘being actual’ as distinct from mere possibility or contingency. In the present 
section I argue that there is no good case (especially not from—two-
                                                         
320 I explain all of the terminology below. 
321 See ch. 3, §3, ch. 4, §3.1 and ch. 5, n. 34. 
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dimensional—semantics to the metaphysics of modality) for (ii), thus A should 
be viewed as a rhetorical/pragmatic marker, as opposed to being a more ontic 
operator that latches onto a genuine modal property—at least in the absence of 
good, metaphysical argument for the latter. No argument for (i) can be fully 
philosophical (involving as it would pragmatics and general, linguistic practice), 
thus my strategy here will be to argue that there are no good, existing 
arguments for (ii) and indeed, that there can be no such arguments, since the 
general strategy is to proceed from logico-semantic premises to modal, 
metaphysical conclusions—which, as I stress throughout, is the wrong order of 
explanation. In the following sections I then begin to offer more metaphysical 
arguments against the ‘actual’ and possible-worlds framework—and thus 
further against (ii). 
A standard argument for a realist interpretation of ‘actually’ as per (ii) 
might proceed as follows.322 There are natural language sentences that appear 
to resist formulation in a standard, quantified modal logic (QML) 323 for 
example, 
 
(A) it is possible that everything that is actually red could have been 
shiny.324 
 
According to the argument, (A) cannot be parsed as 
 
(A1) x ◊ (Rx  Sx), 
                                                         
322 Indeed one of the best, existing arguments is offered by Crossley and Humberstone 1977, pp. 
11-13. Davies and Humberstone (1980) offer a further discussion of the logic of A and 
necessity. I view the latter paper in large part as a formalisation of both Crossley and 
Humberstone 1977 and Evans 1979. Cf. Davies 2004, pp. 84-5 and Soames 2007a. Although 
Soames claims to offer “a theory of the metaphysics…of actuality and possibility” (p. 251), its 
key move concerns the semantic indexicality of “the rigidifying actuality operator” (p. 251; cf. 
pp. 255-6). Similarly, the ‘metaphysics’ and ‘epistemology’ (of pp. 256-60) looks decidedly two-
dimensional, consisting of a combination of Stalnaker’s ‘possible worlds’ plus Carnap’s ‘state 
descriptions’. 
323 By which I mean a quantified, predicate logic enhanced with modal operators, as opposed to 
a modal, predicate logic that quantifies over possible worlds. I go into more detail on this issue 
below. 
324 Crossley and Humberstone 1977, p. 12; cf. Davies 2004, p. 84 (my phrasing and labelling). 
Soames (2007a, p. 253) offers the following example: “It could have been the case…that 
the…general who actually won…lost the battle”. To my mind this example is easily parsed as the 
following—without any A operator: x (Wx  ◊¬Wx). Hence I focus on Crossley and 
Humberstone’s initially more interesting example. 
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since the envisaged possibility is too restrictive. That is, the possibility that all 
red things are jointly shiny precludes the possibility of something shiny but not 
red, which is very much suggested by (A). Similarly,  
 
(A2) x (Rx  ◊Sx), 
 
will not do, since this is (allegedly) the overly liberal possibility that all (‘actual’ 
and ‘non-actual’) red things are shiny, whereas (A) requires only the ‘actual’ red 
things to be shiny.325 Thus, goes the argument, we should introduce an ‘actually’ 
operator and formalise (A) as 
 
(A3) x ◊ (ARx  Sx), 
 
which is the possibility (supposedly identical to that of (A)) that every ‘actual’ 
red thing is shiny but that not all possible red things are such.326 
In response to the foregoing argument then, my general strategy will be to 
show that there is no need for the insertion of the A operator; thus no 
‘actually’-involving modal conclusions can be drawn from the likes of (A) to 
(A3)—in the absence of the relevant metaphysical premises. In slightly more 
detail, I make the following three moves. First, I think that such arguments, as 
well as being so generally problematic (in aiming to move from semantics to 
metaphysics), are also specifically flawed, in making the assumption that 
everyday discourse concerns the ‘actual’ and ‘possible worlds’, such that 
operators such as , ◊ and A pick out genuine realms of necessary, possible 
and actual (real or ‘ersatz’) objects. Against this, I think we ought to begin with 
the more ‘minimalist’ assumption that natural language modal talk concerns 
the ‘actual’327 world and possibilities (necessities and contingencies) thereof. 
That is, let us assume (in the absence of compelling, metaphysical argument to 
the contrary—which logic and semantics alone cannot provide) that there is 
                                                         
325 The scare quotes are to suggest that ‘actual’ here is used in a potentially question-begging 
manner. The point being, if there is no real, interesting class of actual red things (as opposed to 
just red things), the illiberality of (A2) might not be such an issue. 
326 Davies (2004, p. 85) puts this well. 
327 I.e. qua rhetorical device, on the assumption that there is, strictly, only one world. 
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just the one world, and that modal talk is about that world and its modal 
properties. Accordingly, without the relevant argument, the ‘actually’ in (A) 
should be viewed as rhetorical at best or redundant at worst. 
Second, the ‘it is possible’ at the start of (A) is badly placed; the modal force 
of the example concerns the red and shiny things—it is de re not de dicto. Third 
then, and given the previous two points, the ‘could have been’ suggests that 
some of the ‘actual’ red things are not shiny; that is,  
 
(A4) the red things (some of which are not shiny) could all have been 
shiny. 
 
Third and finally (and as I begin to suggest already), the ‘everything’ in (A), 
or universal quantifiers in (A1) and (A2), need to be within the scope of the 
modal claim. That is, dropping the parenthesised qualification in (A4) (which is 
perhaps more a matter of conversational implicature), we have: 
 
(A5) the red things could all have been shiny, 
 
or, perhaps better (since the ‘all’ might now be similarly redundant), 
 
(A6) the red things could have been shiny.328 
 
In terms of formalisation, (A4) to (A6) are perhaps best parsed as follows:329 
 
(A4p) x [(Rx  y (Ry  ¬Sy))   (Sx  Sy)] 
(A5p) x (Rx  Sx)330 
 
                                                         
328 I am very much indebted to Jonathan Lowe for discussion of this section. Lowe would add 
the following potential paraphrasing of (A): ‘the red things could have been shiny, red things’, 
depending on the disambiguation of (A). The point being, moving from the English (A) (or 
similar), to the logic/semantics of (A3) (and A), to the metaphysics of actuality, is entirely the 
wrong order of explanation. Instead, we should start with the metaphysics of modality, objects 
and attributes (as I do both here and in more detail below), and then turn to the logic and 
semantics. 
329 Very much bearing in mind the previous note. I.e. without the detailed metaphysics (to 
follow) not a lot rests on such formalisations. 
330 This formalises (A5) and (A6). 
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Of course, (A5p) is identical to the original (A2), which is perhaps neither 
surprising nor problematic. The key point being, the alleged problem with (A2) 
is that it is ‘too liberal’, in terms of failing to limit the possible shiny things to 
the ‘actual’ red things. As I argue throughout however, absent the required 
metaphysics of actual (and possible) worlds, there is no good reason to make 
such accusations. In order to interpret ‘actually’, A (and ◊/) in terms of the 
‘actual’ (and possible) world(s), some quite deep, metaphysical reasoning is 
required. As I suggest above (and argue more forcefully below), the 
metaphysics of the actual (and possible) world(s) are deeply problematic, and 
the semantics of natural language expressions and the ‘logic of ‘actually’’ cannot 
provide the relevant, metaphysics. Consequently, we should not attempt to 
make such ‘modal realist’ and substantive, metaphysical conclusions on the 
back of merely linguistic and logico-semantic premises; we ought not to 
conclude that A is genuine; we ought instead to make the more ‘minimalist’ 
assumptions I outline above. 
On such minimal assumptions, several entirely A-free versions of (A) are 
available, so there is not even good, logico-semantic motivation for adding A to 
the standard QML. The wider point being, logic is a mere analytic tool, designed 
(for example) to bring out (semantic and) metaphysical assumptions. Where 
those metaphysical assumptions are suspect (as per ‘actual’ and ‘possible 
worlds’) we should only accept them when there is independent, compelling 
reason to do so and we should reject them when there are clear, metaphysical 
problems—as I go on to argue that there are. As I have stressed throughout, in 
general there is no clear route from the semantics of natural language, via 
logical analysis, to metaphysical conclusions. In particular, there is no route 
from ‘actually’ via Ap or p  Ap, to the necessary a posteriori or the 
contingent a priori. 
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2.2 Possible worlds, ‘realism’ and essentialism 
 
Having thus discussed ‘actual’ and ‘possible worlds’ talk, I now turn to a more 
explicit discussion possible worlds and modality. First, let me repeat and 
emphasise a point I make throughout the thesis; following the likes of Fine, 
Lowe and Oderberg,331 I am committed to the claim that what we are really 
interested in, in discussions of apriority, modality and essence, is genuine 
apriority, modality and, ultimately, genuine essence; real essentialism. This 
being the case, I now set out my position on the various modalities (and 
essentialism), as discussed by the likes of Plantinga (1974), Forbes (1985) and 
Lowe (1998). Beginning with logical modality, there are arguably three relevant 
species; strict, narrow and broad logical modality. I begin with broad logical or 
metaphysical modality, since this is what I have been most concerned with 
throughout. 
Perhaps the standard understanding of metaphysical modality is in terms 
of the possible-worlds framework; metaphysical necessity is truth in all 
possible worlds, possibility is truth in some worlds and contingency truth in at 
least one world—a contingent truth is then a proposition that is true in the 
‘actual’332 world. As I suggest above and shall now argue however, this 
understanding is both typical of the kind of semantics to metaphysics reasoning 
that I criticise throughout and, ultimately, is the wrong way of viewing 
modality. Metaphysical modality, I claim, should not be understood in terms of 
possible worlds; it should be understood in terms of the objects and attributes 
of this world and, crucially, their essences and accidents. So, a metaphysically 
necessary circumstance is an arrangement of objects and attributes that 
obtains of necessity in virtue of the relevant object’s having the relevant 
attribute as part of its essence; a possible circumstance obtains when an object 
possesses an attribute accidentally (or essentially); and a contingent 
circumstance obtains when an object only accidentally has the relevant 
attribute. 
With such an understanding of metaphysical (as the most basic) modality,
                                                         
331 Fine 1994; Lowe 1998, 2006, 2008b; Oderberg 2001, 2007 for example. 
332 I very much explain the scare quotes below—if their use is not clear from the foregoing. 
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other relevant modalities (including the rational) should then be viewed as 
grounded therein.333 Strict (and narrow) logical modality is (metaphysical) 
modality in virtue of the laws and relata of logic (together with the non-logical 
definitions or concepts); e.g. p is strictly (or narrowly) logically necessary iff p 
is a law of logic (or iff p is entailed by the laws plus definitions);334 p is possible 
iff it is a law or is consistent with the laws; and p is contingent iff p is merely 
consistent. 
In this way, the strict and narrow logical are purely formal (i.e. analytic) 
necessities. As discussed explicitly in Chapter 4 then, rational modality cannot 
be identical to or coextensive with such modalities, since apriority (rational 
necessity) is not analyticity (strict/narrow logical necessity), for example. 
Similarly, rational modality cannot be a fully epistemic modality, since the latter 
is (as discussed in Chapter 4) a relatively subjective and, importantly, non-
modal ‘modality’. The point being, rational necessity and so apriority are, 
importantly, (i) knowledge that is independent of experience (which is not the 
case for epistemic necessity), (ii) arguably (given potential further rational 
correction), significantly closer to being alethic than is the merely epistemic, 
and (iii) as I suggest in Chapter 4, a more modal form of modality. This being 
the case, rational modality is best viewed as (metaphysical) modality in virtue 
of (human) rational capacities; p is rationally necessary (a priori) iff p is 
(humanly) knowably necessary; p is rationally contingent (a posteriori) iff p is 
knowably contingent; and p is rationally possible (conceivable) iff p is 
knowably, metaphysically possible.335 
All of this being the case, what I am suggesting is that in order to 
understand modality, we need to make the following assumptions. First and 
foremost, we ought to begin on the relatively safe ground of there being an 
‘actual’ world, consisting of objects, attributes and so on (depending on the 
correct ontology). Second and quite clearly, there is modal talk that stands in 
need of explanation; people say things like, ‘I might see you next week’, ‘shares 
                                                         
333 I am aware of a potential conflict with Fine 2002 here, depending on the nature of (e.g.) 
nomological necessity. This a clear area for further research. 
334 I leave the parenthesised insertions as tacit hereafter. 
335 There are, arguably, further species of modality such as the nomological and deontic, which 
might be categorised as (metaphysical) necessity in virtue of the natural laws and the right, 
respectively. As per n. 14, I am aware of deep issues here and leave such speculation for further 
research. 
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can go up as well as down’ and, ‘there is no way that could have happened’. 
Given these two assumptions, I take the correct starting question not to be, ‘is 
possible-worlds discourse factive?’ (or similar). The point being, I very much 
view possible-worlds discourse as a (more or less successful) philosophers’ 
means of understanding and analysing the former and more basic, modal 
discourse. Thus, I take the correct question to be the more basic, ‘is modal 
discourse factive?’336  
As is clear from the foregoing (this section and previous chapters), I view a 
negative answer to this question (modal anti-realism), as deeply counter-
intuitive and problematic; it appears to render all properties as ‘contingent’ (or 
‘necessary’) tout court. To my mind, claims that there are (for example) no a 
priori, no non-revisable or (similarly) no necessary truths, come increasingly 
close to self-refutation; presumably, if ¬p p is ‘contingent’, it might have 
been false? For present purposes then, I ignore such clear anti-realisms.337 
In terms of a positive answer then (i.e. ‘modal realism’—although perhaps 
not all ‘realist’ positions are ultimately realist about modality, as I now explain), 
the next question to ask is, ‘if modal talk is factive, what are (or what grounds) 
the relevant facts?’ It is on this question that the remainder of §2 focuses. Very 
briefly, the main, pertinent options are reductionism and what I call ‘modalism’ 
(i.e. the view that modal properties are somehow basic).338 The main options 
then being ‘possibilist’ reduction to concrete,339 or ‘ersatz’, possible worlds 
                                                         
336 Much contemporary philosophy (all that flows from possible-worlds semantics, for example) 
takes the first question as the right starting point. That said, even some ‘modal primitivists’ 
(such as McLeod 2001; cf. Chihara 1998, who has Lewis as a ‘modal realist’ in virtue of his 
realism about possible worlds) appear to start with the first question. For all of these reasons 
my terminology differs from McLeod’s and Chihara’s, as I explain below. 
Kalhat (2008) begins from a similar stance on ‘ordinary modal’ versus ‘possible-worlds 
discourse’. Although I am in broad agreement with Kalhat’s conclusions (that possible-worlds 
talk gets both modal talk and the metaphysics of modality wrong), I note that he offers very 
little in place of possible worlds. 
Shalkowski (1994, pp. 669-70) begins with the right questions; e.g. what is “the nature of 
the ontological ground of modality”? I also note approvingly both his discussion of Lewisian 
(and related—see especially pp. 685-8) reductionisms and his general, modal primitivism. Cf. 
Bueno and Shalkowski 2000. 
337 But this is a potential area for future research. 
338 For present purposes, I ignore more extreme eliminativisms such as (Forbes’s 1985) 
‘modalism’, as well as fictionalism (e.g. Rosen 1990; Divers 1999 but see also Divers’s 
discussion in 2002, 2004 and 2006), which, to rearrange Russell, seem to involve a great deal of 
toil, without managing to thieve much at all. Again however, these are areas for future work. 
339 Lewis 1968, 1986. 
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(maximal sets of states of affairs,340 propositions,341 properties342 and so on)343 
versus the ‘modalism’ or ‘modal realism’ that takes modal properties as basic 
and grounded in the natures or essences of things—objects, attributes, kinds 
and so on. In what follows, I argue for the latter option; I maintain that the 
correct order of explanation moves from objects, kinds and their natures to 
(real) necessary, contingent and possible attributes. Nevertheless, such claims 
very much stand in need of defence and explanation. In the following sub-
sections then, I first compare what I take to be the two leading options 
(possible-worlds ‘realism’ or ‘possibilism’, and the ‘modalism’ I allude to 
above), before moving on to discuss the grounding of modality in essence. 
 
 
2.3 Problems with possibilism and merits of modalism 
 
My strategy in this section is to undermine the main motivation for 
possibilism—that possible-worlds semantics (PWS) and so possibilism are the 
required semantics and ontology of everyday modal talk—by showing that 
simple, quantified modal logic (QML)344 is sufficiently expressive; to provide 
separate argument against possibilism (that the relevant ontology is deeply 
paradoxical); then to conclude (albeit briefly) that modalism is perfectly 
tenable and, indeed, preferable. 
The standard argument in favour of PWS (and so of possibilism) usually 
                                                         
340 Plantinga 1974. 
341 Adams 1974. 
342 Stalnaker 1976. 
343 I view Lewis as a strict ‘possibilist’ (a ‘realist’ about other possible worlds) and ‘ersatzism’ as 
‘actualist possibilism’ (‘realist’ about the actual and abstract possible-worlds). In addition to 
this, strict (and actualist) possibilism is very arguably anti- (or quasi-) realist about modality 
itself, since any stance that appears to reduce real modalities to additional ‘real’ worlds, is only 
questionably described as realist about modality. I am indebted to McGinn 1981 and McLeod 
2001 here, and the former (as well as Chihara 1998 to some extent) throughout the following 
section. 
As mentioned above, I note some confusion over terminology; McGinn (like me) has 
‘actualism’ as a variety of possibilism, whereas McLeod has ‘actualism’ as a species of ‘modal 
realism’. As indicated in the main body, I prefer ‘possibilism’ as covering Lewisian and ‘ersatz’ 
or ‘actualist’, ‘realisms’ about possible worlds, and ‘modalism’ or ‘modal realism’ as realist about 
modality. (That said, I do note approvingly McLeod’s (2001, pp. 62-77) raft of arguments 
against various possibilisms—in my sense.) 
344 As before, by ‘QML’ I mean a predicate calculus with modal operators, whereas ‘PWS’ should 
be understood as a predicate calculus that quantifies over possible worlds. 
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consists in an appeal to certain examples of everyday modal talk, which, 
broadly, exemplify certain complex modal claims.345 For example, 
 
(P1) there are many possible games of chess; 
(P2) there could have been things other than there actually are; 
and 
(P3) your car could have been the same colour as mine. 
 
As before, the possibilist idea here is that no such examples can be formalised 
in terms of standard QML; in order to capture such complex modalities, PWS is 
required. In response to this, let me first say that this is not at all the case—at 
least making some ‘minimalist’ assumptions as (or similar to those) I make in 
§2.1 above. For example, (P1) can be quite easily parsed as 
 
(P1a) xyz… [(x ≠ y  x ≠ z...)  (Gx  Gy  Gz…)].346 
 
Similarly, assuming there is one (‘actual’) world, that everyday modal talk 
concerns this world (and its objects, attributes and their modal properties), and 
so (minimally) that there is no logico-semantic reason for holding that 
possibilities are things, (P2) would be better written as 
 
(P2a) xy (Wx  ¬Wy  Wy), 
 
i.e. there are some things (x) that are ‘actual’, ‘worldly’ or ‘world-inhabiters’ 
(W) and some merely possible things (y) that are not worldly but could have 
been.347 
                                                         
345 Melia (2003, pp. 30ff.) offers this kind of argument. As Chihara (1998, pp. 120-5) points out, 
clear, ontological arguments for the existence of possible worlds are few and far between. 
346 Where ‘G’ stands for ‘is a game of chess’. 
347 A slightly more complex example along the lines of (P2) is as follows: 
(P2b) It is possible that person x who is not actual and who Ys but who might not have 
Yd (amended from McMichael 1983, p. 54.) 
As before, making certain assumptions about the world and its modal talk, this can be 
formalised as 
(P2c) x [¬Px   ((Px  Yx)  ¬Yx)]. 
The point being, the required situation is one where there is no ‘actual’ person but if there 
were, he would Y (contingently). 
 226 
 
 
 
Finally and similarly, (P3) could be parsed as 
  
(P3a) xy (Mx  Yy  Fx  ¬Fy  Fy),348 
 
Note here that I am not attempting to make a similar move (to those I criticise 
throughout) from logic and semantics to ontology; I am not arguing that since 
such sentences can be formalised in terms of a standard QML (with  and  
representing basic, modal properties), there are just ‘actual’ objects, attributes 
and modalities. Instead, what I am suggesting is that there is no such clear 
argument from logic and semantics to possibilism (or modalism); hence the 
attempt to derive possibilism (or modalism) from such logico-semantic 
premises is illegitimate. Now of course, as I suggest, such an argument is not 
conclusive, either in terms of refuting possibilism or supporting modalism. This 
being the case, I now offer some further, general arguments against the 
existence of possible worlds and so in support of a more genuine, modal 
realism. 
There is perhaps no single, clear conception of possible worlds, easily 
lending itself to straightforward, critical appraisal. Moreover, as has often been 
pointed out,349 there are few (if any) clear and positive arguments for the 
existence of such entities. In addition and as already indicated, given that this 
section is relatively exploratory, I assume both some familiarity with the 
relevant accounts and the (existence of the) relevant positive arguments; I 
therefore focus on problems, dealing briefly with each of the leading accounts 
of possible worlds (mentioned towards the end of the previous section). The 
key distinction between each account being ontological (Lewisian, concrete 
possibilist realism; Plantinga and Adams’ state of affairs-based/propositional, 
abstract realisms; and Stalnaker’s property-based, abstract realism), I therefore 
focus on metaphysical and ontological problems. 
Beginning with Lewisian, concrete possibilism, aside from the apparent 
incredibility of such a theory, let me note the following two, main and related 
objections. First, where we have Fx, for example, there is the issue that what is 
                                                         
348 Where ‘M’ and ‘Y’ stand for ‘is my car’ and ‘is your car’ respectively (ignoring complications 
about indexicality); and ‘F’ stands for ‘is of colour F’. 
349 For example by McGinn 1981, p. 148; cf. Chihara 1998 and Divers 2002. 
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presumably an additional, modal property of a possible circumstance, Fx, 
should be explicable in terms of further, non-modal circumstances.350 That is, 
just how are possible and necessary properties explicable in terms of further 
non-modal arrangements of objects and attributes, in additional, concrete 
worlds? Now on its own perhaps, this objection is more suggestive than 
conclusive but, when conjoined with the related, second objection, the 
suggestion (that the relevant ontology is both bloated and ill-suited to the 
explanatory task at hand) becomes much more conclusive. 
Second then, is the issue of the nature of the relevant ontology. In short, if 
possible worlds are real, concrete objects, then presumably they will have 
essences and criteria of identity and individuation. In terms of identity and 
essence, just what are the essential features of particular possible worlds? As 
McGinn notes,351 unlike space and time (for example), which have fairly clear 
(basic) essences, such as position and order respectively, possible worlds are 
neither spatially nor temporally explicable; they are not spatially related to the 
actual world, nor are they clearly and linearly orderable. Moreover, if worlds 
are maximal (as is almost universally insisted), what occurs therein is surely all 
that is essential to them. But then of course, 
 
“…one loses one’s grip on the idea that a particular world is distinct from 
the set of properties which characterize it.”352 
 
The point being, possible worlds would seem not to have at all clear criteria of 
identity and essence. 
Turning (briefly) to individuation (as I return to this with respect to all 
accounts of possible worlds, below), clear questions here are: ‘how many 
worlds are there?’, and ‘how do we count them?’ As we shall see below, the 
issue of the cardinality of (the set of) possible worlds leads to a clear, potential 
paradox—as this applies to all versions of possible-worlds realism however, I 
set this aside for now. 
                                                         
350 Relatedly, there is the issue of ‘modal irrelevance’, as noted by Van Inwagen (1985, p. 199) 
and Jubien (1988, p. 305), for example. The issue being, how my non-identical counterpart’s 
non-causally-related to-ings and fro-ings have much to do with my modal properties. 
351 McGinn 1981, pp. 150-3. 
352 Op. cit., p. 152. 
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Moving briefly on to state of affairs and proposition-based accounts of 
possible worlds, it is fairly clear that similar problems also beset such theories. 
Again, if Fx is possible, how is this explicable merely in terms of further states of 
affairs or propositions? Surely Fx’s possibility is a way or mode of Fx’s being, as 
opposed to being a further state of affairs or proposition. In effect, if states of 
affairs are identical to propositions, this line is very similar to the ‘modal 
irrelevance’ line suggested against Lewisian possibilism—the details of which I 
set aside for present purposes.353 Similarly, precisely analogous problems of 
essence, identity and individuation also afflict such accounts of possible worlds; 
as I cover the first two of these above and as I return to individuation below, I 
also set these aside presently. 
Finally then, turning to Stalnaker’s account of possible worlds as sets of 
properties, although it is difficult to see how what appear, initially, to be 
objects, should be explained in terms of properties,354 at least this theory seems 
to meet a tacit condition of the previous two objections; that Fx’s being possible 
is a mode or way of Fx’s being, rather than a concretum, state of affairs or 
proposition. So, is Stalnaker’s position more acceptable than the previous two 
kinds of account? Well first, as I suggest against the previous, state of 
affairs/propositional account, there is a very potential issue of circularity;355 if 
propositions are sets of possible worlds and possible worlds are to be 
explained in terms of properties, then propositions, which presumably consist 
of objects and properties, and possible worlds are looking extremely, 
explanatorily close. Again, setting this worry aside, there still remain precisely 
analogous issues as before; essence, identity and individuation. The time has 
come therefore, to turn (briefly) to the issue of the cardinality of possible 
worlds. 
As stressed throughout, this section is only a brief and exploratory 
                                                         
353 There are fairly clear and separate objections contingent upon the distinction of states of 
affairs and propositions; namely if possible worlds are states of affairs/propositions and yet if 
either of the latter is best understood in terms of sets of possible worlds, some intricate 
footwork is required to avoid circularity. As several pieces of ‘intricate footwork’ are available 
here, I very much leave this debate for future research. 
354 Fine makes a similar point with respect to several ersatzist positions: “…any possible state of 
affairs is possibly a state of affairs but no proposition is possibly a state of affairs…” and “…a 
possible world is possibly the world,… yet no way the world might have been is possibly the 
world…” (2003, p. 216); cf. Forrest 1986. 
355 As widely noted from (at least) McGinn (1981, p. 160) onwards. 
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discussion of some of the problems besetting standard, possible worlds-based 
accounts of modality. As I suggest, the main issues are identity, essence and 
now, individuation; specifically, the problem of the cardinality of the ‘set of all 
possible worlds’. Now, this issue is live, contentious and vexed; as I suggest 
then, my comments here are not to be taken as definitive—they are merely 
strongly suggestive that (in addition to the foregoing problems) possible-
worlds accounts of modality might be less preferable than what I describe as 
the realist, ‘modalist’ approach. 
The basic problem is as follows.356 If T is the set of all truths, {T1, T2,…}, and 
P(T) the powerset of (all subsets of) T, {, {T1}, {T2},…,{T1, T2},…}, Cantor’s 
theorem states that the cardinality of P(T) is greater than that of T. Now, for 
each element, X, of P(T) there corresponds a further, distinct truth, Tn, such that 
Tn either is or is not a member of X. Accordingly, there are as many distinct 
truths, Tn, as there are elements of P(T). Hence the set of all Tns will be bigger 
than T. Thus, T cannot be the set of all truths (and neither can P(T), given the 
possibility of P[P(T)]); there can be no such set. Versions of this ‘paradox’ 
argument are employed against the set of all possible worlds,357 the set of all 
truths (and maximal, consistent sets of propositions),358 maximal sets of states 
of affairs (and propositions again)359 and the set of all possible essences.360 
Divers claims that the paradox argument(s) can be made to tell against all 
versions of actualist possibilism (i.e. Plantinga, Adams and Stalnaker-style 
theories), with the addition of the following premise: 
 
(PW) “For every possible world, there is a corresponding maximal 
consistent set of propositions”.361 
 
Combining the paradox with (PW), we get the result that there are no such sets 
                                                         
356 Versions of this argument are presented by Davies 1981, Grim 1985 and Bringsjord 1985; cf. 
Menzel 1986. 
357 Davies 1981; although Davies relies on what Bringsjord (1985) describes as the “rather 
slippery notion of thinking a proposition”. Either way, a wider application of the Grim-
Bringsjord argument (without Davies’s ‘thinkability’ of propositions) can be shown to apply to 
all versions of possible-worlds realism—as I explain below.  
358 Grim 1984. 
359 Bringsjord 1985 and Chihara 1998, pp.126-7. 
360 Chihara 1998, pp. 130-1.  
361 Divers 2002, p. 244, my labelling. 
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of propositions and so no such possible worlds.362 Now, Divers also offers three 
potential ‘solutions’ to the paradox argument(s); ‘restriction’, ‘proper class’ and 
‘non-maximalist’. As each reply is additionally contentious and as the details of 
each require “substantial work”,363 I set aside thorough discussion at this point; 
suffice to say that each response limits possible-worlds responses to the 
paradoxes, to such a level that their initial, alleged explanatory power is further 
undermined.364 
As I suggest then, although this section has been tentative and promissory, 
I still aim to support the following points; that the main arguments for an 
understanding of modality in terms of possible worlds are logico-semantic (and 
that this—as I urge throughout— is the wrong order of argument); that even if 
it were something like the right order of argument, no derivation of possible 
worlds is available from QML; and finally, and most importantly, that possible 
worlds are deeply problematic in terms of their identity and individuation. This 
being the case, the explanatory force of possible worlds is highly dubious and 
the consequent drive to the required, bloated, ‘realist’ ontology, deeply suspect. 
 
  
2.4 The grounding of modality 
 
Given what I have said so far, it is relatively clear that we need a different and 
genuinely realist account of modality. Accordingly, in this final section, I now 
begin the initial, tentative case in favour of an essence-based account of the 
grounding of metaphysical modality.365 
                                                         
362 Divers (2002, p. 255) also claims that a Lewisian, concrete possibilism can avoid this 
argument given an assumption that there is a “maximal possible size for spacetime”. This claim 
is deeply contentious—and I do not share it—I think the paradoxes apply to all versions of 
possible-worlds accounts of modality. Again however, this is an area for further work. 
363 Op. cit., p. 249. 
364 Although Chihara (1998) claims that the paradoxes also apply to ‘sets of all essences’, I do 
not think that they apply to my account of modality, since this does not involve a set of all 
essences and especially not worlds as reducible to such sets. 
365 With respect to Hale’s (1996, McFetridge 1990-influenced) argument that ‘broad’ logical 
necessity is absolute and ‘metaphysical’ necessity is either less strong than (and ‘relative’), or 
equivalent to, the former, I follow Lowe (1998, pp. 16-21) and Shalkowski (2004; cf. 1997) in 
viewing Hale’s ‘broad’ as mere, conceptual, formal (or, as per ch. 4, ‘narrow’) logical necessity. 
Additionally, as I explain throughout the present section (and further below), metaphysical 
necessity is ‘relative’; relative to the natures or essences of all objects and attributes. 
Consequently, the alleged equivalence of the metaphysical and the ‘broad’ qua conceptual is 
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In very brief detail, my argument is as follows. First, considerations such as 
those I make against the possible-worlds understanding above, suggest that 
possible worlds are not basic in terms of explaining modality and instead, that 
modality itself is the fundamental notion. This being the case, as I go on to 
suggest above, we should instead begin with a notion of the (‘actual’) world as 
basic, and of the objects and attributes of the world as determining the 
possibilities and necessities in virtue of their natures or essences. In addition to 
the anti-possible worlds considerations then, some argument is required for 
the claim that objects’ and attributes’ essences are what determine or ground 
modality. Admittedly, this argument is somewhat complex, but it is effectively 
one that is presented in a collection of papers due to Kit Fine.366 
Second then, instead of possible worlds accounting for modality, I argue 
(following Fine to a large extent) that it is essence that does the relevant 
grounding work—metaphysical modality is a sub-species of essentialist 
modality; necessity, possibility and contingency in virtue of objects’ and 
attributes’ natures. So, against those who argue that essence is grounded in 
modality, instead, it is modality that is grounded in essence. 
The details of this latter argument367 are as follows. There are two, broad, 
modal accounts of essence, the categorical and the conditional, respectively; 
 
(CAT) x is essentially P iff necessarily Px 
(COND) x is essentially P iff necessarily Px if x exists.368 
 
The problem with both accounts concerns the sufficiency, rather than the 
                                                                                                                                                              
plainly mistaken and the ‘relativity’ of metaphysical necessity is not the problem Hale 
envisages.  
366 See Fine 1994, 1995a, 1995b and 2003. 
367 As presented most explicitly in Fine 1994. 
368 The separate accounts are intended to deal with issues surrounding contingent existence 
and ‘weak necessity’; cf. McLeod 2008a—and the discussion of ‘conditional’, alleged examples 
of the necessary a posteriori in ch. 5, §2 (e.g. n. 11). 
I am also aware of some issues in the ‘logic of essence’ here (hence the lack of a fully 
formal presentation). Specifically, the following are further ways of expressing both accounts: x 
is essentially such that P / P is an essential property of (or an essence of, or part of the essence 
of) x iff necessarily x is/has P (if x exists—i.e. mutatis mutandis for the two accounts). I follow 
Fine 1995a, 1995b, Correia 2007 and Lowe 2007b here. Additionally, the necessity is clearly 
intended to be de re. 
The issues of the logic of essence and (relatedly) what ‘essentially’ and ‘’ modify are deep 
and in need of further research. See again McLeod 2008a, pp. 324-7, for good, initial discussion. 
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necessity of the analysans (since if P is essential to x, it is surely the case that 
Px—at least, if x exists). Accordingly, there are several, clear, counter-
examples to the right-to-left conditional versions of both theses. There is also a 
separate, brief—but conclusive—‘existential’ objection to (COND) alone; it 
suffers the terminal defect that it renders existence an essential property. As 
Fine writes, 
 
“...it is necessarily the case that he [Socrates] exists if he exists. But we do 
not want to say that he essentially exists”.369 
 
Setting aside issues of existence, properties and predication (which are shared 
assumptions of both (COND) and the ‘existential’ objection),370 I take this 
argument to be pretty conclusive against the conditional, modal account of 
essence. Thus, I turn to the other three counter-examples as versus (COND) and 
(CAT). 
The three counter-examples involve set theory, necessary distinctness and 
necessary truths, respectively. Taking the first of these, consider Socrates and 
the singleton whose sole member is Socrates, namely {Socrates}. According to a 
standard, modal set theory, 
 
(Soc) necessarily, if Socrates exists, he belongs to {Socrates}, 
 
which, according to (COND) entails 
 
(Soc1) Socrates essentially belongs to {Socrates}. 
 
Now, following Fine’s suggestion, 371  having conditionalised the relevant 
property, in (Soc), it also entails the following, via (CAT): 
 
                                                         
369 Fine 1994, p. 6; cf. Correia 2007, p. 66. 
370 McLeod (2008a, pp. 319-20) adds several, similar problems to the conditional account; e.g. 
given the validity of a conditional with a false antecedent, non-existent objects (i) exist 
necessarily and (ii) have all properties and their negations.  
371 Fine 1994, p. 6; cf. Correia 2007, pp. 63-6. Whilst disputing Fine’s claim that there is no 
successful modal account of essence, he begins by accepting all four of Fine’s main objections to 
the conditional and categorical accounts. 
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(Soc2) Socrates essentially belongs to {Socrates}, if Socrates exists. 
 
Thus, given (Soc)’s truth and the strong counter-intuitiveness of (Soc1) and 
(Soc2), the ‘set theory’ argument appears to refute both the conditional and 
categorical, modal accounts of essence. 
Of course, some might find an objection based on set theory and abstracta 
problematic. This being the case, Fine presents two further counter-examples, 
as follows. Considering two distinct objects, Socrates and the Eiffel Tower, the 
following is true: 
 
(D) necessarily, if Socrates exists, Socrates is distinct from the Eiffel 
Tower, 
 
which, as before, entails 
 
(D1) Socrates is essentially distinct from the Eiffel Tower 
 
and  
 
(D2) Socrates is essentially distinct from the Eiffel Tower, if Socrates 
exists, 
 
via (COND) and (CAT), respectively. Similarly, considering any necessary truth, 
p, we have 
 
(N) necessarily, if Socrates exists, Socrates is such that p, 
 
which, again as before, entails 
 
(N1) Socrates is essentially such that p 
 
and 
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(N2) Socrates is essentially such that p, if Socrates exists, 
 
via (COND) and (CAT), respectively. Again as before, with (D) and (N) being 
true, yet (D1), (D2), (N1) and (N2) being extremely counter-intuitive, the 
‘necessary distinctness’ and ‘necessary truth’ arguments appear to refute both 
modal accounts of essence. 
There are of course some potential, initial issues with all three types of 
counter-example; they involve set theory and abstracta, the contentious matter 
of necessary distinctness, and the potential problem that being ‘such that p’ is 
arguably not a genuine predicate. As it happens, I am confident of the viability 
of all three objections, perhaps with decreasing strength in order of 
presentation. That said, even the ‘degenerate predicate’ response (versus the 
‘necessary truth’ objection) can be countered by insisting that x is ‘such that p’ 
involves a genuine predicate, even if it involves a ‘degenerate property’ of x.372 
All of this being the case, it is fairly clear that essence cannot be grounded in 
metaphysical modality and that, on the contrary, it is modality that is grounded 
in essence. 
In very brief, final summary of my position on rationality, modality and 
essence then, I take the essences or natures of all things to be fundamental, 
with metaphysical (or ‘broad logical’) modality being necessity, possibility and 
contingency in virtue of objects’, attributes’ and so on (i.e. all—metaphysical—
things’) natures. As very much stressed in Chapter 4 (but also again in the 
present chapter), strict and/or narrow logical modality are then necessity, 
possibility and contingency in virtue of the natures of the ‘logical things’, i.e. the 
laws (whatever they might be), theorems, axioms, propositions, definitions and 
concepts, for example (and moving from the strict to the narrow). So far, so 
alethic. Epistemic modality on the other hand is an extremely subjective, non-
                                                         
372 As Fine suggests (1995a, pp. 53-5); cf. Correia 2007, pp. 63-4. There are some additional, 
slightly deeper, potential responses, such as the insistence on ‘relevant’ properties that ‘really 
characterise’ the objects apt for consideration (Gorman 2005), and Correia’s (2007, pp. 67-83) 
alleged, alternative, ‘Priorean’, modal account of essence. In very brief response to both of 
these, I am slightly suspicious of the notion of ‘relevance’ here (as is Fine 1994, pp. 6-7); it is not 
at all clear that ‘real characterisation’ can occur without presupposing the relevant kind of 
essentialism. With respect to ‘Priorean’ modality, Correia’s response relies on an account of 
‘global’ and ‘local’ modality, where the latter appears to be very close (if not equivalent) to 
Finean essence—as Fine argues (2007). That said, the responses are interesting—so both are 
obvious areas for further research. 
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alethic modality; necessity, possibility and contingency in virtue of what a 
subject knows or believes. Finally then, rational modality, is a more 
intersubjective, fallible but (rationally) corrigible and, ultimately, modal, 
modality; necessity, possibility and contingency in virtue of, general, human (or 
similar, wider) rational capacities. As very much argued throughout then, with 
metaphysical modality so grounded in essence and, especially, with the rational 
grounded in the metaphysical, what is genuinely a priori, a posteriori and 
conceivable, is necessary, contingent and possible, respectively. 
 
 
3 Thesis summary 
 
My initial questions concern the nature of conceivability, possibility, and the 
relationship between the two—specifically, does conceivability ‘entail’ or is it a 
‘guide to’ possibility? In the introductory chapter I offer a working 
understanding of conceivability in terms of ‘a priori possibility’. Thus, in order 
to answer the initial questions, it is first necessary to understand apriority and 
modality—and then the relationship between conceivability, apriority and 
modality. That is, what is the nature of the a priori, does apriority ‘entail’ 
necessity, and how are apriority, conceivability and modality related? This 
being the case, the thesis is split into two larger parts; one on apriority/ 
aposteriority and modality (chs. 2 to 4), and another on conceivability, 
apriority/aposteriority (i.e. rationality) and modality (chs. 5 to the present). 
I begin to consider the first main issue (in ch. 2) by discussing the a priori 
as traditionally understood in terms of negative (e.g. independence from 
experience) and positive accounts (e.g. rational intuition or insight into 
necessary truth). Finding problems with both kinds of explanation (negative 
accounts being dependent on the additionally problematic notions 
‘independence’ and ‘experience’; positive accounts being potentially obscure, as 
well as further dependent on some unclarified notion of necessity), I 
nevertheless draw two lessons; (i) that some notion of necessity (specifically 
‘rational necessity’) is involved in the claim that a proposition p is justifiable on 
an a priori basis (i.e. if p is justifiable a priori, p is rationally necessary); and 
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relatedly, (ii) that an a priori proposition is one that is, strictly, not defeasible 
by empirical evidence. I go into much more detail on (ii) via a discussion of 
Euclidean geometry (ch. 2, §5) but before commencing the main discussion of 
apriority and modality, I also admit that a priori reasoning and justification is 
intersubjective (ch. 2, §4) and fallible but collectively corrigible (ch. 2, §6—but 
continued throughout). 
Turning to lesson (i), if apriority somehow ‘entails’ necessity and similarly 
for aposteriority and contingency, perhaps some form of coincidence thesis 
(CT) obtains. In Chapter 3 I use Goldbach’s conjecture (GC) and its ‘contingent 
equivalent’ (CGC), to disambiguate (CT) into the following four, putative, 
conditionals: 
 
(CT1) apriority entails necessity; 
(CT2) aposteriority entails contingency; 
(CT3) necessity entails apriority; 
(CT4) contingency entails aposteriority. 
 
As well as thus clarifying (CT), I also claim that (GC) and (CGC) show that 
unqualified versions of (CT3) and (CT4) cannot stand, and that there is a fairly 
clear lack of coextensiveness between the rational and metaphysical domains; 
whilst all true propositions are either necessarily or contingently true, they are 
not all justifiable a priori or a posteriori. This being the case, (CT1) and (CT2) 
cannot be viewed as the relevant biconditionals that would generate (CT3) and 
(CT4); similarly, (CT4) and (CT3) cannot be viewed as clear contrapositives of 
(CT1) and (CT2), respectively. So perhaps the best one can do with respect to 
(CT3) and (CT4) is to endorse, 
 
(CT3*) if p asserts a metaphysically necessary circumstance and if p is 
knowable, then p is an a priori justifiable proposition, 
 
and 
 
(CT4*) if p asserts a metaphysically contingent circumstance and if p is 
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knowable, then p is an a posteriori justifiable proposition. 
 
Of course, following the work of Kripke, the main, current threat to any 
(attenuated) (CT) is the possibility of contingent a priori and necessary a 
posteriori propositions. This being the case, I spend some time on a detailed 
discussion of the contingent a priori (ch. 3), and the necessary a posteriori (ch. 
5). Beginning with (CT1) and the contingent a priori, I argue that genuine 
apriority does entail necessity (ch. 3); indeed a proposition can only be 
justifiable on an a priori basis if it is (or rather asserts) a necessary 
circumstance. That is, I endorse 
 
(CT1*) if p is a genuinely a priori justifiable proposition, then p must 
assert a metaphysically necessary circumstance. 
 
Returning to the theme of fallibilism, I admit that such a notion of ‘genuine’ 
apriority is highly idealised, so I also endorse fallibilist versions of (CT1*): 
 
(CT1p) if p is a prima facie a priori justifiable proposition, then p is a very 
weak guide to metaphysical necessity. 
(CT1s) if p is a secunda facie a priori justifiable proposition, then p is a 
strong (but still fallible) guide to metaphysical necessity.373 
 
A clear corollary of (CT1*) is that strictly there can be no genuinely contingent 
a priori propositions. In line with this, I argue that apparently ‘contingent a 
priori sentences’ express (at least) two propositions, but these are (generally) 
either ‘widely’ contingent but justifiable on an a posteriori basis (if at all 
justifiable), or if justifiable a priori then ‘narrowly’, necessarily the case.374 
Finally concerning the a priori, in Chapter 4 I summarise my position, 
returning to some of the problems of negative and positive accounts, and 
offering an analysis that underpins both; apriority should be understood in 
                                                         
373 For ease of expression, I mainly focus on ‘genuine’ versions of the relevant theses in what 
follows. Throughout however, the reader is urged to bear in mind that similar fallibilist sub-
theses also obtain. 
374 The parenthesis points back towards (GC) and (CGC); not all necessary/contingent 
propositions are justifiable. 
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terms of ‘rational necessity’. This notion explains both the ‘experience-
independence’ aspects of negative accounts and, as I suggest, positive 
explanations such as ‘rational insight’ or ‘intuition’—whilst avoiding allegations 
of obscurantism and mysteriousness that can be levelled against the latter. 
Moreover, my position also avoids a potential regress problem (ch. 4, §2.1) that 
can be brought against traditional, positive accounts, whilst at the same time, 
being thoroughly fallibilist (a point I reinforce in ch. 4, §2.2). 
As suggested throughout, apriority qua rational necessity (and rational 
modality in general) is not coextensive with, but is grounded in, metaphysical 
necessity (and modality). Again in Chapter 4, I go into more detail on such 
claims, arguing that rational necessity is not the same as epistemic or logical 
necessities, since epistemic necessity is entirely non-modal and subjective, 
whereas logical necessity is entirely formal and analytic. Apriority, on the other 
hand, is (at least) intersubjective and broadly modal, and it is not the same as 
narrow or strict, logical necessity, since the latter requires apriority (or rational 
necessity) for its explanation. With respect to the grounding of apriority (and 
rational modality in general) in metaphysical necessity (and modality), as this 
is perhaps the central topic of the thesis, I only introduce the discussion in Part 
I, leaving the final analysis until Part II, since a discussion of the necessary a 
posteriori, conceivability and possibility is required in order to draw the 
conclusion that rational modality is grounded in the metaphysical. 
Turning to (CT2) and the necessary a posteriori then, as with the contingent 
a priori, I argue that there are no genuine cases; apparently ‘necessary a 
posteriori sentences’ in fact analyse out into (at least) two propositions, which 
assert either necessary circumstances justifiable on an a priori basis (if 
justifiable), or a posteriori justifiable but contingent circumstances. In this way, 
I claim that aposteriority does entail contingency, in that a proposition that is 
only or essentially justified on an a posteriori basis, must be a contingent 
proposition. That is, I endorse, 
 
(CT2*) if p is an a posteriori justifiable proposition, then p must assert a 
metaphysically contingent circumstance. 
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During my discussion of the necessary a posteriori, I begin to suggest that a 
discussion of the semantics and pragmatics of assertion and belief ascription is 
required for a more complete understanding of conceivability and possibility. 
This being the case, I deal with Frege and Kripke’s puzzles, conceivability and 
possibility in Chapter 6. With respect to the two puzzles, I argue that they rest 
on a confusion of wide and narrow propositions asserted by a pair of original 
and apparently problematic sentences—or propositions. For example, although 
it appears possible for an entirely rational Peter to believe both that 
 
(20) Paderewski has musical talent 
 
and that 
 
(21) Paderewski does not have musical talent, 
 
at precisely the same time (assuming Peter has different ‘guises’ of ‘Paderewski’ 
for example), truly believing either proposition (widely) would result in the 
denial of the other, since (20) and (21) are contradictories. The point being, it is 
not possible for Paderewski to be both musical and not musical (at the same 
time), so it is not (widely) possible to believe (20) and (21); such a scenario 
would be rationally impossible or inconceivable. Narrowly, of course, Peter can 
believe both (20) and (21) (at the same time) since they are not narrow 
contradictories; it is entirely possible (for example) for two identically named 
but distinct things to have opposing properties; it is entirely conceivable that m 
is musical, n is not musical and m is not identical to n. 
Finally then, turning to conceivability and possibility, given my position on 
Frege and Kripke’s puzzles, and the necessary a posteriori, I hold that there is 
no real problem in reasoning from genuine conceivability to metaphysical 
possibility and, indeed, p is conceivable only if p is possible. Simply read then, I 
appear to endorse 
 
(CON) if p is conceivable, then p is possible375 
                                                         
375 Bearing in mind repeated points about fallibilism. 
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and its apparent contrapositive, 
 
(IMP) if p is impossible, p is inconceivable. 
 
I do however seem to question the related 
 
(INC) if p is inconceivable, p is impossible 
 
and 
 
(POS) if p is possible, then p is conceivable, 
 
suggesting that both limitations and exaggerations in reasoning abilities might 
allow there to be possibilities that are ‘inconceivable’ and ‘inconceivabilities’ 
that are in fact possible.376 
In the final section of the previous chapter, I flag the issue of contraposition 
with respect to the relevant (CON) theses. As discussed, a simple acceptance of 
(CON) and (IMP) would appear to lead to a clear tension in my position, given 
an endorsement of (CT3*) in the light of (GC), and especially given the 
acceptance of the rational-modal theses, 
 
(R1) Rp  R¬◊¬p 
(R2) R◊p  R¬¬p 
(R3) R¬p  R◊¬p  
(R4) R¬◊p  R¬p 
(R5) Rp  R¬p  R◊p 
 
By way of avoiding this alleged tension, I argue that we should endorse all of 
(R1) to (R5), as definitional of rational modality but with the caveat that the ‘R’ 
superscript indicates ‘strict’ or ‘human’ rationality. With this caveat in place, 
there are two clear implications; (i) that apriority-aposteriority and 
                                                         
376 As in the previous chapter and below, the issue of non- and inconceivability is very much up 
for discussion; hence the scare quotes here. 
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conceivability-inconceivability are not exhaustive (unlike necessity-
contingency and possibility-impossibility); and (ii) that we must therefore be 
careful when we say that something is ‘not justifiable a priori’(or ‘not a 
posteriori’), or that something is ‘not conceivable’ (or ‘not inconceivable’). What 
I mean by both (i) and (ii) is that there is a third category for the rational-modal 
domain; there are a priori, not-a priori (i.e. a posteriori) and non-a priori 
(neither a priori nor a posteriori, i.e. unknowable) propositions, and there are 
conceivable, inconceivable and non-conceivable (i.e. neither conceivable nor 
inconceivable; undecidable 377 ) propositions. Simply put, just because a 
proposition is ‘not a priori justifiable’ (i.e. what I am calling non-a priori), this 
does not mean that it is justifiable a posteriori; and just because a proposition is 
‘not conceivable’ or ‘inconceivable’ (i.e. what I am calling non-conceivable), this 
does not mean that it is genuinely inconceivable; some propositions’ (rational) 
modal status is unknowable or undecidable. In short, this is what I mean when I 
make such claims as that the rational is grounded in, or parallels, the 
metaphysical-modal. 
Accordingly, (R1) to (R5) operate in more or less the same way as (M1) to 
(M5), except that rational modality is metaphysical modality in virtue of 
rationality; i.e. the nature of limited, cognitive agents’ rational abilities. Thus 
(R1) (in conjunction with the relevant, final version of (CT1)) defines an a priori 
proposition as a ‘rationally necessary’ proposition qua a strictly—i.e. human- 
(or similar)—knowably or justifiably, metaphysically necessary proposition. 
Similarly (R2) (plus the relevant, final (CON)) equates conceivability with 
(strictly) rationally justifiable, metaphysical possibility; (R4) (plus the relevant 
(INC)) analyses inconceivability as (strict) rational, justifiable impossibility; 
and (R5) (plus the relevant (CT2)) defines aposteriority as (strict) rational not-
necessity (not-apriority) and rational possibility. 
With this understanding in place, we can (i) outline the correct reading of 
the (CON) theses and (ii) determine whether (and if so how) the relevant (CON) 
theses are contrapositives. Very much in line with the amended (CT) theses 
then, the best versions of the (CON) theses are: 
 
                                                         
377 I am indebted to Yablo (1993) for terminology here. 
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(CON**) if p is a conceivable (qua strictly rationally possible, so 
knowable/justifiable) proposition, then p must assert a 
metaphysically possible circumstance; 
(IMP**) if p asserts a (strictly knowable/justifiable) metaphysically 
impossible circumstance, then p must be an inconceivable 
proposition; 
(INC**) if p is an inconceivable (qua strictly rationally impossible) 
proposition, then p must assert a metaphysically impossible 
circumstance; 
(POS**) if p asserts a (strictly knowable/justifiable) metaphysically 
possible circumstance, then p must be a conceivable 
proposition. 
 
Taking (CON**) and (IMP**) first, on the amended readings and with due care 
over the ‘strict’ qualifications and the relevant negations, it is fairly clear that 
the two are contrapositives. Strict, justifiable metaphysical impossibility is the 
correct negation of the consequent of (CON**), and since we are limited to 
strictly justifiable propositions (given the clear antecedent and what I say about 
(R) above), inconceivability is the correct negation of conceivability, and vice 
versa; so ‘knowable’, ‘justifiable’ impossibility does entail inconceivability after 
all. That is, (CON**) and (IMP**) are mutual contrapositives. Moving on to 
(INC**) and (POS**), again, the correct negation of a (justifiable) metaphysical 
impossibility is a metaphysical possibility and mutatis mutandis for (justifiable) 
inconceivability-conceivability, and vice versa; so (POS**) and (INC**) are also 
mutual contrapositives. 
Looking back at the four original (CT) theses (as amended in line with 
(CON**)) above, 
 
(CT1**) if p is a genuinely a priori justifiable (qua strictly rationally 
necessary) proposition, then p must assert a metaphysically 
necessary circumstance; 
(CT2**) if p is an a posteriori justifiable (qua strictly rationally 
contingent) proposition, then p must assert a metaphysically 
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contingent circumstance; 
(CT3**) if p asserts a (strictly knowable/justifiable) metaphysically 
necessary circumstance, then p must be justifiable on an a priori 
basis; 
and 
(CT4**) if p asserts a (strictly justifiable) metaphysically contingent 
circumstance, then p must be justifiable on an a posteriori basis; 
 
it is now clear that similar reasoning also applies here; for true propositions, 
(CT1**) and (CT4**) are mutual contrapositives, and mutatis mutandis for 
(CT2**) and (CT3**). As before, since we are talking about strictly knowable or 
justifiable propositions, then the negation of apriority is aposteriority, and 
contingency of necessity (and vice versa). 
 
 
4 Issues, objections and replies 
 
There are, of course, several objections that can be levelled against the 
foregoing. For example, first, that much of what I say here ignores or perhaps 
contradicts what I say about fallibilism and justifiability elsewhere in the thesis. 
Second, that my account of the a priori and conceivability as ‘grounded in’ 
rational and, ultimately, metaphysical modality, places the analysans too close 
to the analysandum; i.e. that my account is circular. Third, is the allegation that, 
despite criticising two-dimensional semantics, my account is ultimately two-
dimensional, in recognising two aspects of meaning and in conflating epistemic 
(qua rational) and metaphysical modalities. Finally, fourth (and returning to an 
issue first mentioned in ch. 3), is the objection that in offering such a close 
account of the rational and the metaphysical, I leave no room for modal error. 
In what follows I deal with these objections in turn; fallibilism, justifiability, 
circularity and two-dimensionalism (in §4.1), and modal error separately 
(§4.2).  
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4.1 Fallibilism, justifiability, circularity and two-dimensionalism 
 
In terms of fallibilism, the detailed allegation is that I admit that a priori 
justification is thoroughly fallible (in ch. 2, §6 and elsewhere), yet presently I 
appear to claim that (genuine) apriority/(in)conceivability entails necessity/ 
(im)possibility and so on. Now, I deal with the general issue of fallibilism in 
relevant sections of the thesis,378 so I do not have a great deal to add here. All I 
would say is that first, my present conclusions are intended to bear in mind my 
previous points on fallibilism;379 I focus on ‘genuine’ versions of (CT), (CON) 
and so forth, very much for ease of reference—if I were to qualify each thesis 
with prima and secunda facie versions, the thesis would become quite unwieldy. 
Second and more importantly, reminding the reader of my position on genuine, 
prima and secunda facie apriority, I would very much extend this to 
aposteriority and (in)conceivability. In much the same way that a priori 
justification is corrigible on further rational reflection (such that e5, for 
example, is prima but neither secunda facie nor genuinely a priori), a 
proposition such as Eminem is distinct from Slim Shady might be prima but it 
is neither secunda facie nor genuinely (widely) conceivable—as per ch. 5. 
With respect to justifiability, here the problem is that throughout the thesis 
(and especially in the previous section) I suggest that there are a priori, a 
posteriori and non-a priori (or conceivable, inconceivable and non-conceivable) 
propositions, yet towards the end of the previous section I claim that if p is 
necessary, it must also be a priori (and so on). In quite a simple response to this 
allegation, in the previous section I try to make it entirely clear, with various 
‘strict’ (i.e. pertaining to human, or similarly, cognitively limited agents’, 
rational abilities) and ‘knowable’ or ‘justifiable’ insertions, that we are talking 
about (humanly and similar) knowable propositions; and for such propositions, 
aposteriority is the negation of apriority, and similar for (in)conceivability. So, 
where some p is strictly knowable/justifiable (i.e. for human beings and 
similar) and asserts a necessary (or contingent/possible/impossible) truth, 
such a p is a priori (or a posteriori/conceivable/inconceivable respectively). 
                                                         
378 Notably, ch. 4, §§2 and 4—in addition to ch. 2, §6. 
379 As suggested several times above. 
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Ultimately, I am claiming that apriority (for instance) consists in rational 
necessity, which is grounded in metaphysical necessity; p is a priori iff p is 
rationally necessary iff p is strictly, knowably/justifiably metaphysically 
necessary. That is, (strict) rationality consists in what it is (strictly) 
necessary/contingent/possible/impossible to believe; i.e. what might be called 
metaphysical necessity in virtue of strict (i.e. human or similar) rationality; 
literally what we must, may or may not, can, or cannot know or be justified in 
believing. 
Turning to the second of the main objections, the unconvinced might insist 
that the present account is either extremely close to being, or just is, circular. 
The alleged point being that if apriority (and so on) consists in rational 
necessity which is (more or less) metaphysical necessity in virtue of rationality, 
this is effectively what rational necessity (i.e. apriority) means, or is, in the first 
place. This kind of objection is perhaps not too far from the kind of general 
objection to ‘analytic philosophy’ that consists in something akin to the 
‘paradox of analysis’; whereby either the analysans means the same as the 
analysandum, in which case the analysis is uninformative, or the analysans 
does not mean the same as the analysandum, in which case the analysis fails. 
Without going into great detail on responses to this kind of objection, let me say 
that one of its key assumptions is something akin to the idea that there is a 
single notion of meaning; and a good analysis must both correctly and 
informatively provide such a ‘meaning’. Of course, one of the central 
implications of this thesis is that there is no such clear, singular notion of 
‘meaning’; meaning (for example, what a sentence expresses or asserts—on 
occasion of use or generally) is a highly complex issue, and it is very arguable 
that sentences can express (at least) two propositions, along the lines of what 
might be called ‘wide’ and ‘narrow’ meanings (as dependent on circumstances). 
In this way, the analysis of apriority (and rationality in general) that I am 
offering, is intended to provide a wide or ‘real’ definition (i.e. to provide real 
necessary and sufficient conditions),380 as opposed to capturing all possible 
‘narrow’ meanings or, perhaps, ‘senses’ of the relevant terms. That is, I intend 
to provide a wide analysis, along the lines of sameness of extension, as opposed 
                                                         
380 I nod in the direction of Fine 1994 here. 
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to a ‘narrow’ analysis, in terms of sameness of ‘narrow content’ or ‘grasped’ 
meaning (or similar). This analysis is that the rational-modal is grounded in the 
metaphysical; hence both the need for, and explanation of, the proximity of 
analysans to analysandum. Having said this, I think it is fairly clear that I have 
left room for some distance between the rational and the metaphysical modal. 
As I stress above (and notably in Chapter 3), whilst all propositions are 
necessary or contingent, this is not the case for apriority, aposteriority and (in)- 
conceivability; some propositions are, for example, a priori, some are not a 
priori and some are ‘non-a priori’ (i.e. neither provable or disprovable on a 
priori grounds—i.e. unknowable or unjustifiable propositions). In this way, 
although the rational and metaphysical, modal domains are extremely 
explanatorily close, they are not identical; rational modality is not coextensive 
with the metaphysical. 
Third then, is the claim that despite my criticisms of two-dimensional 
modal semantics, the present account is ultimately two-dimensional. In slightly 
more detail, the allegation is that in accounting for the contingent a priori and 
necessary a posteriori by way of sentences expressing two ‘narrow’ and ‘wide’ 
propositions, which are either contingent but a posteriori or necessary but a 
priori, my position is (i) deeply two-dimensional and (ii) conflates metaphysical 
and rational (qua epistemic) modalities. As with fallibilism, I deal with such 
points at several points in the thesis.381 That said, there are two distinct points 
here, both of which require a little more attention. Beginning with (i), I have 
two responses, both of which I mention in previous chapters. First, I stress 
throughout Chapters 3 and 5 that relevant, candidate sentences can express at 
least two propositions, depending on context, pragmatics and, importantly, the 
relevant metaphysics—I explain the latter in a moment. Second and more 
importantly, my position is unlike two-dimensionalism in that it does not posit 
a systematic relationship from sentences to primary/A- and secondary/C-
propositions,382 involving clear semantic rules (and such constructs as ‘dthat’, † 
and A operators); 383  it does not move from logic and semantics to 
                                                         
381 Notably ch. 5, §3. 
382 As per Chalmers (various but especially 1996 and 2006a) and Jackson 1998, 2004 
respectively. 
383 As per Kaplan 1978, Stalnaker 1978 and (Evans 1979 as formalised by) Davies and 
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epistemology and metaphysics. Instead, I argue that sentences can express (at 
least) two propositions given various semantic, contextual, pragmatic and, 
importantly again, metaphysical assumptions. That is, given that what we are 
really interested in is the modal and epistemic natures of certain propositions 
qua assertions of circumstances (qua arrangements of objects and attributes), 
we should try to understand the natures of the relevant objects and attributes 
in advance of deciding the semantics. 
Turning to (ii), most importantly, my account is entirely distinct from a 
two-dimensional approach in that I most definitely do not conflate 
metaphysical and rational (and especially not rational-qua-epistemic) 
necessities—as I very much outline in Chapter 4, §3. One of the key criticisms of 
two-dimensionalism384 is that it commits just such a conflation of apriority (qua 
epistemic/conceptual necessity) and conceivability (qua epistemic/conceptual 
possibility). As I indicate, I am very much in accord with such criticisms; I make 
it a cornerstone of my position that metaphysical is not identical to rational 
necessity and that neither is coextensive with epistemic necessity. Indeed, I 
urge throughout that such a conflation is the key failing of the two-dimensional 
approach.385 Again as I urge throughout (and responding to both (i) and (ii)), I 
argue from metaphysics and epistemology to semantics and not vice versa; 
given the nature of propositions and circumstances and the necessity of object-
identity (that I argue for throughout), if a = a, then necessarily so—and this 
must be justified (if justifiable) on an a priori basis (and mutatis mutandis for 
contingent circumstances and a posteriori justification).386 So, if my position is 
                                                                                                                                                              
Humberstone 1980 respectively. 
384 Offered in ch. 1 of this thesis and by Yablo 1999. 
385 In this way I concur with Tom Baldwin (2001), when he suggests that meta-semantic two-
dimensionalism (as offered by Stalnaker 2001 for example) undermines the a priori in offering 
an interpretation of Kripke as ultimately closer to Quine. Going further than this, if apriority is 
analysed in terms of epistemic/conceptual necessity (as it is by the likes of Chalmers 2006a and 
Jackson 1998), and if it is further described as ‘primary’ necessity, then both apriority and 
necessity are in danger of reducing to conceptual necessity (analyticity); thereby very much 
suggesting an assimilation of Kripke and Quine, with clear, negative results for both apriority 
and necessity. Much of this thesis is an argument against this kind of assimilation, in that I 
argue that apriority should not be understood in terms of epistemic or conceptual necessity, 
and that the metaphysical is the ‘primary’ modality. 
386 Wong (1996, 2006) also distances himself from two-dimensionalism in attacking a position 
similar to that of Tichý 1983. Wong’s attack depends on a ‘sentence-relative’ notion of apriority, 
which to my mind questions an assumption central to the discussion; namely that propositions 
are the bearers of knowledge, justification and belief. The point being, if I sincerely assert ‘Snow 
is white’ and my German counterpart similarly says ‘Schnee ist weiβ’, although we might 
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remotely ‘two-dimensional’, it perhaps ought to be labelled ‘metaphysical, 
multi-dimensional modal semantics’. 
 
 
4.2 The possibility of modal error 
 
I now turn to the last main objection to my position; that it has little or no 
ability to explain modal error. If the rational and metaphysical-modal are more 
or less coextensive, how can we ever go wrong in reasoning from the a priori to 
the necessary and from conceivability to possibility? 
Let me begin by first identifying four kinds of modal reasoning: 
 
(MR1) from apriority to necessity, 
(MR2) from aposteriority to contingency, 
(MR3) from conceivability to possibility 
and 
(MR4) from inconceivability to impossibility, 
 
More or less corresponding to each of these, will be different, particular errors, 
depending on the general kind of modal error under discussion. I now discuss 
the three kinds of error my position suggests, moving from the most basic to 
the most complex. 
The first kind of modal error is fairly straightforward; it is, quite simply, 
that of mistaken proof or reasoning, which I call ‘mistaken rational status’, for 
reasons that will become apparent. This kind of error is exemplified by all kinds 
of failure (from the mundane to the complex) in calculation or reasoning about 
an original proposition p, which results in a false conclusion about the rational 
and so modal status of p. A prime (and reasonably complex) example of this is 
Euclid’s ‘fifth postulate’, p5/e5, as introduced in Chapter 2. The point being, 
                                                                                                                                                              
narrowly believe different things, widely there is something we jointly believe; namely that a 
certain stuff (snow) has a certain property (whiteness). The further point then being, a 
proposition is justifiable a priori or a posteriori but not, strictly, both. So for example, although I 
might come to know the necessary proposition h = p via the empirical ‘h and p are co-
referential’ along with several a priori and essentialist claims, in being the same (wide) 
proposition as h = h, h = p is justifiable on an a priori basis; it is the a priori essentialist 
claims that are doing the real justificatory work. 
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those who thought that p5 was justified a priori and thereby necessarily true, 
failed to reason correctly about either the proof of p5 or the existence of 
alternative, possible and contradictory propositions such as l5 and r5. Had they 
carried out such additional reasoning, these thinkers would have realised that 
p5 was (justifiably) not a priori, and would therefore have concluded correctly 
that p5 is not necessarily true. Of course there is a plethora of potential 
examples of similar failures in more simple, everyday mathematical reasoning, 
the basic formula being: (a) if p is an a priori justifiable, mathematical 
proposition, it is both true and necessarily the case; (b) p is justifiable a priori, 
so (c) p is necessarily true. The mistake then concerns premise (b), where the 
reasoner has the proof, reasoning and so rational-modal status of p wrong. 
With (b) so wrong, the conclusion (c) clearly does not follow. Similar particular 
errors with respect to (MR3) and (MR4) concern ‘conceivabilities’ that are in 
fact inconceivable and vice versa; for example (again drawing from 
mathematics) that 2 + 2 = 5 is conceivable (when it is in fact impossible and 
therefore inconceivable), or that ¬p5 is inconceivable (on the—false—
assumption that p5 is necessarily true).387 The latter of course, being a 
justifiable, contingent truth (with respect to actual space), is both conceivable 
and justifiable a posteriori.388 
The second kind of modal error is very much related to the first; it can 
perhaps be viewed as a sub-set of ‘rational status’ error in that it relates to 
cases such as Goldbach’s conjecture (GC), whose rational status is very much 
apt for being mistaken, in virtue of their being unknowable or ‘undecidable’ 
propositions. For this reason, I call this kind of error ‘mistaken non-rational 
status’ or ‘the confusion of undecidable with decidable propositions’. Although 
perhaps slightly more complex than the previous kind of error, the discussion 
here is fairly brief, since I cover some of the same ground in previous chapters. 
As I say, this kind of error derives from cases such as (GC) (and to a lesser 
                                                         
387 I go into more detail on inconceivability and non-conceivability (and relatedly, Goldbach’s 
conjecture) separately, below. 
388 Particular cases of (MR2)-related, ‘rational status’ error are perhaps harder to come by (and 
overlap with what I say on the third kind of error, below). In short, I assume that there are no 
necessary a posteriori (nor contingent a priori) propositions and so no clear, related counter-
examples to (MR2) (and (MR1)). Moreover, simple, (MR2)-related cases will be less prevalent 
since we are generally reasonably good at knowing whether propositions require a posteriori 
justification, whereas the a priori is, quite simply, more difficult. I hope to clarify all of this 
below. 
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extent (CGC)), where there is a clear, metaphysical-modal status but no such 
clear, rational-modal status—I am assuming, as before, that (GC)/(CGC) are 
necessarily/contingently true but unknowable. Given such an assumption, 
neither (GC) nor (CGC) could be considered even potential counter-examples to 
(MR1) and (MR2) (given their unknowability and so non-apriority/ 
aposteriority); they are only relevant to the (MR3) and (MR4) modes of 
reasoning. Beginning with (MR4), as this is perhaps the simplest case, let us see 
which, if any of (GC), (CGC) and their negations are relevant, potential counter-
examples. Now it might be argued that since all of (GC), (CGC) and their 
negations are unknowable, they are in some sense ‘inconceivable’; (GC), (CGC) 
and ¬(CGC) then being metaphysically possible, they would then invalidate 
(MR4). Of course, given what I say above and in the previous chapter, this must 
only be taken in the loosest sense—strictly, since the relevant propositions are 
unknowable, they are non-conceivable rather than inconceivable; such 
propositions are, with respect to rational (im)possibility, ‘undecidable’. That 
said, perhaps it is not that clear how often this particular case of the general 
kind of error would arise; it is highly arguable that no-one would really insist 
that (GC) and the like were genuinely inconceivable qua a priori impossible, 
given, for example, (GC)’s non-apriority, and both (GC) and (CGC)’s clear, modal 
status as metaphysically possible. That is, it is fairly clear that the relevant 
sense of ‘inconceivable’ here, is something akin to ‘not imaginably possible’. 
Moving on to (MR3), a counter-example here needs to be a proposition that 
is conceivable but impossible. Given the foregoing assumptions, it is clear that 
the only relevant kind of candidate (and perhaps more strongly so than with 
(MR4)) is going to be a proposition akin to the negation of (GC). The point 
being, ¬(GC) is by assumption necessarily false (or impossible) and, perhaps, 
‘conceivable’. Having said this of course, given that (GC) is unknowable, ¬(GC) is 
only ‘conceivable’ in the very weakest, epistemic sense. Strictly, if (GC) is 
unknowable, so is its negation; hence, I claim, both propositions are neither 
conceivable nor inconceivable—both propositions are rationally undecidable, 
or ‘open possibilities’.389 Moreover, and as I stress several times in the 
discussion of (GC) qua unknowable metaphysical necessity, since it is just not 
                                                         
389 On this point I am fairly close to Yablo 1993, pp. 31-2. 
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possible to entertain the genuine possibility of (GC)’s falsehood; ¬(GC) qua 
metaphysically impossible is also rationally impossible or inconceivable. All of 
this being the case, ¬(GC) is not a genuine counter-example to the (MR3) form 
of reasoning. The only potential modal errors in the region consist in (i) 
confusing an undecidable proposition, such as ¬(GC), with a decidable one, 
thereby resulting in an (MR3)-related error, and, less likely perhaps, (ii) 
reading various undecidables such as (GC), (CGC) and ¬(CGC), as inconceivable, 
thereby committing an (MR4)-related error. Hence my description of this kind 
of modal error as ‘mistaken non-rational status’ or ‘the confusion of 
undecidable with decidable propositions’. 
I now turn to the third and most complex kind of modal error, ‘mistaken 
rational-metaphysical status’, which I claim results in ‘the confusion of 
epistemic with rational modality’. As I go on to explain, this kind of error is 
effectively based on the conflation of original sentences with two (or more) 
additional (narrow and wide) propositions; it is therefore perhaps best 
described in terms of ‘the confusion of ‘sentential’ with narrow and wide 
(rational and metaphysical) modalities’—hence the shorter ‘mistaken rational-
metaphysical status’ description. Examples of this kind of error are best 
exemplified by alleged contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori 
propositions (and their negations). Now since I deny, strictly, the existence of 
the contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori, my explanation of this kind of 
error will differ (in detail, but perhaps not in spirit) from the standard account. 
Before setting out those details then, let me give a summary of the standard 
position. 
The standard, Kripkean account would have it that certain a priori 
propositions in fact assert contingent circumstances and certain a posteriori 
propositions assert necessary circumstances; for alleged, potential example,  
 
(S) stick s is one metre long at t0 
 
and 
 
(e``) I exist at t0; [for the contingent a priori] 
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(1a) e = s 
 
and 
 
(K1) if Aristotle exists, then Aristotle is a person. 
[for the necessary a posteriori] 
 
The point being, propositions such as (S) and (e``) are allegedly counter-
examples to (CT1**) and (CT4**), and so to the (MR1) form of reasoning. 
Following on from this, but as is often overlooked in the literature, on the 
assumption that the likes of (S) and (e``) are justifiable a priori, presumably 
their negations would be justifiably false on an a priori basis; i.e. strictly, 
inconceivable on the present and on most accounts. Now, since the original 
propositions (S) and (e``) are (allegedly) a priori but contingently true, the 
relevant negations would then be contingently false—i.e. not impossible. So, the 
negations would be metaphysically possible but inconceivable, thereby 
negating (INC**) and (POS**), and, especially now, invalidating the (MR4) form 
of reasoning. 
Similarly, the traditional view of the likes of (1a) and (K1) is that they are, 
qua necessary a posteriori propositions, counter-examples to (CT2**) and 
(CT3**), as well as to the (MR2) form of reasoning. Moreover (as before), their 
negations ought not to be ruled out as impossible on an a priori basis; the 
negations ought to be ‘conceivable’ (on most accounts) even if they are 
metaphysically necessarily false (i.e. metaphysically impossible). So, the 
negations of (1a) and (K1) allegedly rule out (CON**), (IMP**) and especially 
now (MR3). 
To summarise, if genuine, the contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori 
provide a clear, general account of modal error; contingent a priori 
propositions and their negations explain failures in (MR1) and (MR4) modal 
reasoning; necessary a posteriori propositions and their negations explain 
failures in (MR2) and (MR3) reasoning. In failing to note such special cases of a 
priori and a posteriori propositions, we can reach incorrect modal conclusions, 
with wide-ranging and clear, philosophical implications; for (alleged, potential) 
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example,  I exist at t0 is an a priori but not a necessary truth (its negation then 
being ‘inconceivable’ but ‘possible’?), and e = s is an (allegedly) a posteriori 
but not contingent truth (its negation then being ‘conceivable’ but ‘impossible’). 
As indicated above, since I dispute both the contingent a priori and the 
necessary a posteriori, I need to deal with such cases as are thrown up by the 
various, relevant discussions. By way of meeting this requirement, first let me 
say that Chapters 3 and 5 are an extended argument against the contingent a 
priori and necessary a posteriori respectively; if and where successful, these 
stand as rejections of such propositions as clear counter-examples to the (MR1) 
and (MR2) forms of reasoning. So far then, the only relevant, potential error in 
these kinds of reasoning is similar to that of the first kind discussed above but 
with the additional confusion in metaphysical-modal status; hence ‘mistaken 
rational-modal status’. That said, the alleged contingent a priori and necessary 
a posteriori examples do provide an interesting lesson for the (MR4) and (MR3) 
forms of reasoning; just perhaps not the apparent lesson I describe as the 
standard account, above. Let me now spell out what I take that lesson to be. 
As I hint throughout, there is something about the negations of alleged, 
contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori propositions that, despite not 
invalidating (MR4) and (MR3), is instructive both in terms of providing 
examples of particular modal errors and elucidating the general form of the 
kind of error under discussion. Beginning with the contingent a priori, if p (I 
exist at t0 or (e``) for alleged example) is genuinely justifiable on an a priori 
basis but asserts a contingently obtaining circumstance, its negation (I do not 
exist at t0) ought to be inconceivable but only contingently false—thereby 
invalidating (MR4). As I argue in Chapter 3 however, it is very difficult to see 
how this pair of properties could be had by a single proposition/circumstance; 
if I do exist at t0 but might not have done, then it is entirely possible and 
conceivable that I might not have existed at t0; if on the other hand it is 
necessarily the case that I exist at t0 in virtue of uttering or thinking (e``), then 
¬(e``) is both impossible and so inconceivable. So, the ‘contingent a priori 
sentence’, ‘I exist’, expresses a wide, contingent but a posteriori, and a narrow, a 
priori but necessary (conditional) proposition. There is a particular modal error 
in the region of (MR4), but it does not derive from ¬(e``); rather it arises from 
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the conflation of the inconceivability of the negation of the narrow (necessary, a 
priori) proposition, with the possibility of the negation of the wide (contingent, 
a posteriori) proposition. 
Similarly, if p (e = s for potential example) is a posteriori but necessary, its 
negation ought to be conceivable but impossible—invalidating (MR3). As I 
argue throughout Chapter 5 (and Chapter 6) however, if a (knowable, 
justifiable) p asserts a metaphysically impossible circumstance, strictly p 
cannot be conceivable; if e = s, then qua necessarily identical object(s), it is 
impossible and inconceivable that e is not self-identical (or not the same object 
as s); it is just not possible to entertain this set of circumstances (as I suggest 
with respect to ¬(GC) both above and several times earlier in the thesis). If on 
the other hand an object named ‘e’ is identical to an object named ‘s’, it is 
entirely possible and conceivable that ‘e’ is not identical to ‘s’. As with the 
contingent a priori then, there is a particular modal error in the region of (MR4) 
but this does not derive from the negation of the alleged, necessary a posteriori 
proposition; rather it consists in the conflation of the conceivability of the 
negation of the narrow (contingent, a posteriori) proposition, with the 
impossibility of the negation of the wide (necessary a priori) proposition. 
Summarising my position on this third kind of error, we have four 
particular cases of erroneous reasoning, which although they do not undermine 
(MR1) to (MR4), do suggest a general kind of modal error. This is what I call 
‘mistaken rational-metaphysical status’, or perhaps better, since this rests on a 
conflation of two propositions for one sentence, the ‘confusion of ‘sentential’ 
with narrow and wide (rational and metaphysical) modalities’. The ‘contingent 
a priori’ and ‘necessary a posteriori’ themselves provide neither examples nor a 
general account of modal error; instead it is the confusion of narrow and wide 
modalities that leads to the conflation of two propositions for one, original 
sentence, which does the trick. Moreover, that trick ultimately results in the 
confusion of rational and epistemic modality. The point being, with respect to 
the contingent a priori and its negation, ‘apriority’ and ‘inconceivability’ consist 
in epistemic necessity and impossibility respectively; and regarding the 
necessary a posteriori and its negation, ‘aposteriority’ and ‘conceivability’ 
consist in epistemic contingency and possibility. Now of course, if we take 
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apriority, aposteriority and (in)conceivability to be epistemic notions (qua 
grounded in epistemic modality), then propositions can be ‘a priori’ but 
contingent, ‘a posteriori’ but necessary, and ‘conceivable’ but impossible (and 
contrapositively); if we are talking of genuine, rational modality however, 
apriority entails necessity and ditto aposteriority-contingency and 
(in)conceivability-(im)possibility. That is, (MR1) to (MR4) stand and modal 
error is located in confusion of the epistemic, rational and metaphysical-modal 
status of relevant propositions. 
In terms of positive lessons to take from the foregoing, I round off this 
section by reconsidering briefly the issue of corrigibility—I begin with the first 
and third kinds of modal error, as the second is slightly more complex. With 
respect to the first kind of error (‘rational status’), a priori, a posteriori and 
(in)conceivability-based reasoning is, of course, corrigible; as per Riemannian 
and Lobachevskian responses to the ‘a priori’ and ‘necessary’ e5 (as discussed in 
Chapter 2). That said, we are, qua human beings, fallible, so it is a plain fact of 
the matter that we will continue to make mistakes in reasoning such that we 
will conclude that ‘a priori’ propositions are ‘necessarily’ the case (and so on), 
when in fact they are not. Concerning ‘rational-metaphysical status’ (the third 
kind of error), exactly similar remarks apply, with the additional problem of the 
complexity of the reasoning required to disentangle allegedly contingent a 
priori (or necessary a posteriori) sentences into relevantly narrow/wide a 
priori and necessary or a posteriori and contingent propositions. 
Regarding ‘mistaken non-rational status’ (the second kind of modal error), 
to some extent similar points apply but with perhaps more emphasis given to 
the problematic issues arising from the impossibility of correction in cases of 
absolutely unknowable propositions. The point being, if p is unknown but 
ultimately justifiable, then of course, p is justifiable on an a priori or a posteriori 
basis and (¬)p is (in)conceivable (as appropriate), but it is an open question as 
to whether we will ever prove or correctly conceive of the relevant 
propositions. That said, if p is essentially unknowable then, as I argue above, p 
is not at all justifiable on an a priori or a posteriori basis, and p is neither 
conceivable nor inconceivable. In such a situation of course, there is no chance 
whatsoever of modal correction; no chance of establishing the rational and 
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metaphysical-modal status of the relevant p—even if we can correct the 
fallacious reasoning from ‘apriority’, ‘conceivability’ (and so on) to necessity, 
possibility (and so on). The rational status of p here is as unknowable as the 
proof, so questions that involve propositions such as (GC) (qua unknowable p) 
are themselves going to be strictly undecidable or open. 
In the final analysis then, my position on modal error, is that current, 
standard (and I include two-dimensional) understandings of rational notions, 
such as apriority and conceivability are very much cashed out in terms of 
epistemic modality (e.g. ‘apriority’ is epistemic necessity-for-all-I-know; 
‘conceivability’ is something like ‘imaginability’—viz qualitatively, or 
epistemically identical situations). So where something is deemed epistemically 
necessary/possible and so ‘a priori’/‘conceivable’, this is only in the weakest, 
epistemic sense.390 This kind of ‘apriority’ and ‘conceivability’ (‘weak apriority’ 
or ‘weak conceivability’) is an excellent guide to ‘epistemic modality’; but not to 
any genuine kind of genuine apriority or conceivability qua rational necessity 
and possibility; and, certainly not therefore to any real, metaphysical modality. 
The present account is that ‘strong’ conceivability should be understood in 
terms of a priori or rational possibility, with apriority itself then being 
understood in terms of rational necessity; rational modality then being a much 
more ‘objective’ modality, grounded, ultimately in the metaphysical itself. With 
this understanding in place, p is a priori/conceivable only if p is metaphysically 
necessary/possible. On this understanding then, the relevant kind of apriority 
entails real, metaphysical necessity and genuine conceivability is a very good 
guide to real, metaphysical possibility. 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
390 I take Yablo’s (1993, p. 29) account (of the conceivability of p in terms of s’s ability to 
imagine a world s takes to verify p) to be a similarly and quite deeply, epistemic account. 
Clearly, Chalmers’s (2002) account of conceivability and possibility is both deeply epistemic 
and two-dimensional. 
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